Inside Hezbollah: A Voice They Tried to Silence

In this episode, we discuss with expert and journalist Hanin Ghaddar the threats posed by Hezbollah - a terrorist group, Iranian proxy, and organized crime syndicate based in Lebanon.

Hanin Ghaddar is the Friedmann Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Her work primarily addresses Shia politics throughout the Levant . and she works closely on Hezbollah. She is the author of the book, "Hezbollahland - Mapping Dahiya and Lebanon's Shia Community," which explores the intricacies of Lebanon's Shia community. And before arriving at the Washington Institute, Hanin had a long history as a journalist based in Beirut.

What Hanin’s bio does not reveal, however, is that she herself is a Shia Lebanese woman from the South of Lebanon. And because of her work to expose Hezbollah’s nefarious behavior and criminal activity, Lebanon’s military court, which is influenced and controlled by Hezbollah, sentenced her in absentia, but was then forced to drop the sentence due to U.S. pressure. So, her case is now sitting somewhere in a civil court. And so, she has a unique and intimate understanding of this terror organization and the threats it poses - both within Lebanon and globally.

Read her book for free here: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyFocus172Ghaddar_1.pdf

Read her testimony on Hezbollah here: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/targeting-hezbollahs-broader-ecosystem-power

Transcript

SPEAKER_01 0:00

I'm Jay Solomon. And I'm Hagar Shimali. And welcome to the Threat Podcast. Every week we'll analyze and discuss the most pressing, yet not always so visible, threats to global security and the movements and ideologies that fuel extremism and terrorism.

SPEAKER_00 0:18

We'll take listeners to the front lines of these battles, both at home and abroad, and we'll talk with the key players in law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, and academia who are working to counter these threats. Welcome to the Threat Podcast. I'm Hagar Chamali.

SPEAKER_01 0:37

And I'm Jay Solomon.

SPEAKER_00 0:39

Today we're going to discuss the threats posed by Hezbollah, which is a terrorist group and Iranian proxy based in Lebanon. And I am personally so excited to welcome a good friend of both Jay's and mine, Hainin Ghadar. Haineen Ghadar is the Friedman Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Nearest Policy. Her work primarily addresses Ashia politics throughout the Levant, and she works closely on Hezbollah. She is the author of the book Hezbollah Land, Mapping Dahya and Lebanon's Shia Community, which explores the intricacies of Lebanon's Shia community. And before arriving at the Washington Institute, Haneen had a long history as a journalist based in Beirut. What Haneen's bio does not reveal, however, is that she herself is a Shia Lebanese woman from the south of Lebanon. And because of her work to expose Hezbollah's nefarious behavior and criminal activity, Lebanon's military court, which is influenced and controlled by Hezbollah, sentenced her in absentia. But they were then forced to drop the sentence due to US pressure. So her case is now sitting somewhere in a civil court. And so she has a unique and intimate understanding of this terror organization and the threats it poses, both within Lebanon and globally. Before we dive in, why don't you give us a little bit of background and tell us a bit about how you fell into this work? You yourself are a Shia Lebanese woman who grew up in the South. How did your views of Hezbollah change over the course of your time? And what caused those changes, if any? Tell us a little bit about your background.

