The Battle of Borodino

Today, we cover the story of the Battle of Borodino, the battle that would turn the tide against the French and Napoleon. It was one of the most important conflicts in world history.

Transcript

Episode 308 - The Battle of Borodino

Last time, we discussed life as a serf in Russia, partially based on the memoir of Savva Dmitrievich Purlevsky. Today, we change topics once again and cover one of the most monumental battles in Russian history: Borodino.

When Napoleon invaded Russia on June 24, 1812, he intended to fight the Russians in a decisive manner, similar to how he had fought against his enemies in the past. Initially, his tactics proved correct as he achieved a significant victory at the Battle of Smolensk, overcoming the Russian Army led by Generals Barclay de Tolly and Pyotr Bagration. 

Following the disastrous battle, Tsar Alexander I replaced the two men with Mikhail Kutuzov, who decided on a war of attrition against the invading Grand Armee of France. This would impede Napoleon's plans and would lead to his eventual defeat. But, as you might remember from the series on Kutuzov from 2023, there was a great deal of pressure to fight a major battle against the invaders. This was going to be the Battle of Borodino.

Let's first situate ourselves. Napoleon had 460,000 troops stationed in Russia, with another 200,000 covering his lines of communications back into Poland. As Paul Davis writes in his book about the men in his Army, 100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to the Present, “…however, about half of them were not French and therefore were potentially unreliable.” 

Napoleon was concerned that Russia was working with England against the French, which was indeed happening. The trade between Russia and France was up and running again, as it was a significant part of their economy. Russia was concerned that Napoleon would recreate the Kingdom of Poland, an old archrival. On top of that, Napoleon had installed French Marshal Bernadotte as Crown Prince of Sweden. The Russians saw this as another indication that an invasion was imminent. 

The Russians were on their own turf, and while seemingly alone, they had several military advisors from Prussia, Britain, and, surprisingly, the Ottoman Empire. To top it off, Napoleon's closest advisors warned the General not to try to invade Russia as it was far too risky. Napoleon believed that the Russian peasants would be more than happy to overthrow their government, very much like the French peasants helped tear down the monarchy. 

His other major mistake was believing that his Grand Armee would be capable of living off the land, not believing that the Russians would follow a scorched-earth strategy. All they needed to do was create a series of supply depots along their lines if they were unable to find food on their march into the interior of Russia. Adding to the insanity was Napoleon's ego, fed by fourteen years of victories over all of his opponents. 

There is one other problem that the French faced that is not often talked about; Napoleon of 1812 was not the same man of the previous fourteen years; he had grown fat and was having lots of health problems. The energetic military genius was no more. Instead, he was lethargic and not as mentally sharp as in the past.

The French continued to win battle after battle while marching deeper and deeper into foreign territory. The problem they faced, though, was one of Russia's greatest defenses: the weather. It wasn't the cold and snow; it turned out that the summer of 1812 was particularly hot. This weakened both the men and the horses. 

The uprising of the peasants that Napoleon was so sure of turned out to be the exact opposite. Not only did they not rise up against their enslavers, as most of them were serfs, as we learned in the last episode, but they embraced the scorched-earth policy of the Army. This had an unexpected effect on the size of the invading Army. Because they were unable to gather enough food on the journey inward, they needed to create more depots. In order to protect these stations, they needed to leave additional troops to guard them. This would reduce the force facing the Russians, the massive force Napoleon required to win the conflict.

After the disastrous Battle of Smolensk on August 17, 1812, General Barclay de Tolly ordered a retreat before his Army could be surrounded and destroyed. Many criticized him and believed he took the coward's way out, especially General Bagration. In hindsight, though, it turned out to be the exact right thing to do and set up the Russians to inflict significant hurt on the invaders. 

The Russian forces cheered Kutuzov's replacement of de Tolly, as they did not respect the General as being fully Russian. However, some Generals did not see Kutuzov with the same positivity as the ordinary soldiers. Many thought him too old and not a brilliant military man. They would be proven wrong quite quickly. 

