Beijing’s Long Reach: How China Exports Repression Beyond Its Borders

How far is the Chinese Communist Party willing to go to silence critics overseas? In this episode of The Threat Podcast, Jay Solomon and Hagar Chemali speak with pro-democracy activist and Hong Kong Democracy Council Board Chair Anna Kwok about Beijing’s growing campaign of transnational repression. From secret police stations and surveillance networks to intimidation, bounties, and political influence operations, Anna shares her firsthand experience as a target of the Chinese government and explains how authoritarian regimes extend their reach far beyond their borders. The conversation explores the CCP’s global influence apparatus, threats to democratic societies, and what the United States can do to counter foreign repression on American soil.

Transcript

SPEAKER_02 0:00

I'm Jay Solomon. And I'm Hagar Shimali. And welcome to the Threat Podcast. Every week we'll analyze and discuss the most pressing, yet not always so visible, threats to global security and the movements and ideologies that fuel extremism and terrorism.

SPEAKER_01 0:18

We'll take listeners to the front lines of these battles, both at home and abroad, and we'll talk with the key players in law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, and academia who are working to counter these threats. Welcome to the Threat Podcast. I'm Hagar Shamali.

SPEAKER_02 0:37

And I'm Jay Solomon.

SPEAKER_01 0:39

Today we're going to discuss the threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party and its efforts in the United States to interfere in our politics and elections, and also its efforts to export its repression here. This episode comes following some interesting news in this space, and this just skims the top. In May, for example, of this year, the mayor of Arcadia, California, Eileen Wang, she resigned after she pleaded guilty to acting as an illegal foreign agent for China. In late 2024, a staffer of New York City Mayor Eric Adams named Winnie Greco, she faced federal investigations regarding her deep ties to the Chinese government. In 2022, the Department of Justice exposed a secret overseas police station operated by China's Ministry of Public Security just in Manhattan's Chinatown, literally in the Lower East Side. In 2025, the New York Times investigated how the Chinese consulate in Manhattan has mobilized community groups to defeat political candidates who have opposing views to the CCP. In 2021, a three-story sculpture depicting Chinese President Xi Jinping's head in the form of a COVID molecule was burnt to the ground. There is a lot. Like I said, I am just skimming the top. These are some of the most major headlines. Jay, it doesn't look like the CCP is letting up on this kind of behavior anytime soon. And I keep wondering why they feel so emboldened to do this kind of behavior and why it's so central to their foreign policy.

SPEAKER_02 2:13

I mean, you're right. It does feel like our country in many ways is like totally penetrated. You wonder like how our counterintelligence, counter-espionage, you know, forces are working when like all these cases you put, you know, right, right there in a row. And I've been thinking a lot about some of these protests that have been erupting related to everything from Palestine to the Iran war. You know, there's pretty good evidence that it's funded through this network called the Singham Network, which goes back to China, and our government believes it's part of a Chinese intelligence operation as well. So yeah, it does feel like our country is very penetrated and exposed. And you wonder, I mean, I guess you could say these people are getting arrested, so it's not like we're totally blind to it. But I think that's part of the reason the Chinese probably feel so emboldened. They just see a very open space to which to operate operate. And even if some of their operatives are getting taken out, you know, the overall structure of what they're doing continues.

SPEAKER_01 3:17

Well, and it's crazy because we have, you know, they have it's a dictatorship, right? An authoritarian an authoritarian regime that stamps on any kind of freedoms, and yet they abuse our democracy to either advance their own goals, export their repression, something the FBI calls transnational repression, um, and also to ensure that they harass and intimidate people here, Chinese Americans, to make sure that, um, and Hong Kongers, to ensure that their dissent or that their views don't pose a threat to the longevity of the CCP. It's crazy to me because I always keep thinking, like, how can these, and I know that the Chinese regime is not the only one, that the Iranian regime does this, the Russian regime does this, how they feel so emboldened, and yet at the same time, sometimes I feel like we have these vulnerabilities that they exploit because we have freedom of expression, because we have uh social media that operates freely. Um but some of the most concerning, I find, is this harassment and intimidation of people here. Um and I want to talk a little bit more about this. And in nor we're gonna dive more into this, and to do so, we have an incredible guest with us today. Um, so let's let's turn to her. She has firsthand experience dealing with the repressive tactics of the Chinese regime. Anna Kwok is the board chair of the Hong Kong Democracy Council, an organization that seeks to promote the freedom and establishment of a democratic Hong Kong, which therefore provides a voice for those silenced by Beijing. Anna played an active role during Hong Kong's 2019 protests, the seventh anniversary of which is actually today when we're taping on June 9th. She also led an anonymous international campaign, and in 2022, she made the decision to go public, risking her own safety to continue fighting for the freedom and democracy that Hong Kongers everywhere deserve. For her actions, her 70-year-old father was taken hostage by the Hong Kong government to retaliate against her on the basis of a fabricated national security crime. And we're going to talk about those national security laws later in the podcast. On top of that, the Hong Kong government has placed a bounty of one million Hong Kong dollars on her. Yet Anna joins us today, based in the United States, thankfully, continuing the work that Beijing has criminalized. Anna, welcome. Thank you for joining us.

