Al-Qaeda's Comeback: How a Terror State Is Rising in West Africa

Most people think Al-Qaeda died with the 9/11 era. It didn't — it's arriving exactly where it always intended to go. In Mali, an Al-Qaeda affiliate known as JNIM has encircled the capital, choked off its fuel supply, and now controls roughly half the country using drones, Starlink terminals, and $50 million ransom payouts. It's on the verge of becoming the first Al-Qaeda affiliate to effectively govern an entire nation — and its leaders are talking about an Islamist superstate across West Africa.

Jay Solomon and Hagar Chemali are joined by Sarah Harmouch — an expert on Al-Qaeda and counterterrorism, CEO of the risk assessment firm H9 Defense, and a fellow at George Washington University's Program on Extremism.

They discuss why JNIM doesn't want to storm Bamako but simply let it fail, how the group modifies commercial drones and turns captured bases into resupply events, the chain of allegiance linking JNIM back to Al-Qaeda's core leadership, why kidnapping-for-ransom has made it one of the richest jihadist groups alive, and the million-dollar question hanging over it all: when does a local insurgency become a launchpad for the next global attack? Harmouch lays out where West Africa could be in five years — and why, by the time Washington notices, it may already be too late.

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:01

Welcome to the Threat Podcast, where we talk about the most pressing yet not always so visible threats to global and domestic security. I'm Jay Solomon.

SPEAKER_01 0:11

And I'm Hagar Shimalli.

SPEAKER_00 0:14

For many in the U.S., the threat posed by the Al Qaeda terrorist organization is sort of a thing of a past and a bad memory from the September 11th, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. Successive U.S. governments spent 20 years occupying Afghanistan to deny Al-Qaeda a safe haven from which to again launch attacks against the West. Even though the U.S. pulled out of Afghanistan in 2021, Al-Qaeda has yet to regain a major presence there. This isn't the case in West Africa, though. In recent months, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, which goes by the acronym JNAM, has continued to gain ground in the nation of Mali and is essentially encircling the capital of Bamako. Using drones, Starlink terminals, and a mix of Islamist and tribal forces, Jinem is on the precipice of being the first Al-Qaeda affiliate to essentially gain control of an entire country. And Jinim's leaders are talking of creating an Islamist superstate in West Africa, which could include neighboring countries like Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Hagar, this sounds kind of nuts. Didn't you think like I did that Al-Qaeda was kind of a thing of the past?

SPEAKER_01 1:34

So, you know, sort of. It's you're it's interesting because when I used to work in counterterrorist financing in the government, we really viewed our efforts, those efforts were really effective in getting at their assets and undermining them. And so, you know, maybe not quite a thing of the past, but certainly not nowhere near the threat that they used to pose. The thing that, um, the thing, but the thing is, I will tell you, I remember when I was in government and I remember Mali becoming an issue. And at that time, it was shortly after the Arab Spring, you know, the US government was stuck in a whole, you know, it was a slew of issues. We had Syria, we had Libya, we had um Iraq was still a problem, we were still in Afghanistan. Um we had all sorts of problems. And I remember, I remember when the French were like, we got this, we're gonna take control of it. And in the United States at the time, it was like, oh, good, good, good, they got it. And I'm not sure how much they focused on it since then, but yeah, I mean, it's it's it's rearing its ugly head again, that's for sure.

SPEAKER_00 2:38

It doesn't feel like people right now are paying attention to it in Washington at all.

SPEAKER_01 2:42

Like, I I wonder about that. I will tell you, having been on the other side in government, that there are always Africa experts and they are always screaming for more attention. So there are experts out there and they do focus on this and they write about it and they argue for policies and so on, but they do tend, like in government too, and in media, but they don't tend to get the attention they deserve, that's for sure.

SPEAKER_00 3:04

To discuss these worrying developments in West Africa and the resurgence of Al-Qaeda, we're lucky to have on the threat Sarah Harmoush. Sarah is an expert on Al-Qaeda and counterterrorism writ large, and she's the CEO of the risk assessment firm H9 Defense. She's also a fellow with us at the program on extremism. So, Sarah, welcome.

SPEAKER_02 3:26

Thank you so much, Jay and Hajar, for having me today here. I'm really looking forward to talking about this issue.

SPEAKER_00 3:32

Great. Well, just to begin, can you give us just basically the status of the situation in Mali right now and the very real threat that Al-Qaeda could essentially take over the country? I mean, Al-Qaeda activity is not new in Mali, but it's certainly gotten a lot worse. And given reports that Jadum is essentially like encircling the capital of of Bamako, and it feels like they're almost like starving the place out. So just give us a scene setter.

