Pressure Zone a podcast by Hack The Box
Pressure Zone is a game-driven cybersecurity podcast where CISOs and executives are placed inside escalating, realistic risk scenarios that mirror the complexity of today's cyber leadership. Each rung requires the guest to make a decision under pressure, explain the rationale, and translate the impact into business terms, just as they would with a board, CEO, or executive team. The episode unfolds as a structured game, creating an engaging format that reveals authentic leadership judgment, tradeoffs, and security insight without feeling like a traditional interview or sales pitch.
Each episode is built around escalating rounds: connected, sequential scenarios that move from early warning signs to high-stakes incidents, where every decision shapes the context and pressure of what comes next. Guests must assess the risk, make a clear call, and defend it in business terms. If they dodge a question or avoid a decision, they trigger a Confession Card penalty, prompting an honest, insight-revealing response such as a hard lesson learned or an unpopular opinion. This keeps the tension high while preserving the realism, pace, and authenticity of the game.
Pressure Zone a podcast by Hack The Box
The Blind Horizon
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Who should lead when a cyber incident crosses into the physical world?
In Episode 7 of the Pressure Zone podcast, Olivier Caleff faces a series of decisions that test the limits of authority during a crisis. Technical responders want to contain the threat, maritime operators prioritize safety, and executives push to restore operations. Each choice brings consequences for the workforce, the port, and the wider supply chain.
The episode explores why effective crisis leadership depends on clearly defined mandates, domain expertise, escalation paths, and teams that can keep functioning under prolonged pressure.
Uh again we've got uh regulations in the maritime world and uh um as you've got firefighters and in in uh in stations, in airports, you've got firefighters and you've got people who are ready to to fight against any kind of pollution. And all that is related to hazardous material is also well set into the into the regulations. So uh I would say that's I wouldn't say it's business as usual, but we are ready for that if we are such a big uh big hubber.
SPEAKER_00Welcome to Hack the Boxes Pressure Zone podcast, where we take one operational nightmare and watch it spiral. I'm Christine Bartlett, and today I'm joined by Oliver Kalef, who has held many cybersecurity leadership positions in the CISO community and is currently chair of the first organization. Oliver, you've spent your career in environments where a bad decision does not stay on a dashboard. You can stop transport disruption infrastructure and put people and operations at real risk. You've said crisis management is never a lone hero game. It depends on mandate, roles, and alternatives because when pressure hits, unclear authority quickly turns into hesitation. But today we are stepping onto the docks of the blind horizon. The digital data is lying and the physical containers are unstable and the clock is always ticking. Your cyber team says the system cannot be trusted. Your crane operators say the physical load cannot wait. Both are looking to you for a mandate. Who decides what risk matters most and when to stop the business from moving forward? Let's see if your team framework holds up when the ship starts to tilt. Are you ready to step into the zone?
SPEAKER_01Yes, Christine.
SPEAKER_00Okay, great. All right, here's the the overall storyline. Your company operates a major automated maritime container terminal handling over 10,000 TEU. That's 20-foot equivalent units a day. A sophisticated cyber incident corrupts your terminal operating system planning layer and injects spoofed commands into the automated straddle carrier control network. The system hasn't crashed. Instead, it is silently scrambling the digital data tags of shipping containers. Containers holding volatile hazardous chemicals are being logged as ambient food cargo, and the yard planning algorithm is routing massive multi-ton industrial loads to be stacked on top of fragile containers. Because operators are forced to bypass automated weight and tilt interlocks to maintain throughput, the yard faces an immediate physical capsizing and structural collapse risk. Your digital threat hunters are brilliant at analyzing malware, but they know nothing about maritime port physics or safety laws. Conversely, your harbor masters and crane captains understand the yard perfectly, but cannot read a firewall log. Ships are idling in the harbor, costing $80,000 an hour, and a heavy storm is rolling in. Okay, round one. It is now 10 p.m. on a stormy Friday. The terminal operating system is scrambled, and a heavy cargo crane operator radios the control room, stating that a stack of containers in zone C is visibly leaning because a heavy industrial generator was mistakenly stacked on top of thin-walled retail boxes. Your lead instant response engineer demands an immediate total network isolation of the automated yard control segments to freeze the malware before it spreads to shore vessel data exchange ports. However, the harbor yard master violently objects, stating that if you kill the control network right now, the automated emergency brakes on active straddle carriers will engage instantly. Load carriers mid-travel will lock in place with compromised windsway stability, creating pinch point hazards and risking a catastrophic stack collapse as the storm hits. They are both looking to you to settle the mandate. What is your command? Don't worry, there's multiple choice. You've got four options coming up. A the safety first mandate, delegate absolute operational authority to the harbor yard master, defer the network isolation, keep the automated systems live, and accept the risk of the malware spreading to secure the physical loads first. B the technical isolation mandate, delegate absolute authority to the lead IR engineer, order the immediate network shutdown to contain the cyber threat, accepting the risk of mechanical lockups and hardware damage on the docks. C the fractured hybrid, split the team, order the IR engineer to isolate only the administrative network segments while commanding the crane operators to manually run to the breakers and physically kill the power to individual cranes bypassing automated logic. Lastly, D the operational pause, refuse to choose between them, order an immediate 30-minute operational pause for both teams to collaboratively map out an alternative containment strategy that protects both data integrity and physical safety, despite losing 40,000 in port downtime during the huddle.
