ANC History: Episode 9: The Hani Memorandum: Mavuso Msimang, Ronnie Kasrils

The Chris Hani Memorandum & Morogoro Conference

Today's episode focuses on the historic Chris Hani Memo and the watershed conference that adopted the first Strategy and Tactics of the ANC: Morogoro Conference.

This is the first time AN officially adopted NDR as its theory of struggle.

We ask: What gave rise to the Memo? What did it contain?

How did it affect the ANC? Did its contents end up in Morogoro Conference Resolutions? Was the Strategy & Tactics a Communist capture of the ANC? And what happened to the central figures who wrote & influenced the memo?

Looking at these questions, we hold a round table discussion with veterans Mavuso Msimang and Ronnie Kasrils.

Transcript

SPEAKER_01 0:00

So I think maybe I must uh w begin by thanking you both uh to to create time uh and and uh for this political public education. Um we are obviously going to discuss a very important moment in the AN's history, which in every single conversation is handled with legend, lots of myths, but also undoubtedly a Meg Obreg moment, one of the most important Meg O'Bregue moments in AMC the Krishani Memorandum and the Morogoro Conference. It seems to me that uh there are all types of and we've already on your individual interviews had reflections about the key historical factors, the key historical developments, also the outcomes. Uh the the key, which is the strategy and tactics, and the ANC for the first time officially adopts the National Democratic Revolution as a primary theory of the struggle, for which in the SACP it would have been in 1962, Road to Freedom. Very important. I think it changes the complex, uh, the complexion of the struggle. So let me start with you, Comrade Baroni, by order of age. I'm grateful for your age. It looks like also you may have uh, because I mean it's just also uh the advice. I we don't know what would have been the what would have been my choices, but we I'm happy we don't have to even find out because I'm way younger. Uh but you would have been at the very founding moment of um condo season. And led uh and we have explored this in your in your own episode. But can you lay the field for us? What is the state of the organization when the m the group which Chris Honey is part of? Let me read their names, the signatures MT Honey Chris W Hembe or is it Hembe? Hembe Hembe Z R Mbenwa Jack Tamana Koposi uh the Golza Leopard Pito J S Moshe Mze Mlenze N Dabenkosi Fipaza Mbali uh Some of the names are pseudo names, I think, uh because of uh a strong gear yes and military nine the gear the nine before war. Yes, yes. Chris is twenty five years old in nineteen sixty sixty-eight. He's born in nineteen forty-two, he's sixty-five, twenty-five. He's in his mid-20s, it would be called. I don't know about the rest, but just to put I always keep that in mind. Uh anyway, what are the circumstances, Comrade Roni? That what is the state of the organization after Wonky, Sipolillo, and uh the Navy the Navy Victoria is later?

SPEAKER_04 4:13

That's 70, 71, yeah. Aventura. That's avid later.

SPEAKER_01 4:18

That's so Wanki and Sipolillo. Yes, based major military campaigns into Zimbabwe, yeah. Yes, but now it's after this. Uh what was the state of the organization before these grievances? If one was looking at uh the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party Sizu at the time, you were to give an organizational report, what would be the key overarching aspects that would knit together the state of the organization?

SPEAKER_04 4:54

Well, one of retreat, the organization, both ANC and Communist Party, has really been smashed in an organizational structural sense inside the country post-the sabotage campaign 6163 inception of MK, but then the blows fall, and the Ravonia leadership are all picked up, and hundreds, thousands, in fact, around the country caught up in the arrests that take place. So it's a huge blow, an incredible setback. In a sense, it's the depths, uh, the idea of the movement. Um, the question of whether it's going to survive or not is in the reckoning. And because of the durability, the commitment, the fact that there was this aspect of independent Africa, which meant across the borders there was refuge. As tenuous as it might have been at times, was a saving grace. The key thing, of course, is that we had an experienced leadership that had managed to escape the arrests. People like Alor Tembo, Katani, Dumanockwe, um JB Marks, Joe Slova, Yusuf Dadu, they're in London because it's quite difficult for a non-black African to lead and be prominent in Africa. Um the movement was in one sense licking its wounds, but not to that kind of hand-wringing extent. We really believed in the struggle that we would survive, and the contradictions of the system were so great that uh we would be on the rebound, and that actually happened. But the attempt to get back into the country where we had in exile 500 plus trained guerrilla fighters, Comrade Matuso, one of them, the earliest in the groupings in Moscow, uh, he was in one group, Krishani in another. They're the first people being trained to that degree. I'm from the group with Mudisi and Mabida and others, big groups, 150, 160 people being trained later in the Soviet Union and Odessa. So a situation in which things at home were very bleak and people at home full of despair, those who survived keeping their noses to the ground, the leadership outside weren't primarily a military leadership. They were sent out to organize the ANC abroad and the Communist Party abroad and international solidarity and support for the struggle inside. In their midst were these 500 or so trained, highly trained guerrillas rearing to go to get back in the country. And one of the ways this was done was the incursions into Zimbabwe. Um, Mavuso, as I said, one of them, and he can speak a lot about that. Uh, they actually do very well. They prove themselves in battle, but they don't reach South Africa. Just to recap, the Hani group um end up captured um in Botswana and uh are in prison for something like a year, and then they return to Zambia. The situation in Zambia has been a grueling one of the ANC there attempting to reorganize a setback as a result of the Zimbabwe incursion not having succeeded fully. And I think one can say correctly, again, Mavuso, who's there, talk about it, but quite a degree of demoralization and finger pointing, and the fact that in the leadership there was a group, the Makawani brothers and Temba Mkoto, who was called um called Alfred Kakong, quite prominent intellectual. Um they were in a state of uh a rebellious spirit, not of the correct kind, uh factionalism, where they resented the fact that uh Makowani Ambrose was not the leader of MK. This had been settled back in 1975. They were now blaming the Joe Modisi as the commander and behind him, the top leadership uh for the failures. So it it was rather right with that kind of um of problem of rumor mongering, of pointing fingers, blaming people, etc. The group from Botswana um come back into that situation and they feel aggrieved as well. I think the main error that is made, and I can't to this day really understand why, they weren't given a rip-roaring welcome as real heroes from the battlefront who had also been in prison. I think that's a major mistake. We begin to look at these subjective factors, and this group, particularly, and I must say this uh group, and you've read out the names. I know quite a lot of these comrades and trained with them. They're all about the same age, by the way, same age as Chris, mid-twenties, late 20s, maybe 30 or so. Um, they they have their uh their their complaints, and they find that that particular trio I've referred to receives it, welcomes it, empathizes, but they have an agenda of their own. They want to topple a leadership that's in place, and all the fingers are pointed in that direction. That gives rise to a great degree uh of differences. Um the Hani group are actually isolated, and again we should go to Mavusa for the situation on the ground. Just to complete the contextual aspect at this point, because fingers get pointed at Joe Mudisi, who's the commander, um one bears in mind three things. One, that we were basically broken back home. Secondly, that the external structure and leadership is not set up for military activity at all. It's set up, as I've said, for international solidarity and keeping the ANC politically alive and interacting in Africa, particularly. And then, third, the fact that there's a strategic crisis, a crisis of strategy, whereby we make a major error, which we are aware of through all the discussions about guerrilla warfare, that you can't expect a guerrilla band to go into a vacuum and begin to set up political structures. You've got to have that in the first place. So I just want to say that when we look at a figure like Joe Modisi, who becomes the butt and the person that fingers are pointed at, he at that stage is like the single identified military commander who bears all the brunt and responsibility of setbacks.

SPEAKER_01 13:23

Comrade Mavus, you you were the communications um head of Wangi. You you said in the strategization. Um and you were in the camp when Chris came back, together with the comrades that were incarcerated. Uh long actually beyond Sepolilo. I wonder if you wanna add firstly something to really what were the circumstances that were attaining in the camp? What was the mood? Uh what was the life? What were the the real concrete circumstances on the one hand? Uh, but if also you could be able to say something um in relation to the leadership itself. And uh uh through that I will go into some of the problems. This problem Comrade Roni is speaking about. Who are the leaders? What I understand at this stage is you know, the the NEC members, these are the leadership of the ANC, top leadership of the NCR, national executive members of the ANC. I must assume all of you at that stage, yourself, Chris, um, and the rest of uh the names that you've read here are people who are not in the national executive committee. Also, that's something we have missed. These are not at this stage, these are MK combatants. But if you could also paint for us on the ground in the camp, who are the national executive committee members? Who is there deployed for strategic ANC work? Who is there for MK work? Who who is who just paint for us the picture?

