Search for Meaning with Gary Grappo

In this urgent follow-up to their conversation from June 2025, Rabbi Yoshi sits down again with Ambassador Gary Grappo — former U.S. Ambassador to Oman, Chief of Staff to the Middle East Quartet, and one of America's most seasoned diplomatic voices — to make sense of the Iran MOU signed just days before this recording. Together they examine what the deal actually does and doesn't do, why the Strait of Hormuz provision troubles so many observers, and what meaningful nuclear verification would require from a regime that has never won a war and never lost a negotiation. Ambassador Grappo speaks candidly about what disappoints him in this moment — a war he believes was unnecessary, a strategy that attacked Iran at its strongest rather than its most vulnerable point, and an MOU so loosely worded that either side can walk away from nearly any commitment it contains. And yet he finds reason for genuine, if cautious, hope: the Iranian government has never been weaker since 1979, its economy is in desperate straits, and the pressure from ordinary Iranians on their leadership to deliver relief may yet prove to be the most powerful force in the room. Drawing on nearly four decades of experience in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, and Oman, Ambassador Grappo brings clarity, candor, and hard-won realism to one of the most consequential moments in the modern Middle East.

Recorded June 24, 2026. Released July 3, 2026.

Transcript

Speaker 1 0:09

There's a lot of pressure coming up from the Iranian people on the leadership to do something about our plight. And hopefully that is enough to persuade them to do what is necessary.

Speaker 0:31

Welcome to Search for Meaning. I'm Yoshi Zweiback. Thank you so much for joining me. My guest today is one that you will be familiar with if you've ever tuned into the podcast before, Ambassador Gary Grappo. He was with us just about a year ago at the beginning of this conflict with Iran. Israel had just struck Iranian military assets and war was breaking out. And millions of people in Israel across the region were watching in fear and in prayer. And I had the chance to sit down with Gary and talk about this. And Ambassador Grapo talked to me about a couple of things that I wanted to check back in with him, given that this memorandum of understanding has just been released, and there are a lot of questions about this. It looks like there's a deal on the table, and many of us are unsure of what to feel. Is there a sense of caution, fear, relief, something more complicated? So I'm just so grateful to you, Ambassador Grappo, for being with us today. You've spent nearly four decades in the rooms where these decisions get made as U.S. Ambassador to Oman, political affairs chief at our embassy in Baghdad, working with Tony Blair and the quartet. And you've been so deep in these conversations. And so we're really grateful to you that you're spending some time with us today. So, Ambassador Gary Grapple, my friend, thank you for coming back to Search for Meaning.

Speaker 1 1:55

Well, thank you, Rabbi Yoshi. This is truly uh a pleasure. I always enjoy speaking with you, whether it's on our podcast or just informally as friends. So it's a real treat to be with you and happy uh to dive into what I think is a pretty pretty thorny issue at the moment for lots of people, certainly in the US, in Israel, in the Middle East, and around the world.

Speaker 2:20

When we spoke about a year ago, the war had just broken out and so much has changed since then. Uh a year later now, what has surprised you most about the moment we find ourselves in right now, how it's all unfolded?

Speaker 1 2:34

Well, there are some well, more than actually several things that that are on my mind. Uh first of all, recall that at the end of the war in June of last year, the 12-day war, President Trump had announced that U.S. and Israeli forces had obliterated Iran's uh nuclear weapons program. Uh but yet we we found ourselves, what, eight or nine months later, entering into a conflict once again, this one far more intensive uh and uh and longer lasting, much longer lasting than than I think the American-Israeli sides uh had hoped for or anticipated. Uh that war went on for, well, the fighting part of it went on for a little more than uh, I guess, five or six weeks, and then we got into a period going back and forth about whether there are going to be negotiations or not. That takes a while, especially when you're negotiating with the ever difficult, challenging, and frustrating Iranians. They are among the best negotiators in the world. Uh, and I will say one thing right up front I don't think this administration fully understands the challenges of negotiating with the Iranians. They are difficult. Nevertheless, uh the war went on. It seemed as though, given the military statistical reporting, it was an overwhelming victory for the American-Israeli forces. Nevertheless, we saw last week the text of the MOU, and everyone is laughed scratching their head. Uh, how did we so-called win this war and end up with so little? Um, there can be very few people that are pleased with the outcome uh given this MOU, with the exception of the leadership of the of Iran right now. Certainly not the Iranian people. Things will not get better for them. Uh, not for people in the region, whether it's uh the Gulf countries or Israel. Their security has not improved one iota, although we must say that the Iranian military forces, whether we're talking missiles, drones, or anything else, are much degraded and certainly present a less less of a threat, but still a significant one to all the countries in the region, including Israel. Um, and certainly not for the United States. I don't see much that the United States was able to achieve out of this war. Uh there are commitments, so to speak, very loosely worded, shockingly so, in my view, with regard to the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. Uh the Iranians had agreed to make best efforts. This is diplomatic language for, well, we'll see what we can do. Uh I mean, it it's language big enough to drive a freight train in through. Uh, and nothing about missiles, nothing about proxies, nothing about the nuclear weapons program, except they're going to kick that can down the road uh during the 60-day period of the MOU. And uh nothing about the Iranians, uh people themselves, and certainly nothing to reassure any of the countries in the region uh about uh the U.S. security blanket they previously enjoyed and what may be coming afterward. So, all in all, I would say a very disappointing outcome to an unnecessary war.