SPEAKER_03 5:38

Thank you for having me.

SPEAKER_01 5:40

Anna, let's start off with this story of the bounty because it's just so shocking and truly emblematic of the Chinese regime's transnational repression. You recently testified about this. You talked about this in your testimony before the Congressional Executive Commission on China. So talk about this one million Hong Kong dollar arrest warrant issued against you. Can you explain it a bit? Is it truly the CCP's hope that someone will turn you in from here? How has this bounty affected your daily life?

SPEAKER_03 6:10

Yeah, for sure. So it all started actually almost three years ago now, in 2023, uh, July. So one morning I was asleep, uh, hoping to get more hours of sleep in actually after a lot of work done. And uh I heard my colleagues knocking on my door, asking me to wake up. And of course, I was nervous, I didn't know what was going on, and then they shouted, You are now wanted by the Hong Kong government uh with a one million Hong Kong dollar bounty on your head. And of course, immediately I went, What the hell did you just say? Like, what do you mean? Because that was the first time they were using something like a bounty. Uh, and quickly I saw a lot of news uh waking up uh about this bounty being issued to eight people who are outside of Hong Kong, who were still doing a lot of pro-democracy uh advocacy at the time. And uh the chief executive of Hong Kong, which is the political leader of the government, uh, then held a press conference saying that if we were caught, it would be life imprisonment for all of us. Uh, and of course, their goals ultimately, I think there are several layers to it. Um, the top layer is that, of course, they wish someone would just kidnap us, send us back to Hong Kong, um, but they know that would be the most uh impossible mission of all of it, because all of us reside in uh mostly democratic countries uh or countries that really fully understood uh this sort of transnational repression and foreign policy, uh foreign influence uh by the Chinese and Hong Kong governments. Um but at the same time, I think they wanted to make sure we know we're being watched. They want us to feel hunted all the time, uh, no matter where we are. Uh and they also want to put this target on our back. They were essentially encouraging uh pro-CCP nationalists or extremists to carry out perhaps lone wolf operations on us uh that would harm us or injure us in ways that cannot be imagined. So basically that's the goal of putting something as ridiculous as a bounty on us.

SPEAKER_02 8:25

In in 2022, Anna, you made the deliberate choice to sort of take off your mask and go public with your um identity. Why did you decide to do that and what what has been the repercussions for you, besides obviously this bounty was part of it, but why did you decide to make yourself public knowing the risks involved?