SPEAKER_02 15:26

Well, first of all, I need to congratulate Comrade Ronnie for his the freshness of his memory uh and the lucidity of his mind. I I uh I absolutely take my hat off to you for that uh recollection. Yes, that's right. I want to take it a little bit back before Lusaka, where the memorandum uh was written by Chris and six other comrades, and the circumstances surrounding that. We arrived from training in in Moscow for some of us in 1964 and are sent to Congo. And for some reason, we are told that we would be we will be on our way home within a year, at most 18 months, but things are okay. So we get to Congo as the first group there, 43 of us. Chris's group from one area in Moscow, and my group. And we are under the leadership of uh Ambrose Makiwane, who had already been in this, who was an established leader from home, had been in uh Cairo uh representing the ANC. So he he seemed eminently qualified to me uh to run a camp that was only a transit camp. He hadn't trained uh militarily. So more people come, including Comrade Ronnie, from training uh late in 1964, 65, 65 mostly. And they all believe that they'll be on their way home within a very short time. So and this doesn't happen because there is a real problem about going home. The route has not been properly charted. Um the main obstacle is transit from Tanzania to South Africa. You have to go through Zambia and Botswana. Very supportive members, countries, but also extremely cautious about having trained people in their countries. So the earlier attempts to get to South Africa were through Zambia and Botswana. And and and people would be caught by this. Oh, okay. We were aware uh for Zambia, for instance, uh, this is 1964-65. Zambia has just obtained independence in 1964, and for the first six months or so, the leadership of the army, of the police is British. And you are heading towards South Africa. And it was clear that you were not ever, whatever the politicians thought, however sympathetic they were to the struggle, you were not going to say we are on our way to Southern Africa. So we did not get into Zambia legally. We would come as a car that we allowed to go through with the driver and whatever, and we would come in through the fence uh and join it uh later on. So we eventually get people sent into Botswana on to check the route and so on. And when they are caught, uh the Botswana, I think they don't buy this story uh of of why these comrades are in Botswana. Because they they were not going to say, well, on our way to South Africa, so we've come to check uh something here and so on. Uh oh. So but they would catch them and send them back to Zambia, which was a nice thing. If they were hostile, they would have said, You're South African, go to South Africa. So it happened repeatedly. In the end, in the meantime, in this Congo, people are becoming very restless. I can tell you that morale was extremely high in the beginning. And you would have thought that uh the war area is not really a dangerous area. Whenever the truck, uh, there was a Land Rover, the DO1911, DO1911, which used to ply between Congo and Daran Salaam. Whenever it picked people up and took them away from the camp, guys would be excited and say, whoa, from China, you know, you've been poor, you know, like in FAFI, that you're lucky, you've drawn your lucky number, you're going, and so on. But in the end, people discovered that people are not going beyond uh Daran Salaam and later uh Lusaka. And the waiting there aimlessly, uh, I mean, we did polit had political lessons, classes, and we would do things really we did not fully occupy people's minds. And and I think there began a feeling that uh we are not ever going to go home. Contrast this to people who had gone for solidarity work, diplomatic work, who are not in a camp, who must travel to conferences. The good activity. Yes. But you know, we are in the camp there, we don't know much about hotels. When you hear that somebody is in New York or wherever, in a hotel, you know, they're having a good time. I I'm not sure that they were always having a good time, but the kind of freedom they had, contrasting, and that's where the decisions were being made in that sector of uh at that level of the organization. So people began to accuse the leadership of not being interested in going home, in taking us home. And there was Restlessness and desertion started. And you could only desert being in Tanzania to Kenya because the Tanzanians would catch you if you left the camp illegally and take you back there. But the Kenyans were quite open and welcoming people who said, no, we're facing difficulties there. Either they want to kill us or they said we should go home, we want to study now and all of that, and sitting idle and so on. So a lot of people started deserting. Morale was getting low. I'm really fast tracking this now. Then the opportunity to travel through a country where you would not succumb, you'd not just give up when you are arrested. You would never want to fight against the Zambians or the Botswana if they arrested you. You just this these were friendly countries. But in Rhodesia, as it as Zimbabwe was called then, the Zapu were fighting, and and John, I think it was, approaches them to say, guys, how about forming an alliance? We want to go through to South Africa, but if there is anything that happens there, we will all fight because you are fighting and so on. And uh Zapu's, I mean, it excited them, no end. They were very enthusiastic about this proposal, and preparations start being made in the camps for people to go through Zimbabwe. Um Zapu had not started operating in that area. They were fighting in Zimbabwe, but not in that area. And the corridor that you are really looking at is across the Zambezi, just east of um of um Victoria Falls, um, and and down northern Matevele land, if you're successful, down to Limpopo and into South Africa. That that was the idea. And there would be a base, transit base, created in Zimbabwe, so that future incursions into the place would be brief there, take up and so on. So this is what what starts causing some problems. When this was this idea, not this idea, what this development was brooked to the comrades in uh Congo, and people were moved to camps to start training together with Zapu in preparation for going through Zimbabwe. The numbers being called in for training seemed to be large, too large actually, for an operation, uh a guerrilla operation. Uh uh so the suspicion now was, ah, these guys are launching us. You know, there was an expression that was used imitating the space technology. You know, you're being launched into space where you'll just orbit alone. We don't know anything about Zimbabwe. So there was no excitement among some of the comrades. But there are there are others really like the group who got trained and uh started making preparations who were in Zambia, and uh in August 1967, uh people are ready to cross. Uh but there's been a suspicion, and the coming together with Zapu had also generated more desertions because there was just uh uh suspicion that uh there is something here, these people are trying to get rid of us, they can't take us home, but uh putting so many of us into Zimbabwe, there was there was that. The people who crossed the Zambezi on August 2nd, 1967, took the whole night crossing. Um seventy-nine of them, fifty-three from the ANC, the rest from Zimbabwe. So with that kind of size, there was absolutely no way that in in in short course the Rhodicians would not discover that there is a group of people in military things, uh when you look closely, carrying arms and so on. And we debated this. I want you to know this, uh uh the size. Uh Comrade O. R. came uh in to attend the meeting in Livingston before people crossed. And um this puts me in an awkward position, but that's it. And and uh he says everybody ready, uh in attendance where some of the leaders were crossing. Chris, guy we called George. Lennox Lennox and so on. The name do Guerrero's Giorgio, um, are also in the group that's going to cross, which actually gave them a beef up, which beefed them up, which was really the people who crossed, none of them, I think I can say was hesitant about crossing. Uh there may have been a few, but the morale, the motivation was extremely high. And so Corridor uh says, yeah, ready to go, and and he ambushes me uh and says, uh, they used to call me Vu. Uh I understand you have some problems with uh this mission and so on. Um I said, uh can can you explain uh what what what what are your difficulties? Absolutely no problems except the size. And I've been part of reconnaissance groups. We have not gone more than 30 kilometers at most south of the Zambezi. So we don't know anything beyond that. And this large number of people is bound to be spotted, and when they are spotted, there are no withdrawal lines, and there is really no established communication system. So we'll hope for the best luck and so on. One of the people in attendance was Moses Mapida, who had um similar similar views.

SPEAKER_01 29:13

As yourself.

SPEAKER_02 29:14

Yes. And expressed them very strongly uh and say, uh remember him saying you're ramming this thing down our throats. Um uh I think the argument being not that there's anything the matter with fighting in Rhodesia, but that uh we are acting in desperation. And one can understand the desperation because the people who had been crossing would be in twos and threes, and they are caught and it finishes. So a larger number was there. But that that was the this thing was just Chris was in the meeting and spoke very strongly in favor of the project. Um and and very impressive, of course, because this is a person who need not have been there but volunteered to join the group and go and so on. So, but in the end, after discussions, uh the most unfortunate person, participant there was Peter Tadi, who was called uh this Nom Ducker, his name is Lawrence Pukanuka, uh, who had been assigned to go with the group that would be going to uh what we're calling Lompopo, some someplace in the Boko now. And and he also held the views that uh the view that um it wasn't too good to send such a large number of people. It obviously wasn't. So but I think the pressure had to do with we need to call the OAU, AU now, Liberation Committee, is saying you have been you were the first to arrive in Congo, and you haven't seen battle. In the meantime, Fre Limo had come, uh Swapo, MPLA that come after us, and since moved on. So it was a very awkward situation for us. And uh but for them, we should have the OAU, especially the Liberation Committee. The Liberation Committee was a group that uh well s serviced uh the fighters. They should have known better because there was a time when they sent a delegation to Botswana to say, guys, it looks as if people are trying to cross are having difficulties and so on and so forth. But when the issues of sovereignty had to be respected. And and really the fear was that if you have uncontrolled movements and people coming up to the place, the Boers are going to attack them, and which they did in subsequent uh uh years. So uh that's that then. So the crossing did take place, and within eight days the group was spotted. No, in fact, in eight in eight days, I think food started running out. Somebody was sent to um check where things could be bought. People had money. And I forget to say, but I don't think this is the detail you're wanting for your interview, that uh after crossing, a small group of ten went to do some reconnaissance ahead of the group. Um some of them got lost and ended up in Botswana. Uh this is uh uh clearly by mistake, but close to the Botswana board and so on. And and some of them never found the group again. Uh but around the eighth day, the uh subject to correction about a number of days, the one of the guys who had banions and was finding it difficult to walk, I think just was overcome by fatigue or whatever, sat down and and and surrendered himself to the Rhodicians and told them that there were people. Uh and the Rhodicians started following the group who had since moved on and they were in the reserve um wanke, which was called Wanke.

SPEAKER_01 33:33

And you don't want us to go into too much detail on this, uh, because you've already covered ground of the actual uh expedition and campaign. Okay. What I want to maybe push you towards is on the return of the prisoners and the comrades that uh were then arrested uh following the campaign. What they they are in the camp. I mean, maybe you take from what Comrade Roni was saying. They come back and uh it's as if nothing.

SPEAKER_04 34:14

Okay. If you don't mind, just very briefly to make a comment, two points about the incursion into Zimbabwe, and and his memory is so good in, by the way. Uh I just wanted to say two things there in the sequence. So the one thing, Mavuso, of course, 69 plus are crossing uh the Zambezi, but it's not that the detachment, if we can call it that group, is moving together. They they uh disperse into groups of 10 people or so, as you've mentioned, just to make it clear. But the main point that I would like to say at this particular point in time, the problem and the errors that were made aren't just specific to a movement like MK Armed Wing of ANC, just to give you in historic terms what happened in Cuba with the Dell, something rather similar in um uh uh 1956 after they released from prison. They prepare in Mexico, and they have a group of about 150, 160, if I remember correctly, and they land um on the grandma boat is a beat-up old yacht, and they land in the southeastern part of the island altogether. And they are similarly caught even worse than us, uh killed, arrested, captured, and so on. And it's only 12 of that whole group who survive. It's like a legend, but it's true. And they get to the Sierra Maestra, and there it's said that Cheg Bavara says that the 12 are there, and he says, we have survived, we'll carry on the struggle, the days of Batista are numbered. So one does need to understand the tensions, the issues, the debate as one moves on in terms of the revolution, not any form of contradiction, just to add on.