SPEAKER_01So I'd rather say to me what's most important is uh I would say real life. So that's the business approach. So I would rather say uh option A, uh, because uh they know what they have to do and they are in charge, and I'm just I would say a supplier of a tool which is called IT. And uh but their problems and their issues uh is more important. Uh if I take if I make an assessment um from an IT perspective, I've got in the CIA triad, I've got the integrity issue, I've got availability issues, but that's nothing compared to real-world consequences. And in that case, uh if we have some physical uh risks, uh according to my understanding, they are much they're way more important that uh than me, and that's uh what they may be confronted with from an IT perspective. Um the second thing is uh if we are in a harbor, uh and as you said, that uh you've got some uh products uh that are uh I would say hazardous material, uh you've got stronger regulations in the world of maritime transportation. So again, I consider that I'm just uh someone who is providing support and I'm nothing compared to the real business uh approach. So uh I definitely would say uh option A, and then I will ask them to uh how I can align myself in order to ease their work or to anticipate on potential impacts.
SPEAKER_00Okay, alright. So you you've ultimately handed the keys to a cyber incident to the harbor master. It's a highly compassionate choice for physical safety, as you mentioned. And while your crew is moving containers, the malware just leaped across the port's bridge connections and infected the navigation systems of an arriving container vessel. You protected the dock workers, but you also allowed a systematic cyber infection to hit the maritime supply chain. So the saga continues. Round two, the vessel extortion. It is now 2 a.m. on Saturday. The storm is worsening, and your choice from round one has left the port unstable but functioning. Suddenly, the captain of the MV Oceanic Titan, a massive container ship carrying 200 million in cargo currently moored at berth four, radios your operations center on an emergency channel. The attacker has left an automated text-to-speech broadcast running on the ship's bridge console. They claim that because the vessel accepted the port stowage and shore power data fees, they have compromised the ship's integrated automation network and are threatening to remotely trigger an asymmetric trans ballist transfer. They are demanding a 3 million extortion payment for four in four hours. If you don't pay, they threaten to initiate the transfer, which would roll and capsize the ship right at your berth, completely blocking the harbor channel for months. Your lead IR engineer says that they can attempt a remote network purge of the umbilical bridge, but the ship's technical crew insists that only they have the maritime authority to touch the vessel system. How do you assign the mandate? A the unified instant command, assert absolute port authority, explicitly expand your IR engineer's mandate to override the ship's crew and push the remote network purge across the umbilical, treating the vessel as a node on your network. B the sovereign handoff, respect maritime boundaries completely, formalize a clear handoff of the incident management mandate for the ship to its captain and chief engineer, offering them raw technical logs while your team focuses purely on the dock side perimeter. C. The external escalation loop, refuse to let either team act alone, trigger an emergency maritime protocol to hand the command mandate over to the Coast Guard and National Cybersecurity Authorities, placing your own team into a strict supporting role while the clock ticks down. D, the contingency anchor, reject both technical gambles, order the harbor master to immediately assign a fleet of emergency tugboats to pull the oceanic Titan out of the berth and into open water immediately, accepting that if the ship rolls in the shipping lane, it will disrupt regional trade but saving your docks.