SPEAKER_03 8:48

Yeah, so uh it was actually sort of a spiritual journey leading to that moment where I decided to go public. Um, so Hager said uh in the very beginning that during the 2019 pro-democracy movement, I was largely anonymous, right? Um so basically I was organizing some online internet campaign behind a screen name called Macaronie because I love eating macaroni, the type of pasta. Um but uh later on, so uh the people that I worked with anonymously actually started getting arrested. Um, somehow information of our network got leaked uh to the government, and uh there were people telling me you better not return to Hong Kong or you would be arrested. Uh and for one year or two, I was just kind of in hiding, uh, not sure whether I should go back, what I should do, you know, that kind of uh grueling existential crisis, really, about oh, what what do I do with my life now? Uh now that I can I don't know whether I can really go back. The only way to find out is to actually try to go back. But with that, it's essentially a huge gamble, right? Because you could be arrested, you don't know what's going to happen. Um, and eventually I realized this sort of fear, this sort of indecision is not a unique experience that is only limited to me. In fact, a lot of other protesters were facing that as well in their own ways. Um, because a lot of people joined uh the 2019 movement, and with the mass persecution that was happening by the government, uh, there's never a way to know whether you would be next. Um, so eventually I decided or I realized this individual experience is actually a collective trauma, a collective processing of what happened in 2019. And I wanted to contribute to allowing our community to process what happened and to realize we actually still have a sort of freedom, even though all our political freedoms are being crushed by the government. We have this innate sort of freedom in our brains where we can still decide what we want to do with the frameworks we're given. Uh, and to me, it's realizing that I still have that decision of whether to move forward or to give up in my hands. The decision is not with the government, it's with me. Um, so that's when I decided, okay, seeing so many people were being so spooked by the government, we're being in this limbo of not knowing where to go next. I wanted to be an example to show people you can always keep moving, you can always keep going, we always have that decision in our hands. And that's why I decided to go public. I wanted to be an example or a source of motivation for other people being stuck in this sort of situation. So I did that. I revealed my identity online, and uh within one hour uh it got a lot of traction because obviously it ref resonated with a lot of people who were in the same situation. And I very thankfully and very gratefully I also received a lot of messages telling me uh my decision has motivated them to move out of their trauma, to keep going in our movement. Um, so I'm really glad I made that choice, even though today, of course, I've faced a lot of repression because of that choice. Um, but still I think it gave my life, it gives my life a purpose, a meaning, a sort of mission that cannot be replaced. And uh I'm really glad that I'm here today, you know, talking to you about the story, because that period of not knowing what to do, not knowing whether to move on, whether to give up or to keep fighting, what's I think the most difficult period of my life. And uh I moved past it.

SPEAKER_01 12:52

Anna, can you talk a little bit? I want to pull, I want to pull on that thread a little bit more on facing this kind of transnational repression. Can you give us a few examples of what does that look like? You know, whether it's toward you or to others with whom you've worked through your organization. Do you have some some examples you can share with us of what transnational repression looks like when a government like this, when the CCP reaches its tentacles across its borders and operates here?

SPEAKER_03 13:22

Yeah, so transnational repression actually comes in many forms and ways. Of course, the bounty we talked about started off as this legal apparatus, right? Uh it also froze my asset, actually, and uh refocused my passport so I could no longer travel internationally to continue with my advocacy work. Um, but at the same time, it evolved into this complex of physical, psychological, social uh warfare against me, really. Uh, one thing you see is that um you receive a lot of threats, uh, and they are mostly physical threats. Um, there were threats, you know, to uh kidnap me, but there were also threats uh to rape me or even assault me here on American soil. And of course, when you receive these threats, you never know what is going to happen, whether they're being serious, uh, when they're going to do it, what they're actually going to do, who was doing it. And then it drowns you in this constant fear and constant anticipation that, oh, perhaps the next moment someone is going to barch inside my door and start it, you know, doing whatever. And I think that kind of builds onto the pressure of transnational repression we face. We are stripped of the sense of security and safety. We're always in the state where we feel we're being watched, we're being hunted. Uh, and that's the psychological warfare they aim to build with uh transnational repression. Uh, and of course, there's also the social element, right? When there are people in our community, other Hong Kongers, uh, see that people like us are being hunted or being repressed and being uh punished even for what we're doing, uh, then they try to step back from their pro-democracy work as well. And uh some would start cutting ties with us because they fear being associated with us. So transnational repression is never about only the individual they're targeting, but it's about dismantling the community and the network that you have tried so hard to build. Uh, and I think that's the most toxic thing of transnational repression. It essentially breaks down trust you have built with people so that you can no longer organize uh a movement or community as effectively as you have done before. Um, but I do want to stress that I think our community has come a long way. Of course, we're still in our infant uh period uh of you know doing this organizing movement uh outside of Hong Kong compared to a lot of other diasporas that have been in exile for decades or even sadly for generations. Um at the same time, I think Hong Kongers are finding ways to combat transnational repression, not only by working with government, but also by devising strategies inside our community to see, you know, how we can be smarter, more effective, and how we can really counter that sort of psychological threats being placed on us.

SPEAKER_02 16:33

Anna, can you give like a structural kind of overview of how this CCP international uh how it works, what you know, what are the institutions inside the CCP, inside the even the Hong Kong government, how how these institutions execute this extraterritorial repression, just to give a kind of a face or a structure to it?