SPEAKER_02 4:01

Yeah, I think that's a great beginning to to discuss these uh these issues. So Mali in West Africa is is one of the countries that's further along the path to state failure than any country in Al-Qaeda affiliate has ever pushed. I mean, you've mentioned the Capitol, and since September of last year, Jinum has run an economic blockade on Bamako, and Mali is landlocked and imports about 95% of its fuel by road. So JN has been very strategic and deliberate in its approach when it comes to Mali and Bamako specifically. So it's been burning over 300 tankers on the highways from Senegal and Ivory Coast, and JNA has also choked the capital without even fighting inside of it. Schools which resulted to schools being closed, lights being out, Western embassies have also told their citizens to leave. And just as recent April, JNUM put like put its own checkpoints on roads around the city. And even more recently, and on April 25th, Janum and its new Turig allies, the FLA, have launched the largest offensive since 2012, rebellion, and where they hit six cities simultaneously. That that attack was very well planned and it was very sophisticated sophisticated. They've killed the defense minister with a suicide bomb at his home. They wounded the intelligence chief, and they also forced the Jon Tao leaders there to evacuate. And a second country offensive also started around July 4th. So this is a really live issue as we speak about it. And you've mentioned when they're encircling Bamako and how of it, how is it to that they're going to take over? I don't think Jain wants to take over Bamako. I think they're much smarter than that. They're very deliberate. And this goes back to the bin Laden era and also the like the Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Mahrib era, AQIM, who's also one of the closest allies and relationships and affiliate to Jainem itself. Bin Laden knows they've they've seen the mistakes that were done before when the Islamic State took over very fast. And they've also seen the mistakes that Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghrib, AQIM, has done within within North Africa around that time when it comes to governing and when it comes to taking territory. So Jainem learned from that. And and bin Laden has focused on taking territory very, very slowly and very, very gradually and governing and doing that very slowly so the so they don't overextend and they don't become too expansive and overstretched thin that they're not able to sustain the their governing project. So I see when it comes to Bamako and encircling it, encircling it doesn't mean that they want to storm it. They don't need to take over Bamako. They just need Bamako to fail. And by that measure, they are winning right now.

SPEAKER_01 6:39

So I'm curious a little bit because, you know, as we talked about, it's not these threats aren't new in Mali or in West Africa in general. And I'm curious how you view Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and jihadist groups, their growing power in West Africa, and what it means about what that means about, you know, given their regarding their resurgence globally, and why they've been able to hang on and grow this way in West Africa, right? Like what is Al-Qaeda's support there rooted in?

SPEAKER_02 7:12

I think these this is a great question. It's a very interesting one because Africa's always been a region where a lot of the in the factors and the issues like poverty, uh low governance, low uh low governance, no government services. There's also the the chain of coups that occurred in the early 2020s have also increased the likelihood of these of these actors to take to to take advantage of that, to exploit the vacuum, to fill in those services. And they've really learned well how to do it. And you know, this is what what both you and Jay have talked about at the beginning of the podcast is there's a lot of people think Al-Qaeda is a is a is a phenomenon from the past. It's it's silent, it's it's gone, it's not making noise, which usually the West and Western experts see it as, oh, it's declining because as uh the West sees noise as a signal of strength, and when there's no noise, and when an uh uh Al-Qaeda is not conducting international attacks or any attacks on the U.S. homeland, then it becomes a thing that we don't really need to focus on. But that's the thing, I don't think Al-Qaeda is resurging. I think Al-Qaeda's strategy is is arriving where it always intended to go. This the whole plan of Osama bin Laden, the whole plan of Al-Qaeda to begin with from the start is is a seven-step plan where they move back and forth between each one of them, whether it's conducting terrorist attacks to to break the United States' prestige and its allies, to overthrow Muslim-run governments. But the eventual goal is restore an Islamic caliphate. And by that measure, Jainum is standing as the one of the main affiliates after since Afghanistan and the Taliban to actually reach that. But they're not rushing through it. They're not, they're not, uh, they're very deliberate, they're very strategic. They're not trying to take too much territory at the same time. And they're trying to use, use what they're taking and as as a way to negotiate, as a way to have a uh a government embamakute that they want, that they would would want to negotiate with. So they are very, very strategic. And I think the the Africa, it it's it's a very porous border. We've the West and its allies have withdrew after Afghanistan. There's been also withdrawal from from a lot of uh places in Africa, or also countries have been pushed out of uh of Africa. And I recently there's been so many uh former general uh AFRICOM commanders and um African experts who have said we have lost the granularity to see the the full threat picture there. We don't have eyes anymore on the ground, and the the makeup and the demographics and the geography of Africa, the borders are so easy to to to go through, to cross. There's Africa serving as a logistical area, Libya, there's so many problems. Libya is facing its own problems, Sudan is ha is facing a war, uh there's a bunch of coups happening in the West African region, and also there's another actor, the Islamic State, who's also Jainem has been fighting with, which adds and amplifies all these all these uh ways that to these type of groups can take advantage of that region. And there's no UN presence, US presence. A lot of the missions have been have been uh leaving and and the region is up for grabs at that point, and the resources of Africa makes it and the situ the how geo gro geographically it is situated makes it a great strategic uh uh angle and uh element for these groups because they're like, we're gaining access to the waters, we're gaining access to the ports, we're gaining access to the to the resources, and we're also filling in government uh services and vacuums that now people are just we want to be able to govern those people, give them what the junta and the leaders of these regions are not giving them. So they've been very smart and they're playing the long game, and Jainum is is playing the long game, which has always been the overarching strategic strategy of Al-Qaeda core and Al-Qaeda as an organization.

SPEAKER_00 11:09

Do we know what the relationship is like between Jainum and sort of Al-Qaeda Central? I mean, I where where do you can is there in like Al-Qaeda Central? I I normally think of it as Afghanistan, but then the most senior Al-Qaeda leader I I know of now is Saif al-Adl, who apparently is in Iran. But is there what is this relationship between Jainum and the more centralized Al-Qaeda leadership wherever they are? And are they getting funding from these from the outside?

