I Built the IRGC: Inside Iran’s ‘Monster’ Machine

This week on The Threat, Jay and Hagar sit down with Mohsen Sazegara, an Iranian dissident who, in his earlier life, helped create Iran’s most lethal military force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as a top aid to the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Sazegara described to us how the IRGC grew into a multi-headed “monster”; how Tehran oversees its terror cells in the West, and what he sees as the most effective way for the U.S. to help promote regime change in Tehran. Have a listen.

Transcript

SPEAKER_03 0:00

I'm Jay Solomon. And I'm Hagar Shimali. And welcome to the Threat Podcast. Every week we'll analyze and discuss the most pressing, yet not always so visible, threats to global security and the movements and ideologies that fuel extremism and terrorism.

SPEAKER_04 0:18

We'll take listeners to the front lines of these battles, both at home and abroad, and we'll talk with the key players in law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, and academia who are working to counter these threats.

SPEAKER_03 0:33

Welcome to the Threat Podcast. I'm Jay Solomon.

SPEAKER_04 0:36

And I'm Hagar Shamali.

SPEAKER_03 0:39

Today we're going to discuss the threats posed by the Iranian regime with someone who knows the regime better than anyone. Mosan Sa Zagara is a prominent Iranian journalist, dissident, and political analyst, and his story did not begin where you think it would. He was an anti-Shah activist during the 78-79 Islamic Revolution in Iran. And following the revolution, he co-founded the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, the most powerful military force, inside the country. He also served in the Iranian government under Prime Minister Mousavi, including as deputy prime minister. And that was before he became disillusioned with the revolutionary regime and in the late 1980s began publicly opposing many of its positions. Sazigar was imprisoned several times in Iran before leaving, and today from exile is a leading voice calling for political change inside inside Iran and the abolishment of the very system he helped create. Mosin, we are so honored for you to share your insights and particularly at such a critical time. Thank you for having me.

SPEAKER_04 1:50

Okay, Mosin. Well, again, so excited to meet you. Uh, it's really truly an honor, and the insight you're going to give is really unparalleled to anybody who could give us what you've experienced. So I figured let's set the scene a little bit. If you could tell us a little bit about your role in the early days of the Islamic Republic and why you ultimately came to the United States.

SPEAKER_01 3:48

And uh after uh his death, I uh left political position and I went to industries of Iran. I became head of the uh Idro, Industrial Development and Renovation Organization. I was in that position for about five years. Uh uh, and during that period, I found out that something went wrong with this revolution gradually. And this is not what we wanted to establish. So after the war was finished in 1988, Khomeini passed away, and uh I said to myself that okay, enough is enough. Uh uh, I don't work with this regime anymore because I found out during those uh uh reading and studying that uh the problem of this regime is uh essential, it's not accidental, it's in the theory of this regime. So such a theory uh doesn't matter who will be at the top or uh who will be in what position. I didn't accept any position after 1988. During these years, gradually, uh especially after reform movement, that I was one of uh the activists and maybe one of the architects of uh uh reform movement with the others. Uh we were a group of uh about 20 people. We tried to reform the move uh the regime, but we didn't succeed. And it showed us that this regime is not reformable, and the problem is in the constitution of the regime. So uh I tried to start a campaign of uh referendum on the whole constitution for this reason in 19 uh uh 2001 uh uh I became uh a presidential candidate. I knew that the uh Council of Guardian, who is uh in charge of uh ratifying all the candidates of every election in Iran will refuse me by the order of the leader, Khomenei. For two years uh I had several uh courses for students because they didn't let me to teach in universities. And uh uh by imitation of the students. In 2003, when they arrested me for uh referendum campaign, they arrested 800 students with me. I I had two long hunger strikes while I was in prison. Uh I was only uh uh 85 pounds when I was released from the jail. After that, I came to England, uh to London for my eye surgery. It took about a year. I had two surgeries on my right eye. And then for my heart surgery, I came to the US by invitation of Washington Institute for Nearist Policy. So after Washington Institute, I went to Yale University as a visiting fellow for one year, then I went to Harvard University for another year with the help of scholars at risk, both universities, uh, for another year. And then I joined President Bush Library for three years and a half as a visiting fellow and helping uh collection, uh Democracy Collection, helping more than 60 freedom fighters all around from all around the world, including Dalai Lama, Vaslav Van Wild, uh John Son, and the others. And uh then I uh resided in Washington and uh uh started uh my own nonprofit organization, Research Institute and Contemporary Iran. Uh at the same time I was active from outside in Green Movement 2009 in uh Woman Life uh Freedom uh movement two years ago. So far.