SPEAKER_01So here uh there are there is a dimension that uh we must take into account, uh, which is again related to regulations and the fact that it's not simply located in our own uh uh harbor, and that we have to take into account uh the global approach. So in that case, I would say it's between C and D, because we must uh if we haven't done so, uh we must send notification to the coast boards because they are the ones who have must have a global picture over everything. And um the second the second option would be uh the the last one, D, uh, regarding the contingency, because here we have uh a local approach, I would say, to my understanding in what you said. So it's both a global approach and a local approach. So to me, definitely it's between C and D, and I would say uh for A, it's not the role of a captain or whoever or the port authority to only deal with his own problem because it's not simply their own problem. It's much wider than that. And uh, as um there were no option before that to uh issue a warning or to send a notification to the authorities or to the regulators, uh, that I think that's high time to do it. Uh moreover, uh you've got uh quite a few uh regulations uh when it comes to uh safety uh at sea. Uh you've got some uh regulations, some that such as the SOLAS, uh the safety of life at sea, you've got uh the uh uh AMDG about the uh the hazardous material, uh, and you also got all that is related to, I would say, physical security and protection of human life. So that's uh I would say here it's uh much more than simply a little hazardous environment. It's uh I think there's a real environmental risks, and the fact that there's a ransom demand, it's just something which is well bothering, uh, but it's not it shouldn't be seen as a major item, and I shouldn't focus on that.
SPEAKER_00Okay, so it sounds like you're leaning maybe a little bit more towards C, the external escalation loop to pull in the Coast Guard and National Cybersecurity Authorities, right? Um which yeah, makes makes a lot of sense when you're in one of these situations, it's incredibly complex. Um all right, we'll we'll keep uh oh, go ahead.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, I'd like to add something because uh at that point I do believe that there will be some uh legal or liability issues. Uh so I don't know whether uh I I've got an insurance uh uh behind me or whatever, but um there are things that that cannot be uh left just in my own premises, and that's why I really need to go and extend that to others. Yes. Yeah, and that thing is that um well, we've been working for something like uh four or uh four hours, uh because it started at 10 uh p.m. it's uh 2 a.m. according to what you said. Yeah. So I think the human factor is must also be taken into account. Uh when you are under pressure, whether it's for cyber incidents or real-life incidents, four hours uh may become may start to be uh a big, uh big tall. So I also have to uh be ready to have some uh additional uh staff or other teams that may be coming as a as a support and uh to I would say release a little bit of the burden of those who've been uh working on the first hours of the incidents.
SPEAKER_00Yeah. No, that's yes, agree. All right, we'll we'll keep we'll keep moving. Now we're moving into uh round three, the board's mandate ultimatum. There's always an ultimatum somewhere. Now it is 6 a.m. on Saturday. The local crisis has escalated into an executive battleground. The CEO and corporate legal team place a call into your war room. Due to the mounting port downtime penalties and threat of global shipping delays, the company's stock price is starting to feel the pressure and pre-market sentiment. The CEO delivers a blunt directive. Oliver, I appreciate your structured team approach, but structure is slowing us down. I am giving you absolute emergency executive power over both the digital response and the maritime operations. I want you to bypass the harbor master safety delays, override the ship crew's legal objections, and push a forced technical recovery script across the entire port network immediately. I want this port processing containers by noon. You are ordered to accept a massive centralized mandate that violates your core principle of role-specific expertise. How do you respond? A. The strict regulatory veto. Reject the centralized mandate flatly, inform the CEO that forcing a technical override without the explicit authorization and validation of the local experts, the harbor master and the crane captains, violates maritime safety regulations and you will not accept a mandate that forces a reckless gamble. B, the delegated authorization trail, accept the emergency power on paper to appease the executive team, but immediately issue a sub-mandate to your localized team leads, forcing the CEO to sign an explicit written technical risk waiver before live code is executed. C. The team sovereignty compromise. Inform the CEO that you will act as the unified commander for the crisis, but you will refuse to push any network override script until your dual domain team, IR leads, and the Yardmasters provide a unanimous, verified, alternative sign-off. D. The hard executive resignation. State firmly that a centralized executive mandate cannot solve a decentralized operational physics problem. Refuse to participate in a boardroom-driven gamble that risks human life on the docks, and surrender your command.
SPEAKER_01So first thing is that uh I don't think I can bypass any regulations uh because it's not in my mandate, uh, even if the CEO is uh signing something to me. Uh so definitely uh no. Um having uh a waiver which is I would say only signed by the CEO is not enough either. Um so uh I I'm afraid I didn't fully understand option C and D, but um I I would say uh if any of those is related to the fact that uh um I I am I cannot be in charge of something I do not master at all and I have no knowledge because uh I would say I've got no knowledge uh about uh about cranes, about STS, about uh um I would say the the real maritime life and how it's taking place. Uh I can I can re I really cannot take any any decision. So uh I I if you can repeat option C and D, please, and that would be easier for me to uh make my make up my mind.