SPEAKER_01 36:42

I do want to propel you, Kumbrag Mavoso, to the aftermath. Okay. I'm careful, obviously, uh not to be too restricting. But um if we are able to say the group comes back, uh it would have been 199 or so, I don't know. Let me let me do that. What do they find in the case?

SPEAKER_02 37:07

Maybe I'm no no no. I'm going into too much of a detail, but I can say I've people went in and fought excellently in three battles. Excellently, outstandingly. And in the end, because with the passing of time, everybody in the security in Rhodesia was after these people, they retreated to uh Botswana and didn't fight there. Then later, at the end of that year, we launched something else in what is called Sipolillo. Um, larger numbers here, more time spent, absolutely more time. For three months, the people are in Zim, uh and and and the enemy hasn't picked that up. And when um the enemy didn't re did realize that there were so many people, the fighting breaks out, and it doesn't actually happen anything as well as it did in the So when Cipolillo was happening, Chris was in prison. They're in prison. So Sipolillo, uh I I want to talk about the mood in Lusaka. So the crushing really of the um Rhodesia initiative uh demoralized a lot of people um in back in the camps. So so so this happened uh Cipolilla happened late, uh end of the year, part of 1988, 1968 and so on. So when Chris and them come back, they find a group of people who have been demoralized by the failure of the campaign as a whole. You know, despite the good fighting uh in battle, the pro the project, the objective of getting salved not. People were very demoralized. So when these heroes, and they were absolute heroes, Chris and company, arrived in Lusaga, they really came to a very cold reception. There was no hostility towards them at all from the comrades, but you know, they were demoralized in their own right. What I think would be very difficult to excuse is the absence of a person from the office in Lusaka, political uh office, to be present to receive them. But they didn't take that well. But we sit, and we were friends, by the way, with these guys. I was uh the Pizzo, whom you mentioned here, used to share a room with me, and he was in communication like me. So we talked and so on. The sense of frustration is understood, and I think people would have known that um it's demoralization. However, then uh Chris and a number of comrades sit down to write about the situation. Yes. And this is the memorandum that you are talking about. Uh so uh uh Huangwe uh finishes with people going into Botswana. Then much later, Sipolilo. We spent months reconnoitering the area, going in, out, and uh and and Johnself at one time went in to check what the score was, uh what the situation was. And people then crossed around Christmas time, and um and there was a large number of them, over a hundred, uh, and the majority of them Zimbabweans. And um I have to say that bases had been established in the reconnaissance up to five, up to about 70 kilometers south of the crossing point, uh by people who were established in the area. So the the the learnings would have been, I think, that uh do your reconnaissance and and not just throw people in and so on. But I mean that's the the w when the fighting broke out, then uh I want to say this the level of the the the morale wasn't anything like uh in one go. And um we suffered more casualties there. And uh I think all of which had an impact on what you we we we want to talk about. Uh but when Chris Hani and Comrades come back to Lusaga, they are they find a demoralized group of people in Zambia, and they are not well received. Um uh and and and I want to say, if it's my opinion facts actually, that i there was no hostility towards them per se, but just that people thought um, well, this wonky thing, this this Zimbabwe thing has not happened, and so it has not been productive and so on. So there is discontent, there is really nothing happening in Lusaka at the time in the ANC uh camp, uh except you know, low morale. And these people have come from at what stage are they coming back?

SPEAKER_01 42:51

It seems to be the timelines confusing for me because if Sipolilo is late 68.

SPEAKER_02 43:01

Yeah. Chris and not late, not late 68. End of 67, and the the fighting in Sipolillo broke out in March 1960 1968.

SPEAKER_01 43:15

Okay, so early 68.

SPEAKER_02 43:17

Early 68.

SPEAKER_01 43:18

So by say June, July. When does Chris Haney and his group, when do they at what time in 68?

SPEAKER_02 43:31

Around June, if I recall. Uh around June. June, July. Uh thereabouts, I don't really remember.

SPEAKER_01 43:39

So how how do you explain uh I mean two campaigns, Comrade Rolling?

SPEAKER_00 43:46

You suffer defeats. Obviously, there is heroism. And um but you had Wanky Lopeta executor.

SPEAKER_01 44:00

And learned you know from the failures, the weaknesses of Wanki also gets defeated. Yeah, around March it's defeated. The Wanki group comes back in June, and how can you reconcile the fact that they think nothing is happening? I'm just saying if I'm in a camp, two major campaigns back to back. In a s in a camp of uh hundred people?

SPEAKER_02 44:38

200, perhaps 300.

SPEAKER_01 44:40

300. That's like 300 soldiers. You've just suffered. I mean, there are deaths that go into tens, there are imprisonments, there are decisions, but there is evidence of an actual attempt. The last of those attempts is March 1968. In June 1968, how do you say there is nothing happening? Even in September 1968, how could you be, or even in uh January 1969, you could so maybe my question directly is how could this be a legitimate uh observation that but the leadership is doing nothing of the two important Oh wait a minute, yeah.

SPEAKER_02 45:35

You need to get something that's gonna be it answers your question. There was a feeling that people were being launched. I mentioned that to you. So many people didn't have an expectation, especially looking at the numbers also who went into Cipolillo, that much would come out of that. It is true that was there was more preparation time. Um and people and and the people were in Rhodesia for at least two months, perhaps three. Yeah, because the fighting broke out in March 19 uh 68, and and it didn't last very long. You're asking me the questions that I'll give you, the answer to which the answer are morale was not high among the group who fought in Sipolillo. I must be careful because there are people who fought their cuts out, but the group as a whole, um when the fighting broke out, there are people who just ran, you know. Uh they they ran. There was a lot of discord within Zapu. I'll give you an example of a person, perhaps I mentioned that in my podcast, of a person in base number three, Zola Zambe, and I were in there, and uh there was nobody senior from Zapu. Uh and so a person is brought to us uh accused of telling the population that uh there are South Africans who have come to reinforce in Dabeles. And uh this is a Shona speaking person. Um and so really sowing discord. And it's it's almost like causing mutiny. And we were advised by our colleagues in um encouraged rather to deal with the matter there, set up a court martial and deal with our findings. But it's only two senior ANC or MK people and no one from their side. So we decided that we would take that person back, across the river, and present him to Zappu for them to deal with the thing. Zapu was going through a crisis at the time. By the way. They were going through a crisis. Uh that person was released within six. The one that we might have been asked, we've been asked to look to to take care of was released. Because Zappu was having a problem. This is a time when Frolisi was formed. And Chikerema, who was the OR of Zapu, you know, standing in for Como, actually broke off to form this organization called uh Frolisi. So they split right at the top. And um and that's what weakened uh Zapu very much. Uh but the the the uh as an organization uh they fell into uh some some difficulties, but the fighting was poor because really it didn't matter that people had been there for very long. When the Rhodicians came, uh people had not gone into the had not established any serious contact with the communities. So you would fight as little groups against the uh and air force and and you know, okay.

SPEAKER_01 49:32

Maybe I pick up a few things from the memorandum itself to give the description of that the memorandum puts to the fact that after this bolilo, wanki, maybe uh the timelines you will advise again. The circumstances that we're attaining, uh for instance, they say uh the leadership in exile has created the machinery which has become an end in itself. It is completely divorced from the situation in South Africa. It is not in a position to give an account of the functioning of branches inside the country. There have never been an attempt to send the leadership inside since the Rivonia arrest. There has been an overconcentration of people in offices. This has become a fully-fledged activity in itself. And they give an example, a director of youth who maintains no liasm with the home front. And they give departments, the department of the secretary general, which has not furnished any reports of political activities in the various regions in the country, the department of publicity, which has given out propaganda geared only to external consumption. Um, I'm giving a sense of this let's this is like section one of the memorandum. It's painting a detachment, a a sort of disinterest on the part of the leadership in uh internal activities in South Africa, establishing links in South Africa, but there's over concentration of people who are in office as opposed to soldiers.

SPEAKER_02 51:36

You know that paragraph. Okay, shall I say MK came out of the country, trained, and went into camps. They are the people who were expected to come into South Africa and do a lot of these things. You could argue that among MK people in the camp there should have been leaders. But the leadership that uh Ronnie explained to you had left early to establish solidarity offices abroad. Uh they had not trained, they they knew nothing. It there was a real separation, not conflictual, um between those who were doing diplomatic work, who were attending conferences and doing other things, and those who were set, who were preparing to get into South Africa. I to be very honest with you, I'm not sure how any of those people who are said to be concentrated in offices would have gone home. And the establishment of contact with home, you know, the same difficulty that we experience going through military would have been the experience anyone would have they could only have come as part of the military formation. There is just no other way they would have gone in unless somebody said, Yeah, we are going home where they're.

SPEAKER_01 53:15

I mean, look at the line, for instance, these people have become salaried employees of the movement, merely salaried. It is high time that all members and caders of the NC, be they MK or not, should receive equal treatment and be judged only on the basis of their dedication and sacrifice to the cause we serve. Comrades, you may have been part of the people who were in offices.