SPEAKER_03 8:14

Can you tell us from where did the IRGC go wrong? Like you kind of you said you were you set it up and you weren't there very long, but you you have a great perspective. From today we see it as this kind of overarching power that kind of controls the whole system, but how did that come to be? How did the IRGC become from this small people's army you described to such a pervasive force?

SPEAKER_01 8:41

You know, IRGC uh in in the last 47 years gradually was from a people army come and the first ideas converted to a monster, I can't say. Sometimes I say it's like a dragon with seven heads, and every uh uh name of all of them is IRGC, but uh uh they are different uh IRGCs, they are different from each other. And uh especially during Khomenei, uh he had uh these heads directly were connected to the house of the leader that is the headquarter of uh the country, and uh he controlled every part directly. Sometimes he has appointed a person three levels down the uh commander uh and uh dismissed somebody. Uh and these different parts, uh uh better to say uh deviations from the first mission of IRGC uh happened in different years. The first deviation started during the war between Iran and Iraq when Mohsen Erezoi became commander, and this guy, Moshabazul Ghad, who is now uh secretary of uh high National Security Council of the country, was uh his vice commander. They started to expand IRGC and uh uh create ranks in IRGC because IRGC was supposed to have no ranks. A people army, uh something belonged to the people, by the people, for the people, uh, from the people, but they started to uh when the war was finished, uh it was a big organization and very similar to classic military of Iran, Artesh, they had uh uh ground force, air force, navy, votes force for out of Iran operations and the siege force, the militia, five forces, and they uh give themselves the the ranks of colonel, general, the the lieutenant, and uh whatever. The second aviation started after war when uh by the permission of Autolokhomene, they started to come to the economy of the country. They started uh they brought the facilities, equipments, uh uh engineering equipment that they had during the war to the projects of the country. Uh apparently it seemed good to uh be helpful in the peace uh era, but uh gradually they uh manipulated many of the big projects of the country, and they started to uh uh own and capture many of the factories of the country. Uh and they didn't stop there during the reform movement because that Khomenei, the leader, had no power base amongst the uh reformists and the intellectuals of the society and even amongst the clergy of Iran, uh he brought IOGC to the scene of politics and used their organization to architect many of the revolution, many of the elections in Iran. And the other deviation uh started when uh after uh intervention in economy and the politics of Iran, uh they uh uh uh started to uh by growth's force that was a terrorist organization outside Iran, uh they started to establish, reproduce the model of IRGC in the countries of in the region, in Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon, in Yemen. And uh uh those proxy groups uh that better to say those terrorist groups became a part of the activities of IRGC that was quite different from the other parts. The other uh uh head of this dragon is intelligence of IRGC uh that became a cage, uh private KGB for uh Khamenei and his son Muchaba uh uh directly working uh with him and his headquarters uh because Ministry of Intelligence was a member of the cabinet and was appointed by uh Khatami, the reformist president, and Khamenei was not satisfied with that and was not in his hand as he liked, and he wished. So he established uh IRGC intelligence that the name is IRGC, but actually it's the uh uh direct uh uh intelligence organized, sector organized police of Khamenei and uh uh his son and uh his office. It's twice bigger than uh Minister of Intelligence. Uh gradually, some parts of after sanctions, especially after sanctions, uh some parts of IRGC started to intervene in the smuggling of sanctioned goods like oil, like oil productions or petrochemical goods. And uh for these types of mafia acting, money laundering, gradually they started to get involved, a part of that uh uh in uh narcotics uh and uh uh smuggling of the drugs, not in the region, uh production and distribution, with especially with the help of Hezbollah in Lebanon, but uh they uh created a network from Kabul to Caracas in Venezuela, especially that uh synthetic uh narco uh uh captagon, uh which is famous as jihadist pills, uh are produced uh uh with Hezbollah, a part of that in Syria that now is over, and in Iran, and then they send it to uh uh especially European countries. Such an organization uh is uh right now the