Speaker 6:13

When we spoke uh about a year ago, you talked about the lack of friends that Iran has in the region going back to the revolution 1979, and that at that time, a year ago, many of the Arab governments really seemed to be privately rooting for Israel. And I'm wondering where we are right now, has that changed? If so, in what ways, where does Iran stand relative to its Arab neighbors today?

Speaker 1 6:42

Well, um, the Arab neighbors, I think, were truly shaken by the uh the devastating attacks that they experienced uh during the war. The UAE in particular uh was the target of more missile and drone attacks than was Israel, which is a bit of a surprise, including quite a few um civilian um uh uh targets. So uh a real surprise, and and there the attacks were quite devastating. We saw almost 20% of Qatar's uh LNG uh production uh uh knocked offline. Um and oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait, uh, airport in Kuwait and other uh other targets were uh badly struck. Uh I think the Americans, even, were a bit surprised at the seriousness of that attack. So certainly the Arab countries uh are shocked by what the Iranians did when they were not a party to this war. Um while they may have been rooting for Israel quietly and for the United States uh in the expectation that uh the two sides would be able to take out the Supreme Leader, and somehow that would lead to the collapse of the government. Of course, we all know that did not happen. Uh and then they became um a bit more chastened. And in the latter half of the war, several of them were actually putting pressure on the United States to end it, uh, particularly uh Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and possibly even Saudi Arabia. The only country that uh has stood out in terms of its uh support for the United States and the war is is the UAE. And the UAE uh is continuing to maintain its very strong relationship with the United States and with Israel. So the UAE is really casting its lot with its traditional allies in the case of the United States and uh Israel. The other countries remain to be seen, but I don't think any of them has much trust or faith in this new leadership in Iran. And so at the end of the day, they're they're left to count on the U.S.

Speaker 9:04

So you talked about it in your introductory words, a little bit about what the deal actually is, not the spin that we're hearing, certainly not from the Trump administration, certainly not from the Iranians, but for someone who really understands the the code behind some of this language, can you give us a couple of the highlights, maybe in addition to what you already shared with us? And and also what's this idea of a 60-day window to negotiate the final deal? How much does this memorandum of understanding lock in some of what the final deal might have to include?

Speaker 1 9:43

The language of the MOU is extremely loose, very shaky, very wobbly. I've I've been involved in uh negotiations where we work off of work with the various sides involved in negotiation, work off of various texts that have been submitted by all sides, if there are more than just two parties or by both sides. And um, language goes back and forth. And very often uh language is left intentionally vague where the two sides simply cannot agree. And it I drew the conclusion that that was the case here, that it was difficult for the two sides to reach hard and fast understandings on the specific issues that they all wanted. Um so the language is very, very loose, and it leaves more than enough reason for either side to back out of any seeming commitment they may have made in this agreement. Uh, but I see very few in there. Uh, for example, there was the statement of intention to establish this $300 billion uh reconstruction and development fund at some point. Uh my guess is that point would be when the U.S. and Iran reach an agreement on the disposition of Iran's nuclear weapons program. Uh, and that's going to be a very, very heavy lift, as we should all expect. Uh, and so that particular program, that fund, may never see the light of day. Moreover, and I would just caution people, and I know this is maybe revealing some biases here, but Donald Trump has a long, long track record of welching on promises, whether it's to the American people as president of the United States or to his business partners during his business career. So um I hope the Iranians are not thinking they can take that $300 billion to the bank. Um, it's a long way off. Uh, and it would require the Iranians taking some very, very significant action that I personally don't think they're going to be willing to take. Um of the other language, uh, Rabbi, is just so loose that uh there were plenty enough uh uh reasons and ways for either side to wiggle out of what seems what might seem to be a uh a commitment. Uh I I mentioned uh the Strait of Hormuz, uh the United States. Uh this is surprising, even the fact that it was mentioned, agreeing to withdraw U.S. forces from proximity to Iran. Uh that runs contrary to U.S. national security policy for the last 40, 50 years since the first Gulf War, 1990-91. Um, I I can't truly believe that the administration uh it would be serious about this and it would be greatly disturbing to our allies in the region if we were to do something like that. And what does proximity mean? Within missile range? Uh so a vague interpretation uh and very in even more vague of language. So it's a very loosely worded uh agreement. Nevertheless, uh just standing back and looking at the general sense of it, um, the Iranians would seem to come out much, much better. Certainly than the U.S. Well, Israel is not even mentioned uh at all. They were not a partner to the negotiations, insofar as we know. I'm sure they were consulted, but certainly not present for any of the negotiations, despite being an ally of the United States from day one of the war. Uh is so they're not mentioned, although Lebanon is. Uh, none of the Arab countries are are mentioned either. So um uh this ends up being a major negative, certainly for the United States, Israel, and uh the Arab Gulf countries, I would say for the Iranian leadership, that they can go and they can present this to their people and say, we stood up to the two strongest militaries in the region and the world, and we are still here. We survived, the Islamic Revolution lives.