SPEAKER_04 53:41

Well, I was certainly in exile and sent to London by O. Tambo in 1965. And what was that all about? We had very good links from Britain to South Africa, business, tourism, um uh people going for studies, black and white, by the way. And in London, under the guidance of both Communist Party and ANC, the whole point was how to rebuild the movement within the country, and we carried that out quite successfully. There were some attempts in Tanzania to try and infiltrate people back home. Um it wasn't very successful, and I think it's James April, uh a great hero of that time, still alive today, who talks about the math. Might it be you, Mavuso, in the interviews uh for the Joe Madese book, that on the basis of a couple of people being infiltrated every month or so, it would take us years and years before you got, you know, 500, 600 back into the country. So that pressure to send a lot of people in was was within that context. And the point is that the pressure from Congo, from the very comrades to go home, forced the leadership into that strategy of an incursion in numbers into Zimbabwe. So it really is part of a learning process in revolutionary struggle and particularly in the problematic factors we face, being so far from the front line, um, very difficult. And the key thing that the ANC kept coming back to at Morigoro and back to in subsequent years was precisely that you can only send a trained guerrilla fighter into a country if you've got a political base for their reception in the community. Within the community, working within the community. So do you So just to quickly say before, sorry about this, the problems of Zapu that Comrade Mavuso points to is exactly the same as us. And they are just across the river, the mighty river, but under very close surveillance. And Rhodesia might have been a small settler colony, but they had well-organized, disciplined troops, aircraft, um, and all the paraphernalia of the military and communication, quite a force to come up against what was happening in terms of the problems. Wanki and then Sipulele is that Zapu itself didn't have those structures within the people. So you see the similarity. And you had to rely on it. It moves one away from the subjective factor of frustration amongst people, and therefore demoralization and desertions and the finger pointing. You'll have the finger pointing in the military situation when you are rebuffed, when you when you lose uh the finger pointing, uh you've been in the midst of that there, is much more severe than the political.

SPEAKER_01 57:21

But would you give credence? Um, Comrade Roni is white. Uh, he's got a secondary problem with being based in the continent at the time. You already pointed this out. Indian and white comrades. Uh that is well established even before the ANC goes to exile. But Deba and OR are encountering a problem that the ANC is captured by white people and by Indian people raised by nationalists in the continent. But would you agree, or how do you rate the complaint that I'll give you, I want to read Chris's in Chris's weights. An equally disturbing situation is that MK is being ran or ran completely independently of the political organization. The political leadership abroad is not aware of the activities and plans of MK. We therefore infer that MK is separate from the ANC, that there is conflict between ANC and MK. That the ANC has lost control over MK. That there is no coordination. And this has brought about a situation where the ANC is run single-handedly by the commander-in-chief who appoints and dismisses arbitrarily. As a result, there is a tendency among the members of the headquarters to owe allegiance to the individual who appoints and misses them. And it takes a genuine revolutionary to challenge you. We are completely, we are completely compelled to blame the national executive for this anomalous situation. I think the commander-in-chief later on it's uh Moudise. You were there, Comrade Mavos. Maybe they didn't invite you to ride here because they knew you wouldn't maybe agree. Although these are your comrades, some of them are your roommates, Chris was your friend. How do you rate this complaint?

SPEAKER_02 59:31

Yeah. You know, Comrade Ronnie has said something about when you really come from a difficult situation like the front and things are not working well, the finger pointing is intensified. But let me take it right the the Morogoro corrected. So the the there is a good point in what's being made.

SPEAKER_01 59:55

How about we we are building blocks towards Morogoro? Yeah. So in the camps, was this in the assessment, in the experience, a legitimate concern? Was the leadership finding itself at odds from a point of view of organization and a military wing, and the fact that uh Moodise, Joe Mudise, uh was calling the short Hallone.

SPEAKER_02 1:00:30

Let me let me let me try and answer this. You know, we had crisis in the camp in Congo, like when guys from what we call KZN now, 29 of them took a truck and said they're tired of waiting in exile, want to go and fight. I told you about the waiting and so on. Um then there were issues of desertions and and so on. The leadership would come. Uh JB Max came at one time. Oh, another issue that brought the leadership into Congo was the strong challenge of the C chief CNC, what's his commander-in-chief. The commander-in-chief position had been given to Joe Modisa by the NEC. We had been told about this even before we left our training that Joe Modisse is the commander-in-chief. I mentioned that we arrive in Congo and you have Ambrose Makiwane, who finds it very difficult to recognize Joe Modisse. That's a fact. And when Joe Modisse is visiting, uh, you know, it took time. We were in Congo, arrived first to this group of ours, and Makiwane is in charge. Later, these guys come and Joe Modise comes. And when Joe Modise arrived at the camp, he wasn't introduced as the commander-in-chief by the people in charge of Congo camp. He was not. Essentially by Ambrose. Essentially by Ambrose and the leadership of the camp.

SPEAKER_01 1:02:19

Was Ambrose Makiwani a national executive committee member? He was. So was Joe Moudise.

SPEAKER_02 1:02:26

Uh maybe Joe was too. I I don't remember now. He was, yeah, yeah, yeah.

SPEAKER_01 1:02:32

So how was that resolved? The continent. So it was resolved.

SPEAKER_02 1:02:39

The leadership, which is said to be absent here and has no authority, came in, set everybody down, and said, Comrades, um, what had happened? I'm trying to just think what's uh what precipitated the crisis. The KZN.

SPEAKER_04 1:03:02

The case is. Oh, yeah, the KZ precipitated. I mean, they notion and they took the tracks and they went to Morigara in complaint.

SPEAKER_02 1:03:10

So the leadership comes to talk about this crisis which has been created by guys from Natal. It was called then taking a truck and saying they want to go home because the leadership and everybody is not serious about the revolution. Uh, of course, it I think it was just some wonderful grandstanding. There was no way you would just get into a truck and hope to get into South Africa and so on. But they came to resolve that crisis. Joe Mudisse has always been given, had always been given to very hyperbolic statements. Uh his reaction to the Natal group was this is a desertion. These people must be shot. He modified his position later and said, no, but they must be experts. It is a desertion. Um and other comrades, you see, there is already uh the the people were sympathetic. Some of the people are sympathetic to the case at N group in the camp. And uh when they they were tried, they were kind of um uh what do you call pro-bono lawyers uh defending the taking away of the camp. They say these people didn't go to the enemy, they wanted to go and fight. So it's not a desertion, uh da-da-da. But already we are splits in the camp. The people in charge of the camp, including Chris and others, uh, were eventually charged with trying these people. And because of this very strong uh consensus in simple sympathy with them, they were sentenced to two weeks of cleaning the camp. That that's that you know. So, I mean, this is not your story, so it as it delays what you do what you want. But I'm saying when the leadership came, consisting of Tambor, J.B. Marks, uh, I can't remember who else came, they resolved the problem of Makiwane and Joe. And they told everybody that Joe Modisse has been appointed, was appointed by the NEC commander-in-chief. There is no doubt that Ambrose Makiwane wanted that position.

SPEAKER_01 1:05:36

Let me come to uh to what they say, for instance, later on about Joe Moodise. There's an interesting paragraph here. Those who serve in the central task of suppressing and prosecuting dedicated comrades of MK who have nothing to lose by participating in the struggle except their chains. There is no security department in our Organization. For instance, Msomi and Matthews. The arrest of Msomi and Matthews was inevitable as the fact of their presence in South Africa was common knowledge, as well as comrades bound for home. This situation's tantamount to betray out. In Morogoro, Joseph Cotton, 50 Shadra Tladi, Boy Otto are openly flirting with the Peace Corps. An internationally known CIA front, a counter-revolutionary and espionage organization. The first two handle vital information as they are connected with the radio transmission service relaying organizational material. Boy Otto is moving between Zambia and Tanzania, transporting MK personnel. And most disturbing is that comrade, a comrade raised this matter, and the Secretary General and Chief of Security of the ANC Dumanogwe, who agreed that the matter of the above comrades flirting with peace crop was true and that it should be furnished in writing, but no action was taken. So the behavior of the Secretary General and Chief of Security of the ANC Dumanwagwe and his attitude towards Comrade Jay's Mlenze when we pursued for a meeting disturbed us greatly. For him, to have said that he did not know, did not recognize Mlenze is a height of indifference and cynicism, and we are really worried about it. Here is a comrade from the battle front and commander of a unit and a security chief of a vital region, namely Trans Guy, accorded this type of snub.

SPEAKER_02 1:07:55

You know, I honestly I wouldn't know I I can't tell what went on between Dumanogwe and these comrades when they raise certain questions. People who gave them soccer, who gave them the memorandum memorandum was drawn up in Tennyson Makiwana's house. That's uh the younger brother of Ambrose. I don't know whether they're brothers or cousins and so on, yes, but yes, yeah. Was he in the NEC? It was. Tennessee. Tennyson. And he was the person was involved in taking us across. He represented the NEC in MK. When people were sent to Botswana and elsewhere, it was Tennyson who was arranging things. Absolutely. So the memorandum was drafted in his room? Please complete that story? No, it was it drafted in his house. In Lusaka, yeah. They would leave the house, the the ANC residence in a place called Lilanda, a suburb of uh uh, and go to meet the the six people, or is it seven? Yes. And they met with at the house. It's clear from the content of the memorandum that they became privy to these things that are being stated in the memorandum, yeah, which none of the MK people knew anything about. Um yeah.

SPEAKER_04 1:10:13

And and of course, my views is not just Tennyson at the house. Yeah, yeah. Oh yeah, yeah. Sorry, I forgot to say it.

SPEAKER_01 1:10:19

Yes, maybe give us it looked, it sounded like an organized uh faction.