SPEAKER_02 11:38

So when it comes to the relationship between the affiliates, it's it it sits and rests on the chain of allegiance. So when Yad Ghali, the leader of Jainum, founded Jainem in 2017, he pledged Bayah to an allegiance to the head of uh Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Mahdib, AQIM. It's the it's the Al-Qaeda uh Al-Qaeda's uh Al-Gir branch and Islamic Mahdib branch in North Africa, and who in turns answers to Al-Qaeda's uh leader and main core and emir. So, and also when when Yad Ghali pledged allegiance and bayah to Jain, he's also pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda Corps' leader at that point, Ayman Zawahiri, before Imun Zawahiri was killed uh back in Kabul. So, so it's a chain, it's a chain of allegiance, and the relationship between Jain and A and AQ Corps actually is rests on the the Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghrib, AQIM, the Al-Qaeda affiliate in North Africa, which is now serving as the conduit between Jainem and between um Al-Qaeda Corps. And AQIM is the organization that's been working with Jinum, that's been uh training it, that's been giving it experience and capabilities, because it is the older uh organization than Jinem. AQIM has been in the Al-Qaeda affiliate uh ecosystem much longer than JNM has been. So AQIM is serving as this conduit between Al-Qaeda Corps and JM, and it's training JM, it's it's it's serving as the the guidance as the experienced uh uh branch. And when it comes to so the relationship is still there, and yes, while Saif al-Adil is in Iran as the UN monitoring team uh late uh the latest time reported, he's and he's been in Tehran, and with the circumstances now, with the war, who knows where he could be. But uh Saif al-Adil is is is his way of thinking and strategy is very different from how bin Laden and Zawahidi led the uh Al-Qaeda organization. He's very he's uh he's the first Egyptian uh for he's the first military uh guy uh guy with actual military experience. He's an intelligence officer. He has actual military experience from the Islamic, from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad back in Egypt. So he he is he is now changing how Al-Qaeda's looking. Al-Qaeda of 2001 does not it no longer exist. It it's the movement that came out of Al-Qaeda's 2001 that is now living. And Jainum is the example how that movement is shaping to be. And Saifila Adil's way is he gives strategic guidance to all the affiliates via his books and the publications that come out. And he's recently published a book in 2023 where he lays out uh uh uh guidance for the affiliates, and Jainum gets some some nods and some guidance in there too. He tells the affiliates to form unconventional, pragmatic relationships with other actors that could that could um enhance and increase al-Qaeda activities, that could be in benefits of Al-Qaeda's activities. And the FLA, the Azawad Liberation Army within Mali stands as one of those unconventional examples of why JNM is allying with them. And they have they have been the reason Jinem has also been able to sweep uh uh uh their latest offensive to their list in April. And he also tells JNM to start focusing on, not just Janum, all the affiliates, to be self-sufficient and uh and fund themselves independently so no actor can have influence on their activities. And shortly thereafter, granted, Jenum started to focus more on kidnapping for ransom. Jnum taxes its people, it governs, it it uses not so much extortion as of right now, but there's been uh a lot of kidnapping for ransom, and the recent act uh uh kidnapping for ransom was hostages from one of the Gulf countries, which the Gulf countries ended up paying Janum as uh about $50 million. $50 million is a lot for anybody, let alone a terrorist organization like Jnum. And J Num is like, yes, has other ways of financing, but that amount of money tells you like JNA is is is doing well, it's strategic, it's smart, it's following the overarching guidance of uh the Al-Qaeda core, and it's now a structured decentralization. So the the groups follow the general guidance, they follow the overarching strategic objectives of Al-Qaeda or as the organization, but they do it on their own ways in the regions because they are from Al-Qaeda's view the experts in those regions.

SPEAKER_00 16:06

Can you say which country coughed up that much money?

SPEAKER_02 16:08

I honestly cannot remember, but I do think it was the UAE.

SPEAKER_00 16:12

Yeah, 50 million goes a long way in Mali.

SPEAKER_02 16:14

I think it was the hostage that Janum took, I think, was um a prince or some sort of like royal family. So, I mean, it it it's you know, what else? I understand there's not much to do because you want the people back and you want, but also that starts a precedent where now we're also seeing other uh Al-Qaeda affiliates do that in other regions. AQAP's finances have also Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda's branch in Yemen used to be like quiet on decline the past couple of years. Just this past year, it's rebuilding, it's regenerating, it's causing concerns among the uh the US and international security officials, and it's also starting to emulate Jinum's um model of kidnapping for ransom. And the amount of Jinum is described by so many uh uh UN reports and experts, the richest of Al-Qaeda's affiliates right after Ashbaab. Ashabaab makes $200 million a year. That's the the Al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia. So the the money now that is that's just being generated by Jainem and Ash Shabaab Al-Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia is not seeing within those two groups in Africa. It's being circulated within other Al-Qaeda networks. And it is in, as UN reports have mentioned, the relationship between the affiliates lately, between Jainem, Ash Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and Yemen have increased so much over the past couple of years where they're more, much more embedded, work much more closer together, training, expertise, propaganda, messaging, financing. It's it's quite incredible for me to see that people assume that Al-Qaeda is a threat of the past. They just keep I think they keep thinking of the Al-Qaeda of 2001, the Al-Qaeda that conducted 9-11. And Al-Qaeda today does not need another 9-11 to be to be winning, to be on the path that it put itself out from the beginning. It's it it we defeated the Al-Qaeda of 2001, the centralized core based in Afghanistan. It and now it's regaining and it's rebuilding after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. But the movement that came out uh out of the 20, the 20 years of war in Afghanistan and the post-9-11 wars is much, much stronger movement Al-Qaeda has today than it had before 9-11.

