‘Remembering and Forgetting' Season Review, Professor Edward Harcourt

On Tuesday, 26 May, Professor Edward Harcourt gave a talk to membership titled ‘’Remembering and Forgetting' Season Review’.

The abstract is as follows:
In this talk, Edward Harcourt will look back at the 2024-25 lecture series - elaborating which ideas stood out to him the most, discussing the thought behind the selection of speakers and topics, and offering his own thoughts on Remembering and Forgetting. 

About the Speaker:
Edward Harcourt is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of Keble College. His research lies in moral psychology, and on the boundaries between ethics and the philosophy of mind. From 2018-22 he was Director of Research, Strategy and Innovation at the UKRI Arts and Humanities Research Council.

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:05

Welcome everybody. Thank you so much for joining us. Today we have Professor Edward Harcourt speaking about the Remembering and Forgetting series. He is a professor of philosophy at the University of Oxford and a fellow of Kempell College. His research is in moral psychology and the boundaries between ethics and the philosophy of mind. And from 2018 to 2022, Professor Harcourt was Director of Research, Strategy and Innovation at the UK RI Arts and Humanities Research Council. Thank you so much for joining us tonight. Over to you.

SPEAKER_01 0:42

Thank you very much, Julia, and welcome to all of you. If you can if you know how to operate the hands up button, if I could ask you to do a quick show of hands, how many of you attended more than zero of the remembering and forgetting lectures themselves? Because that'll give me a way of seeing one. Only one of you. Okay. Ah, and you've some the two of you. Okay, thank you. So it's kind of a little bit evenly balanced. So some of this will be more familiar to some of you than it is to others. I hope that's not a problem, but I can't really think of a way around that. So look, thanks all very much for joining. I guess the first thing I should say is that it's a great privilege to be academic director of the Royal Institute of Philosophy because one of the funnest things that I get to do is dream up these lecture series. So nobody tells me what to do lectures about. I've got a completely blank page. As long as the theme is such as to attract decent philosophers to address it, and such as to attract members of the public to attend them, I can invent a series of lectures on absolutely anything I want, and then I can invite anybody I want to come and give those lectures. And that's exactly what I've been doing over the last three years or so. And so I don't quite know how I thought of the topic of remembering and forgetting. Philosophers have been interested in memory for a very long time, but the subjects in relation to which they have explored memory have been quite narrow, as some of you will, I'm sure, know. So, for example, when I was a graduate student, philosophers were very interested in analyzing the concept of memory. So they were interested in whether to remember something there has to be a causal link between a past experience and a present mental event, and if so, how that is mentally stored, whether there has to be a memory trace encoded in the brain. That was a huge topic, the causal theory of memory. People have been interested in skepticism about memory, whether we can really know that there was a past, or whether in fact the only thing we can know is real is our immediate present experience. That leads to worries about solipsism of the present moment. And most famously, perhaps, philosophers have focused on memory because they've seen it as a key to the metaphysics of personal identity. So famously, Locke seems to have said that the person you are extends forwards and backwards precisely as far as you can extend your consciousness. So the present you didn't exist any further back than you can remember. Now, we won't go into the ins and outs of that theory, but memory's been important to philosophy for various reasons. But in thinking about this series, I wanted to go beyond those familiar topics, staying true to the idea that memory is central to who we think we are, central to our sense of identity, central indeed to our lives, but going beyond those epistemological and metaphysical questions in which memory features centrally and bringing in more psychological, ethical, political questions in which memory also plays a role. So when I first started exploring these ideas, I was talking to a friend and he said, Ah, I see. What you want to do is you want to do a volume about statues. That was just after Edward Colston's statue had been thrown into the harbour at Bristol. Edward Colston, famous owner of or trader of slaves, who'd become very rich and then given money to charity bull causes, which is why he had his statue in Bristol Harbour. Huge public controversy at the time. Now, I really didn't want to do a volume about statues, and I think a volume about statues would have been, well, it might have been an interesting volume, but a bit of a narrow focus. But I did want to, statues was kind of in the right zone. I wanted to start thinking about memory as a collective as well as an individual phenomenon. Statue is a prompt to memory, it helps us to remember things, and indeed it remembers things insofar as it is a representation, it's got words on it, tells you something that happened in the past, it's a representation of somebody who existed in the past and so on. But it's a collective object, it's not an individual psychological phenomenon. And I wanted to talk about the material scaffolding of memory as well as its embodiment in individual psychological states. And I wanted to think