backbone of uh keeping the dictator of Iran in power. These uh I call them mafia types, gangs, this better to say teleptocracy of Iran is now the best definition for the structure of this regime. Half of the GDP of the country uh and IRGC is one of them. Uh this is something that uh uh uh we should notice that this is not IRGC that is running the country, this is House of the Leader that is running the country, and IRGC is a part of that. But they have mutual uh relationships. The the most important uh organization that enforces the dictatorship of the uh leader in Iran is IRGC, yes, but uh whole power goes over there, especially the brain of the system uh of dictatorship in Iran is at Ministry of Intelligence and IRGC intelligence. That again, both of them, besides two 14 other intelligence organizations of Iran, uh, are uh controlled and led by a special office in the house of the leader uh uh that uh uh use that. Or judiciary power is another tool at the hands of the leader and his house to control and arrest uh anybody even inside the regime that may you know oppose that. Uh this is the structure of Iran now. This is very difficult to control all these mafia-type gangs uh uh and networks that in corrupt in corruption they have uh uh you know they are rooted and different parts everywhere. Uh in a you know very general uh uh looking at the scene of the politics in Iran, from the first days of this uh Islamic Republic so far, we have had two big factions. One faction you can call them uh pragmatists, or uh the people uh who believe in reason and they are more rational, by the way. And the other part is uh you can call them idealists or uh ideologists, or uh the people fundamentalists that they believe in some uh uh slogans, I I have to say. Uh these two uh in every crisis, from hostage taking in US Embassy, in war between Iran and Iraq, and different uh scenes after that, we have seen these two parts of the regime. I'm looking at the regime from another point of view, and competition between these two sides, although mostly the idealists had upper hand, but uh uh this competition inside the regime, uh, while Farmen was alive, uh publicly mostly he was with the idealists, revolutionary idealists and uh revolutionary uh slogans. But now that his accent, these two parts uh are competing each other. And I can say that uh these two types of looking at the uh politics of Iran, economy of Iran, and running the country is not only in House of the Leader or in the government uh or foreign policy, it's in IRGC as well. In IRGC, we have we can see these two parts as well. But uh at the same time, we have some other factions in IRGC, like the ex-commander of IRGC, as is Jaffari, uh who was an engineer uh graduating from the University of Tehran. Uh, I can call him somehow pragmatist. Or this guy, Galiboff. Ghaliboff, Bogar Ghaliboff uh is a corrupted general, definitely. He's I call him one of the Al-Capons of Iran because at the head of any of these, you know, uh corrupted gangs, we have an Alkapon at the top that runs the network and get the benefits. Especially while Aliboff was the mayor of Tehran, he had lots of corruption over there and many cases uh that uh none of them was uh continued in judicial power, although there were lots of complaints against him. Uh but somehow he's pragmatist uh because he knows how to you know uh keep the power and understands that uh can't uh uh say that, okay, we will go destroy the US or revenge. Now the idealists in Iran say that we should continue the war and keep Hormuz straight close until we get the revenge of the leader from Trump and Netanyahu. And nobody uh not none of them answered that. How how how you wanna do that? Uh how you can get you you can you think that you can do that? They say that they keep that uh Hormuz straight close until they surround. To us. This is the competition in Iran. This is why you can't hear one voice from that regime. It's difficult. I don't know that now between Khadibaf as a corrupted brutal general at the top of Iran delegation, but pragmatist somehow. And for instance, Said Jalili, one of the idealists who is a member of High National Security Council of Iran, one of the representatives, three representatives of the leader in that council that is defending the continuation of the war. And these days they have accused each other inside Iran. And I don't know if they can conquer these hardliners or not. But the problem is in Washington as well. Wresident Trump non-stop tries to humiliate Iranians. And although it's a ceasefire blockade, that is an act of war, he has announced so uh uh the hardliners to say that see uh they don't uh uh ceasefire is not uh uh a true one. I wanted to explain that uh what's going on now and why this is difficult to uh bring out a decision from the Iranian side.