SPEAKER_00Sure, sure. Yeah, no, C is more of bringing the team together. So I'll read it again. The team sovereignty compromise, inform the CEO that you will act as a unified communicator for the crisis, but you refuse to push any network override script until your team, including the IR leads and the yard masters, provide a unanimous, verified, alternative sign-off. So you're looking to them to help, you know, kind of bridge the gap and pull together the solution, um, and still telling the CEO no, or you, you know, you need more time for that to happen. D, the hard executive resignation would be that um you state firmly that a centralized executive mandate cannot solve this decentralized physics problem and refuse to participate in a boardroom-driven gamble that risks human life on the docks, and you would basically resign.
SPEAKER_01Uh okay, so I think it will be more uh C than anything else. Uh first thing, because uh it's not in my habit to resign uh in the middle of a crisis, and uh I can be uh of help. So I would say it's option C. However, in option C, that's something that is missing. Uh, when you are talking about the time uh that is needed in order to make an assessment, uh, what is that uh amount of time? And time is a critical factor to me in every uh incident, and that's something that I always try to assess, and that's also one of the things that I always ask to uh uh to uh users or to the business partners whenever there's an incident. Uh how long does it take to uh stop uh operations? Uh how long does it take to uh stop non-critical operations, and how long does it take to make a diagnosis? Because if the diagnosis takes, for example, uh uh half a day, uh it doesn't match with uh the context we are in. So maybe in some cases it's much better to shut down everything, even though it has a cost. You told it was something like uh 80k per uh per hour, if I'm well at the very beginning. Uh that's something, of course, but uh I would rather ask the CEO what is your limit? Because um, can I have uh let's say um 10 hours or 12 hours to deal with the incidents, even though it has a cost? Uh it's not my responsibility, it has the responsibility of the CEO, and I must get an answer from him before anything else. So, because in any case, uh my answer uh if I do not have any elements is I do not want to create even more problems that may have some long-term impacts. Because I would say rebuilding a network or rebuilding computers take hours or maybe a few days, but rebuilding uh a shipyard or uh a full environment in a harbor may take months, if not years. So we've got here the the time factor which is critical. So to finish with, I would say in that case, it would rather be option C.
SPEAKER_00Okay. All right, well, and in that case, there's also the the people factor, too, right? So trying to run a democratic consistency consensus model and an active cyber kinetic crisis requiring a unanimous sign-off from a tech expert, your IR uh person and your harbor master, who are currently now blaming each other for the incident. Uh, you you might not find a middle ground. Uh, you've just created an internal gridlock, and the noon deadline, as you mentioned, is going to pass while your experts are still debating technical terminology in a war room. Okay, round four. Fractured Coalition. It is now 11 a.m. on Saturday. The pressure from the boardroom has trickled down to the docks, and your structural framework is splitting at the seams. Your lead IR engineer, operating under intense panic, bypasses your command structure and coordinates directly with a junior crane operator to run a localized network reset on a single automation cluster. The reset goes wrong. It triggers an unmapped system state that drops a container, container stack in zone D, narrowing, missing, narrowly missing a ground crew. Now the Harbor Yardmaster is furious. He radios the war room stating his entire crew is walking off the piers immediately because the tech guys are going rogue and creating a lethal work environment. Your unified team has completely fractured because roles and responsibilities are now violated. How do you re-establish your command mandate? A. The disciplinary removal. Instantly remove the lead IR engineer from the incident response team for breaching his assigned mandate and formally hand over all site safety control to the harbor yard master to coax the workers back. B the re-anchored war room. Refuse to fire anyone, halt all technical actions instantly, call a mandatory 15-minute emergency huddle on the floor with both leaders and force them to verify and cosign every single command path before a single key is touched. C. The automated mandate split. Separate the infrastructure physically. Order the IT team to work completely out of band in an isolated laboratory sandbox while ordering the yard crew to run the port on 100% manual, non-networked legacy diesel equipment, eliminating the dependency entirely. Lastly, D the executive accountability stand. Step down to the docks yourself, stand between the yard crew and the tech leads, take full personal accountability for the coordination failure, and formally declare that any future rogue technical action will result in immediate termination of those uh employees.