SPEAKER_03 16:59

Basically, um the CCP has something called the United Front Works Department uh that is within the central government agency, um, and it is used to do explicitly uh targeting of diasporas and dissidents overseas. So the United Front Work Department is responsible for everything that has to do with overseas matters, uh, but not on a governmental foreign policy level, but on a more local grassroots uh infiltration infiltration level. Uh so basically uh they decide on the direction they want to take with dissidents and diasporas. And then you have this network of the secret police stations that Hager mentioned in the very beginning, which is deeply upsetting and unsettling. Uh, and at the same time, they also have a bunch of United Front groups that are disguised as normal cultural social groups. So, for example, the Hong Kong associations uh uh that are spread around America, they are being seen as this normal, grassroots, diaspora-led uh uh groups uh that are for promoting the cultural and economic ties with the Hong Kong government. But in reality, they are actually chaired by a bunch of people who have strong and deep ties with the Hong Kong and Chinese government, and they have always been intended uh for connecting with local politicians here in the United States. And this sort of associations start acting as the years and the eyes of the Hong Kong and Chinese government. They collect information of both the United States and the Hong Kong diaspora and Chinese diaspora here in the US, uh, and then they send that information back to the central government, and then the central government sometimes then start dispersing agents, spies, people to actually harass and repress certain activists. Uh, or sometimes they decide to use the judiciary structure to issue a bounty like on me. Uh, so that's kind of the overview, a very, very surface level and high-level overview of what's going on with this sort of transnational repression structure. And what's interesting, one more thing, is that uh for a lot of these structures, they serve for multiple purposes at once, right? So it's not only about transnational repression. They also work on foreign influence, they also work on surveillance, uh, they also work on um influencing elections, local politics here in the United States. Uh, and at the same time, uh Chai the Chinese government essentially functions as a black box because it's not a democracy, it doesn't have transparency or accountability. So their composition also sometimes changes uh depending on who's the leader uh or which person uh see trusts more these days, and it can become rather arbitrary at time at times. So that is the sophistication of the Chinese Communist Party as well, that they never let you know what's really going on underneath the wrap. So you never know what to expect.

SPEAKER_02 20:14

As far as this idea of getting Chinese to basically spy on other Chinese or expatriated Chinese, I did a story a few years ago about Silicon Valley, sort of Chinese espionage in Silicon Valley, and I remember talking to people where they said all the Chinese nationals who were working in Silicon Valley basically when they go back to China, they're basically forced, maybe even upon arrival, to sort of give the give a download on what they're doing or what they're what they're up to. Is that part of this structure that you're talking about? This kind of if you're going back to China, you're sort of by law required to divulge what you're what you're picking up. Even in this case, it seemed like what it was trade secrets from the tech companies that they were working for. But is that a similar dynamic?

SPEAKER_03 21:07

For sure. So um you talked about Silicon Valley, the kind of tech race that uh the Chin Chinese and with global powers around the world. And at the same time, in terms of uh democratic organizing, during the white paper movement a few years ago when uh Chin Chinese people really stood up against government, uh a lot of the efforts actually happened overseas uh outside of China uh by uh organized by uh students who were studying abroad. And what we heard or saw on the news was that a lot of the times when these students go home, go back to China to visit family or go for vacations, the first thing they did was to have a conversation with the secret police because they would uh look at, you know, search after them and To ask them about their involvement in the white paper movement, ask them about people they were in touch with, ask them about content of conversations, or even ask them to identify potential classmates or friends they thought would be involved in this sort of uh political organizing. So that's definitely something China does that even if your activities happened completely outside of the bounds of China, outside the geographical borders of China, still, once you were a Chinese citizen, you would always be governed by the Chinese government no matter where you are, including when you're outside the US. So that's the horrors of what the Chinese and Hong Kong, Tibetan, Uyghur people are facing. We're constantly being watched, our information are constantly being collected, and we're always uh threatened by this sort of surveillance operations.

SPEAKER_01 23:01

Anna, the, you know, we talked a little bit about the secret police stations that uh were in the Lower East Side, as we mentioned. And by the way, these secret police stations, as far as I understand, are all over the world. And some countries have taken action against them and some haven't. The U.S. was the first, I believe. And the U.S. indictments named officers from the Ministry of Public Security of the CCP. And I found that fascinating because this ministry is identified really as the PRC's domestic law enforcement agency, kind of like RFBI. And um, so I was wondering if you could talk about the role this ministry plays in China's transnational repression campaign.