SPEAKER_02 2:13

Thank you, Hagar. It's so good to be here among friends. Jay, so good to see you both. And thank you very much for having me. And thanks for the great introduction. I would have done it myself. What I do actually, that's exactly why I don't consider this just like a job. It's not like a nanofight job for me. I carry it through my evenings and weekends because it's also a passion for me. And my understanding of Hezbollah and Lebanon is both professional and personal, which usually helped me also with accessing the community, accessing Lebanon, but also understanding the dynamics that usually people do not. So this I was born in south of Lebanon, in a Shia town called Razi, and I have uh studied in Saida uh between uh the Imjalta School, and then I went to Khariri High School and ended up in Beirut at the American University of Beirut. What got me here is actually I've always been interesting and interested in writing. Even as a kid, like my favorite subject was literature was literature. So for me it was interesting, but I was more interested in research and literature and writing, etc. So when I went to college, I thought I was one, I was gonna do English literature because this is what I wanted, but then college changed me and made me realize that I want to do actually not literature per se, but actual research and politics. Uh, and then I went into journalism. And journalism uh uh also I moved from all sorts of journalism, started with uh-Safir, which was like a pro-Hezbollah. I couldn't last, I moved on to you know, working in Nahar, uh Hayat for a little bit, and then now Lebanon, which was like my home for 10 years before I came to the US. Um and honestly, Hezbollah, the other question, Hezbollah, I never liked them. I was uh in 82 when they really started to surface. Uh, I was eight years old. It was scary for a little girl to see this darkness. Uh the south of Lebanon was full of color, was full of uh uh dancing and weddings, and people really like even you know, older women who uh wore the hijab, they wore it in a different way, half the head, uh colorful stuff, you know, skirts not to the ground. The whole culture, the Iranian culture that came with Hazullah actually scared me. And it didn't really land well in my sahdi as a young girl who was exposed to my mom's family, to all sorts of uh books and literature and poetry and uh music and something felt wrong from the very, very beginning. I never liked them. A lot of people thought that they were the resistance, they were didn't like them ideologically, they didn't believe in their ideology, but they also uh the whole resistance narrative uh uh worked for many people, especially those who believed in the leftist resistance, the the jabhal wafani, the tahit, you know, zebhal neni, uh so the mukawami. So this this basically the Lebanese leftist resistance all believed in Hezbollah because oh, look at them, they're so capable, they're so efficient, we have to, you know, like let them do the job. And they did actually, anyway, make people believe that they are liberating the land, and to a certain extent, they might have, uh, until we realize that it's not about liberating the land. But that gave a lot of people, you know, like some kind of um uh relationship, uh fond feeling towards you know, Hezbollah, and they were like presenting themselves as keen, the only party that is not corrupt, the only party that is actually doing the job, the only party that is giving to the people not taking from them in terms of social services, etc. So many people fell into this trap, even if they actually are not ideologically or uh uh you know ship or even as a kid though, as a kid though, are you pressured into supporting them in high school?

SPEAKER_01 6:23

Like you didn't feel a black sheep.

SPEAKER_02 6:25

No, I don't know. I didn't go to a high school in the town, I went to Saida to uh to a school, to Khariri High School, and I went to uh before to uh uh you know evangelical high school. So Saida, it was a diverse, uh uh, you know, very diverse situation where you really uh see everything in everyone. When Hezbollah arrived, and I was really part of a more diverse community, my even my mom's family, uh they were exposed, they studied in Saida and Beirut, American University, Saint Joseph. Uh it was a diverse uh family in that sense. They weren't, no one, none of them was really like a Hezbollah uh affiliate or member, they weren't really part of this. So I was not pressured. Of course, there's that general pressure, you know, of you have to uh support them, you have to love them, but you don't really have to uh express them, express their ideology, or like they no one came to me and said, here's a veil, you have to wear it. So I was not pressured in that sense. However, when I started expressing my opinion about them later after college, when I started really talking about how I hate them because I started uh going into journalism and I started writing and I started expressing myself, that became a problem, not because my family thought just it was a problem, because Hezbollah started pressuring the family to tell me how problematic it is. Because well, this like young Shia girl is really like going outside this uh cocoon of like everybody loves Hezbollah, and I was like, no, not really. Uh so I never I never liked them. What I saw in them is a lot of darkness, uh literal darkness. They brought a lot of black to my town. Everybody is suddenly like wearing black. Ashwura, the Shia uh commemoration of you know, Kerbala al-Hussein was a very, you know, like mild occasion. People ate sweets, read some stuff, and like really uh uh, you know, it was it was in my it was it it was it's an occasion to you know think and remember. And suddenly it became a 40 days of uh uh the IRGC and the Wila al-Fahi ideology imposed into the people by comparing Hezbollah to Imam al-Hussein. And I was like, what? So the whole thing didn't make sense to me. I never really, and the whole thing of you know wearing the veil and the abeyi and uh women actually uh going back into the background of supporting the men and having to wear the hijab and and and do the women's job uh for Hezbollah, it's very clear, like women does not do men's jobs. So it's like this equality that although I was I lived in the south of Lebanon and although I lived in a town, uh for for me, and this came from from my mom's family actually, that uh no women women women are not supposed to be that. All my aunts went to college, uh, a lot of them got a master's degree. Uh it's a it's an educated family that did not really believe in that kind of uh positioning for women. So from my very, very young age, I was against that.

SPEAKER_01 9:30

Could you take us back to the history of Hezbollah, how it was founded, um the connections to the Iranian regime? I think when it was originally formed, it was kind of a bit more murky, even though there are these stories of you know IRGC commanders in the Becca training. But take us, bring a listener to you know the beginnings of Hezbollah and Iran's role in it.