Speaker 14:02

How do you make sense of it? I mean, obviously, the midterm elections, the uh lack of partners elsewhere in the world, beyond Israel, um, the way this war has been polling in American public opinion and around the world, um, all of that certainly helps us understand why there would be a desire on the part of the United States leadership to somehow bring this to a conclusion. But giving the Iranians essentially of a victory, uh, one that they are claiming and that uh we're seeing in headlines around the world, other uh analysts, journalists, uh pundits are saying as well, much to the chagrin of uh of the Trump administration. How do you make sense of it? Why give away all of these things?

Speaker 1 14:53

It is very clear uh after the second week when the Iranians uh were not going to cave. They were going to continue to resist, they were going to continue to throw everything they had, their missiles, uh their drones, everything else against the U.S. and against the countries of the region, that this was going to last a while. I don't think, well, certainly the administration grossly underestimated the ideological resolve, commitment, determination of Iranian leadership. Um they believe they truly are the leaders of an Islamic revolution, and this is their test. And they had to stand up to this, they had to meet the test. And in their view, they did. They did. They suffered greatly, mightily for it. Uh, but they're still standing. On the other hand, I think Donald Trump had expected this would be a short war. This is the great power fallacy that you can respond to a crisis with overwhelming technological and military superiority and force your enemy to capitulate. And this was an enemy that wasn't going to do that. We've had experience with that before. And all of us in my generation know it well, and that is in Vietnam. There was a famous moment in uh the cabinet meeting. Uh, I don't know whether Nixon was present, but Henry Kissinger, he may have been chairing the other meeting, and it uh was leading up to what would be uh the start of the negotiations with uh the Vietnamese and the uh uh Nixon administration had started that major bombing campaign on Vietnam. Just an all-out assault with B-52s and everything else. And yet the North Vietnamese and the Vietnamese uh were not going to capitulate, not going to surrender. And Kissinger pounded the table and said, How is it that a third-rate nation can stand up to the mightiest nation that has ever existed in the history of the world? And it would not surprise me if that was the attitude of Donald Trump on February 27th, 26th, or whenever it was that he had his last cabinet meeting to discuss uh going to war. Uh, I just think they underestimated the enemy that they were taking on. Um, particularly when, in my view, this war was unnecessary. It was unnecessary because when you go to war, and I and as someone who who graduated from an American service academy, studied military strategy for all four years, one of the basic lessons you learn in your military strategy and tactic classes is you attack the enemy at its most vulnerable point. Now, there's no question that Americans and and the Israelis enjoyed considerable superiority over the Iranian military forces. But it wasn't their most vulnerable point. Their most vulnerable point is their economy. And they have no solution to that problem. None. And in my view, the U.S. and allies around the world, and this would have taken considerable diplomatic efforts on the part of the United States and potentially Israel as well, to work with all of our friends and allies around the world to get these countries to double and redouble their efforts on uh sanctions on Iran, to truly strangle that economy. It is the one way that you can bring this government down. In fact, in my view, it's the only way, uh, because it could potentially trigger the kind of uprising Trump, and I think the Israelis are hoping to see within Iran itself. Uh but they didn't do that. They did not tackle its most vulnerable point. They actually attacked an area where they have some strength. Uh the missiles and and drones. I think we underestimated their capabilities on drones, particularly when it came to the straight of whore moves. You probably only need a couple squadrons of drones to shut down the straight of whore moves, and they've proved that. One drone hitting a tanker, and that's it. Traffic comes to a dead halt. Uh, and so this was an unnecessary war. The strategy was incorrect, and we are left with a very unsatisfactory outcome, and from which I really don't know how we're going to proceed.

Speaker 19:41

Help us understand uh Straits of Hormuz a little bit better. I spoke to a colleague at the congregation whom you've met, Rabbi Josh Noble, who's a graduate of West Point, and uh so he has a little bit of a similar background to you in in that regard, uh, graduating from one of our elite service academies. And he said, you know, not having a plan to control the straits before initiating the war just left him scratching his head. Is there anything that you can help us uh add to that, other than incompetence, not not thinking this through very clearly? Is there something I'm missing? Was there some reason why we didn't do that beyond just uh stupidity, I guess?