SPEAKER_01 18:28

Sarah, it's so fascinating for me to hear the extent to which kidnapping for ransom remains such a major vehicle of financing for Jane and for these others. I remember this being a major issue when I worked in counterterrorist financing in government. And I was at the Treasury, and I can never forget this. In 2014 and 15, I was spokesperson, and you had a real surge in kidnapping for ransom from Al-Qaeda affiliates. Um, in the Maghreb, it was among the worst, but also in Syria and elsewhere. And we used to get a lot of criticism from the Europeans, we, the United States, when we would press them on not engaging in kidnapping for ransom for the very reason you said that it sets this precedent. And not only does it set a precedent, then the terrorist groups start targeting. You know, if they see a European citizen, they would kidnap them deliberately, knowing that governments would pay. And when it's a government, they'll pay a hefty price. And we had intelligence that we declassified and we put it in a speech. I can never forget this. Undersecretary David Cohen said it in a speech and said, We know for a fact that Americans are not targeted for this reason because they're like, ah, they're not gonna pay, so let's move on to the Italian or the German or whomever. Um, and this was so this was constantly a source of of um of angst between us and the Europeans. Um and I, but it leads to my next question, actually, which is about the fact they have this amount of money and it's allowing them to become a pretty modern military force. And they are doing things like employing drones, they're using Starlink terminals, they have armored personnel characters, and um, and we're seeing this in general, these terrorist groups become more sophisticated because of the advanced technologies out there that they can use. So I wanted to ask you, how are these, how is this militia, how are how are they in general getting these technologies? And are they using foreign fighters on the ground in Mali, or are they tribal and Islamist ones?

SPEAKER_02 20:23

Yeah, I think this is this is a great question. I think a lot of people when they they you mention Al-Qaeda or you mention its affiliates, they think these groups are still operating from caves. And the facts are they're not operating from caves. They're actually very smart individuals. And Al-Qaeda's known, Al-Qaeda core, at least as an organization, is known to really focus on education, on geopolitical analyses, on adaptation, on technological uh what the enemy has. They also need to have it, as long as can they can also have justifications for it. So even Saif al-Adil in his new book, there's a there's many, many references to technology and and cyber warfare and drones. And he also invokes uh renewed ambitions and weapons of mass destruction. And I've written actually a piece that revisits the Al-Qaeda uh weapons of mass destruction argument. And one of the reasons this it's it's more it's more serious right now and it's it's it's threatening and highly concerning, is because the the barriers to technology are lowering. It's it's these groups watch wars, they watch the adaptation of other actors when they're using drones. And when it comes to uh JNM's use of drones, they're they modify them. I mean, it's so easy to order those on the black market to their some of their uh technology and equipment is actually captured. So their drones are modified DGI quad copers and FP FPV racing drones that carry explosive charges. And JM also reportedly, as of recent reporting, has been have been using offline AI tools to plot the flight path and beat the jamming. And and not only Only that also JM has started to weaponize its drones and it's also learning. And you have a Shabaab is now 3D printing and and using uh uh uh night goggles to to be a step ahead of the enemy. You have AQAP now also refocusing on maritime capabilities. So so when it comes to specifically to JNAM, it had pioneered the armed drone use in the Sahid since September 2023. And it's carried out at least 69 drone attacks since, more than any other armed group in Africa. And the Starlink kits are usually bought on the black market and smuggled through the poorest borders we discussed earlier in Africa, through Niger and Libya. And sometimes even when they they buy these uh these uh tools and these kits, they also break them down into different components to get past the border uh post and the border security. So also like Janum's own combat footage, which they've been producing a lot more with the propaganda to show their wins and to show their what they have and what they've captured, has shown Starlink dishes in the field since 2024. So for a force operating across a space the size at this point of Western Europe with no cell coverage, satellite internet has been also transformative for them. And when it comes to uh other equipment and other military uh type of tools, the armored vehicles are usually captured. Um, and then every time, every time JM overruns a base or it overruns um a military post and kills soldiers, it becomes that event becomes a resupply event. Down through the anti-aircraft guns, it then turns like it turns it into an air force and then it modifies it. And so, so it it it is, it is becoming, and these groups are very adaptable. These groups learn, they understand, then they deploy the technology. And then when it comes to fighters, um, it's interesting. Jnum has not been relying on foreign fighters actually. I think there's been um a lot of lessons learned within the Al-Qaeda organization on the impact of fighters, especially what we've seen, the tension and the friction and the the repercussions of what foreign fighters are capable of when they come in from different regions. We've seen that with Ashaba in Somalia and the the friction that occurred there, and the the violent tools that end up, the more violent strategies these foreign fighters bring in with them, which can cause tension with what JM is trying to pursue, especially um it's trying to relearn from lessons that like violence and like what AQIM was doing back in 2012 and the amputations and the the brutal killings did not serve the the community very well to recruit and to be that legitimate force. So um uh JM has been focusing more on uh on uh Sahel uh people, on people from the region. They're focusing on uh recruiting from uh Bamoran, recruiting from Nigeria, from Burkina Faso, from the coastal state recruit, but it's not a global influx like what we've seen uh when it came to the Islamic State in Iraq or Syria with jihadists flying like from 40 countries. Jainum is not relying on foreign fighters as of this point. It's more relying like reliant on uh uh r uh recruiting from Turek, Fulani, Arab, Songhai, and Bombara communities. And every every um uh everything that the uh the army in Mali does or the the Russian state or or even the the the government or the junta uh that leads to local grievances, JNAM focuses on those local grievances and starts recruiting from them as well. So those become uh these events become uh recruiting base from itself because of those local grievances, which also goes back to how they've allied with the FLA based on the narrative and the local grievances aspects.

SPEAKER_00 25:51

I mean, this is pretty alarming. How is the Western countries, even the local, you know, the regional countries, the UN, how are they responding to this really dramatic shift? Because the French did send in a military force in 2013 specifically to combat this Al Qaeda threat, and then they they pulled out or pushed out um in 2022. So it it just doesn't really seem like there's anyone standing in the the way of Jenum right now unless I'm missing something.