SPEAKER_02 9:53

So Hezbollah started as small cells in the south and in the Becca, mostly in the south, and it was really uh a creation of three different people. That is the IRGC who came to Lebanon, but they didn't know.

SPEAKER_01 10:12

The Revolutionary Guard Corps.

SPEAKER_02 10:13

The Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and and they didn't know anyone. So their opening, their people, the people who actually opened the the ground for them was uh the Palestinians, Yasr Arafat and the PLO. They are the ones who trained them, who opened the uh uh the board the doors for them, and eventually they they inherited them. And the third is Amal movement. A lot of people from Amal uh formed this uh uh middle thing called Islamic Amal, which became Hezbollah. So it's it's really kind of a monster that was created by three different forces, each came with their own axis and with their own capabilities. And the Iranians, of course, came with a lot of money and ideology. The Palestinians came in with a lot of uh military capabilities in terms of ability to train and make an army ready. And the Islamic Amal, which came from Amal, Musa Fadr Amal, uh became more Islamic and ideological, and it has access, had access to the Shia dynamics. And that's exactly how it worked. Of course, this all melted inside the new uh entity that they called Hezbollah, but it's really a combination of these three elements.

SPEAKER_00 11:35

And you know, and after a while, Hezbollah became a political party, right, in Lebanon. And with elected and appointed political officials, it began providing social services to the to the South, schools, hospitals, uh, it employs individuals and so on. Is that talk to us a little bit about that approach and how integral it is to Hezbollah's growth and how much of a problem is if you're if you're looking at Hezbollah as a threat, how problematic is it that they have this side to them as well?

SPEAKER_02 12:08

Well, they started the social services way before they entered the parliament and the government. They started with um a pillar, and I talked to this and about this in my book, Hezbollah, how this happened, how they really mobilized the community. So I talk about this in details and I explain, you know, like the history of it. But we have to remember that they understood from the very beginning that they cannot really come to the Shia community and say, we are an Iranian arm, you have to follow us. That was not going to work. So they crafted their uh lobbying powers, if you want, the pillars of power within the Shia community in order to cater for different groups to make sure that they can bring in uh people who are who need the services. Because remember, back then it was the middle of the war, uh the Xia were not like had no access to services, the government was actually in the middle of the war. The whole all of Lebanon was really not, they say like the Shia were deprived. I think a lot of Lebanese were deprived back then during the war. I think the peripheries were deprived, and the Xia are part of the peripheries. So, yes, they didn't have access to services, they didn't have access to anything, and the war was was going on. And uh so basically they came to the Shia community with three pillars of power, and they said, We are your government, we are here to give you whatever you want. We are uh we will give you uh schools, services, schools, uh medical services, education, uh uh you know, anything you need, all the essentials that you need and you can have no access to. And there were a lot of poor people in the Shia community. And also, we will give you liberation. Uh, we will give we will make sure that the South is liberated, we will make sure that Israelis will not occupy the South at all. Uh and then they prove to them that they can actually do that, but the money immediately came in. The money for social services immediately came in. And the third pillar is the uh Shia identity, the empowerment of the Shia identity, which was very subtly but very nicely for them, it was a good job actually. They linked the Shia identity, the empowerment of the Shia to the Wilayat al-Faqi. So everything that came with the Shia identity, it was linked immediately in the narrative to Wilayat al-Fahqi. Wilayat al-Fakli, it's it's an ideology that basically uh with the Iranian revolution in 82 when when Iran, uh the new this current you know um uh regime in Iran came in, and Khamina'i, uh before Khamina'i there was Khomeini. Khomeini is the one who started this thing uh with the revolution, Islamic revolution, that lied on the idea on Wilayatul Fahih, which means that he himself, uh the the the the uh what do you call him, the Burshad al Allah, uh the the the the ultimate imam of the Shia. Hey, exactly, uh he is Walid Faqih. So he is the uh the the representative of God on earth for the Shia. So this is something that the Shia have never heard of. This is something that is usually frowned upon by the Shia community. No one represents God on earth, no one has ever represented God on earth. The whole idea is that the Shia wait for the emergence of the Imam al-Mahdi, and he leads basically the Shia to you know to the good days. So the Shia identity started to change into an Iranian um uh narrative, and that's how they turned the Shia community into an RRGC community. But apparently now the Iranians come with a very different idea, the Wilayat al-Fahihih, which is very Iranian. The whole idea behind it is not just about the representative himself, but about creating a strong link and allegiance between the Shia communities in the region, starting with Lebanon, uh, to Iran, because Iran just wanted to own the Shia, and the only way for them to own the Shia is to make them believe in the Iranian ideology of the Shia of Shiaism. And that's how they they they really uh uh worked on this.