Speaker 1 20:26

Well, the rabbi's 100% correct. How is it that this never came up? It's it turned out it apparently did, according to one report that I read, uh, General Kane, the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, did mention it in one of the meetings uh with the president. The president dismissed it, uh, believing that uh we would be able to decapitate the leadership so quickly that they wouldn't be able to adjust fast enough uh to uh close the strait. Uh that was, of course, flat out wrong. In fact, uh the the Defense Department, the State Department, and the CIA have conducted, Rabbi, I can't tell you how many war games when it comes to the U.S. uh in a confrontation with uh Iran. And in every single instance of those of running those war games, the Iranians closed the strait within at least two days. Two days. So this is something that not only should have been anticipated, it should have been planned for, should have been counted on, and we should have been prepared immediately to respond. Now that would have required a lot of work uh in advance. And uh as uh as Rabbi is it Joshua or Josh? Josh, Rabbi Josh Noble. Yeah, uh as Rabbi Josh uh Josh mentioned, um, there did not seem to be a whole heck of a lot of planning that went into this. Because to respond To a potential closing of the strait, you would have had to plan far in advance in terms of terms of moving lots of vessels around, not only ours, but allies, because that's not a job we want to take on all by ourselves. Even in uh the first Gulf War, during the so-called Tanker War, we had friendly countries who came to our assistance. I think Britain, France, uh, and and a number of other countries. Uh we should have reached out to our, most especially our NATO allies and perhaps even the Gulf allies, to see how many vessels they could have lent to an operation to secure the Strait of Hormuz so that the Iranians were prevented from shutting it down. Uh we did not do that. Now I will say another misstep uh they did they did not see, despite all the evidence from what we have seen in uh in the war in Ukraine, is the heavy use of drones by the Iranians. And it's the use of the drones that effectively was able to shut down the strait. Because one small drone hitting the coning tower of a tanker and its lights out. That's it. No more business in the Gulf. Um and that's what everyone was fearful of, and that's all the Iranians needed. No nuclear weapons program, none of that. Just squadron of a few hundred drones. Um so it was a it was a gross uh oversight, uh lack of planning. Um and it just goes to show uh I I think the slapdash way in which uh this this war was planned strategically. And I say strategically because tactically the two militaries did a brilliant job. They truly did. Uh any other country watching this is going to have to take note of how effectively the Americans and the Israelis were able to operate. Granted, they did not encounter much resistance because the air defense system of Iran had been taken down mostly by Israel in the last war, last June. Uh, but nevertheless, it was precisely executed. But you but you have to be able to connect tactical advantage with reaching your strategic goal. And I don't think the truth, in fact, it's clear that the Trump administration had not done this. And as a result, we are left standing here with none of our goals in our hands. None of them. Uh despite our tactical superiority.

Speaker 24:39

I wonder, you know, based on your decades of work with the State Department and your experience in the military yourself, you know, when you think about, okay, the chain of command, the president, and then you think about the Secretary of Defense, uh and then on down through the chain of command. Obviously, there were many, many officers, um, leaders in the United States military who w knew that the straits are going to get shut down because of all of the war game scenarios that they'd, you know, and exercises that they'd been a part of, and the kinds of things that you learn when you go to a military academy. How do you explain or or what's your sense of of how that didn't make its way up into the chain of command? We obviously have a Secretary of Defense who's also uh very inexperienced and uh is not a graduate of of uh you know the Naval Academy or West Point, uh, but but certainly, you know, joint chiefs of staff, there's there's lots of folks there. Is there an explanation that you can share or something that makes sense again of how this didn't manage uh to reach its way to those in in the position to make decisions?

Speaker 1 25:52

It seems that it it it at least reached General Kane because he did raise it in his meeting with with President Trump. I don't think he argued it very strongly, but I don't know. I wasn't in the room. I didn't hear it. Um but clearly there there would have been officers in the Defense Department, there would have been individuals in the State Department, and certainly um our intelligence officers at the CIA and DIA who would have known this very, very well. And I you don't have to be very experienced to know this. This is like Iran 101. Uh there they sit there on the other side of the Strait of Hormuz, they have a commanding position, uh, they certainly are capable of shutting the strait down. We knew that. Uh, but how we did not anticipate that they would actually act on it is is beyond me. Uh I'm sure that um career people in the defense and state departments and the CIA uh uh did communicate this up to higher ranks, uh, the extent to which it resonated, particularly when we have a president that doesn't like to be contradicted, that doesn't like to hear negative views, that doesn't want to hear uh that uh there are challenges to whatever objectives he may have in mind, and it's not clear what he had in mind. Uh, we should keep in mind that um the objectives for this war were never clearly stated when the war began. Uh the president did not appear before the American people. Uh no cabinet member nor the president uh went to Congress with any type of communication, whether it was a physical presentation, presidents, or a written communication. And um and if you listen over the course of the first week to two weeks, um the the list of objectives uh uh was all over the place. One day I heard the president, um Secretary uh Rubio of the State Department, and Secretary Hegswith at Defense each enunciate different objectives for the war on the same day. So clearly the administration was never on a single page. The president apparently never even articulated his objectives to uh uh to his cabinet. And so now they sort of were shaken out as the war continued, uh particularly when we reached the point where we started negotiations and we wanted to supposedly end Iran's support for Pranzies, uh constrain its missile program, and clearly uh eliminate it, or at least constrain seriously its nuclear weapons program. Um and none of those were articulated at the outset. At one point, uh the president had mentioned he wanted uh unconditional surrender. At one point, he was calling for uh the Iranian population to stand up and overthrow their government. Uh no president should ever count on something like that. You just can't do it, particularly in a country like Iran, which is probably one of the most oppressive and repressive countries in the world, with the possible exception of North Korea. So um I'm just left bereft of an understanding for why he did it, other than he thought there would be a quick victory, that somehow the Iranian government would collapse and someone else would step in, who that would be. Well, apparently they had someone picked out to step in, to take charge once the Supreme Leader had been uh eliminated. Uh the infamous Ahmadine uh Ahmadinejad, who was never a friend of the United States. I I uh Lord knows why they singled him out. Even the Israelis uh were in favor of him. Uh so this was, like I said, it was really kind of a slip shod plan from the very outset. There was some report reporting that the Israelis had organized a Kurdish insurrection up in the northwest of the country. That may or may not have been the case. I I I can't confirm it, but there was reporting even out of Israel that um that uh Mossad had organized this effort, but that Trump got cold feet at some point and uh it never took place. But even if it had, I think the Iranians would have been prepared for it. I don't think it would have been enough to destabilize the government. You would have needed many, many more Iranians other than just the Kurds. And the Kurds are are divided among themselves too, by the way.