SPEAKER_02 1:10:26

Let me tell you. Exactly. They met at Tennyson's house. Ambrose Makiwani, who was mainly resident in Tanzania, traveled to Lusaka. So did Alfred Mcota, uh Hokon, uh Numdekir, Numdeplum for him. Also, so when this memorandum was drafted in Tennessee's house, I don't know, I wasn't there how much participation, whether they are mere hosts, or and said, okay, talk guys, uh, you've got space here to do that. Except that when you look at the content, it's clear that matters of the NEC, which no one outside the ANC knew about, um found their way into the memorandum.

SPEAKER_01 1:11:23

Written by comrades who were fresh from prison. Oh, yes, that'd be. I I want to read this section again and then maybe bring bring the reaction of OR. But just to get a sense of the other big complaint, and it informs my earlier uh location of their ages, because in a normal political environment, the age at which Chris and these comrades are at would have been the same age of 1944, the age that the the chair that started the youth league would have been in the mid-20s. Yeah, 1944. Anyway, one of their big complaints is about the youth league. This is what they say. Um we consider the youth in MK as the most revolutionary. Possibly right. We strongly feel that we should be consulted on matters affecting the youth. For instance, we must be informed about the revolutionary international youth gatherings, and we should be given priority in the sending of delegates. The farce of the Bulgaria ANC Youth Delegation should never be repeated. And those responsible should acknowledge the mistake they made. The Youth of South Africa is not located in London or in any European capital. We therefore take particular exception to the appointment of certain students as leaders of the ANC youth. Taboombege, who went to London on a scholarship sponsored by NUSAS, is a leader of ANC Bogus Youth Organization. We are convinced that the ANC leadership in exile is according better treatment and attention to the students. This attitude and practice has had a disastrous effect of diverting many would-be revolutionaries into the academic field. We feel that it is high time the MK personnel, which is in fact the core of our revolution, should be given the best treatment by virtue of having volunteered with their lives to give a supreme sacrifice to the revolution. I can go on, and then um you would know the harsh stuff they say about comrade um Joe Moodiz. I've read about Manu Okwe. I think it's Tabo More. There are lines about Comrade Tabo More, the commander in chief, who is the commander in chief. Um what is your you were um I keep saying this, Comrade Mavoso. The youth element, this assessment that there seems to have been dissatisfaction with youth that was not choosing arms. And the idea that only the youth that is choosing arms. Firstly, it is the youth that is actually identified with supreme sacrifice, and by that virtue most revolutionary and should be prioritized in the ANC youth activities, a complete uh uh uh rejection as well that some people are just being diverted to academia. Can I can I think I'll be able to help you?

SPEAKER_02 1:15:13

Because in some ways I was affected at a certain time. I think when we're talking informally, I mentioned that when we got to Francistown, there were young people who were already in MK, ready to go to receive training, and I was sent out of Fort Hare to go and finish my studies abroad because my arrest together with a few others was impending. So they said, guys, I I I knew MK existed, but I had not been in MK myself. A lot of people were leaving the country, including Tabo and so many others, who were ANC but not in MK. Now, the ANC had two houses in uh Daresalam. The MK House, which was called, I think, Lutuli camp, at about 50, 60 people are coming before the process. And there was Mandela, which was a place for students, all of them under the wing of the ANC. The ANC found them scholarships and sent them there. And I think it must have hoped that they continue either to study and become potentially good uh um for the revolution when it comes, or they would come back. So I am saying the following: those who opted to go to Mkonto went straight to military training. They were not mixing up with any civilians and and that kind of activity. Their task, our, was to wait and be given the opportunity to go home. There's just never, there would never have been a thought that let's get some of the people in MK and take them to conferences. Not at the time. Not at the time, because you were there. Part of the complaint was that people are sitting idle and and and you're unable to take them home, but they're sitting there. Because they were waiting to go into this thing.

SPEAKER_01 1:17:42

So I am saying Why would comrades raise it in this way? If uh by policy, you know, people had those options. Um, but also this idea already here, and I'm I'm very specific here, Comrade Mavuch. This memorandum gets abused a lot. Uh, but this line about TM ultimately being sponsored by Nusa. I mean, I know you were not part of them, but no, no, no. Were you comrades gossiping about such nettes?

SPEAKER_02 1:18:27

No, wait, wait a minute. I would not be able to know, I never who sponsored uh uh Tabo. Maybe it was Nusis, I I really don't know. It's not anything that we used to discuss. Tabo was not there. Uh he went to study like other ANC people, many of them ended up in MK. Uh and when he finished his studies, Sussex, I think, he came to join the ANC and he went for training. Zodile Nagani. Um, I think there are many. Maxel. Yeah. Yeah, Max. Uh they started uh at at university with us at university studying and came back in. I would imagine, for instance, that while those people, well Max Sisulu and others, uh they would be the ones to call upon to go and represent the ANC because you dare not expose people who are being ready to go home. So there was absolutely no way you would take people away from what you promised you would do to them, deliver, get them home, and so on. I I I think it's it Sally's, it's it's it's not very helpful to the memorandum, factually. Uh it really makes no sense at the time.

SPEAKER_01 1:20:06

There was just no way you could take a person being prepared to infiltrate as a soldier and say, go be in a con you are exposing them. Well, that's the contradiction.

SPEAKER_04 1:20:18

They want to go back home above everything, which means secrecy, your identity. And then there's a statement: why aren't we being sent to the European capitals or even to Bulgaria where there was this youth festival? You're going to be revealed. If I was being prepared to go back home, I would not want to go openly to any of these Western countries or even to a university in Daris alone. So it's it's full of these contradictions. And uh, you know, it's in part.

SPEAKER_01 1:20:56

What does it mean, Comrade Ronnie? Um is it is it the age of the comrades? Is it uh is there something else happening around this memo? And Comrade Mavuso, you were beginning to say part of where it was drafted, there were NEC members who had sharp differences with Mudise. Yes. May they call out Mudise in the most radical attempts? And let me let me read one line or two. Uh, for instance, about More. Tabo More. About Tabo More. There is a certain symptom. There are certain symptoms which are very disturbing and dispiriting to genuine revolutionaries. These comprise the opening of mysterious business enterprises, which to our knowledge have never been discussed by the leadership of the organization. Oh my god. For instance, in Lusaga, a furniture industry is being run by the ANC. In Livingston, a bone factory, whose original purpose was to provide cover for underground work in Botswana is now being used as a purely commercial undertaking. As a result of these enterprises, more and more MK men are being diverted to them. And some of the people in charge of these enterprises are dubious characters with shady, shady political backgrounds. We are therefore compelled to conclude that there is no serious drive to return home and carry on the struggle. This is disturbing because the very comrade, Tavo More, who is supposed to be planning, directing, and leading the struggle in South Africa, is fully involved in these enterprises. Now he has assumed complete responsibility for the running of these enterprises in collaboration with others. And it is extremely doubtful that with his attention so divided, he can do justice to the armed struggle in South Africa. We should be the primary and absolute The leadership of the NC can't but be blamed for this state of affairs. Um I thought I give it is so what is happening there at least?

SPEAKER_04 1:23:20

Isn't that all rumors? And if the ANC, as was the case, sets up front companies like Star Furniture in Lusalka, like the Bone Factory and other such enterprises, will everybody be told or party to the fact that these are front companies? And what do they know of how they're being run and whether in fact it's being run for self-interest? Mudisi was involved in these and other such uh enterprises as any revolutionary movement worth its salt, the attempt to smuggle back weaponry in the secret compartments of furniture and so on, the coffins going back or being exported from Zambia to Botswana, sometimes they had a person inside. There are anecdotes along those lines. So, how how does one penetrate aspects of this document, which in part, because it's not as though everything is a tissue of lies, it's not as though there wasn't neglect of comrades in the camps, but it's all put together in such a way to point at people who they don't want to be in leadership. And it's also possible that some leaders need to be replaced. There was a problem with Dumanoque, if we're going to be very open, where he fell from grace, and that was an inclination to use alcohol to excess. And this is why he was demoted from being the Secretary General after the Marugoro conference. But it's hardly emotional. There's so much that's based on rumor mongering and gossip that at the time this document was not taken seriously. You know, you can go through more of it. There's the part about Joe Mudisi being attacked because he had a Peugeot 404, uh a fairly nondescriptive, very good vehicle at the time. And he's using this as his private property. How does he have a car? My goodness. This is the guy who's the commander of MK. And if you go to the Zimbabwe comrades who regard him as such a dedicated military commander, they explain it in their interviews, not part of this particular memorandum, as thank goodness for Joe Moudisi and his Peugeot, because when we were as Zapu trying to smuggle weapons from Tanzania into Zambia, uh, it was very difficult because such military-style vehicles were constantly under suspicion. And as Mavusa points out, the British were very well entrenched in the security aspects in those earlier days. Um they say that we relied so much on Joe Moodisi actually driving the vehicle with a Zappu comrade and taking in the stocks of weapons. That's fact. That's not saying, as is the case here, and it's fact-based by huge evidence what that car was about. As is the case with all the other gossip-based um uh um accusations and allegations.

SPEAKER_01 1:27:17

Maybe Kumrima was uh can you triangulate for us this uh Ambrose Magiwane Mudiza fight? Uh and perhaps as you do that uh for us finally bring in OR and his his uh reaction to the mem the memorandum.