SPEAKER_01 16:36

Did people in the South find this weird though?

SPEAKER_02 16:38

You know, you've got at the beginning, yes. At the beginning everybody thought it was weird. Uh people did not really buy it. At the beginning, Hezbollah was not that popular. Their peak really was in 2000 with the liberation of the South, and I do like quote unquote very uh uh uh consciously. Uh uh they they this was their peak, this is where everybody was like for them. But I think also when when um um when they came and they said, you know, we like they didn't say wilayat al-fahi right away, they talked about wilayatul faqi as part of the narrative, but they didn't force it on the people because they realized that the people are not ready for that. They were very subtle. They came with a lot of services, they came with whatever you need, we're here for you. Anything you need, we're here for you. Money, jobs, services. Uh someone needs money, they give them money for without vetting anything. There was like so much money. And they really boat a lot of people by these services, boat allegiances by these services. They came in with the liberation, although there was like some kind of a resistance before them, uh, the national leftist resistance before them, which was, you know, like doing what they can, obviously, but they weren't as efficient. So when they came with their whole uh resistance capabilities and plans, and and uh don't forget that they actually came in with a very clear uh suicide uh bombers, and this really what made them more efficient because the national resistance before them did not really believe in uh intihari, uh they believed in the fidai, which is very different than an intihari. Fida'i is that I fight if and if I die while fighting, it's fine. The intihari that Hezbollah introduced is actually uh like the ISIS kind of uh very you know Islamic type, is that my goal is to die for this. So there's a huge difference, and for the Lebanese that was a little bit too much, but then they realized actually our people, there are people killing themselves to liberate the land, and that made the the Shia feel you know like grateful, you know. They they they saw a lot of people fight before, but they didn't see that kind of dedication that people are actually killing themselves, so that kind of changed the uh uh introduced the whole idea of shaheed, the sacred shaheed, because the shaheed is no longer just someone who dies in battle, it's now sacred because he's giving his life for the cause. And the idea of the sacredness of the shaheed carried a lot of uh ideological weight with it. And this also was the other pillar, and it's all linked to the empowerment of the Shia community, and that's how they gradually started to go into the parliament and then government and bringing in the Shia narrative of we are strong, we are here, and the Shia felt empowered. So it worked. It worked for a very long time, uh, it cost them a lot. The budget was equally divided at one point uh between the military and the services. And then it has it had to shift. When Iran decided to uh for for the Kutzforce of the, which is the regional arm of the IRGC, uh at one point it was led by Qasim Sulaymani, who was killed uh in Iraq uh in 2020. Uh so after that Hezbollah became the Kutzforce. And the first the first really crossroad for their you know uh money shifts, budget shift is when they went to Syria because they no longer became a Lebanese-focused group. They also had a lot of expenditure in Syria and the Yemen was also happening, and the Fatimyyun and the Zaynabyun were coming in. So a lot of money was going to that. And then 2020, Hezbollah became the cuts force, and uh they the expenditure simply changed in addition to you know sanctions on Iran and stretching this budget, etc. So they stopped gradually throughout these phases. It's basically they started to shrink their budget in terms of catering for the Shia community, uh, whereby they started catering for a smaller part of the Shia community, the the the the you know, like the supporters, and then the members, and then the soldiers, and now barely anyone, because you know, like this this pillar is shaking, this like the tripod of pillars of powers is shaking drastically now because they don't have they can't they can't provide services, they can't provide uh uh jobs, they cannot provide reconstruction, they cannot provide compensation, and the Shia empowerment is shattered. Uh the whole idea of Shia empowerment has been shattered among the million displaced in the streets of Lebanon. Uh they don't feel empowered at all. And the whole uh link with the Iranian regime also is in question today because they realize that the Iranians do not care about them. When Hassan Masrullah was killed. Iran did not.

SPEAKER_01 22:01

He was one of the leaders of Hezbollah.