Speaker 30:44

You mentioned uh obviously the the nuclear program, and that's been at the heart of all of this, both in the words of President Trump, certainly uh Prime Minister Netanyahu in in Israel and so many others who have been looking on that that's been a central goal. Uh where do you think we are at this point? Because uh certainly when we think about meaningful verification dealing with the Iranians who have demonstrated time and time and time again that they cannot be trusted, um, that's one thing we can uh that we can trust that that they will violate whatever agreement they uh you know they they purport to agree to. So where are we left right now? What's your sense? Obviously, uh the president's words, you know, a year ago that their program had been completely destroyed. Uh there's no reason to believe that that is the case. Um there's uranium that we we don't know exactly where it is. Uh, but what what might this look like going forward? Is there any path where their attempt to create a nuclear weapon at this point can really be reliably thwarted?

Speaker 1 31:55

When it comes to their nuclear weapons program, you can count on the Iranians to delay, deflect, take infinite detours, in fact, do just about everything they can to avoid that conversation. And when they do have to have it, as they certainly will, because it's a priority for the United States, uh, they will haggle over every single letter, every single one. And they're masterful at it. They're masterful at it. And if that's what you want to do in any negotiation, you can do it. You can frustrate the other side by negotiation ad nauseum over every single detail. And with Iranians, even when you think you may have an agreement on one particular point and you move on to the next point or the point after that, they will come back to that first point. You can count on it and want to discuss it again, even when you think, no, that's been settled. No, not quite. Um, that's one thing that I learned uh in uh in my dealings with the Omanis, who have been involved in many a negotiation with the Iranians, have come to understand them extremely well. I would have advised the American negotiating team to go to the Oman and talk to Omanis who have actually negotiated with the Iranians to understand them better and how they negotiate. They are very good at it. In fact, there's an old saying in the State Department and the Defense Department that the Iranians have never won a war or lost a negotiation. Uh they're just really good. And so closing a deal on a nuclear weapons program, on their nuclear weapons program that satisfies us, not to mention Israel, uh, is going to be very, very difficult. And this reflect back on the JCPOA, much criticized. But nevertheless, we we were able to reach a deal, but it took more than two years. And it took a lot of negotiation. Painstaking in listening to some of the things that the negotiators had to say, it was extremely difficult. Very, very frustrating, always coming, circling back to some issue they thought they'd had resolved. Even at the very, very end, when they thought they had a final text, the Iranians were still wanting to raise points. So we can expect that that very same practice will take place in this particular negotiation. And I give no credence to concluding this within 60 days. It's just it's impossible. It really is. I I unless this new leadership is truly turning a new leaf. I don't know. Um that that is that is the one question mark I have. Um there are a lot of hardliners now calling the shots, but the pragmatists are reasserting themselves. Now, first of all, let me just clarify everyone in a leadership position in Iran is a hardliner. You need to make that clear at the outset. But there are principalists, these are the ones that are truly dedicated and committed to the original principles of the Islamic Revolution. The folks that are just never want to compromise. Then you have the pragmatists. They're still hardliners, but they see the reality on the ground of a devastated and destroyed economy, which was already in abysmal shape before the war even began, is now even worse shape. It will require hundreds and hundreds of billion dollars to rebuild destroyed factories, infrastructure, and other facilities, housing, you name it. And so these pragmatists see the reality, and they also see the desperate state of their own people. Uh many people are unemployed. The Iranian real is the most worthless currency in the world, trading at 1.8 million reales to the dollar. Very high inflation, really hyperinflation now. They don't have enough fuel for their own vehicles inside the country. Uh, and so uh these pragmatists are saying no. We have to negotiate more seriously with the Americans. We need to get access to oil, uh, to export oil earnings, which they now have, by the way. The Trump administration has removed the sanctions and is even allowing them to sell the oil in U.S. dollars, which is a first in uh the almost, what is it, 45, 47 years of sanctions on Iran, that they can sell their oil in U.S. dollars. They can even sell their oil to American buyers, shockingly. Uh, and so that's a big boon for them, particularly um of their economy. Uh, and they're lifting some sanctions. Um I it it doesn't appear to me, based on the very loose language of the MOU, that they're going to be able to access the frozen assets that they have in various international banks uh around the world, not any in the United States, but in countries that respect our sanctions. And that amounts to about $25 billion, which they would love to get their hands on. Um now, I thought it was interesting that Vice President Bance said they would release some funds, but only for the purchase of American products, agricultural products, and things of that nature. Um, okay, there's a humanitarian uh angle to that, which I can understand, and we have some control over the funds because we can direct that those funds go directly to an American bank. They don't pass through Iranian hands. Uh we'll have to see if that's actually the plan afoot and whether the Iranians accept that. They may not accept it. Uh I don't know. Uh so all in