SPEAKER_01So to me, one factor which is important, I already mentioned, is the human factor. So it's 11 a.m. We've been uh running this incident for 13 hours. Uh, if it's still the same people, I do understand that uh people can go into panic and make mistakes. So um I would say firing and taking undisciplinary measures, maybe, but that's it will be in the future, and there will be reasons why um this incident occurred. So uh I'm not interested in option A. Uh I would rather say option C because here again it goes back to those who are in charge of uh um the business approach and uh um handing over to uh manual operation by those who know how to do it is to me what makes more sense. I would say the um HR issues um shouldn't be taken uh into account uh in the middle of uh of an emergency. Uh that's something that should be uh cared for at a later stage. So to me, it's just uh a side uh element uh that shouldn't uh take me out of the focus, which is uh going and trying to care for this incident. And I will simply reinstate to the uh to the CEO or to the other uh stakeholders that uh as we've been working for 11 hours uh on this incident, uh if we they haven't been uh switching uh staff and having other people coming on shift, uh it's high time to do that. Otherwise, uh similar issues may be arising and the situation will be even worse. Right. So again, this uh human aspect is must be taken into account in any incident, whatever the severity of the emergency is.
SPEAKER_00Yeah. Spoken like uh somebody who's been through something similar, relying on your other executive teams to or executive leaders, right? Um you're not you're not looking forward to doing HR's job. Let them handle that after the fact. All right, uh, we're moving on to round round five, the kinetic climax. It is now 11:45 a.m. The noon deadline is 15 minutes away, and the storm has reached its peak. The malware has exploited a legacy calibration routine in the crane control network, causing a rapid synchronized overcorrection loop across all primary gantry systems. Under the storm's high winds, the empty spreaders are swinging like massive pendulums, pushing the automation system past its wind compensation safety thresholds. The attacker delivers their final message. Pay the ransom now, or we drop the automated spreaders straight into the hole of the MV Oceanic Titan. Your technical team presents an unvetted emergency logic script that can force an absolute runtime kill of the entire automated yard subsystem. It has an 80% chance of freezing the cranes instantly, but a 20% chance of triggering a cascading database corruption across your entire multi-region shipping inventory system, scrambling global tracking data for weeks. There is no time for consensus and no clear rule exists in the run book. What is your final command? A. Do it live, execute the unvetted runtime kill script immediately. We take the 80% odds to protect the vessel and human lives on the pier, accepting the risk of global data corruption. B the physical line isolation, reject the script gamble, order a volunteer team of mechanical engineers to physically run into the storm with high voltage pot sticks to trip the manual line isolation switches at the base of the crane, risking their immediate safety. C. The controlled failure containment. Let the timer hit zero, keep your teams behind the safety barriers, accept the physical damage to the ship's hull, and rely strictly on your localized damage control and maritime salvage teams to handle the aftermath. D. The immediate ransom play. Bypass all operational protocols and immediately authorize the 3 million extortion payment out of your emergency corporate fund, betting that the attacker keeps their word and releases the logic lock before the spreaders drop.
SPEAKER_01So here again, I don't think I have the power to risk the lives of human beings. Um it's far beyond my authority. So I certainly won't take uh option B, even though it may solve the problem. Um second thing is I have a comment. I do believe that based on the side of the harbor, I do have backups. So if there's a corruption, well, maybe I'll be losing a few uh data. Uh so that's uh something I must deal with the RPO, and I do believe that I've got something which is uh uh coherent uh with the business approach uh due to the size of the harbor. Uh so uh I would say even though the database is compromised, uh that may not be that of an issue to me. So uh paying the ransom, I don't have either the the I'm not confident that it will solve the problem because it may be true but it may not be true. So I don't know what are the stakes, but I I'm not either ready to to gamble. Uh so I'd rather be options say that option C is the best one of what you've been uh suggesting, uh which is waiting for the for the crash if it happens, and uh uh in a way uh anticipate and have my salvage salvage team ready to uh to act in case of the problem really occurring.
SPEAKER_00Okay. Alright, so the final answer you're picking C, the passive surrender to the clock. You stayed behind the safety barrier and allowed the compromise to play out because your rules didn't allow an unvetted gamble. The automated spreaders dropped, uh puncturing the hull of the oceanic Titan, and the berth is now flooded with fuel oil. You kept your team structure perfectly intact, but you've successfully protected a pile of rules while the actual asset melted right down in front of you. But as you said, we've got backup, right?