SPEAKER_02 1:27:43

By the way we discussed the memorandum with Chris afterwards. When he's not here, so I will not say uh anything and he's uh unable to do that. But uh Yeah, you know, he was such a hero. Uh and he's not here. I think if it was here, you would be saying a lot more of what Ronnie is saying. You're talking about age, perhaps at that age and being under pressure and facing possible death, and you come back and find people relax, you're given to these kinds of outbursts and anger and so on. This factory, Star Finisher, used to make what you call this face bottom uh false bottom. 100 years he is today, was put in one of those and crossed into Botswana. In a false bottom. False bottom covered with ice. So he's one of them. Um one of them was Yuria, Yuria Mukabe, uh stalwart, in fact. Oh, absolutely. So there was a comrade, uh, we used to call him Ratas, I don't know the real name at home, who who had been put out as a fisher, as a fishmonger. He drove a uh a baki, as we call it in South Africa, up and down across the uh Kazangula Bridge. Some Botswana and some buying fish. That was a tekoi, what you call it in proper English. But the aim of that business was to take people across Kazangula to do reconnaissance in the area in northern Rhodesia, then, and also the route towards South Africa. So the reason for the existence of uh Star Furniture wasn't just to make money, which by the way was extremely helpful. It was monitored by Tom Gobi, who was the TG at the time. There was uh Jimmy Pambo, who's late now, who was the accountant.

SPEAKER_01 1:30:37

See, is is is is Thomas Ngobi Shadrachlady?

SPEAKER_02 1:30:42

No. No. Oh, that's a different okay. So so I uh they could only have known, if this is a fact, that the leadership doesn't know about it from people who sat on the NEC.

SPEAKER_01 1:30:57

How would I know that Star Finisher is unknown to the wrestled that that's the NEC members were finishing that? We're saying no, we we we we we we we we don't even know what's going on in that in the yeah, look at Moody. So it sounds much like um a complaint because I do want to say something about how I want I don't know who between the two of you will say what happened to the Magiwanas. But you were you were explaining uh an earlier problem of uh Bruno Mdolo. Where I mean it's obvious, it's all it's all open, it's uh publicly known. When Mdolo's complaints often sounded like this uh about specifically Walter Sasulu. That Walter Sasul's house has expensive furniture, how can he afford expensive furniture? Uh these comrades are not what they say they are, and all of that. Am I wrong?

SPEAKER_04 1:32:01

That was exactly it, as you recall, what Bruno Matolo, um, who gave the evidence at the Ravonia trial and the Intel trial, and he says, Well, I started doubting these leaders when I went into Walter Susulu's house, my goodness. 1960 little house Ever so went to with some furniture. He goes on and exaggerates. So we're coming down to our human beings, uh, for whatever motive, either utter frustration, and in saying this about uh Brunan Touro, I'm not transferring this to the writers of the uh memorandum, but who in his case he collapses, he collaborates with the regime, and now it's all of this exaggeration about because you live a wonderful.

SPEAKER_01 1:32:54

I wouldn't be too quick to dismiss the tendency of this degeneration to the potential for collaboration. But before I do that, uh you was there originalism in the camp?

SPEAKER_02 1:33:12

Yeah, you know, you know, I really I wish I didn't come to the symptom. You know, the memorandum in the first instance was not popular at all among the generality of the comrades. And really, it's because of this misfortune. You see, the leadership in Congo at its establishment under Ambrose Makiwane consisted of people who came from one region overwhelmingly. There were only two who didn't come from that region. It was uh Ponio, what was um uh A. Le Fort Le Follon, yeah. And basically from Le Southe. Yes, yes. And um and uh Robert Miyama, who's died now. Probably was we ended up. Which originists from the Ramozzi uh sorry, uh I know you talked about Gilbert. Yes. Yes, yes. He was from a Pumelangar thing. Yes, oh yeah, all in Popo. So those are two people who are in the leadership who were not from the Eastern Cape. You are taking me into an area that I really don't like too much. And that that that is no not nobody. We were completely untouched, uninfluenced, unconcerned, as the first group of 43 about those appointments. They were all worthy appointments. I mean, if I was Ambrose, I would have spliced it with more people from other areas as well. But also there was a sense that we're in transition. What does it matter if you're on the lead in the leadership now? We should be gone in uh in a year or two.

SPEAKER_01 1:35:08

So this is the leadership of the camp? This is the leadership of the campaign. Which was predominated by people from the Cape.

SPEAKER_02 1:35:16

Eastern well, now Eastern Cape, yes, but it was the Cape Pizzo, I think came from Cape Town, but the rest of the other people came from the Eastern Cape. Huh? Now, when the memorandum is drawn up, it's also that same group from the same region exclusively. If these problems of MK are so bad, they should affect everybody. And you should be able to pick people from other places who would make common cause with you and say, let's do this and so on. I I don't know why the mistake of not inviting other people who you would assess them. Maybe the not maybe, there are people who would not have agreed to be part of the memorandum. There are people who would have agreed and might have influenced it differently, but never. I mentioned that the pizza was a room uh roommate.

SPEAKER_01 1:36:27

So he would go and uh be part of this without telling you.

SPEAKER_02 1:36:31

On the eve of the distribution of the memorandum, he says, hey, Wally, uh Walter uh uh with this document, man, and so on. Uh so I say, What document? And he shows it to me. And you know, among other things, I didn't even read all of it. I just looked at the names and I said, Oh my god, I know the reaction of the mguenya. Mkwenya is the the guys. Just looking at that, they will recall Kongo.

SPEAKER_01 1:37:05

I don't know. What is to recall Congo, the fight of Odise and Ambrose?

SPEAKER_02 1:37:10

All saw that subsequently. But in terms of the leadership, which seemed acceptable in Congo of that group, uh Makewan, of course, is the Islamic, is is appointing these people, then he quarrels with Joe because he wants his position. I am telling you the truth, he wanted that position. Uh and it wasn't given to him because it had already been given to Joe Modisi. He might have made it, he might have made a better commander in chief. I don't know. But the fact is that the position had been filled already.

SPEAKER_01 1:37:46

So, in some way, those divisions find themselves to a nonetheless more or less legitimate concern about in activity strategy and broader questions of the direction of an armed struggle.

SPEAKER_02 1:38:03

Yeah, you know, we we were div we got divided at a certain time in this congo. And, you know, it was there was a period when it was quite sad. You got the Natal group eating alone, um, and uh you got the Cape Group also sitting together for guys. The Houten guys, as we call it today, uh kind of uh more flexible. Uh and and by the way And Joe Mudiza is uh is is transvaal. Transvaal, yeah. He was transvaal. And you see, there came issues about him being a Totzi. Uh you you know you are opening a very difficult discussion. Uh who is not educated.

SPEAKER_01 1:38:47

Yeah, because they have a questionable political background. Well, uh was was was Joe Moody said. Well, let me tell you about the gangs in of the 1940s and 50s.

SPEAKER_02 1:39:00

I've got hard things to say about Joe. I do. Anybody who left around 1962, 63 for MK, Joe called in Durban, East London, PE, wasn't it? Collecting people. He he drove this. The the reason he wasn't even at um uh Rivonia was that he had been shipped out because he had, I think he was very much uh mocked and so on. But I am saying, how can he have been a nobody if he was entrusted with the task of taking recruiting people and taking them across the border? And he did that, no one can change that thing because that's what happened. Now, I don't know, maybe um not Mutsualedi, who was one of the three uh chosen uh of the Rivonia people, weren't it? Yeah, Andrew Mlatangene?

SPEAKER_04 1:40:01

No, no, no. Um Elias Mutzaledi, Andrew Malangeni, um Ray from PE and Sab. No, not him. So who are you searching for? Three, and then Government and Walter and Madiba Mlangeni.

SPEAKER_02 1:40:21

It was Andrew. Oh yeah, it was Andrew, yeah. Oh yes, it's Malangini. I know what story you're coming with that uh interview G. I don't know if relevant. But I I did there was also uh curious when we came back eventually to South Africa, say exactly Joe Mudisse. Uh what role did he play in all these things? And he said I took his place in Rivonia because he had to go. He said he was a member of that high command. I I don't know if you that's what he told me. Um so but I really discount completely. It's not worth dis arguing about whether Joe was a senior leader or not. He may have driven to Manogue's car and all of that and so on. But uh, I mean, suddenly he gets to gets to exile and he's made a commander-in-chief uh from nowhere. Uh it doesn't wash, but there are issues. You see, people spoke so there also. Ah and he also did speak quite a bit of Sotita, except with and all of that. And I think he was just now being regarded by some people as a Tso, you know.

SPEAKER_04 1:41:47

I have uh keep it in my you know, I'm making points which had to me, because I really don't it can't they can't be serious in terms of that phrase that nobody's uh in important positions, because this is a man who is well known. He was in the treason trial, Joe Modisi. Yes, he was a lieutenant of uh of Medibas in the defiance campaign. So they throw that out, it's thrown out, and it it's a ridiculous statement. So no name given. Who are they talking about, for goodness sake? Any of the people that they really fingered and named are people from Duma Noque to Job Disi who were known as leaders in the country. But that's a problem. They undermine there the actual real grievances which do exist, and the big problem of a strategic approach. And that's unfortunate in terms of the document. What was OR's?

SPEAKER_01 1:42:55

So the idea is there's crisis, division as you put it, memorandum, you know, and there are NEC members that you have put out against Makiwani, Ambrose Makiwani. And it looks like the there's also a problem of regionalism uh that was emerging, which had taken root for a couple of years in the what did Oliver Tambo do in response?

SPEAKER_02 1:43:30

The publication of uh the memorandum really shocked and disappointed uh OR. It really did. Um there is a number of occasions when he was invited by the comrades uh to talk about things and they would refer to the memorandum and say what's happened to these people, you know. Almost like they come from your area. You know, there are some really nasty things that followed up which had nothing to do with the OR that we know. But what hurt him the most, and he said, This is the first crisis for the AMC since we came out. We had the other crisis I was talking about, decisions, uh Natal people going and say this is the first crisis we're experiencing because there is a division within the National Executive Committee. Some members are using this memorandum as a doormat on which to rub their dirty feet. He was very hurt about the criticism of um uh Kutani, Moses Kotani in particular. Yes.