about the ethics and the politics of memory, which stems from the fact that the things we remember or the things that we conserve, conversely, the things that we forget, the things that we allow to decay, reflect human values and sometimes human choices. And what I mean by the scaffolding of memory is can be something material like a statue, but it could be something uh it could be something that's material and public like a statue, could be something that's material and private, like your family photo album, or diaries, or letters, or it could be something that is public but barely material, like traditions of commemoration, like Remembrance Sunday or Easter Sunday. Um, or again, uh social scaffolding of memory that is once again perhaps only marginally material, like digitally held data which are generated by social practices like uh social uh the social media. So yeah, it's memory beyond the individual and psychological and into the public. So it's collective memory as well as individual memory. It's the s material scaffolding of memory in all its different media, and it's the way in which what gets remembered and forgotten, what is done with that material scaffolding, reflects ethical and political values and sometimes ethical and political choices. Now, one of the tricky things about doing what I'm trying to do in this little talk is that though I invented the topic and invited all the speakers, I didn't write any of the papers. So when I I and I'm not going to talk you through what all the papers say, partly because there were 14 of them, it'll take too long, and partly because anyway, I'm not responsible for what the authors say. So the the authors have expressed and deliberately been chosen to express a diversity of views, many of which are not my own. Not necessarily because I disagree passionately with them, but because prior to reading their work on these subjects, I didn't really have a view on a lot of these things. I just thought, well, it's an interesting topic. Let's see what people think. So let's start with a paper which is by Maria Schechtmann, which is perhaps closest to the traditional areas of exploration of analytic philosophy of memory, which is the relationship between memory and personal identity. But she's not interested in memory insofar as it reveals something about the metaphysics of persons, the identity conditions of persons, but in memory insofar as it's important to your sense of who you are. And it seems pretty obvious that memory is important to us. Otherwise, why would we save our school certificates, our scrapbooks, pictures that our children did, wedding dresses, and loads of other memories from long-forgotten boyfriends or girlfriends and all that sort of stuff? But exactly why memory is important to us is difficult to say. So a straightforward answer, Maria argues, would be that we enjoy remembering these things. But although we sometimes enjoy, you know, this was my 21st birthday party, it was a great celebration. We actually remind ourselves of stuff that we don't enjoy, like the death of somebody, the fact that somebody's no longer with us, or some very sad event in our lives. So enjoyment can't be the key to it. It can't be not only about enjoyment. And also she comes up with this very interesting psychological test case that so if you if you think it's not about enjoyment, then you might say, Oh no, all right, well, let's try and find some generalization of the notion of enjoyment that covers both enjoyment and re-experiencing past pain or reliving past suffering. Well, these are all very central experiences to our lives. So the the general notion that encompasses both past suffering and past pleasure is meaning. We need memory to give meaning to our lives. But she then digs out from somewhere, I don't know how she found out about this syndrome, there is a thing called severely deficient autobiographical memory syndrome. So there are people who don't have the capacity to remember incidents in our lives. So if the theory that we need memory to make our lives meaningful is correct, that would suggest that people who are incapable of recollecting past experiences, you know, they look at the family photograph album and they think, well, what's that, right? Like I can't remember any of that, would have a sense that their lives were meaningless. But this really doesn't seem to be true. Because people who have severely divisioned autobiographical memory syndrome have stable personalities, stable relationships, stable values, stable activities that they enjoy. So it's as if a whole lot of standing features of ourselves, what we like doing, our character, our pleasures, don't require episodic memory to hold them stable. So it's not like if I lack episodic memory of the last great victory I scored at in some golfing tournament, I can't sustain an interest in golf. I just am actually I don't know anything about golf. I can't play golf, just an example that I pulled out of a hat. But if I'm a golfing person, I will remain a golfing person and remain somebody who's into it and who takes pleasure in it, even if I can't remember a single game of golf I've ever played, because somehow the capacity to enjoy and to be skillful at golf sits in some bit of the mind that's unconnected with episodic memory. And similarly with my values, it's not like, you know, I sort of vote labor one day and vote reform the next day because I can't remember what I voted last time. So so what? Every day is just a, you know, it's like some form of dementia in which I've got no continuity of political choices. Every day is just I begin again with a blank slate. On the contrary, you can have continuity and therefore meaning. You can sustain meaningful relationships doing the stuff that you love