all, I say that this tug of war between the pragmatists and the principalists is ongoing as we speak. Which is why, and and I'd like to uh caution all your viewers, when they hear conflicting statements from American public officials and Iranian public officials, it's because they're speaking to their respective audiences. In the case of the Iranians, they have to show some sign of hope for the Iranian people in terms of economic relief. They really do need that. And that's what the pragmatists want. On the other hand, they have to be able to say to the principalists, we're not giving away the store. Oh no, we're not doing this, we're not doing this. And that's why you hear Vance saying some things that the Iranians have committed to. For example, the return of IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, and the Iranian public analysement saying, oh no, we never accepted that. We never committed to that. Maybe they did. Uh they just don't want to talk about it publicly. Um it's I mean, it's not beyond them to deceive people. Um it's not beyond even sometimes our public officials uh to engage in some kind of uh deceit. Uh and so I take uh any and all public statements with a grain of heavy grain of salt uh or a dose of salt. Um uh but clearly the MOU is a very, very shaky, very wobbly document. Umstensibly what you would want to have at the end of however long these negotiations end up lasting is a hard and fast agreement that addresses the nuclear weapons program to the satisfaction of the United States uh and its friends and allies, uh, and uh and provides some genuine economic relief for the Iranian people and keeps the money uh that they may receive out of the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Right now, we can't necessarily assure our public that that's going to happen because the hardliners assert a lot of control. During the actual combat portion of the war, they were calling the shots. Now we're into the negotiating period. I think there are a lot of people who see the potential for the Iranians to really get something out of this, but also having to make some compromises that'll be painful for them.

Speaker 40:36

I want to just talk about the negotiations a little bit and who's involved and who isn't. Um importantly, Israel has been excluded from the negotiations entirely, this strategic partner from the beginning, or I guess tactical partner, if we want to be a little bit more um uh honest about it and accurate. Uh, but now we've got, you know, the United States, Iran, of course, we have uh Qatar, we have Pakistan, we have other countries involved in this conversation, but not Israel. And uh I'm wondering what you think that means practically for Israel's security. You know, do you think that there are some things happening behind the scenes, or does this really uh demonstrate a break that that relationship that certainly Israel was counting on and uh Benjamin Netanyahu was counting on with Trump, that that is either over or it's on pause, or do you think behind the scenes some of this is is happening with Israeli input and uh and partnership?

Speaker 1 41:39

Well, it it doesn't surprise me that the the Israelis would not be in the negotiations with the Iranians because the Iranians probably would not have accepted that. I I think they should, I think we should have presented it and said if you really want to address seriously what's happening uh in Lebanon, the Israelis need to be at the table. And I don't know, perhaps even Hezbollah, um, which may be objectionable to Israel. But um so uh they were not at the table. I would hope that uh there's very, very close coordination and communication between the two sides. I don't know for certain that there is. Um there was a very tense conversation, we've all read about it, between uh Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu, uh, and I think they ended the call in very tense way. Uh and and uh I think now the concern is that the Israelis who will continue to defend themselves, as they're entitled to do, uh, from uh uh continual attacks by Hezbollah uh risk undermining this MOU. They're not mentioned, I don't think Hezbollah is mentioned, only Southern Lebanon, but there is this um uh loosely worded commitment, and I lose that, and I use that term commitment in the loosest possible way, um to uh to terminate um uh these attacks against Southern Lebanon. And the implication is the Iranians expect the United States to exert its influence over Israel and get them to stop. And yes, we have considerable influence with the Israelis, but we can't order them to stop, particularly when it's a question of their own security and security of their people. And Donald Trump knows this. I mean, he can harangue the Israelis and Bibi all he wants, but the Israelis are not going to stand by idly as Hezbollah continues to carry out attacks. And so the question remains to what extent the Iranians are willing to apply pressure on Hezbollah to cease its attacks against Israel, and actually to abide by the formal agreement that was reached between Israel and uh and Lebanon to withdraw all Hezbollah forces from southern Lebanon to the north of the Litv. They have not done that yet. There is now a possibility that's been that's being floated around that Israel will vacate certain pockets of areas in southern Lebanon so that the Lebanese army can come in and continue with its disarmament operations. I think they may be willing to do something on the order, but in a very limited way, because the success of that is certainly in no way guaranteed. The Lebanese army, despite maybe very uh very good intentions, uh, may not be capable of doing that. And in fact, it will require IDF forces uh uh to finish that, um uh both de-arming and expelling the uh Hezbollah forces. So uh the the Israelis are in the agreement, although they're not specifically mentioned, and so there is an implied obligation on them, at least in the view of Donald Trump, but it's one that Donald Trump really can't enforce. He cannot make an unqualified commitment to anyone, much less the Iranians, that Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon are going to stop.