SPEAKER_02 22:03

Hassan Nasalah was the main leader. He was the leader, Hezbollah, to an extent, actually. I wrote a succession paper about him before he was killed, and everything is there, and it, you know, it was translated exactly as is. It's basically he was Hezbollah. He made it, he did that to himself. He linked Hezbollah to himself in a way that it was very difficult for Hezbollah to stay as it is after him. So they they are now for the Shia community, a lot of this has changed. The services have stopped, the construction is not happening, the compensation is not happening. They have to pay now. And they have to pay to an entity that they don't understand anymore, that has started war in Lebanon to protect Iran, not to protect the Shia or Lebanon. And a lot of people never vote into this. They really thought that Iran is helping them. They really thought that Iran is actually their father figure. They thought that Masrallah and Iran is the father figure who is here to actually provide for them, protect them, and all they have to do is, you know, be loyal. That's it. You know, they came to them. Hassan Nasrallah told the Shia that I'm your father figure, I am the one who is going to provide for you, protect you, liberate you, etc. Whatever you need, you come to me. All I need for you is loyalty. And this worked for decades. However, today they realize that their father figure is dead, they're orphans, and those who are taking care of them today, like they're like godfathers, the Iranians, are not actually treating them the same way. They are dragging them again and again and again into a war without any compensation. So now the price is so high, it's not just about loyalty, and they don't have a father, they don't have anyone to protect them anymore or provide for them. So the whole equation that worked for 40 years has been shattered by the two wars that we saw.

SPEAKER_01 24:15

Can you talk about Hezbollah's role in major international terrorism? I think a lot of younger people probably don't remember, but before Al-Qaeda, some of the most spectacular acts of international terrorism were tied to Hezbollah, whether it was the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon in 1983, the bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires in 1993. I mean, these radically shifted what people thought of as international terrorism because, like you said, it involved suicide bombers. But was this a shock to Southern Lebanese that this organization, I mean, maybe they tried to disguise it, but such spectacular acts of violence it really shifted how terrorism was used as a tool for geopolitics?

SPEAKER_02 25:10

Well, this did a number of uh you know ripple effects. Uh it's it's in Lebanon, inside Lebanon, it showed everybody how strong Hezbollah is. For the Shia per se, it worked actually because it showed how Hezbollah can actually uh for some Shia that was too violent, a lot of people did not really buy in it.

SPEAKER_01 25:33

There must have been some revulsion about it.

SPEAKER_02 25:35

Yes, of course. But I'm saying for those who were already both, who were already loyal, uh they felt empowerment. Those who were not really loyal were like, remember back then Hezbollah was not in its peak. A lot of people were not pro-Hezbollah, and people within the Shia were divided. The peak was really in 2000 when everybody was like, oh, Hezbollah is actually serious about it, because they actually went back to their land and they did it. So uh so back then the Shia community was still very, very divided. The uh Amal Hezbollah uh you know uh alliance was uh either not there or it wasn't it wasn't really strong enough, so a lot of Amal people were against it. Um also, you know, the Lebanese, of course, the other Lebanese were like, this is this is beyond our you know understanding. This is this is too much. Uh so yes, uh it but it proved, whether you like it or not, it showed that Hezbollah has the capacity to do this. Not for the Lebanese, for the international community, for everyone in the world. They graduated in their perception uh and and people's perception from a resistance, a local resistance group to an international terror organization. And as this is this is huge, but this is what Hezbollah wanted. They wanted to show everyone that this is that's their power. So Iran basically, the Iranian regime, wanted to use Hezbollah and show the world how powerful they are. That's the message, that's the whole idea. Whether they're designated, whether they are now have a problem with the international community, they never cared about that. They are Iranian, and whatever Iran wanted to show the world, they used Hezbollah. And this is what the Iranians wanted to show the world. Like, finally, we are on the map. That's exactly what happened. And it took a while for people to actually understand that how linked, how organic Hezbollah is within the Iranian regime. But I don't think that's uh that's a big question today.

SPEAKER_00 27:40

Can we, Henin, can we I want to expand on that a little bit because I don't think that this is actually well understood or appreciated by people around the world. We know that there are Hezbollah cells and individuals abroad, including several who've been arrested in the United States in the past and who've tried to enter the United States to the southern border. Um, one critical one that Jay Solomon did a huge investigation on is the would-be assassin of Salman Rushdie. In New York. Yeah. Um we all know the, right? Hadi Matar, who went, who appeared at this festival where Salman was giving a talk and stabbed him. Um Salman Rushdie obviously survived, lost his eye, I believe, though, in the process. Um he was initially described as a lone wolf. That's how everybody, that's how the media described him. And then Jay did an investigation and found that he was actually a Hezbollah operative.