doing with the people you love, even if episodic memory is absent. So there's a kind of a puzzle about what exact role episodic memory plays. Of course, what Maria doesn't say is that there may just be more than one way of leading a meaningful life. And the usual way is through using episodic memory to sustain these stable things, but it's possible to sustain them without episodic memory. But it's surprisingly difficult to pin down what exactly it is that we can't do if we lack episodic memory, other than, of course, to remember stuff that we've done in the past. So that leaves us with an interesting philosophical puzzle. The next paper that I want to focus on is also about individual memory, but it relates to individual memory in a very different way. And this is the paper by Matthew Ratcliffe. So Matthew is very well known for his work on, he always seems to write about miserable topics, I'm not quite sure why. Um but he observes that it's a kind of truism in the philosophy of emotion, that emotions reflect our values, and he says, you know, that's fine, that that's that's not untrue. But what's often forgotten in repeating that truism is that emotions also reflect changes or instabilities in our values, and he identifies this very interesting memory phenomenon, which he calls being haunted by the past, which is obviously a memory phenomenon, and he connects being haunted by the past precisely with that kind of relationship to value that is not the usual one. Not the usual one where emotion reflects standing values, but the case where emotion reflects an instability in one's values. So the standard kind of case is well you experience the emotion of pride at winning a philosophy essay prize. That's because you value doing well in philosophy. You experience fear at seeing a fierce barking dog in the farm that you're walking past. That's because one of your values is to dislike being attacked by dogs. You experience shame when you make some stupid remark to a friend that offends them, and that's because you value not offending people who are close to you. These are the standard cases of emotions reflecting stable values of ours. But he associates with this experience of being haunted by the past with what he allow he describes as the past coming alive to disrupt the present. And he says, uh, and it may be caused by imperfectly remembered traumatic experiences, but it needn't be. It could be a positive shift in one's in one's values. And he says, haunting is an early sign of emotional self-dissonance. And when your emotional self-dissonance has resolved in favor of some new value after the sort of wholesale abandonment of an old one, we may cease to be haunted by those particular memories. But while we're in that state of incivility, that's when you get phenomena of haunting. So that's, I think, an interesting and insufficiently remarked connection between memory and personal identity. Somebody who has become a sort of philosophical poster boy for memory studies is the novelist Marcel Proust, because he wrote this huge seven-volume book called Remembrance of Things Past or In Search of Lost Time, depending on um how you like to translate it. And I think Tom Stern uh in in his contribution, he's speaking as an interpreter of Proust, but I think some of these ideas about memory in the past are quite close to his own thoughts as well. Now the the standard view of Proust, and apologies if to those of you who are not Proust fans, because I don't know how much this will mean to you, but I thought it was I I don't really like Proust, but I'm interested by him. The standard view of Proust's novel is that life is made good by recovering in memory things that are no longer really present to us. So it's terribly sad that after you've been alive for a long time, the past is so distant, but that's all made okay again if we're able to tell our life stories and bring it all back. Now I'm sure that that is an intelligible sort of life narrative that that we redeem past experience by recalling it and rehearsing it in memory and perhaps writing about it. But Tom argues very convincingly that that is miles away from what Proust has in mind. Because apart from anything else, almost all the recollections that he rehearses in his book are rehearsals of experiences that were totally unsatisfactory at the time that we had them, or that the narrator had them. So over and over again in the book, Proust will say, I was walking down a country lane and I saw this tree, and it made me remember the time when I was standing there 30 years ago, and there was this young woman there, and I failed to say so and so to her. And it would have been such a great day if I had done such and such, but I didn't. And if we'd gone down some other path, then perhaps we'd have had some enjoyable experience of witnessing such and such, but we didn't do that. And so all he recalls is the total disappointingness of previous experiences. And so, if it was also disappointing at the time, what would be so great about remembering it all? You're just remembering that your life was a series of failures or series of disappointments. And so there's something very special in Proust, Tom argues, about involuntary memories. So rehearsing past episodes of your life in memory is not what it's about at all. It's about these spontaneous involuntary memories, as in the very famous example where he dips a little cake in a cup of tea and a load of things all come back to him. It's there that value resides for Bruce. And it doesn't only reside there because something good is being recollected, it resides there because these involuntary memories cause the superimposition of the present on the past. So somehow or other, what you have in this very complex involuntary