SPEAKER_01 1:44:57

Really, they worked very closely. And uh and Kordani was at the time the general secretary of the party.

SPEAKER_02 1:45:06

What was it? Was it was of the party, but also treasurer of the ANC. Yeah. And so fans would come out of his office. And there was uh a feeling about he liking Cho overly, something like that. So, and he is attacked, as you know, in the memorandum. That really hurt OR because he knew Moses Cortane and knew him well. Uh, I don't think they mentioned JB Max uh specifically in the memory. But he also was saying, how do these people who are bothered about issues in MK, how do they know about things that are happening in the NEC? You know, and uh so that that that's what worried him most about. He really was not concerned. I mean, he was thick skinned in terms of criticism. He welcomed I'm saying a positive thing about him. You criticized, or I think some people would be saying this ANC is um running dogs off the Moscow and things like that. And people said those things and you know, it almost laugh uh and so. But this was the most helpful thing. But what he also knew was that it was dividing the people in the employees.

SPEAKER_01 1:46:30

Did these comrades get to be taken to some DC? And if so, what was its outcome?

SPEAKER_02 1:46:38

Yes, there was uh oh yeah, you give me an opportunity to say something else also that was completely spread falsely. They were disciplined. I don't know who tried them, uh but the result of the disciplinary action was to suspend them uh from the organization. Uh that's when Chris uh I don't think they were suspended as in being driven out of the camps or anything.

SPEAKER_01 1:47:10

But they were suspended as members of the ANC?

SPEAKER_02 1:47:13

Um I think maybe as members of the ANC. The suspension I don't remember very well now. But the result of that suspension, by the way, was that Chris wasn't able to attend the Morocco conference uh because he was on suspension. And which was sad for me, because you know, to be at that conference and the guy which has come from the front line is not there because of these issues, you know, it kind of uh uh embarrasses you. So OR's reaction was really, really um bad, one of shock, one of disappointments. And uh, you know, with the passing of time, with hindsight now, we can talk about the three people who were from the leadership who supported, who seemed to have facilitated the drafting of this memoranda. And they are this was uh um Alfred Mporter. That's a nom du pair. Uh Alf uh Alfred Hokong. Uh uh Alfred Hokon was correct. But the MK.

SPEAKER_04 1:48:19

Mkota is his real name. Temba. Tem Temba Mpata. Temba Mb or T. Temba's his actual name. Temba who? Mother, MQ. You've got the click right.

SPEAKER_02 1:48:30

Yeah. It was it was him, it was Ambrose Makiwane, and it was Tennessee Makiwane. Those are the three people who were members of the executive uh who were uh implicated uh but did not sign. They did not sign. No, they did not sign.

SPEAKER_01 1:48:49

I I know for a fact, and everybody was in Lusaga knew that the people used to go to the I do want to know what happened, but let me go to the conference itself. And maybe we can bring in Comrade Ronnie here. I want to do make two ridiculous well provocations. First provocation if the memorandum and the issues it raises as it is known today was the reason for the Morugoro Conference. Are there solutions contained which you can take us through in the strategy and tactics which was the outcome of the Morugoro Conference?

SPEAKER_04 1:49:35

Yes, definitely. Um in the first place is the setting up of the Revolutionary Council open to all races. So not elected, appointed people. And this is where heroes of the group, such as Joe Slova, Yusuf Dadu, Rich September, are on the RC. So the Statement has good parts to it, which really helps. That's why the negative side is so unnecessary. And that is that they had felt that there had been a failure, let's say, an Africanist failure, that all members of the liberation movement weren't involved in decision making. And they did have a lot of confidence in the people that I've mentioned. But the need for a real structure now to deal with all the problems of this exile situation and of returning people to home and building the underground needed a proper organizational form. As I said at the opening of this interview, what we had inherited was the smashing of the structures at home, and then an exile structure which wasn't set up for the purpose, clandestine purposes, purposes of the armed struggle. So couldn't really cope and left too much on the shoulders of a particular commander of MK. So that was a very important aspect. The other also that emerges and doesn't only come from the group that are responsible for signing this, the ones who sign, is a point that the movement everywhere was struggling with, a strategic factor, that we weren't going to be able to develop an arms struggle on home ground unless we had proper internal preparation of a political kind to create sanctuary, to receive people in safety, and to connect the caders, the military caders, with political processes in the country. That's a big step forward. It's not succeeded immediately, and it remains an issue of its implementation going forward, by the way. But that's essential factors there. The other aspect that comes in is a changing world and the question of understanding the international community and the role of the socialist camp, the role of imperialism, that's very uh much a part of the strategy tactics document. And perhaps incorrectly, the pointing of the finger is only to the communists because of their knowledge and connection with the socialist countries.

SPEAKER_01 1:52:38

Can I quickly to the communists in a bit? If you'll allow me, yeah. Can I add you add you to speak but also deal with what happened to Manogue in this conflict? Okay, fine. Yes.

SPEAKER_02 1:52:56

But I wanted to say a positive aspect of uh the memorandum is actually the integration of MK, I don't know if the was and uh and the and and the ANC political gosh, I don't know if they're right, at the level of the RC. Yes, the Revolutionary Council. The Revolutionary Council, Tambo becomes the commander-in-chief. Ah, very good. Yeah. Uh where before Joe Modisse was commander-in-chief, uh Joe stays as chief of the army. But the ownership, the the taking in charge of MK affairs by the president of the ANC was exactly what was lacking, I think, which uh point is being made in the middle of the country.

SPEAKER_04 1:53:52

And then Nabusa, that's not uh a punishment as such or the demotion of Mudisi. It's a recognition of the political primacy over the military, so that the president of the ANC political position is also now the commander-in-chief.

SPEAKER_02 1:54:13

Oh, absolutely. I never would have thought it was a demotion. It really, I I uh that's the reason why he was made commander-in-chief. But that's what these guys were saying the leadership doesn't know what's happening in the MK. There was no way in which you would say that now.

SPEAKER_01 1:54:31

There is G of the ANC, big criticism of him here. So we know Moodisa becomes chief of chief of the army.

SPEAKER_04 1:54:41

What is it called? For a while, for a while, that's rather ambivalent. He's not left as commander of MK. There's an ambivalent, ambivalent um outcome because of the contestation, the tension. So you have the president commander-in-chief, and then there is no identified commander of MK as such. It's reorganized to remind you, Mavston, um, in terms of a command in Lusaka, a command um in London, a command in Tanzania, and structure other structures which are commanding the eastern flank of the country, the western flank of the country. It's actually they don't bite the bullet. That gets bitten when the high command of MK is again re-established with Moudisi as the commander in 1983.

SPEAKER_01 1:55:46

I see. To take that long. Yeah. All right. We know what happens to him. The second person is Dumanogue. What happens to him?

SPEAKER_02 1:55:56

You know, again, another older person that I uh respect and would really not like to say much adverse about him. I he was um it did hit the bottle.

SPEAKER_01 1:56:12

Yeah. I'm not laughing. And you know, because he was like, bite the bullet, hit the bottle. You know, it's all about shooting things, and yet you're talking about a different side.

SPEAKER_04 1:56:24

It's actually such a tragedy because he was the most gifted day. Absolutely outstanding. Incredible, Brian. He was really outstanding. But he is put it out there that he came from Everton. Yeah.

SPEAKER_01 1:56:38

Oh yeah.

SPEAKER_02 1:56:40

Okay. What became what he was. So so Duma, of course, um uh Duma was in charge of security. Really, there's very little that one knew about that. The security system in MK even was always suspect. People were thought to be hounding uh comrades they didn't like. You know, security should be about uh looking at what the enemy is doing and so on. But there was always a fear about what we used to call James Bond. The James Bonds are the people who are spying and telling somebody else and so on. But I don't think Duman Nogue ever kept a group of people who would go and uh um I th I think perhaps it's the way he reacted to Mlenze when he came that exacerbated his position. Um I I think so. But also you had the three people from the NEC, the Makiwaners and so on, who really did not like Duma at all because he was very, very clear about the role they were beginning to play, the Africanist theme, if I can call it that, at the Morocoro conference, where people will say, Well, you know, it's good for us to come together, but uh the at the driving seats of the ANC must be it must be Africans and so on. Uh this thing drifted to what came to be called the gang of eight.

SPEAKER_01 1:58:21

Um but at the conference, uh before n not to interrupt you, uh did Dumanogue lose the Secretary General position?

SPEAKER_02 1:58:30

There there were new elections, there were elections and uh Nzo, Al Alfred Nzo was uh elected to replace him, and Duma took it so well and continued being the production house. There's no way any uh there's no way that uh Alfred Nzo would be able had the capacity of Duma noku in terms of writing, etc., with due respect.

SPEAKER_04 1:58:56

Yes, but he was he was an advocate. But this is just sorry to perhaps correct you, are you not thinking elections took place at Cabwe, but not at uh Moragora for those positions appointed? The elections take place at Cabwe. And what was Duma just dropped? Oh, yes, he he he was dropped because it was felt that he had carried out his duties correctly.

SPEAKER_01 1:59:24

I stand. But remember, Duma, as I understand, had actually been acting on behalf of Walter Sasulu from when the ANC was acting. Oh yes, it could be. He had been in that position. I don't think there was a including OR. Yes, OR had been acting as well as the president of the ANC. Yes, because Lutuli uh had been under house arrest, blah blah blah blah blah and also until he died.

SPEAKER_02 1:59:54

Until he died. Even after he died, OR was refusing to take the position of president.