Kutuzov knew he was going up against one of the best military minds in history. The Russian General had seen firsthand how dangerous and brilliant Napoleon was at the Battle of Austerlitz on December 2, 1805. This battle was part of the War of the Third Coalition, and it marked the end of that conflict and forced Austria out of any further conflict against Napoleon until 1813. 

It is now September 4, 1812, and Kutuzov had seen the state of his troops and had made his decision as to where he would put up a defensive stand against the Grand Armee. As General Bagration wrote on the night of September 3, "The army has set up its camp near the village of Borodino." This small village was perfect as it protected the Russians in two of the three positions. As Kutuzov wrote to Tsar Alexander I on September 4, “The position at Borodino where I am currently halted is one of the best places one can find on the plains. The weakest spot of this position is the left flank, but I will make up for it with engineering art.”

While Kutuzov exuded confidence, he was still quite concerned for those in Moscow. He had two daughters in and around Moscow, and he told each of them to move as far away as possible. Secrecy was also crucial, as one of his daughters was married to a man who was sympathetic to the French. As Kutuzov put it, “Everything I just told you must be kept in the utmost secrecy, for if this information is made public, it will cause me great troubles.”

Napoleon was informed of Kutuzov's appointment as the head of the Russian Army shortly before the fighting began on September 5. As author Alexander Mikaberidze puts it in his biography of the Russian General, Napoleon thought, “For him, and for the French army as a whole, Kutuzov was simply le fuyard d’Austerlitz (the fugitive of Austerlitz) and there was little doubt in their minds that he would be beaten again.”

This overconfidence caused the French leader to make a series of mistakes leading up to and during the Battle of Borodino. The fighting began on the 5th, with the French attacking the Russian redoubt, which was built to slow down the enemy, not stop them. Even though the French Army had a three-to-one advantage in manpower, they were repulsed numerous times that evening. 

Napoleon was feverish and suffering from a terrible cold. This prevented him from assessing his Army's actions and making adjustments, as he had done over the previous decade of fighting. While not having the energy he once had because of age, Kutuzov was still more mobile and energetic than his French counterpart.

The delaying tactics worked, as by 10:30 pm, the Russian General was informed that his 2nd Western Army had successfully made it to the town of Semeyonovskoe. The Battle of Shevardino, while costly to both sides, aided the Russians far more than the French. The invaders lost 4,000 men, while the defenders lost 5,000. 

On September 6, Napoleon, whose health had improved somewhat, reconnoitered the Russian defensive lines, although much of the territory was shrouded in mist. The French commander saw that the left flank was the weakest part of the Russian defense, but because of the mist, he did not know about the formidable number of Russian Jagers hidden in the surrounding forest.

With approximately 130,000 men and 587 cannons ready at Borodino, the French Grand Armee was prepared to launch their attack. The plan was a full frontal assault at the Russian center with minimal attacks on the right and left flank. As Mikaberidze puts it, “This was perhaps the least imaginative and the costliest method of engagement. The plan displayed none of Napoleon’s usual energy and mastery, prompting Kutuzov to admit, ‘it is difficult to recognize him because he is so unusually cautious.’ Marshal Davout urged Napoleon to undertake a wide, sweeping maneuver with 40,000 men to turn Kutuzov’s left flank and cut his line of retreat; if successful, this maneuver would have driven the Russians into the cul-de-sac formed by the Kolocha and Moscow Rivers, where they could be hammered into submission. And yet the emperor rejected this idea and ‘too dangerous’.”

One of the main reasons Napoleon decided against what could have been a winning strategy was his concern that Kutuzov would retreat once again, taking minimal casualties and forcing the French deeper into Russia. 

A difference in command structure would come into play at the Battle of Borodino. Whereas Napoleon demanded control of the actions, Kutuzov gave his field generals complete freedom of action, trusting their expertise and bravery. While the Grand Armee had a centralized system, the three cluster system of the Russians, led by Barclay de Tolly, Pyotr Bagration, and Kutuzov, and aided by generals Kaisarov, Toll, and Kudaschev, could be seen as uncoordinated. Mikaberidze writes, “The high command was a minefield of competing egos, and Kutuzov had to tread carefully.”