experience is not only the re-experiencing of something that happened to you long ago, but that combined with the experience of something distinct in the presence, in the present. And that superimposition of the past on the present enables, in Proust's view, enables us to experience an essence of something that is outside time, what's common to the present and the past. And in experiencing something that's thus. This sort of essence that's neither now nor then, but it's what's common to now and then. We somehow cheat time, we cheat the passage of time, we defeat time, and so we're free from the contingencies and disappointments of actual past experience. So that's enough about Proust. Reading Tom's paper actually forced me to go and reread a little bit of the book. And I said to a colleague, I can't possibly read all seven volumes of this thing. I'll be 99 before I finish it. What should I do? And he's just said, read volume seven, all will be revealed. And I think actually, based on my reading of Fall Seven, Tom's interpretation of the um book is pretty plausible. Okay, the next paper I want to remark upon takes us more into ethical territory. And this is the paper by Lucy Allais. It's another commonplace about memory that forgetting and forgiving are associated with one another. We said, you know, forgive and forget. But she says, hang on a minute. How can you forgive something if you've forgotten what it is? Right? It's essential to the possibility of forgiving something. You've got to remember what it is. You can't for you can't forgive something you've forgotten. So, what exactly is forgiveness? Another philosophical puzzle about forgiveness is that you can't forgive something that was justified. So forgiveness is only in order if the, let's say, the wrong that was done to me really is a wrong. If I said, oh, it's fine, don't worry about it because I've realized that it wasn't an offense against me, or because I misremembered the circumstances, or because I don't care about it anymore, that wouldn't be forgiveness. I've got to, it's a necessary condition of there being of my forgiving something that there be something to forgive. So I think of the thing as meriting blame. But then if I think of the thing as meriting blame, how can I also forgive the person? Because I think it merits blame, then wouldn't it be the wrong thing to do to forgive a person? And so she comes up with this interestingly paradoxical formula of Deridas, which she quotes, which we can only that we can only forgive the unforgivable. And so her view is complex, and I can't rehearse all the ins and outs of it here, but she thinks that two things, I think. The first is that forgiveness is a kind of free gift. So I can never be required to forgive something because it's a necessary condition on something being a possible object of forgiveness that it continues to merit blame. So I can never be required to forgive, but I give you your forgiveness. I give you forgiveness for free despite its meriting blame. I'm going beyond what's required of me. She says forgiveness is the voluntary relinquishing of a bit of moral bookkeeping. But then she expresses this interesting further view as well, which is that it's really important to our capacity to grow as moral beings that we hold in view a picture of a better self that we could become. So if we don't hold in view a picture of a better self that we may become, either we already think that we're great, so there's nothing to grow into, or we think we're not, and we despair, and we can never become any better. And so, what forgiving also, what you also do in forgiveness, in this voluntary refusal of moral bookkeeping, is to communicate to somebody a more hopeful view of themselves than was embodied in the wrong which I acknowledge they've committed, and thereby offer them the opportunity of growing into that better self. Okay, so another really interesting that takes us into kind of ethical territory. Another really interesting and I think ethically inflected area of philosophical thought about memory is the concept of trauma. And of course, trauma is connected with memory because trauma can interfere with memory. So we may simply be incapable of remembering traumatic experiences in our lives because the best defense we have against past trauma is to repress the memory altogether, to place it beyond memory. But also in the phenomenon of PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder, past events affect the present, but they don't affect the present in the manner of a memory. Because typically, what people with PTSD have is they re-experience past events as if they were happening now. And of course, it's essential to memory that although memory preserves knowledge of what happened in the past, you know exactly that what you're remembering was past, not that it's present. So PTSD, trauma in those two ways, both by repression and through PTSD, interferes with the operation of memory. And this then gives rise to the question of what exactly is trauma? And that's a really interesting philosophical question and is explored. There's a paper on it by Michael Brady, and there's another paper which I'm going to talk a little bit about by James Dawes. And so the concept of trauma is not well understood in philosophy. So in physical medicine, trauma is more or less a synonym of injury, and so you can experience an injury without there being any psychological dimension to it. So you can bash your leg, you're rendered unconscious by something, and then by the time you regain consciousness and come, you've had your treatment to your leg, your leg no longer hurts. So you've suffered trauma, i.e. injury, but there's no psychological dimension to it. But translating the concept of trauma into a