SPEAKER_02 26:23

No, and it it's it's a it's a really uh harsh reality to also be c like come in in fact with or like have to like uh uh live with because the truth is, yes, like France was pushed out after the 2020 and the 2021 coups, the junta itself made the French press's presence very untenable and formally expelled the mission. And the last French soldier, from what I remember, have left in August 2022, and then the 10,000 strong UN peacekeeping force was also terminated the following year. The junta replaced them with Wagner and decided to uh work with Wagner instead. So this is the Russian the Russian This is a Russian Africa Corps, yes. And so the story is not of Western abandonment, it's a sovereign choice by a military regime to swap partners. And that choice has now been stress tested and failed. And what's to be honest with you, what's true is the West response has been minimal. I mean, the entire world globally, I mean, if we go back to the time of pre-9-11, we were dealing with one Al-Qaeda organization, one core, one terrorist group, and what it focused in one region and centralized. Today the world is mired with conflicts from left to right. It's it's uh uh we've withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021. Al-Qaeda Corps is is resurging, rebuilding there. But now but today Al-Qaeda has affiliates all over the world, and their presence is much, much larger than it was before. Also, we have the Islamic State and we have loan actors and we have wars and conflicts, and we also have domestic issues. So, and each country in the West is also dealing with its own issues. So our attention spam, unfortunately, is very, very little. And uh experts in the West moves with what the news, and we the West tends to be very reactive than proactive. When the Africa issue needs proactivity right now, it cannot, you cannot wait until Jinum actually becomes Jinum is currently a proto-state, it's not choosing to overrun Bamaka right now. It wants it, it wants to build slowly, but we cannot wait until Jainum becomes a state to actually deal with them. But also that is what worries me because jihadist governments is becoming normalized. I mean, the Taliban run government, um, we've normalized other types of governments as well. And it it maybe now it's easier for Western for the West or Western government to actually deal with these actors as governments, as actual states, but also that risks set setting up so many precedents, so many other issues to deal with. And and the question is, which is the million-dollar question, I think, in this community, is when does the Jainum issue become now it's a local regional issue, but becomes a global issue? Al Qaeda's never abandoned the 9-11 type of attacks or international terrorism. And Saif Adil says that explicitly in his book, it's not abandoned. It's never been the narrative that it's gone. It's been like we will wait, we will strike uh selectively, we it will be timed, it will be on our own terms. But what is who is it to say that once JM acquires this territory, doesn't use it as a launching pad for international attacks? I mean, we've seen Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan, we invaded the US invaded Afghanistan because Al-Qaeda used it as a launching pad for international attacks for 9-11. So what does it when does the risk of JNM locally become this global uh risk? And that is the million-dollar question. And the thing is, as I said, it's they never abandoned that idea, and JNM still follows the Al-Qaeda overarching strategic narrative and guidance. But it is going to be a cost-benefit analysis to them when they decide they want to attack, when they know that the attacks can benefit them, can benefit the Al-Qaeda brand, the profile being in the headlines again. But it's it's a calculus that they will be thinking about. But it doesn't mean that JM won't conduct attacks. We we don't know. It can. Anything can change in in in in minutes. I mean, same for any other Al-Qaeda affiliate that's gaining ground. And we know the 9-11 attacks showed us that safe haven, time, capability, and intent has caused the the has resulted in the 9-11 attacks. So JNA technically has all of these and their resolve, the resolve of Al-Qaeda as an organization, their commitment to their goals, their adaptability to our measures and to our technology have shown that they are more likely, will be organ like one of the Al-Qaeda or two or many of the Al-Qaeda affiliates to go to make a comeback on the global stage and stage another type of terrorist attack. And it's never been a matter of if, it's just gonna be when. And that is why I think the international community needs to act sooner than later and do something, because Africa has not just been the place where Molly grains territory. It's a logistical facilitation nodes of hubs. It's where terrorist groups uh cooperate and compete, where they're learned together, where they where they experiment, where they move things and smuggle and use borders to in ways that we are not seeing anymore because we have lost visibility on the ground.

SPEAKER_01 31:40

Well, and Jain and doesn't just seem to be satisfied with just taking Mali, right? They seem intent on creating an Islamist superstate that could include West African countries like Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Um, how serious of a threat is that?

SPEAKER_02 31:55

I mean, it it is a theory serious threat. Like it it's difficult, it's difficult for me to see, again, the West just go with the news and forget about the Al-Qaeda threat and its affiliate. And yes, uh ever every a lot of people seem to be stuck in the Al-Qaeda of 9-11, Al-Qaeda of 2001. But Al-Qaeda's in like Al-Qaeda's main goal, the one of the goals, which moves it between defensive and offensive, is to restore an Islamic caliphate. It it wants to restore the Islamic caliphate that was that was during the Prophet Muhammad's days, the Islamic Empire. It wants the entire Islamic empires, the most expansive Islamic empires that happened under the the Rashidun caliphate and the Prophet Muhammad's times. And Jainum in Africa is just the start. This is the Al Qaeda master plan. It's the territories, it's it wants to govern. It doesn't, it's not just a terrorist organization. It wants more than mass casualty attacks. It wants territory, it wants to govern and it wants it on its own terms. So I like Jainum is is operating and is holding territory more. It's holding territory as of like 50% of the Malian territory at this point, from what I remember the statistics showed. And also, it's holding territory in 11 of Burkina Faso's 13 regions. And Burkina Faso now is where it conducts most of its attacks. JNE is also active in Western Niger. It has struck Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast, since 2019. It also claimed its first attack inside Nigeria last October. And per the UN also just appointed a Syrian new senior leader specifically to run expansion toward the coast. So violence in the Niger-Bene-Niger triborder area nearly doubled from last year. And the fear would be is that would expand and go through the corridor to the Gulf of Guinea, which would connect the insurgency to ports, to more smuggling routes, and to new populations it can use to recruit, to to train, to to get expertise from. So what worries me is Jainem is already very expensive. It's it's it's it's concerning to a lot of people in this community. But also the fact is um it it's an insurgent gov, it's an insurgent insurgent gov governance spreading along the lines of weak states and aggrieved communities with a leadership that has learned from Al-Qaeda's own failures, that empires declared too early collapsed. So the restraint right now that we're seeing is actually what should worry us. It means that these groups are actually thinking in decades and not in our four years of election cycles.