SPEAKER_02 28:37

Yeah, and in fact, investigation, wonderful work.

SPEAKER_00 28:41

Yeah. Um Owen, thankfully, now he's been charged with providing material support for Hezbollah. And so I want to talk about that a little bit for a few reasons. One, how big is that threat? I mean, are there more guys like that here? And do you think to bring it to today, is this something that Iran could activate? Uh, you know, activate Hezbollah overseas, given what's going on in the region?

SPEAKER_02 29:08

That's that's a big question. Yes, absolutely. They have cells everywhere. We all know that. Uh, my colleagues uh have been following that. Uh I know the American authorities know about this. They have they have cells, they have been recruiting people actively, and don't forget also the other guy who actually drove into the synagogue in Michigan the other day. So he's also, you know, has family and Hezbollah. There, there's, you know, even if they act, you know, like uh because individually, they're all part of something. There's like I, when it comes to Hezbollah per se, it's very hard for me to see lone wolves, right? They are all connected one way or another, even if not materially and practically, ideologically, they are like they recruit people even inside the US. There are people who are recruiting Hezbollah on a daily basis. They haven't been really um activated in that sense, except for these different individuals. Uh, and they can activate them, yes, and that really scares me. And remember when the Iranians also went after Masia al-Nijad, they actually sent someone to kidnap her, and she's the Iranian dissident in New Jersey or Brooklyn. She's an Iranian activist, uh uh a woman activist, and uh she's anti, she's very outspoken against the Iranian regime, and they did send someone to kidnap her. And these people were part of a cell inside the US, and they were arrested, others are there, I'm sure. Um, when will they be activated? If they will be activated, it depends on many things. But does Iran have this capacity? Yes, they do have this capacity. And the only way to get rid of uh these people is to make sure that the Iranian regime is no longer there. Because they will use them anytime they want to. And it's not just in America, in Europe, everywhere. Uh, in the Gulf as well, in the UAE, there have been some arrests. Uh so yes, I think to really get rid of them, to really make sure that these cells inside the United States are no longer active and no longer have access to any leadership inside Iran, is for the IRGC to be gun. For the regime basically to be gun. Otherwise, they will always have them and they will never let go of them.

SPEAKER_01 31:31

Do you think Hezbollah has ever really paid a price for these operations? Because I know with like the the attack on Salman Rashdi, it was like it sounded, it felt like they kind of wanted to play down. They they did eventually charge Hadi Matar the was convicted, but they that was kind of kept quiet. They never really said, wow, Hezbollah is operating inside the US. It felt like they wanted to keep it down.

SPEAKER_02 31:54

Yes, uh, I don't know what happened there, but Hezbollah didn't really like Hezbollah's never been really paying a price. Uh like they always manage to navigate these things. They managed to navigate sanctions because they always depended on Iran oil sales. If Iran's oil sales are jeopardized, then Hezbollah will get no money. They managed to navigate these operations because at the end of the day, their operations, their channels of money, their channels of, you know, like there are certain things that harm them, obviously, Venezuela. This is something that will or is hurting Iran.

SPEAKER_01 32:32

I mean they won't be getting revenue from yes, that's a big deal.

SPEAKER_02 32:35

That's a big deal. So it's really about Iran oil sales, their allies, etc. But then eventually they navigate it. So today, if Iran survives this war, and the IRGC survives this wars, this war between the US and Iran, and eventually cuts force that is Hezbollah, survived this war, and they manage to get continue selling their oil, then Hezbollah will continue getting money to rebuild, regenerate, and do more of these operations. The only way for them to pay for all this actually is not for these guys to go to jail, because these guys who actually hold the gun and do the deed are small operatives that really are uh dispensable for Hezbollah. They don't care about them. Even if they go and say, yes, Hezbollah told me to do this, what do they care? Right? They these these people are dispensable. These guys think that they are doing the great job of, you know, like uh the resistance, but at the end of the day, they're very dispensable people for Hezbollah. They've dispense, they've been dispensing these people to the south of Lebanon, to south to fight the Israeli forces uh uh without any protection. So they don't they don't care about these people. They the only way for them to actually pay the price is to go after them directly. Not, you know, like whatever happens anywhere in the world where a Hezbollah apparently is implicated, then Hezbollah itself has to pay the price. Today Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese government, today Hezbollah is part of the uh Lebanese system in terms of security organizations, their allies are thriving. Uh so and no one is doing anything, there was like no policy to pressure Lebanon to stop this. And this is what really hurts Hezbollah: to get Lebanon to remove Hezbollah from the system, to remove Hezbollah's allies from the system. That's what hurts them. Uh otherwise, they don't care.