psychological form is not straightforward. Easy to specify what physical trauma is, what's psychological trauma. And here are two rival views. Two people might be exposed to the same stresses in war, for example, and one suffer flashbacks or dissociation, and the other not. Well now, are they both suffering trauma because they're both exposed to the same, you know, gunfire or attack by the enemy or whatever? Or is only one of them experiencing trauma because, in the one case, but not in the other, their memory is interfered with, either in the manner of dissociation, repression, or in the manner of PTSD. And I think it's debatable which of those two is the correct way of using the word trauma, but nowadays the word PTSD, perversely you might say, post-traumatic stress disorder, is more or less used synonymously with trauma. In other words, unless you've got PTSD, then the thing that you underwent at the time wasn't a trauma. You can say that's really unfair on people who suffer these tremendous um psychological injuries and then don't go on to develop PTSD, why do we exempt them from this label of trauma? And another really interesting dimension to this question about what is trauma is what constitutes a norm, if PTSD is a sort of disruption of the normal operations of memory, what would constitute a normal or an appropriate response to trauma? So, and this looks at this raises very, very interesting both historical questions and philosophical questions about how to handle historical data. So it's very difficult to peel off our way of conceptualizing a phenomenon from the phenomenon itself. But if you look at the way in which symptoms, what we would now call symptoms of combat stress are treated today, where people treat them as medical conditions that need to be remedied in some way, it looks as if something that's behaviorally very, very similar to combat stress when it took place in ancient Greece was praised and lauded as absolutely paradigmatic heroic conduct. Now, what should we say? Would she say, would should we say it wasn't really heroic conduct and the Greeks were just misunderstanding that their own soldiers were ill and they should have dealt with that? Is it easier to deal with trauma, with combat trauma, if the people around you are telling you that you're a hero rather than that you're unwell? How do we deal with all that? Very interesting question. And by the way, the diagnosis of PTSD was only recognized by psychiatry in 1980. Um these behavioral manifestations look as if they're more or less constant through history. I'll give you a couple more examples and then I will turn it over to you for QA. There's a really interesting so moving on to I talked about the publicity of memory prompts and the publicity of the social scaffolding of memory. So let's talk a little bit about that. So in every big city of the rich world, there's there are lots of museums in which things are preserved. And so the question is, well, what do you put in a museum? And what do you just chuck out when it's old? There's this really fascinating artwork by a woman called Sophie Kal, C-A-L-L-E, in which she goes around Berlin taking photographs. And anybody who's been to Berlin will know how very, very carefully memorials of the Nazi era are preserved in order that the Germans don't forget the crimes of those days. And they're not just preserved, but they have plaques and explanations underneath them. Contrast the memorials of the area of the behind the Iron Curtain when East Germany was a separate country. Many of these memorials have been completely destroyed. No record is given of where one has been removed from. And what Cal did in her exhibition is to go around photographing the just miscellaneous scars on walls and pieces of concrete and on the pavement from which you could see that a memoir, that a memorial from the Marxist-Leninist period had been removed. So that was a very, very clear decision by the reunited German government to remember some stuff and not remember other stuff. What are the values that inform those decisions and what are the right values that should inform them? And in this is one of the papers that there's a paper on this by Eric Mattis. He has a very interestingly nuanced view about not just what it's good to conserve in a museum, but how it's good to conserve it. So according to modern museological standards, you need to get the temperature exactly right in the museum, the level of moisture in the museum exactly right, so that as far as is physically possible, the object remains absolutely unchanged by time. Of course, that's impossible. You know, eventually the restorers will come in. But then when you think about the ethics of restoration, we think of, you know, the ideal is not that the museological ideal is not that the thing should show age, but that we should restore it to a pristine state that it was in when the thing was made. Well, not all cultures think of conservation that way, and indeed not all people in our culture think of conservation that way. Think of the hoo ha about when the cysteine ceiling is restored because, oh my god, all those awful bright colours, we hate it, you know, because what they like are signs of age. And so uh Mattis unearths various other cultures who think that conservation is very important because it's a way of preserving continuity of cultural memory. But conservation means but part of the connection with the cultural past consists in the fact that the cultural artifact shows that it's old, which is very much contrary to the museological ideal of today. I'll just mention two more briefly and then I'll stop. So Derrick McTravers has a paper in this volume which raises a number of enormous questions about what historical writing should aim for. So