SPEAKER_00 35:59

Some analysts have read about maybe this is hopeful, that Jinum could like maybe follow the model of what happened in Syria where an al-Qaeda affiliate, which was known as HTS, kind of rebranded itself, apparently m moderated itself, or that was the perception, and is actually like running the state of Syria. Is that something Janem could do to try to sort of moderate itself, make it more of a national movement, or is that are they just too radical at this stage to go that that route?

SPEAKER_02 36:34

I mean, we thought HGS was too radical, but here they are running the government of Syria at this point. I think i when it comes to Syria, Jay, it it's a different demography, different geography, different type of ties that HGS had with Al-Qaeda Corps. However, I did write a piece not too long ago in March with the title of the Peace with Law Fair is Ahmad Sharra is building the state Abu Hammad Jolani Promised. There, he might have changed his suit. He might have moved from the fighter uniform to a presidential to the presidential palace, but his thinking on how he envisioned an Islamic state when he was still a terrorist is still being translated in the actions and the way how the government is being formed, how the rules and laws are being thin. So if we were to look at Jainem, Jainem is watching ATS closely. All of the Al-Qaeda affiliates watch the global news, watch how every event is going to impact them. So Jainem is watching Syria very closely, and the UN reported that explicitly, along with internal debates about the Al-Qaeda relationship, going back to at least, I think, last of July. And the behavioral signs are there. I mean, Jainem's communique increasingly amidst um Al-Qaeda core reference. However, I think when it comes and and there was an interview uh with one of the with one of the uh Jainem leaders where the group's messaging focused on negotiations, coexistence, and cross-ethnic and unity and its Trug allies in the uh like FLA, we've seen them also work closely also with Jainum. But and when when I think Iyad Rhali was interviewed by um um by Nasser, the France 24 journalist, he said that when he and he was asked uh like would would you cut ties with Al-Qaeda? Uh he responded it's not it's not a priority right now. And to be fair, Jainum wouldn't gain anything from cutting ties with Al-Qaeda right now. I mean, and even if there were to be ties cut in the future, it would be more of a public distancing rather than an actual break of the ties. Because um Jinum, as I mentioned earlier, AQIM is the conduit that all that JNM has with Al-Qaeda core. So JM cares a lot about that relationship with AQIM that it has. And and AQIM has been giving uh JNM the guidance and the experience and the expertise because they are the older Al-Qaeda affiliate. And JNM cares about that relationship a lot. And even from following their social media and their their uh their their channels and and all of that, you can see a lot of the times sometimes the propaganda that's coming from Al-Qaeda's media organization, ARMS, is now folding AQIM with JM as like one organization. They are still distinct, and I'm not saying that they are the same organization, but JNM cares too much about that relationship with AQIM in the in the current in the in the current time for it to break ties, and it wouldn't benefit anything from breaking ties with with al-Qaeda in the in in right now in the time being. But would it in the future distance itself as it garners the the recognition that it wants as probably maybe, but I wouldn't think an official break of ties would be the thing that that would happen. And and Jainum is different. It's rank and file is it's more seen as a local Al-Qaeda affiliate. It has a Fulani base, it's mobilized under the banner of jihad and sharia. And also in that region, you have the Islamic State Um Sahib Province, ISGS, standing there and it's been fighting and competing with with Jainum and offering a Jain like offering the the region there an alternative for Jainum. So even if even if there was a break on the table and it it's not the priority, and doing those doing so if Jinum were to do so without religious justification, it would bleed its fighters back like to the Islamic State. It would a break from the Al-Qaeda brand would would cause too many complications within the regions, and uh Jnum also has ISGS to worry about there. And I think and already we've we've seen ISIS supporters already accusing JM of nationalism just for allying with the Turing. So my answer is like there, I I don't think the likelier path would be a functional break of public distancing in the future, and it would not be a declared one. And right now JM is focusing more on like governing locally, softening enforcement, keeping the the bayah and the pledge of allegiance on paper, and let the if like let the the the time and all of that, the steps that they're doing then decide what they want to do in in the future, but it would not be a break from official public, official uh break. It would be just a kind of distancing if it were to happen in the future.

SPEAKER_01 41:24

Sarah, I wanna I wanna expand a bit further on this point that you made earlier about one of the things that everybody should pay attention to, and that that's a real risk here, is that as local as as Jane is, as you mentioned, the risk that we don't pay attention and this location ends up, you know, they end up starting to use this area and region as a launching pad for other terrorist attacks around the world. And so I wanted to ask you two questions here. One is that whether whether there is any evidence that Jane wants to use Mali to attack Europe or the United States, for example, and whether you think perhaps um Al-Qaeda, which has a base in Iran, could collaborate with JM to launch attacks, uh, particularly in response to the current war.