SPEAKER_03 23:48

Yeah, so as you said, um the Chinese government has no regards for area of jurisdiction, right? So they always transcend the boundaries or the limitations that are supposedly set on their department. And uh the ministry's role really is to direct whatever that goes on uh uh to secure the power of the central government, uh, which actually in today's reality is to secure the power of C. It's not even about the central government, it's only about the power of C, the sole dictator of China. And you can see that uh C has always been very quick uh to really nip the butt of any political dissent. Uh, and not only by people who are seeking democracy, but also on officials that don't agree with his policies or the direction he has been taking. So in the past year, we have seen that he actually has fired a number of high-ranking officials, uh, specifically in the military, because they don't necessarily agree or follow his orders uh to his satisfaction. And even that sort of work uh can be carried out by the ministry because, again, their sole purpose is not, you know, is not about how in the US government is very clear what each agency is doing and what they're designed for. But in China, it's not the same. It's only about who gets the ears of C and who's loyal to him, and uh whoever is the most loyal, they have to do all the dirty work for him. And that's basically uh the work and a duty of the ministry.

SPEAKER_02 25:29

I'm curious. It seems like Chinese in the United States are kind of reluctant to correct me if I'm wrong, but they seem like they're reluctant to like engage with US law enforcement, you know, to push back on this type of repression to help the US government, you know, root out or identify whether it's a police station or so that some other a Chinese operative. How how does your organization look at that? How do you navigate, you know, this problem of being targeted by the Chinese government on US soil and you know whether you're willing or do you trust working with the FBI on these cases?

SPEAKER_03 26:10

Yeah, so it's actually a complex situation, I would say. Um, but in short, we do work with the FBI. Uh, I do meet with them from time to time to talk about the latest. Um, but the problem is that for a lot of diasporas, not only Hong Kong, but also Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur diasporas, um, a lot of them feel fear for talking to the FBI. What if that got found out by the Chinese government, right? And uh if the Chinese government found out anyone they're speaking with the FBI or shared intelligence, then perhaps they would arrest your family or, you know, hold your family just so they can take hostage of them. And that I would say is the topmost fear of most of the dissidents and diasporas here in the United States. Um, but at the same time, a lot of the dissidents face this issue where um they may still be seeking asylum here in the United States. They don't really have citizenship or legal status uh to that secures their permanent stay here. So their worry is also that, oh, if the FBI doesn't understand transnational repression enough, or if they create troubles uh for the FBI, which of course we know the trouble is caused by the Chinese government, not by the dissidents, right? Um, then they worry about being prosecuted or arrested or even have an effect on their current uh legal application to become citizens or to stay here in the US. Um, so that is actually uh a lot of what I hear from diasporists here, that um they worry about speaking to the FBI or law enforcement because they don't know how TNR would be perceived. They don't know how the sort of threats by the Chinese government would be perceived by law enforcement entities. And what we do uh is basically I try to be the bridge between the community and uh the FBI because the community trusts me and I also have a relationship with the FBI. So when community tells me what they have gone through and if they wish to remain anonymous, then I can act as the messenger to share what is going on with the FBI. And so far that has been working pretty well. We have also invited uh the FBI to our community events with hundreds of people so that the FBI can give a presentation and share how the community can contact them directly should they wish to. And I think it's this sort of trust building uh that is really important uh to ensure that the diaspora and more dissidents uh would feel safe and would feel they can reach out to the FBI. Uh, and to be honest, I had bad experience with the law enforcement before as well here in the US because uh in 2023, when I was trying to protest against Xi Jinping during his visit here uh for the APAC summit, uh I organized uh huge protests in San Francisco. And uh at the time I was also receiving a lot of deference, and I contacted the FBI who offered me protection. But on when it came to on the ground uh situations, is really the local police officers who had to be responsible uh for intervening or for protecting me, right? So there was one time when a masked, a few masked Chinese men bearing metal poles were stalking me on the streets. Of course, I was scared, even though I was with a lot of other people, and I tried to seek help from one of the local police officers uh in San Francisco. Yeah, in San Francisco.

SPEAKER_01 30:03

And and I tried to explain for our listeners, APEC is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. So this was their summit in San Francisco. This is what was happening.