SPEAKER_01Yeah, exactly. And uh even though for for all that is related to physical or pollution or whatever, uh uh again, we've got uh regulations in the maritime world, and uh um as you've got firefighters and in in uh in stations, in airports, you've got firefighters and you've got people who are ready to to fight against any kind of pollution. And all that is related to hazardous material is also well set into the into the regulations. So uh I would say that that's I wouldn't say it's business as usual, but we are ready for that if we are such a big uh big harbor. And the Port Authority is also there to maintain a team of people ready to act. And I I believe that if there's a storm, maybe it's a big storm, but I'm also I've been taking that into my risk analysis, not a cyber risk analysis, but the real life risk analysis.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, I think that speaks true, right? Any cyber risk is like real life, has multiple implications, uh, typically, right? Um, okay, so the the storm is slow, slowly clearing, the crane spreaders have stopped swinging, and the shipping lanes are either open for business or tied up in an international litigation. We've just watched a multi-billion dollar uh maritime gateway hang by a single software umbilical cord. Oliver, you faced a mandate collision, an international maritime standoff, executive pressure from the boardroom, an internal team mutiny, and a final choice between a digital gamble or a physical catastrophe. Before we reveal your score, we have one question. When the wind was howling and your teams were scrambling over the radio, did you still believe that a clear mandate can prevent a gamble, or did you realize that sometimes a leader's job is to simply choose which impossible alternative they are going to have to live with?
SPEAKER_01Well, that's a that's a good question. Um I have never considered being smarter than than others in a situation which is unclear. So it's always very easy, and you've got a lot of influencers who are doing that, saying afterwards, you should have been doing this, you should have been doing that. But when you are in the middle of a crisis, uh you do not have all the elements at hand. So you take decisions that may be good or that may not be good, but I would say one never knows. And something that I've been doing, um I don't know if you've seen that, but uh when you were talking, I was taking notes to get a kind of logbook of what was taking uh place because it's important for me to know exactly where I am based on what happened uh before. So uh again, what I want to say here is that um you can only take decisions based on the on the context you have, and that the mandate you have uh must not be something you'll be discovering when you are confronted to a crisis. The mandate must be defined at the very beginning. Or if you are a CISO or if you are a CSO manager or you are a security expert and you don't have any mandate, I would say instead of focusing on technical matters, you should really focus on what is your mandate, what are you allowed to do, what are the um uh the escalation uh path, and uh what is the type of relationship that you have with your management, with the business uh teams, uh with the uh safety, with the security teams within your own organization. So I'm first I'm not alone in a company, and second, I have never considered that I was the one that should be leading uh a security incident, because a security incident has always impacts on real life and on business. I'm again I'm here to provide some support, I'm not here to rule the world. So I'm part of a team.
SPEAKER_00Yes, yes. I feel like that, you know, when you get into management, you you start to learn, you know, who you other leaders you rely on for certain things and levels of expertise, right? Because as you mentioned, you can't know it all, you can't do it all, um, and and you've got to have some humility to to recognize that and and lean on those. Spoken like a true leader, and uh we're gonna give you the systems commander uh title for this balanced risk and pragmatic through your approach. You handled the crisis like a true operational strategist. You recognize that a port is a complex ecosystem where IT and OT must coexist, and you use structured huddles, out-of-band isolation, and risk-weighted sub-mandates to manage the human friction without losing your cool or your reporting ethics. So we'll give you a final resilience score of 87 out of a hundred. You were stable, defensible, and highly professional. You protected the asset without destroying the underlying culture of the team. Alright, and before we unlock you out of this hot seat uh and let you out of the zone, one final uh signature question we always ask our leaders. If you could send one sentence encrypted message to a young instant response manager starting their very first day in a critical infrastructure environment about the danger of pretending to be a hero instead of building a team, what would it say?
SPEAKER_01It would be think twice before doing something, and um in any case, report before doing it.
SPEAKER_00Alright. Okay.
SPEAKER_01It's a question of uh having a global picture or not. Most of the time, when you are at the uh on the in the last mile, you don't you only see what you've got in front of you and you don't understand the the whole context. And taking into account this context is is necessary. And in any case, you've got to adapt yourself to to this context, and what is true in your when you are sitting in your chair in front of your keyboard is one thing, but getting the full picture is much more important.
SPEAKER_00Yes. Alright. Thank you, Oliver, and that's a wrap on our episode of the pressure zone. To our listeners in the logistics hubs and the operational control rooms and the executive suites. Remember that your automated systems are only as secure as the team structure backing them up. If your roles aren't clearly aligned and your mandates aren't rock solid, your entire enterprise is just a gamble waiting uh for a storm to hit. Join us next time when we put another global leader in the hot seat. Until then, trust your experts, define your mandates, and watch the horizon. Thank you for joining us on the HTV podcast.