SPEAKER_00 34:31

I mean, we, you know, we want I want to bring that then to what's happening today. And you already highlighted a little bit about it earlier in your talk when you were talking about what's hurting them now and and the and the fact that they're losing support, popular support among the Shia, right? The that the though they're not getting compensated and so on. Let's expand a little bit about that because I want to see the threat level that you think Hezbollah poses right now, given the latest escalation in Lebanon. Do you think, and I uh, you know, we've talked about it a little bit globally, but so internally in Lebanon, do you think Hezbollah could rebuild itself again? Do you believe it could just turn into a political party without arms? Or is it more likely to turn I know to turn in? I know that's hard for even for me to say, or is it more likely to turn into just a terrorist organization with no official political presence in Lebanon? And externally, so talk about the internal and then externally, what is the risk that Hezbollah plays spoiler in the current Israel-Lebanon peace talks?

SPEAKER_02 35:34

There are two ways of really containing or eliminating Hezbollah in Lebanon. One is for the Iranian regime to go, not change, go, you know. Because what I've seen today is some changes in the in the in the top, you know, uh system, right? Like the IRGC, the the Iwali Fakli, etc. However, you need the IRGC to be gone. That's when Hezbollah is gone. That's one way of doing it. If the IRGC survives, Hezbollah will survive. Another way of doing it, let's say the IRGC survives, the Iranian regime survives. Hezbollah, we still have Hezbollah in Lebanon, very much militarily weakened. The only way to deal with this internally, actually, uh, is to target all of Hezbollah's um power foundations. I wrote about this in my last congressional testimony. I talk about how Hezbollah is actually an ecosystem. It's an ecosystem of military, financial, and political power. So their military power has been degraded in the first war, it will be degraded today, and it will be degraded again and again. However, as long as they have the financial power and the political power that is like their access to the government, their allies in the government, they will always be able to rebuild and regenerate. The only way to do it is to make sure that Hezbollah is one very much degraded, then this arm Hezbollah, completely disarm Hezbollah. But then to make sure that Hezbollah cannot rebuild and regenerate, uh, even if they have zero weapons today, they will still be able to regenerate. To make sure that they don't, you have to target their um uh political and financial systems in order to make sure that they do not have access to smuggle, uh, avoid customs, uh, you know, uh have access to the port or the Tripoli port, and basically to the financial institutions inside Lebanon, uh, which is basically, uh honestly, it's it's it's mostly controlled by Hezbollah because Hezbollah has been debanked in 2019. The only bank that is still working is Al-Khad al-Hassan. And there are a number of cash companies in Lebanon that are helping Hezbollah bring in money, cash to Lebanon without having actual banks in Lebanon that can be monitored and that can be uh coordinated with, then the cash economy that is taking over is going to be uh benefiting Hezbollah. They are the kings of cash. That's their economy. And as long as Lebanon has no banks but cash, that's Hezbollah will thrive. The government doesn't want to disarm Hezbollah, but also doesn't want to target this issue. And they also do not want to target the issue of political positions and appointments within the government. Why do we still have Hezbollah ministers and the cabinet? Why do we still have uh Hezbollah's allies, uh Bri and Co. also in the cabinet and in certain financial positions? That is something that the government does not have any excuse to say we cannot do it. They do not want to disarm, but they can do this. So this is something that they where the US can actually come in with a very clear strategy saying uh disarming Hezbollah is important, this is what's gonna happen, but it's also very important to uh look at all other two foundations and work on them because no one is gonna do anything without that. Um, so this is about you know like how to internally how to make sure that Hezbollah is contained. The second question was about yeah, the peace. Uh Hezbollah will do everything they can in order to uh jeopardize the peace, but we all know that. And uh uh the process.

SPEAKER_01 39:24

Including assassinations?