SPEAKER_03 30:13

Yeah, thank you for uh elaborating on that. But um, yeah, so during that, I was trying to tell the local police officer, hey, I need help. These people are following me. Um, they're gonna actually hurt me because I've been receiving this sort of death threats. And the local police officer looked at me like I was crazy. And he told me, nothing like that happens on American soil. You are safe here. And I just thought, wow, they really didn't understand the problem of TNR and how rampant it has been. Uh, and so I can understand why some people are skeptical about working with uh law enforcement officers or even calling the police for cases like that, because they don't know how the police were going to respond. Uh, and that's why we have also been working to get better state-level responses because a lot of the times it's really the first responders who will uh decide how the situation is going to go uh when someone is being threatened uh by secret police or secret agents from the Chinese government.

SPEAKER_02 31:14

I'm curious, does the CCP ever use non-Chinese or non-Chinese American individuals or organizations as part of this repression? I raise that because we did a podcast a little while ago looking at some of the stuff the Iranians do to target um people overseas, and it's they'll sometimes use like Mexican narcotics gangs or you know, Central Asian gangs to target. There was a woman who was targeted in New York. They traced it back to the to Iran, but they were Eastern, I think they're Eastern European or Central Asian, essentially gangsters. But did the CCP do that, or are they more focused on more controllable assets?

SPEAKER_03 31:57

They actually do that. You're right on point. Uh, and uh I think honestly the Chinese government is forming this dictatorship club with the Russians, the Iranians, um, to do a lot of that because in the past uh we get um DDOS attacks, like um what is it called? The digital attacks pretty often on our servers, email, and things like that. And when we try to trace the origin, it sometimes comes from Iran, sometimes North Korea, even. Yeah, so they do help out each other. Um, but at the same time, going back to the San Francisco experience I mentioned uh a few years ago, uh on the ground, we did see non-Chinese looking people uh joining the efforts to stalk, intimidate, and harass us. And that was very alarming because you can see the Chinese government really has cultivated their own network and ties of commanding people uh that are not even Chinese nationals necessarily to stalk after us. Um and we have also seen in the past uh where they hired uh um Americans even uh to help with transnational repression. Uh, in fact, in the United Kingdom, uh there is a current case uh that that's being unfolded uh in court uh where a British former Marine officer uh was hired by the Hong Kong uh government or proxies of the Hong Kong government uh to stalk and harass and surveil on Hong Kong dissidents. And uh in court we saw ample evidence of that, and uh eventually, actually, this former Marine committed suicide in a park. Uh, and some would speculate whether it was really suicide or if there were other things that happened to his death. But regardless, uh it was clear as day that the Hong Kong government, and of course the Chinese government as well, uh, have always tried to reach out to uh foreign nationals to help with their uh campaigns. And uh they really also like reaching out to people in the military. Uh, that has been something they wanted to do because they would get access to intelligence, uh, to information they would otherwise not get. And uh they also believe uh these people who have been trained in the military would be better operatives when it comes to surveillance. So that's highly disturbing and unsettling.

SPEAKER_01 34:39

Anna, if I want to talk a bit more about President Xi, because we know that monitoring the diaspora long predates him. But while he's been in office, there's been legislation that's been created and passed that has really cracked down further, specifically the national intelligence law and Hong Kong's national security law, which show that he so he's really taking this more active, proactive approach. In your view, how has she specifically changed the nature of these operations? What does he fear so much? Or what drives him really?