I think most historians would agree that their works shouldn't contain any falsehoods. So you shouldn't say that the Battle of Hastings occurred in some year other than 1066. But of course, history books typically take a narrative or an argumentative format, they're not lists of facts about when things happened or who did things, and so what is the equivalent for these one-by-one isolated truths? What's the equivalent standard to which to hold whole historical narratives should be held? And what Derek talks about is the role of choice in historical narrative. So should a historical narrative uh so some historical narratives present history as a history of progress up to the present, others present it as a history of decline from the past, from a golden age, and each of those may itself be irreproachable as far as the factual accuracy of their individual claims is concerned. Do we just say that there's no truth here, that it's all just a choice of perspective, or is there some other standard to which historical narratives should be held? And he kind of I think he's uh he's fond of the idea that historical writing involves perspective taking, and there is a degree of irreproachable subjectivity in perspective taking, so the standard to which historical narratives as a whole needs to be held is kind of lower than the standard for truth for their individual claims. But I'm not sure that that's right, because people fight a lot about history. If you think about narratives of any controversial event, such as the foundation of the British Empire or the Spanish Civil War, you could say, well, of course, there are just two perspectives here. You know, there's the Republican perspective on the Spanish Civil War, and there's the nationalist perspective. And if you take the Republican perspective, basically you say that the Civil War was won by the bad guys and it was all a disaster. And if you take the nationalist perspective, it was won by the good guys, and when the Franco's regime fell, that was the disaster. And it seems to me that although, you know, it may be my perspective to choose that I want to kind of back the Republican story or back the nationalist story, these stories are incompatible. If they're incompatible, the debate about where justice lay in the Spanish Civil War would be a pointless debate because it would just be, well, you have your perspective, I have my perspective. But people fight about the truth of the matter, at least as if, sorry, people fight about this event, at least as if there were a truth of the matter, which imply that perspectives can be incompatible in the way that Derek doesn't really allow for. So I think there's some further discussion there. And the final paper that I want to refer to, which is again about kind of not events that may be remembered by many people at once, but commemorative events that may be participated in by many people at once. What are the ethics? And this is a little bit like the debate about the ethics of conservation, what should we keep, what should we chuck out, what should we put in a museum, what should we not? Exactly parallel set of questions can be raised about what should we commemorate in public. So Remembrance Sunday, I don't think is particularly controversial in this country, but there was a time when people used to say Remembrance Sunday glorifies military action, and so we shouldn't commemorate it in as big a way as we do. Similarly, you know, Easter commemorates uh the the crucifixion and resurrection. If you make a big deal about that, so everybody has to take the day off on Easter Sunday or on Good Friday, that's imposing on people a perspective on what are the important events of world history that they may not share. Why don't we have public holidays for Eid or why don't we have public holidays for the you know key public holidays of other religions that are also represented in Britain? And so on the converse side, people say, well, it's important for people to have some shared rituals because shared rituals are socially binding. And if you're going to have a political society that everybody feels as if they belong to, you need to have some things around which everyone coalesces, which is why it's sometimes handy to live in a newer society than ours, where you can coalesce around the 4th of July or something rather than around Remembrance Sunday or the resurrection of Christ, and uh, which I believe is not a public holiday in the United States. So there is an imperative to include, to try to bind people together by public commemoration and ritual, but also, but obviously, what the more you try to include people, the more you risk excluding certain other people at the margin. So very similar, sort of debate to what statues should we leave up, what should we take down, what should we put in the museum, what should we stick on the rubbish heap, how should we deal with uncomfortable things in the past, whether it's in our own past or whether it's in our collective past, should we just forget about them or should we remember them but offer certain sorts of commentary on them? So that's just a little taster of the very complicated psychological, political, and ethical issues that are touched on in this volume about remembering and forgetting. I hope you'll take a much closer look at the book when the thing is finally published than I've been able to summarize today. And now it's over to you to ask any questions. I can't promise to ask quite answer questions because of course I need to have would need to have 14 authors on the call as well. But ask away and I'll do my best.

SPEAKER_00 42:26

Thank you so much. And we're actually gonna stop the recording here. So if you're watching the recording, thank you so much for joining us.