Speaker 45:18

Obviously, this is playing out in the backdrop of midterm elections coming up and primaries in cities around the country, including a very dramatic one yesterday in New York City, where um virulently anti-Israel voices uh were elected in primaries, and uh, and given the nature of the voting block, it looks like they will end up being in Congress. So that's part of the backdrop here. And I know you work closely when you were at the quartet with Tony Blair, you work closely with uh Prime Minister Netanyahu and other members, senior members of the Israeli government. How do you explain or understand the miscalculation on that side? Because obviously Netanyahu has spent enough time with uh Trump to know a little bit about his character and his competence. And now we're at a at a moment where clearly not only did the president miscalculate, but obviously the prime minister of Israel miscalculated. And in the end, you know, we we we don't know how this will all unfold in the months to come, in the years to come. But at this moment, right now, from this vantage point, you can't help but think, ooh, what what were you thinking? Um, why, why, why did you trust that uh, you know, that President Trump would follow through in in certain ways? Why did you trust that uh going forth with a uh tactical plan but not a strategic plan would ultimately somehow work its way out? How do you make sense of the Prime Minister? Is it also domestic politics on his side? Uh, because certainly it's not incompetence, but but there must be something else driving the decision-making process for the prime minister.

Speaker 1 47:05

I think in the case of the prime minister, it's a triumph of hope over experience. Uh his belief uh that uh longly held that uh this long hoped for partnership, allyship, so to speak, or alliance between US and Israeli military forces would be the ultimate weapon and finally bringing the Iranian government to its knees. Forgetting that Donald Trump throughout his entire life has not been a very loyal or trustworthy partner, whether in his business career or serving as as president. And that sooner or later, when for whatever reason the war got too hard, too expensive, too long, too complicated, just too difficult, uh Trump would just want to throw in the top. And basically left Bibi Netanyahu and Israel at the station. Um and how Netanyahu, who is probably one of the most astute politicians in the world, um, could have believed this is really beyond me. Uh, because Donald Trump is not a person that you want to want that you want to put a lot of faith and confidence in. I mean, his history proves it. And he was never as committed to this war as Netanyahu or anyone else in Israel. For Israel, we said it last time, and it still still holds that this is existential for Israel. It's not existential for the United States, and it's certainly not existential for Donald Trump. And as I said, uh, at the end of the day, Trump was not he was not willing to take the time or expend the resources or the political capital, which would have been very, very costly with the upcoming midterms, uh to go the distance, to do whatever it might take to bring them down. And I'm not sure that that would have succeeded either. The United States was facing constraints of its own on uh on its military. Uh we we've all heard and read about the rapidly uh rapidly depleting stocks of U.S. armaments, and this was before the war actually began, and now it's even more acute. It's it's a serious challenge for the United States going forward if we face um uh threats from either China or from Russia, or anywhere else in the world for that matter. And so Donald Trump basically decided the war was going to be over and he would accept a very unsatisfactory MOU and has left uh the Israelis standing at the station. You alluded to it before. The US-Israel relationship is always going to be there. Clearly, it's taken a lot of beating since uh October 7th. No question about that. Uh here among the American public and the U.S. Congress, uh polls are showing now uh that um uh uh Palest Americans are more uh sympathetic to the Palestinian cause than to Israel, um and some of the election results we have seen. Um but I think the the broader swath of the American public uh is and wants to be supportive of Israel. Um people will run hot and cold on Bibi Netanyahu, but we all know that. That's even the case in Israel itself. Um and perhaps after Israel's uh elections, like what, this coming fall, um uh the lineup in Israel may change, in which case the tenor of uh criticism directed at Israel here in the United States might also change. But for now, I would have to say the relationship is certainly frayed, and it's probably time for the two sides to take stock and seriously look and have um some real conversations about where they go from here, understanding that um the United States is not going back into war against Iran. Uh that's just not going to happen, certainly not in this presidency. Um and we're gonna have to find another way, hopefully through diplomacy, which is going to be a very, very heavy lift, very admittedly, I will say, against a very difficult negotiator. The two sides have much to reflect upon right now.