SPEAKER_03 35:19

Yeah, so that actually reminds me of something ironic. Uh, right before she came to power, uh, everyone knew it was gonna be him that was going to be the next Chinese leader, but people had a sort of optimism around Xi, thinking he would be a liberal person who might bring China into, you know, a state where democracy might be allowed or a bit of voices might be allowed, uh, just because his father was a relatively liberal uh politician within the CCP regime. Um, but in reality, of course, what we saw was that he was a complete opposite to this optimism and he single-handedly led China into this worst era of dictatorship. And I would say, under his leadership, uh, of course, first you see a deeply disturbing track record of human rights uh abuses. He brought Singh down into what it is today, where uh millions of Uyghurs are being detained in essentially concentration camps. Uh, and you also see Tibetans getting their cultural identity erased, uh, getting their gen uh their heritage uh denied. And now you see Hong Kong having our political freedoms cracked down, and the next obvious target for him is Taiwan, where he really wants to annex uh into a sort of Chinese uh state. And uh this ambition of C is unstoppable because actually, according to statistics we have seen, uh, between 2016 and 2020, China spent more than 292 million to influence US policy in opinion. That's a lot of money, and that really spiked uh once came into power. Um, because you know, these actions, you can see his ambition doesn't stop with just controlling China. His ambition is to turn China into this superpower where he can essentially have the power and influence over the entire world. And that's why under Si, we see stronger, more severe transnational repression and also worst foreign influence operations here in the United States. Uh, transnational repression and foreign influence, they often come hand uh hand in hand. Uh, they come together as pairs. And uh for C, it's really obvious that he wants uh the Chinese people or he wants himself to have a say uh in the global arena. And I would say sometimes we see Putin as this ambitious uh dictator, but I would say C actually exceeds Putin in that sense, where uh C really wants his power to extend to not only the US, but also with the work he has been doing in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia. He's really trying to use economic coercion as a mean um to essentially have all the governments under his fingers. So yeah, that's basically what C is about. Uh he's about becoming the dictator of the world, not only in China.

SPEAKER_02 38:43

Anna, can you talk a bit about the US counterintelligence response to this? Because it seems like the Chinese have a very long view on their efforts to intimidate people, to gather intelligence, espionage. You know, they can wait for years for an agent or an asset to kind of burrow into our system. Do you think the US, our side understands that? Is there are there gaps to how they are responding to this threat? Because it it does, you're you're talking about a lot of money, a lot of different organizations, and an extremely aggressive operation.

SPEAKER_03 39:24

Yeah, it's uh it's gonna be a very grim answer. Uh, I think even though some in the US understands depth and the severity of the problem, most do not. Um, and that includes people who are making decisions. Uh, China is often underestimated for not only their ambition, but also the sophistication of their tactics. Um, people don't know how much money they're spending. Uh, people don't know the kind of uh strategies they have uh under their weapon uh arsenal. And I think most importantly is that China does all this in a centralized way. They can strategize everything in every way imagined with all the puzzle pieces at their command. Um, but at the same time, the US is not as centralized as the CCP or the Chinese government in responding to that. We have different agencies doing different things at different times that are a lot of the times not so coordinated. So honestly, I don't think the US has been extremely effective in responding to this threat, but I do think we have been waking up to that. Uh governments have been working in the past few years to really uh uh speed up the entire process, and that's why in Congress, for example, uh there have been bipartisan efforts to bring up this bill called the Transnational Repression Policy Act, which actually is just doing something super fundamental, which is just to coin uh and codify a definition of the TNR. Because so far there's no legal definition of transnational repression. So what we have seen in courts or in indictments is that even though the FBI has the evidence against someone, they don't really have the law of it to successfully prosecute someone who has been perpetrating dissidents. So I think, you know, we're we are still at the very, very beginning of this long march or long battle against the CCP. Um, so I really wish that we can pick up the pace soon and to really start doing all these because the CCP has been doing this for decades. And now they're finally having enough power, enough money, enough people to finally launch their full fledged campaign. And the US is just starting. So it's a very depressing answer. But I do hope with you know podcasts like these, conversations like these, we can pick up the pace, get more people to understand what's really going on, and start building something fundamental and effective against a CCP.

SPEAKER_01 42:11

That's really painful to hear, and you know, because it's it's you know why? Also because we know this, we know the behaviors happening. Um, as Jay mentioned earlier, we have plenty of stories, not just of the CCP doing this, of other regimes doing this. I happen to have worked very closely with Iranian dissidents that have faced kidnapping and assassination attempts here. And we know they do this, these regimes feel bold doing it, and the reason they feel bold ultimately is because they don't feel the consequence of their actions. They just don't, they don't care, right? It's it's just and it's painful because I think to your point, not only do they not understand the gravity of it or the commitment by these regimes to do this and the resources they put to it, but I'm not sure that folks in power are connecting why it's so necessary that we push back on it. Because, you know, these regimes will just keep doing more of it, and it eats at our public safety, it eats at our freedoms, it eats at our democracy ultimately. And I hope that, you know, they have a reckoning soon, thanks to testimonies like yours. You know, I know you've mentioned this bill that that Congress is pushing. That sounds great. What are there other steps that uh other really important steps that you think the US government should be doing or could do that that aren't currently being taken to protect Hong Kongers and other diaspora communities in the United States?