SPEAKER_04 23:43

We really try to focus on the threat posed in general. And and so I wanted, you know, you highlighted for sure that this regime is an organized crime syndicate and all the different types of nefarious behavior it's involved in. You mentioned drug smuggling, and obviously we know about the repression inside the country. Can you talk a little bit about sleeper cells? Um Do you think the Islamic Republic has sleeper cells in the United States, for example, or elsewhere, and will they use them? We know that Iranian dissidents, scholars, and activists have been targeted abroad, uh including on U.S. soil. So how active is that behavior and how key is that effort to the IRGC's control?

SPEAKER_01 24:24

These types of uh uh operations are true. Goldsforce and IRGC intelligence, these two organizations, especially Goldsforce, has uh has been uh in charge of uh development of such cells all around the world. These types of terrorist cells are mixed with uh smugglers as well, the international cartels. They are two most dangerous people in the world. I mean terrorists and uh drug cartels, uh, but they uh can cooperate each other because both uh uh types of activities they have. They need uh money laundering, they need uh fake passports, they need uh uh shooters, killers, murderers, and uh sometimes they cooperate. And what Oldsforce has done, uh especially uh with uh uh terrorist groups in the region, they uh somehow combined these two types of people and cooperating with both types of people all around the world. Uh, and this is why uh uh it's very important uh to be careful uh uh with uh at the same time that the uh that you know the best solution is changing this regime by the hands of the people. War doesn't work, uh especially a war like this, that uh from the air bombing a country, just destroying the capacities and killing the people. Uh but uh empowering the people of Iran is the best solution at the end of the road. It may take time, but by civil resistance, if this regime is changed to a normal regime, and the uh the power of the people of Iran uh push uh the uh the regime to be changed and changing uh by a referendum, by ballot boxes, gradually, then I think that these cells uh can be uh uh uh cured and destroyed all around the world. If the headquarters in uh Iran will be uh changed and will be cancelled.

SPEAKER_03 27:07

There have been a string of attacks or plots in Europe by something called Harakat al-Shab al-Yameen al-Islamiah, the Islamic movement of the companions of the right. I think it's the the it's called it goes by the Hayi, H A Y E. I mean, they've targeted synagogues, other targets in the last few weeks. Do you think these are being orchestrated straight from Tehran, or these are kind of just more loose, these are groups that are ideologically aligned with the regime and are doing this kind of at their own will?

SPEAKER_01 27:43

I I think that many of them uh uh uh uh were actually uh created somehow by support of regime of Iran and it its proxy groups, but uh definitely somehow they are decentralized. They have some support, but uh they have been somehow brainwashed and ideologically supported. So uh like the cells of Al-Qaeda, for instance, or ISIS, that uh they were not centralized, they were uh uh you know uh along walls sometimes. Uh there are different names, by the way, from uh not only in Europe but in Africa as well, Eastern Africa or Western Africa, uh in uh uh the other countries at the west of Africa and to Latin America. For instance, the population of Shi Ilognanese in Brazil is about three million people. The preachers who have been graduated from Mustafa al-Aulaniye University, International Al-Mustafa uh University in Rome, that they give a scholarship to uh clergy from Latin America with their family. Uh and when they are trained, help them to go back to their countries in Latin America and start a religious center, but they are actually starting uh uh a nest of uh you know, training terrorists, or uh mindly at least terrorists. So this is how they they work. I mean, uh not necessarily centralized, but uh uh orchestrated as the word that you use, and the money is important. Uh Nader Oskuyi, who was a scholar in uh Washington Institute, uh, has uh written uh a very good book. Its name is Temperature Rises Up, if I'm not wrong. He explains how the votesports uh operate outside Iran and these cells, how many of them are self-sufficient because of the money sources uh uh wrapped in uh smuggling and uh wrapped in other, for instance, in Iraq, they are involved in many uh uh projects of Iraq, like IRGC in Iran. And even if Iran regime is changed, they may be alive, they may continue, but I'm sure that gradually they will fade if the you know their headquarters will be destroyed or changed in Iran.

SPEAKER_04 30:51

Mosin, I want to take it back to the war, which you had referenced before, and now you've kind of made a reference to if if if if the central command crumbles, as you will. But I'm curious to know how you viewed Iran's response to the war, its war planning. Is there anything that surprised you as they responded to this war?