SPEAKER_02 42:14

Yes, it is definitely interesting when it comes to the Iran. The Al-Qaeda, there are Al-Qaeda senior leaders in Iran, but I think right now, um, and I think there it would be easier for them to deliver their their messaging and their guidance have been more on their communiques, on their uh their their books and all of that. And as I mentioned earlier, the night the international terrorism aspect of it has not disappeared. Al-Qaeda still wants to conduct terrorist attacks, but it wants it on its own terms. But Al-Qaeda also looks at all the factors that are that are happening, geopolitical. The Iran war right now, I think, complicates the aspect of of international terrorism and it complicates even the the Safad al-Qaeda's de facto leader in Iran and Abdul Ahmad Mahribi who are there. So and also the fact that Taliban has been seeking international rec recognition. Um, Al-Qaeda Corps that's been regaining and rebuilding in Afghanistan and all the new tri uh the new training camps and the the fighters there, they're also like uh cognizant of the fact that any attack that comes specifically from Afghanistan is gonna jeopardize Taliban's uh rec international recognition attempts and it's also gonna put back eyes on Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is playing the long game, but also it's playing a silent game right now. It wants eyes off of Al-Qaeda. It wants other actress to be reaping consequences of events and of attacks, and it doesn't want to end up uh going on the headlines. Sefla Adl himself sees himself as a as more of the behind the scenes type of leader, low, low, lay low, uh w take your time, and then surprise the community. So the there would not be as per se as a collaboration. I think back AQAP Al Qaeda's branch in Yemen has been the branch that has institutional memory of international attacks with the US call and other. Other international terrorist attacks that have targeted um the West and its allies. So AQAP still, AQ Corps uh uh has given Al-Qaeda and Yemen the international attacks profile. So Al Qaeda and Yemen is the group also known to have conducted those before, and it has known to have the the the the the the people who have the explosive expertise, the the engineers and the smart people as well. So could it be a coordination between all the between all the affiliates? That's definitely possible. I mean, as I've mentioned, UN reporting have cited increased uh cooperation and overlapping ecosystem between the Al-Qaeda affiliates more than we've seen before. So whereas Jainem and Ashbaab now are the ones who are garnering the money, that money's being moved to the broader Al-Qaeda network, and that what the network decides to do with it later on, it's gonna be up to the network itself to decide. But I do say international terrorism has not been denounced. Al-Qaeda's never said, we're never gonna be conducting terrorist attacks. They will, but it's gonna be on their time. It's gonna be when those attacks will benefit Al-Qaeda, when when they have something to gain out of it. Like if they want to be able to uh resume headlines or or they want to be able to recruit more for a different for a different um aspect. So it is something that they need to decide and it's a calculus that they think about, but it's not it's not something that they decided not to do ever. So it could be a coordinated attempt. It could be that the different branches are serving different purposes within different regions where Shabaab is doing like serving the technology aspect, JM is also uh doing the money aspect, AQAP is is AQAP has been the branch that has um stated its intent again to target the far enemy. We've seen since 2021, since withdrawal from Afghanistan and post-October 7th attacks in 2023, terrorist groups have re-eriterated their intent to conduct attacks against the United States and its allies. Specifically, the branch that has done so has been Al-Qaeda in Yemen, where Ibrahim al-Qussi, their uh the the Al-Qaeda ideologue uh leader has been has said that there will be the next 9-11 will surpass the 9-11 from before. Saif al-Adil had said the same thing. Abuhammad al-Masri, the senior Al-Qaeda leader that was killed in Iran uh uh uh a couple of years back, also wrote a book reiterating the fact that we want to conduct attacks against the United States and allies. So you're seeing a lot of senior leadership echo those statements. Atif bin um Atif Sad itif al-Awlaqi, Al Qaeda's leader in Yemen, in his first appearance since taking the reign of the group in Yemen, has uh uh has made threats against Western uh Western targets and what uh and the West. So the intent is back there, and it's mostly coming from the Al-Qaeda in Yemen branch, not from Jainem in the in the Sahel region. But could could that change in the future? Could it be that it's uh the the the the cooperation, the coordination between the affiliates acting as a force multiplier, as it increasing their operational capacity as a whole organization, it is very, very, very possible. But I do think Jinum right now is more focused locally. It's gonna depend on on what it what it wants, how how it wants things done, and slowly. But also JNM has been focusing more, um like it seems from its behavior, it's it's focusing on its regional ambitions, and it's actually has been killing uh more Russians than other like other actors in the in the region. And also the network itself still still follows the core. JM has still still pledges allegiance to Al-Qaeda and its strategic guidance and Al-Qaeda core as an organization, per literally, the UN report that was published in February still retains ambition for spectacular, spectacular international international and external attacks. But the affiliates do not need right now, I think, an external external attack. But also the pre-9-11 lesson is that, as I mentioned earlier, is that sanctuary plus capability plus chunk plus time changes these calculations. And also, we have to consider the competition. There are different layers of how their cost-benefit analysis would go. Would JNM benefit from conducting an attack uh externally? Like what would they benefit? Would would that eventually amplify Al-Qaeda or would it benefit Al-Qaeda right now? Also, would it would it benefit JM locally when it comes to its competition with ISIS, with ISGS in the region? Would that differentiate it from ISIS? I think JM is winning by localizing right now. And the Islamic State's uh Sahed province, ISGS, has every incentive to differentiate itself by going internationally. It's similar to how ISIS K in Khorasan uh started conducting international attacks when Taliban took the took Kabul, including the attack against Russia that was the Caucus City City Hall attack. So could could the the competition between different actors push any of those actors to differentiate themselves by conducting an external attack? That is it's possible. Could it be JM? Could it be ISGS? I think time will tell and it's gonna be a benefit, uh cost-benefit analysis for both actors. But I I would say it it usually ha it usually from what we've seen in the past, the Islamic State is the group that conducts the international attacks to differentiate itself. It's the group that makes the noise. So I do believe if an attack, if a if an attack in the short term were to happen from the Sahel region, it would be more likely to come from ISGS, from the Islamic State in the Sahih province than from JM itself, because it would try to differentiate itself from Jinum and try to recruit, especially since JM is winning and is making headlines. So and also there's always practical vectors to to to think about before any plot materializes or arrives. It's it's the it's the the kidnapping that they're doing right now of Westerners and and of of Gulf Country people. There also there's the gold smuggling economy. There's a lot of things that goes into the consideration in the calculus of these groups before they conduct. It is the million-dollar question whether Janum's local territorial control and local wins will translate into global ambitions. And also it's gonna depend on the Al-Qaeda organization as a whole and what it decides itself as a cost-benefit analysis and what it would gain from these attacks and which affiliates were to launch them. So there are a lot of factors that the organization, the Al-Qaeda is considering uh today before it conducts these attacks. And as we all know, they are very deliberate, they take their time and attacks unfolds in in years, not over a month.