The way the defenses were built around Borodino was designed to create a battle of attrition, or as Kutuzov put it, let the enemy “break his teeth on us.” The view of the Russian commander was that they could withstand any full attack and that even if the French would win, it would be a pyrrhic one. The losses they would suffer would be so great that they would not be able to recover while the Russians could. This would be a horrible mistake as Kutuzov had not manned the left flank adequately.

While the Russians had superior numbers, 150,000 men and 624 cannons, to the French, 130,000 men and 587 cannons, the invaders had a massive experience advantage. A full one-third of the Russian Army were new recruits. 

One of the benefits of defending armies within their own country was the ability to feed and take care of the Army. While the French had a very long supply line, the Russians had no such issues. Since they were just sixty miles from Moscow, they had far more provisions than their counterparts. Also, since the Russians were very religious, the ability to march holy icons held up by robbed priests through the camps gave the men a feeling of peace before the storm. 

Monday, September 7, 1812, was to see the beginning of the Battle of Borodino. The fighting began at 6:00 am with a barrage of cannon fire from the French aimed at the fleches of Bagration. This would be countered by Russian artillery until the fields the men were fighting on were covered with smoke, making it impossible to determine where the lines were and who held what ground. 

The carnage that ensued in the first three hours of engagement was astonishing even by Napoleonic War standards. While the French made initial gains over the Bagration fleches, the overall outcome to this point was a stalemate. To quote Mikaberidze yet again about what was happening on the field, “Amid incessant cannon and musketry fire, Russians, French, Germans, Portuguese, and Spaniards kept advancing and retreating, firing and reloading, colliding, tussling, falling, screaming, and dying. Dense gun smoke shrouded the entire area, making it hard for either their army commanders to make out what was happening, though messengers and orderlies kept them updated.”

You can only imagine the horrific sights that both sides witnessed. As one Russian officer commented, “Our division was annihilated… I am simply incapable of conveying the horrors I witnessed that day and still shudder remembering it all.” The 27th division, which started with 4,000 men that morning, only forty survived. Another lost 3,700 out of 4,000 within the first hour, as well as fifteen out of eighteen officers.

General Bagration ordered a counterattack against the three fletches that the French had captured. They were successful in recapturing two of them but at a significant loss. Bagration was injured by shrapnel, hitting him on the shin and causing him to fall off his horse. They injury proved to be fatal, with Pyotr Bagration dying on September 12. This was a major blow to the men's morale, but it did not stop them from performing bravely. 

While this loss was grave, another general, Alexander Kutaisov, was lost fighting for the redoubts. He was a young officer who, although ordered to stay at headquarters, led a charge to capture one of the fletches, costing him his life. These acts of bravery were repeated time after time throughout the day on both sides. 

One of Napoleon's plans was to force the Russians into box formations, allowing light artillery to pound them into submission. As Paul Davis writes in his book 100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to the Present, “That was the plan, but the Russians proved remarkably uncooperative. Although within an hour French forces captured the towns anchoring both flanks, the Russians refused to be dismayed.”

The Great Redoubt held, but not for long. When Napoleon ordered a massive attack on the center, the pressure was so great that the Russians did not see the flanking maneuver from the French cavalry, which whipped out all the remaining defenders.

Napoleon finally ordered his cavalry reserves into the fray following this big win. Unfortunately for him, the Russians did the same. The reason for their attack was to protect the Russian Army's retreat. What the French emperor had not counted on was the stand that the Russians made at the top of a ridgeline above Borodino. He assumed they were readying themselves for battle, making Napoleon decide to stand pat as the sun set. He believed that he had achieved a significant victory. While he did win the Battle of Borodino, it wasn't the decisive one he needed.

What Napoleon did not know about the stand that the Russians were holding at the ridgeline was that their forces were terribly disorganized. Had the French emperor deployed his Old Guard, his most formidable forces, he may have been able to win the war and not just the battle. 

In his memoir, Napoleon wrote about Borodino, “The most terrible of all my battles was the one before Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory, but the Russians showed themselves worthy of being invincible.” 