SPEAKER_03 43:37

So uh on the very top level, the US government should seriously have a coordinated cross agency mechanism against all these issues of transnational repression so that before it happens, the intelligence network would be able to catch that and prevent that. And if in the unfortunate case that something happened, there should be mechanisms. And protocols to how do we deal with that instead of reinventing the wheel every single time it happens from a different regime, right? And after it happens, then accountability is needed. Perpetrators should be prosecuted, they should be jailed, they should be punished for it. And also, people who have done that should not be allowed inside the US any longer. You know, there have been cases where Chinese diplomats who are visiting the US or other democracies, they commit something on the soil of democratic places, and then they go back to China, and then they're allowed to come back. It just doesn't make sense to me. Uh, so this is the very top level of what um the government can do. And of course, for Congress, as I said, pass the bill. We have been fighting to pass that bill for three years by now, and still it hasn't been marked up for a vote. And uh, we have been waiting for that. And during that time of three years, a lot has happened. A lot of uh assaults, uh intimidation, harassment have happened on the ground of uh the United States. We have not seen progress on a bill, so that is something that must be done. And uh, at the same time, we are also actually seeing a lot of state-level responses, which I think is where I find more optimism. Uh so, for example, in states like Nebraska, Utah, um, actually state legislators are gearing up to pass their own legislations because they can no longer sit around and wait for the federal laws to pass. Uh, so they're passing their own legislations to reject, for example, Chinese money in their critical infrastructure. Uh, in the state of Nebraska, for example, um, they passed their own bill that banned uh Huawei, uh, which is a Chinese-owned uh telecom giant, uh, from installing uh infrastructure in the state. And uh, we have also seen uh states where they try to codify their own definition of transnational repression so that they can actually persecute uh people who do that. And so I think it's also important for um state legislators to really think of a path forward for dealing with transnational repression and foreign influence because, as I said earlier, uh the Chinese United Front Department, Front Work Department, really do a lot of work in contacting local politicians, local business associations. Uh, they really understand the power of a grassroot or a community bottom-up approach to building influence. So going against them in the local uh grassroot context is also going to be significant. So these are just some suggestions I have off the top of my head. And uh I think for viewers or listeners, not viewers, sorry, listeners here today, uh one thing that's really important is just to familiarize ourselves with the threats of transnational repression. And if something happened in front of you, don't ever deny the person who is asking for your help. Uh, don't tell them things like that don't happen in the United States, and instead share these stories widely about how the Chinese government has been using their power uh here on American soil. And sometimes they also try to gather intelligence and surveil people in companies like normal companies. So there might be TNR happening in your vicinity that uh you wouldn't even imagine. Um, but there are the they are definitely closer than you would always think. So I urge um listeners here to join us today in this fight against the CCP ambitious expansion into American local politics. It's happening as a faster rate than we think it is happening, and it is up to everyone to stop them together.

SPEAKER_01 48:04

Such an important point, Anna. So many important points. Thank you so much for joining us and for sharing your story and your personal stories and and your father's as well. And I'll be thinking and praying for him. Um, truly thank you for for for being with us.

SPEAKER_03 48:23

Thank you so much.

SPEAKER_01 48:24

Before we go, Anna, where can listeners find you or learn more about your work?

SPEAKER_03 48:29

Um, please follow me on my social media, Twitter or X, uh, Instagram, Facebook, threads, and uh follow our work. And uh also just the general pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. We're marking the seventh anniversary of our 2019 pro-democracy movement. Uh, and we are also facing more repression every single day than we have ever imagined. Um, so please keep supporting us, even though you may think, you know, one more voice is not going to change a lot, but that's not true. I think my story attests to that, that one voice can be very strong. And with all the voices together, we can always build a better future together, just one step at a time. So thanks for people who are already supportive, and uh please look us up and continue supporting us as we go.

SPEAKER_01 49:18

I am a big believer in the power of that as well. So, for listeners, that's Anna Kwok KW O K and the Hong Kong Democracy Council. Um, if you've made it this far, please consider leaving us a review, preferably a good one. It makes a huge difference in helping people find us. And if you have an idea or question for us, or just want to say hi, send us a note at thethreatpod at gwu.email.edu. And thanks. Bye. Once again.