SPEAKER_00 50:44

So this has been a fascinating, if not terrifying, discussion. But to why wind it up, I'd like you to be a put on your your hat and like, where do you think we are in five years? Would would the US and Europe really sit back and watch jihadists essentially take control of West Africa? And it's not just the West. Like you mentioned the Russians are fighting there to some extent. I I can't imagine the Chinese are gonna love um having jihadists in control of you know resource-rich in territory. So, what what's your prediction of where we are in you know four or five years?

SPEAKER_02 51:21

Um, I think I'm I'm I would give you multiple predictions rather than a single prediction. I think the most likely like overarching picture in the five years is more of a hybrid map. Uh jihadist governed countrysides and corridors across Mali, Burkina Faso, capitals that survive as besieged islands or under governments that have quietly accommodated Jainum and other insurgent movements and insurgent actors. I could also see an insurgent economy taxing gold, livestock and trade across borders. So we can call it the normalization of armed governance, if we were to like coin the term. Um, the second scenario that I would see would be also political rupture, where another coup in Bamako or a negotiated settlement that breaks JM into power in some form, which would could would make Mali the first state in the Al-Qaeda orbit since the Taliban, Afghanistan, um, whatever name it trades under by by then. The third is maybe fragmentation. The J the JM FLA alliance right now um cracks over governing Kidal. The the Islamic States explode the seams, the region descends into overlapping civil wars. So that would be a third, like a third scenario is where Jin M FLA alliance cracks over governing Kidal. The Islamic State decides to exploit those seams, and then the region descends into an overlapping civil war. I think the the I weigh the first, the heaviest, but maybe the second, uh, the second more likely like likely where the first one is, we would see a hybrid map of jihadist governed countrysides and corridors across the region and an insurgent economy taxing um the resource and the supply chain. And on whether the West would really sit this back, Jay, we already are. The honest answer is that the West's revealed preference since 2022 has been retreat. And the things that could reverse that retreat or make the West act faster right now are specific. It would be a mass casualty terrorist attack on Western soil traced back to the Sahel. That would be one of the reasons the West decides to act. It could be a hostage crisis. We've seen kidnapping for ransom being a thing now. I could see a hostage crisis, or a threat to coastal states like Ivory Coast, Ghana, or Senegal, where we start to see real Western economic and security equities live. So here I think it all depends on the resource argument. That also cuts the other the other way from what people assume. Mali's gold does not need a functioning state to flow. It is already leave leaving through informal channels, and plenty of actors will trade with whoever controls the mines. So resource wealth doesn't did not save Afghanistan from being abandoned, and it will not by itself, I think, summon a Western intervention intervention here. But what gets me to a different answer in five years if is is if the coastal states start to crack, then I think the conversation in Washington changes fast. And at that point, I think it's probably too late.

SPEAKER_01 54:28

Wow, Sarah, this has been like fascinating. I say this almost every podcast that our mind is blown. It's it's and and it's scarier for sure, but it's so important. People who do this kind of work is so important. What you're highlighting is so important. I certainly hope that we don't get to the scenarios that you've painted before everybody wakes up to realize that this is an issue of priority that needs to be addressed immediately. Um thank you so much for joining us and taking the time and discussing with us these very disturbing developments in West Africa. Before we go, where can listeners find you or learn more about your work? You mentioned a lot of articles you've written.

SPEAKER_02 55:08

Yes, I'm it's I've written articles with Lawfare, Defense One, We're on the Rocks, The Washington Quarterly. I'm also on Twitter uh with with uh at Dr. Sarah Harmoosh. So it's I'm also there. Um a lot of my publications are uh are uh open source, open on the internet. People can look them up. And I will be also publishing rec uh coming articles that will discuss some of these angles that we discussed and more focusing on the technological adaptation and um, which is a more terrifying issue, also, is the weapons of mass destruction angle and terrorism and how they're intersecting now with the lower barriers of technology. But thank you so much both uh both for having me and for just important discussion. And I do think it is important that we talk about the things that are terrifying because we need to find solutions, we need to start thinking about them before they materialize into a worst-case scenario.

SPEAKER_01 56:02

As though it wasn't scary enough, right? It could get worse. Yeah, I know, I know. For listeners, if you've made it this far, please consider leaving us a review. Hopefully, a good one. It makes a real difference in helping people find us. And if you have an idea or question for us, or you just want to say hi, please send us a note. We'd love to hear from you at threatpodgw.emil.edu. See you next time.