SPEAKER_01 31:12

No, you know, uh before this war, I heard uh from my sources that after 12 Days War, uh they expected to be under attack uh while they are negotiating. Uh so they started to make preparations for such a war. Uh so on the country to the 12 days war, uh this time they were ready. Uh, and uh amongst their preparations, uh, for instance, uh, this strategy that if they were under attack by the US uh or Israel again, uh this time they attack two Persian Gulf uh uh states, or uh to close Hormos Australia, or evacuate all the garrisons uh that keep the uh uh staff alive, the people alive, not only 180,000 uh members of IRGC, but uh Artesh, 300,000 members of Artesh Aswell because Israel attacked to garrisons of Artesh, classic military of Iran As well. Or they distributed many of uh the ammunition and uh uh uh stockpiles of uh missiles drones all around the country, uh uh or uh uh production of many of the parts of the missiles and drones, not only in military factories of Iran that were destroyed by Israelis in the first week of war, but in many of the private uh and uh small uh uh uh industrial capacity of Iran. Uh so uh it's not working that you know uh Israel or the US destroyed 35,000 uh the uh factories of Iran that are all around the country. They gave uh guns and weapons to more than 700,000 Basie members and told them that take the guns to home and you have the permission to shoot it, to kill the people if they wanted to come to protest during the war. So this is the reason that uh because they believed that this war is about uh the overthrowing the regime, not only the war. And this is the plan. Uh and so uh they wanted to control the people as well during the war. When war started, all the armed forces of Iran, Artesh, Police, IRGC, and the others are under command of a central command. His name is Khatam Alambiyos, sent come uh of Iran, uh uh that uh under the command of that center they fight. And they had already their strategy. When the war is going on, the uh all the factions of the regime are united naturally. But when it's there is no war, even during the ceasefire, for instance, for negotiation uh peace talks, the cracks started to show themselves. You see that they can't have agreement. Uh different factions start to fight each other. And I believe that uh if this war is finished, then in two, three months you will see that there will be lots of clash inside the regime. And maybe sometimes it will be bloody to some parts, you know, can get the power or imprison uh some other parts if they can.

SPEAKER_03 35:08

From your perspective, how do you uh see this war ending? But how do you think uh the West, the US should play it from the perspective of winning the peace? Actually, the maybe the regime survives the war, but it doesn't survive the peace. What do you think the steps that the US and its allies should be taking in the peacetime to try to end this regime? Because it looks like it will survive the actual fighting, but you you think these cracks are gonna reappear once the guns go silent.

SPEAKER_01 35:43

I'm writing an article. In that article, we have a suggestion for uh permanent peace in in the region. Uh that's a type of marshall plan for the Middle East. Uh and I believe that uh not only in Iran we have the competition between radicals and moderates or pragmatists and uh the hardliners, uh, but in the whole region we have these two two types of people. Uh and the only solution is that uh uh a type of marshall plan for the whole Middle East uh that uh bring uh interdependency of the countries to each other Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Persian and Gulf of States, Pakistan, Israel. Uh, because I I believe that Israel's strategy is not right. They are uh uh they they want to solve everything by force. They forget that they have uh uh lived amongst 400 million Muslims in that region. They can't uh you know uh uh use force for everything in that region, besides about five million Palestinians, that anyway they should live with each other in that country. Marshall Plan in Europe after two uh World War II showed that uh economic dependency, interdependency between the countries is the best solution. In Iran, uh, I think that if uh we empower the hands of the uh moderate people, pragmatist people gradually, uh especially economy will dictate that, then there will be enough room for freedom fighters and democracy uh uh supporters like me to step by step by empowering the people uh uh and by bringing the people power to the scene, changing this regime toward a secular democracy that is our idea. Based on the real uh facts inside the Iranian society is the best way. And uh and uh this war damages, by the way, any democracy struggle in Iraq, and empower the hands of those uh hardliners to suppress the people to have upper hand. Uh, but if you have peace, if you have a type of martial plan, you know, like what General MacArthur did in Japan, he didn't eliminate the uh militized part of the regime of Japan, but he actually empowered the hands of the pragmatists and moderates in Japan by uh uh rewriting the constitution and plans, and gradually people uh were uh you know uh people chose and the supporters of those hardliners in the regime of Japan joined the moderates, and one of the best democracies in uh Eastern Asia was created in Japan after World War II. Uh and I think that if you are thinking about a peaceful Middle East, uh the force and the war is not the solution. Uh not only from the US and not only from the Israel but from any other country. I know that there are many obstacles and difficulties, but it's doable. Uh, we have a good middle class, modernized middle class in any of the countries of that region. Uh and we can we can go for that.