Speaker 51:43

What I'm gonna ask you to uh try to do is give us something to be hopeful or uh maybe even a bit optimistic about, notwithstanding the many challenges that you've laid out for us and the many weaknesses that, as loosely uh written as this MOU is, I didn't hear anything in it that got you excited as a diplomat. I didn't hear anything in it that made you say, oh, good work. Um, quite the contrary, especially given the amount of time and resources. And and, you know, there was uh innocent people lost their lives um along the way, too. Let's not forget that for one moment. But is there anything that you can leave us with that might give us a little bit of hope as we think about how this might unfold in the months and years to come?

Speaker 1 52:31

Oh, absolutely. The Iranian government has never been weaker right now, and I'm not speaking just militarily, and that certainly holds militarily. They're not defenseless, they're not harmless, but uh this is the weakest they have ever been since 1979, 1980, when they were attacked by Iraq. So they're very, very weak. I don't think they really pose an imminent threat to any of their neighbors at the moment, and then uh they're not interested in engaging in conflict with any of their neighbors, least of all Israel at the moment. And and that's that's something I think we we should all appreciate. It's something not something we can count on as we move forward. Um, and secondly, I will say I want to be hopeful, but experience uh tells me that it will be very difficult. But nevertheless, we do in fact have a new leadership. They certainly appear to be quite hardlined, but there are some people who realize that something has to happen on the Iranian economic front, and it's only going to happen if they're willing to make some compromises. If they can prevail in their arguments, then we could see something approaching a more positive outcome. Not that it would be totally satisfying uh to our side, but uh their their economic uh situation, I really can't overstate it enough. It is truly desperate. Desperate. Lives and livelihoods depend or are in the balance in Iran today. And they're in their worst possible, most vulnerable moment because they're in the summer. The heat is atrocious. Uh, I'm in Europe right now, and you probably heard we've we're under a heat dome, we have been for a week and a half, and it's gonna continue for a week and a half. If that's the way it is in Iran, and they don't have air conditioning, uh, there are gonna be a lot of unhappy people. Uh, and even if they do, they can't afford to pay for it. People have lost jobs because their place of work has been destroyed. So there's a lot of pressure coming up from the Iranian people on the leadership to do something about our plight. And hopefully that is enough to persuade them to do what is necessary to address their real problem, their economy. And then they can get it to the to the other problems down the line. But this is a very uncompromising group of people, very, very difficult, very um unwilling to compromise. But there are new pressures and there are new players. And um uh I'm looking for signs that uh they may be willing to, as we like to say, play ball. We'll happen, we'll have to see.

Speaker 55:16

Ambassador Grapple, thank you so much. As we are approaching the July 4th holiday, by the time we get this edited and out, it'll be right around that time. And I'm thinking about 250 years, and even in moments where we feel like our government or our military or our leadership has fallen short, sometimes in objectively obvious ways, right? There, there are things that you could argue, and other things you could just say, look, guys, this was a miss. But even in a moment like that, um, I'm uh I'm I remain hopeful and optimistic in in many, many ways. And uh we know that these things unfold over time, and let's just hope for the very, very best. But I want to just thank you again. As I was reflecting on this, this is actually our fourth conversation because you spoke to me uh not on the podcast, but you came to the congregation right after in uh uh 2015, right after the JCPOA, and you spoke about that. And then uh we had podcasts about the uh Russia-Ukraine war when that emerged, and you were very generous with your time then. And then about a year ago talking about the 12-day war and now today. So um, on behalf of the congregation and so many others who uh are able to access these recordings, I'm just so grateful to you. It's a masterclass in diplomacy and the region in American history, and to be able to have it with someone who has so much experience. You were in Oman, you know, uh how many how many kilometers away from Iran, not very many, right there. And you know the the players and the region so very, very well. So, Gary, thank you so much. And on a personal level, I'm just grateful to you for taking a little bit of time out of your your uh your time with your family in Italy to to share your wisdom with us.

Speaker 1 57:04

It's always a pleasure, Yoshi, and thank you for inviting me. And and I hope uh this has been useful for you and for all the members of the congregation.

Speaker 57:11

Well, that's our episode. Thanks for listening to Search for Meaning. If you enjoyed today's conversation, please like, subscribe, and leave a review. It really helps others discover the podcast. And consider sharing Search for Meaning with a friend. They might appreciate the insights and inspiration found here. Special thanks to our producer Amy Shelby, our editor Josh Sterling, and our production coordinator Raz Husseini. Our theme song was composed by Maestro David Cates and myself, produced by Kenley Mathis, and features a vocal by cantor Josh Goldberg. Stay healthy, stay hopeful, and stay tuned.