SPEAKER_02 39:26

They might, they might. They but it's it's becoming very difficult for them now to do anything uh because you know they're in the middle, like the the Israeli drones are following each one of them. So, you know, not because there is accountability in Lebanon, there's still no accountability in Lebanon. I'm not counting on that yet, but because you know, like there are drones above them, so making having you know, organizing these operations, you it requires communications, their communications is also infiltrated, so it's not easy for them to also organize such kind of assassinations that requires one a communication that is not infiltrated by the Israelis, and two, movement that is not monitored by the Israeli drones as well. But they will try their best to hamper it, definitely. They will try to uh organize, you know, like uh stir violence in the streets. Uh, they've tried, they've tried a couple of times actually. Uh Birri is key here. Uh he needs to understand that he cannot be part of it. And if he's not part of it, for Hezbollah, it's also more difficult for them to be at the front and in the streets without Birri. So that's also gonna be a very message that needs to be uh clearly uh conveyed to him that just sit this one out and just wait, wait until this is over. He needs them for elections, he needs them for politics, he needs them for financial purposes, uh, he benefits from their channels, but he also needs to understand simply that the uh risks uh overweigh the benefits. And this is the main, the main, the main strategy that the US has should have with Biri. That risks outside outweigh the benefits, and honestly, uh there are other benefits, and this is what he cares about.

SPEAKER_01 41:12

Where are we two, three, four years with Hezblah? Do you think they survived this both the assault on their main um patron in Tehran and this diplomatic overture that seems to be gaining some traction? Do you think they're able to survive this, or is are we gonna see the end of what's been sort of this, as you described very eloquently, this kind of dark period in Lebanon?

SPEAKER_02 41:38

Well, it depends. Honestly, it can go both ways. I think that if uh there is a uh a policy, Lebanon policy in the US, that really um encompasses not just the arms but also the cash economy and the political appointments and Hezbollah's positions within the government, really target everything and their allies, making sure that Hezbollah not only loses its arms but its access and capability to rebuild. Because that's key. Because even if the Lebanese government itself disarms Hezbollah tomorrow, they still have the capacity and the access to rebuild. That's key. So if there is a policy that really targets the whole ecosystem, it doesn't matter what happens in Iran, they will not be able to access this. But if the focus is only on disarmament and it works, and the Iranian regime kind of survives this, then Hezbollah will be able to rebuild and regenerate because it will still have its political and financial foundations intact, and then we will go back into another vicious circle of rebuilding conflict, rebuilding conflict. This is key to really uh have a sustainable solution for Hezbollah.

unknown 42:59

Right.

SPEAKER_01 42:59

And this includes our illicit businesses, whether it's drugs or absolutely.

SPEAKER_02 43:04

I have it all in my uh uh testimony. Hagar worked very, very hard on this as well. I know that she has publications and some work on that. Uh, some of my colleagues worked on this. Uh it's all it's all on the website. We we have done a lot of work on this and the recommendations are there. Uh it's it's not it's it's it's out there, you know. You all you have to do is just make sure that Lebanon policy integrates all of this, not just the arms.

SPEAKER_00 43:35

Don't get at every every seed that allows it to grow.

SPEAKER_02 43:40

Exactly. Yeah, that's how you maintain and protect peace. Because once you know that Hezbollah is no longer a danger in Lebanon, it will not really uh uh uh rebuild uh uh its weapons to jam to jeopardize peace, then you will be able to actually implement peace in Lebanon because signing peace is one. Thing and implementing it is another story, right? So it's not we're not only doing this to make sure that the war with Israel is no longer uh will not happen. We only want to do this to make sure that peace can be implemented in Lebanon. And then that would be a permanent solution. Otherwise, it would be just like patching up certain uh issues and waiting for the next war.

SPEAKER_00 44:21

Haneen, we're so grateful for your time. Thank you so much for having for joining us.

SPEAKER_02 44:26

I have so much fun.

SPEAKER_00 44:28

I love you guys. I know. We love, you know, talking is our favorite activity over here. Um before you go, can you please let us know, let let the listeners know where can they find you, where can they find your list, your um where the where can they find your writings? And we will make sure to link to your book and testimony as well in the show notes.

SPEAKER_02 44:47

Yes, absolutely. Most of my writings, actually, all of my writings in the past 10 years are on the website of the Washington Institute, uh, Washington Institute.org. So uh you can find it there under Lebanon or under my page. Each scholar has their own page, and my colleagues also do a great job. So you can just like go around and have fun. Uh so yeah, it's it's all it's all there. I'm also on X, uh formerly Twitter, uh where I post uh my articles, but also sometimes quick comments on everything that is happening. If I don't want to wait until I write an article, I'll just like put some bullet points there.

SPEAKER_01 45:28

Thanks so much, and we'll see you soon.