SPEAKER_03 40:00

Do you think the US could play sort of the leading role in kind of ushering this Marshall Plan, or do you worry they could do something?

SPEAKER_01 40:08

No, no, exactly. This is what I expect from the US. President Trump is a businessman, so he understands the power of business. Uh, and I think that the uh leadership of the US for such a plan uh make it more serious. The influence of the US in some countries of the region uh help is helpful. And the management of the US. Uh uh, you we have very good management companies that in the US that government can hire them, plan that international banks and uh uh you know loans for such a plan, the fund of rebuilding the Middle East, and uh all of them should be uh uh led by the United States. It's doable. And the US can do that and see the miracle uh of a new Marshall Plan for the Middle East. And if the US doesn't go for that, I think that this war maybe just uh uh ended, but make sure that it will be uh the base for another war. And uh uh and the uh region countries, especially southern Persian Gulf states, they saw that the US can't keep them safe and secure uh when when the war starts. Now Iran has learned, Iran regime has learned how to attack to them, how to uh uh close uh the horror straight. Uh so naturally they may uh try to get closer to China and Russia because they know that they have uh better uh influence inside Iran and inside this regime. Uh and a type of uh uh uh uh influence of China, especially, uh, we will see in that region. This is why I think that uh the US should lead such a uh movement, such a such an action and plan in the region to lead it toward the US type of uh rebuilding and helping and enhancing democracy instead of Chinese type of influence that we know what they will do. But uh this is another thing that the uh a strategy of the US should be uh very careful about that.

SPEAKER_04 42:42

And do you think that that's possible that's achievable? Like you think that this regime would respect.

SPEAKER_01 42:47

Exactly, yeah.

SPEAKER_04 42:49

Because I've I've I've been more on the other end, I tend to be a bit more of a hawk on this and have argued that no matter who they've decapitated at the top, that you know it's still um it's still hardliners that have very you know ideological fanatic views, and that they haven't tended to be um incentivized really by joining the international financial system, for example. But you think that right now at least yeah, exactly.

SPEAKER_01 43:20

Everybody who is in in the cabinet, ex-members and present members uh in government of the HBR, uh uh when they come to the real scene uh and the facts of running a country, they learn very fast that oh, it's not doable with uh uh those slogans. This is why, for instance, uh uh very hardliner uh idealist uh president like Ahmadinejad, uh who came to power with the help of these guys like Zor Khadra and The others, after two, three years, even he learned that wow, running a country needs good relationship with the world, industries of Iran. That it's ridiculous that we are fighting a pillar of the foreign policy of Iran during the last 47 years have been two uh strategies. First, uh uh uh to be an enemy of the United States, competing with the United States against the US, second, elimination of Israel. Both of them are useless. Why should we be against the US? We can have the help of the US to rebuild that country. This is what I remember that in the government of Bazargan, I was a member of uh his political party. Uh uh, we were against hostage taking on those days. That this is not the way. We should get the help of the US. We have brought down, toppled down the uh regime of Shah, who was supported by the US in that coup. Okay, now we succeeded. Now we need the help of the US to rebuild our country. And we are in the era of uh uh the internet, social networks. The young generation of Iran uh is when you talk to them, are very similar to the young generation in the US or uh in Japan or in Europe. Now it's the era of galobatization, by the way. And this is something that many people understand in Iran. Many technocrats understand it. We have uh uh I can say that maybe the best uh uh economists, especially in Iran, by such a plan, instead of fighting with that country, empower the hands of the moderates and technocrats of Iran and gradually make sure inside the government, the cabinet, and the uh in management of the huge uh industries of Iran uh uh and many other parts. In such a country, make sure that empowering the hands of this part of the society will end to vast political changes.

SPEAKER_03 46:27

Well, let's hope. Um, thank you so much. This has been fascinating. Hagar, any final words?

SPEAKER_00 46:34

No, no, thank you for having me. Uh and sorry if I talk too much, but No, it's fascinating.

SPEAKER_04 46:41

It yeah, it was really amazing to hear your insight and your stories.

SPEAKER_00 46:46

Thank you for that.