SPEAKER_04 2:00:02

Yes, all right. So that was the key thing. So and by the way, from all accounts, he took a demotion um absolute to any rancor, yeah, without any complaint, extremely uh modestly, yeah, and he worked in the um publicity department in quite a lowly position for several years until he proved um that he had the caliber to to give leadership again. But he was never made uh a top leader again. I think he became part of the NEC at some point.

SPEAKER_01 2:00:40

For your for your sake, yeah, uh I I I don't think the if you will be able to in in a very short space of time. 69 Morogoro Conference, ANC is really at its weakest as an organization. You were mentioning uh international balance of forces, the socialist camp is thriving and all of that. The strategy and tactics document quite frankly reads you know, like uh the communists dominated. Uh was this a capture of the ANC by the SAC? No, no, no, that's I mean, and specifically the character of your provocation.

SPEAKER_04 2:01:26

Um with in in a non-personal sense, I can understand how people view these things. Slovo basically wrote that document. And therefore, his theoretical aspect, as well as practical, because it was a case of praxis with him, he was always involved in theory and practice, and he pens it and it's accepted at Moragora. Um, so what he does manage to do is create a document that expresses the aspirations of the AMC, its view, its worldview without it being a communist or even a Marxist uh organization in terms of the National Democratic Revolution, which is a non-communist theory as such, it might originate in the thinking of the communists and the Marxists, but it fits the aspect of what stage we were at in terms of a country that still needed to attain its freedom and independence. And once you attain that, how you develop um a democratic revolutionary change where both the political and the economic economic power resides with the revolution, which we still engaged in to this day.

SPEAKER_01 2:02:53

Final parts for me is to pick up some names and uh you will say where did this person end up? Where did this person end up? Let me start with uh um uh the three NEC members. Tembum quarter.

SPEAKER_04 2:03:14

Okay, he basically disappears almost from view. I can't recall whether he dies in exile, natural of natural causes, or whether it's back in South Africa, he wasn't very well person uh from a health point of view. And I just can't recall that. Um I don't know about you, Madusan.

SPEAKER_02 2:03:39

No, I don't. I all I know is that when he was a member of the so-called Gang of Aights. Yes, it gets expelled at that time.

SPEAKER_04 2:03:46

He was expelled 1973. So he he was part of the Gang of AIDS. Yes, right, and uh and a very bright person. He had a sharp eye. Oh, sure. His editorials in Sichaba could write very well.

SPEAKER_01 2:04:01

Yes. Okay, um, I will come back to a quick explanation of this gang of eight at the end, maybe as a because okay, so he is in the gang of eight. Ambrose uh McKewan, what happened to him?

SPEAKER_04 2:04:18

Okay, so after the expulsion, Ambrose what so fades from view.

SPEAKER_01 2:04:25

Was he expelled?

SPEAKER_04 2:04:26

Yes, with the gang of eight. He was in the gang of the last show. He was basically, I would say, the leading person in the gang of eight. He was a key spokesperson. Um and he also disappears from view, um survives. I'm not even sure where it could have been in living in Botswana or Tanzania or a place like that. Some of these people did carry on living their lives out in that way. Tennyson, oh sorry, so with um Ambrose, I see him. Uh it was quite an event. He suddenly appears in about 1995 at the Ministry of Defense in Pretoria, and I bump into him, and he's been with Moudisi, the minister, and they're very chummy, and Teddy and Ambrose is very relaxed, and we have a very nice discussion. And what I then discover from Woodisi is that you know, this poor guy, he's missed the dates in relation to uh military pension, and he's come to see me, and we're fixing that up for him, Roddy. And I said, first class right Joe, um, well done. At least he deserves that.

SPEAKER_01 2:05:55

Tennyson Makua. Was he also in the gang of aid? He was. He was in the gang of aid. Absolutely. He was a sort of yes.

SPEAKER_02 2:06:04

Yeah. But later he makes a very strange decision to leave exile and come to the trans guy by arrangement with Kaiser Matanzima. And so it becomes very puzzling for somebody who was so much in the leadership of MK, by the way, in the sense of he was the person who used to look uh to take them through uh Zambia and so on and receive them and so on. He he knew what was going on in MK and so on. Uh that he would go to uh the trans guy and live comfortably there. Yeah, I think some people were asked to um uh assist him out of existence, you know. As a as a human being.

SPEAKER_01 2:06:56

Did he did he s did he in his activities sell out comrades?

SPEAKER_02 2:07:02

I think the very act of going to live in the trans guy with a matanzima was really quite hostile. It's not as if everybody in the band stands was like that, but Matanzima was. And to Do you know who gave the order?

SPEAKER_01 2:07:17

I no, I don't. Well, don't know, or you don't want to tell me. No, no, no. Comrade Drone. No, I'll put you on a spot here because in the book that you call you edited, there is a clear story, uh, except this detail of who gave the order.

SPEAKER_04 2:07:35

Well, look, before that, just to remind you, um, we know exactly that it was an MK comrade based in Lesotho who went into the Trotsky and assassinated him. So, in relation to who gives the command, there's a commanding uh center in Lesotho at that particular town. Chris. Well, Chris is the commander in that area. And did um uh did Tennyson Makuani deserve that fate? He was clearly a traitor. Um, everything pointed out to the fact being back in Matran Sky, and by the way, being an advisor to um Matanzima and people in the suit who had very good information about what was going on in the in in the Transcar.

SPEAKER_01 2:08:34

Okay, Chris Harney and Joe Moodise, here there is a vicious fight. What became of that relationship?

SPEAKER_02 2:08:46

Um I I will ask you because at the same time I left to make it. You worked virtueless. Yes, indeed.

SPEAKER_04 2:08:54

So I I had um known Chris in Congo Camp, um, and we we both were transferred at the same time by OR from Conga Camp to work in Daresalaam, and we worked on some project together there for OR. It was all this assessment of documents and books on guerrilla warfare, etc. Got on very well. He's the most lovely person, well lovely human being. Um, I then meet him in Maputu in 1982, where he's withdrawn from the command in the Sutu because there have been several attempts on his life. And we're together at that particular point. So um Chris and I, we work, Mudisi is coming and going to Maputu as well. They get on very well. We're working in the military and political structure there. Um and it was good to see the relationship in 1988. I'm uh called to Dusaka. Chris is already there, and the MK Headquarters and High Command is fully established, as I've referred, and there is the commander of MK, Joe Medici, and his commissar first, who's Chris Harney, later becomes chief of staff. And in all that period, they work very, very well. A respectful relationship, a warm relationship, absolutely no animosity whatsoever. And Chris clearly thought very highly of Moudisi as a commander. And and and Moudisi thought very highly of Chris, his politics, and his involvement of MK and all the duties he carried out. You would think there was had been no problem in the past. It was a much maturer Chris, uh, if if you harken back to the period we were discussing. And of course, Chris, we can say, was one of the most, certainly most outstanding products of our movement and of that younger generation and of contarus as well.

SPEAKER_01 2:11:18

Any other name, Comrad Mavus? I see there's Hembe Mpengua, uh Kobozi, Leonard Bito, Moucem Lanze, and then Mbali, who is Ndobegazi uh Fiphaza. Uh do you not remember any of the others? What happens to them?

SPEAKER_02 2:11:41

Migsa, it was uh Kobozi went to live in West Germany. They were still East and West. And uh as he aged, he was sent to um an old what? Old Old Age home. Old age home, yes. And And uh he was very cagey. He didn't really want to establish contact with anybody at all. Uh at one time the I was asked when we're back here now to um see if he could be contacted because somebody was chasing him and and wanting to but I I I don't know, I suspect he has since passed. Um but he stayed in Germany. He had left the ASCII. And Blanze? Blanzer came back.

SPEAKER_04 2:12:35

Who died late because of the names, but Willmot MP I knew very well, and I think he came back, but old and lived too long.

SPEAKER_02 2:12:44

That's a MP guy. Yes, absolutely. He would have uh overcome the memorandum thing. Uh I don't say he says he regrets it and so on, but he was just the kind of guy who was a trade unionist, first and foremost. And um, yeah, uh from what I know he died a natural death. Okay, and Melenza? Yeah. Melenza uh came back into the country. You remember the last operation this by sea? At Aventura.

SPEAKER_04 2:13:20

Yeah, yeah. 71. Oh. 71, 72, I don't, but I think it's early 72.

SPEAKER_02 2:13:29

Yeah, but he he went in and just sold out completely as a traitor. He became a traitor and was very vicious with the people. I mean, and he would point them out and they would be tortured. I remember the um um person we used to call Madiba, uh who the three who crossed at the Caprivi with that flag. Oh yes, with flag yellow. Yeah. One of them made it to uh Islam, Gugompo, and um and uh this Melanza fellow is uh sold him out. Yeah.

SPEAKER_01 2:14:11

But did you manage to uh do to him what you did to no, I don't think that was done too much. No, I don't think anything happened. Nothing okay. This brings us to the end of thank you very much.

SPEAKER_04 2:14:26

What is a very famous economy? Thank you. Thank you very much. I'm going to have to rush off. Yes, please. Can you help me with this one? Yeah, it's your your memories. Thank you very much.

SPEAKER_01 2:14:42

Uh are we responsible for the for the transport now? I I was brought in here. Yes, I'm trying to check with Comrade Roni because it might be in first last transport. It might be important was because Comrade Roni has to rush. If we are doing his transport, it should be called now.

SPEAKER_03 2:15:07

Um how do you feel?

SPEAKER_02 2:15:14

I've I didn't want to be adding other things. You know I was getting started in story. Maybe we'll find time. When the guys were caught in uh Wanky, uh one of them was Tula Vopel. He wrote a book, Uncle Siswa Fighting for a divide attention. It was one of the people who was uh the