The casualty numbers are staggering. The French lost 30,000 dead or wounded, and the Russians suffered 44,000 casualties. Among officers, the French lost forty-seven generals and thirty-two staff officers. The Russian loses were similar.

Kutuzov knew that he had inflicted a terrible price on the French. However, he also knew that they were still a very formidable force to be reckoned with. At a council meeting in the town of Gorky, he made the decision to abandon Moscow and retreat past the former capital knowing that one of the great defenders of Russia was about to enter the picture, the Russian winter. 

Napoleon entered Moscow on September 14, one week after the battle. The city was virtually empty except for some soldiers disguised as escaping prisoners. They began to set fires all over the city, denying the French any safe places to stay. Napoleon knew that keeping the city was likely not an option. However, he sent message after message to Tsar Alexander, demanding he surrender the entire country. It was a fool's idea, but the French emperor was getting desperate. 

Stupidly, because the weather was unusually warm, Napoleon and his Army stayed in Moscow for five weeks, only beginning their retreat toward Poland on October 19. This was also when Kutuzov and the Russians began to press forward towards the French Grand Armee. They would harass them time and time again but never get into a battle like the one at Borodino. 

Part of this strategy, which was widely criticized, was that Kutuzov did not want to sacrifice his men anymore than was entirely necessary. Every day, though, the Cossacks and Russian cavalry picked off any stragglers and any small bands of soldiers. 

One of the great tragedies in the retreat happened at the Beresina River. The battle that was fought here between November 26 and 29,1812, between Napoleon's Grande Armée and the Imperial Russian Army under Field Marshal Wittgenstein and Admiral Chichagov, would cost the lives of thousands of French forces when the hastily constructed bridges over the river collapsed, causing numerous deaths and stranded thousands more. 

The Russian winter had now set in, and with temperatures plunging to a low of -32 degrees centigrade, the French continued to lose men every minute of every day. Of the vast Army that invaded Russia in June, only about 10,000 of the over 400,000 made it out alive.

Napoleon was forced to race back to Paris after word spread that an attempted coup against his regime had occurred. The coup was squashed, but the damage to his reputation and his Army's strength had been shattered, and it all began at the Battle of Borodino.

Well, I hope you enjoyed today's episode. Join me next time when I interview International Political Scholar Marlene Laruelle who has authored a number of books on the rise of fascism in the world today. So, until next time, Dasvidania eh Spasiba za Vinyamineya. 

Episode 308 - The Battle of Borodino

Last time, we discussed life as a serf in Russia, partially based on the memoir of Savva Dmitrievich Purlevsky. Today, we change topics once again and cover one of the most monumental battles in Russian history: Borodino.

When Napoleon invaded Russia on June 24, 1812, he intended to fight the Russians in a decisive manner, similar to how he had fought against his enemies in the past. Initially, his tactics proved correct as he achieved a significant victory at the Battle of Smolensk, overcoming the Russian Army led by Generals Barclay de Tolly and Pyotr Bagration. 

Following the disastrous battle, Tsar Alexander I replaced the two men with Mikhail Kutuzov, who decided on a war of attrition against the invading Grand Armee of France. This would impede Napoleon's plans and would lead to his eventual defeat. But, as you might remember from the series on Kutuzov from 2023, there was a great deal of pressure to fight a major battle against the invaders. This was going to be the Battle of Borodino.

Let's first situate ourselves. Napoleon had 460,000 troops stationed in Russia, with another 200,000 covering his lines of communications back into Poland. As Paul Davis writes in his book about the men in his Army, 100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to the Present, “…however, about half of them were not French and therefore were potentially unreliable.” 

Napoleon was concerned that Russia was working with England against the French, which was indeed happening. The trade between Russia and France was up and running again, as it was a significant part of their economy. Russia was concerned that Napoleon would recreate the Kingdom of Poland, an old archrival. On top of that, Napoleon had installed French Marshal Bernadotte as Crown Prince of Sweden. The Russians saw this as another indication that an invasion was imminent. 

The Russians were on their own turf, and while seemingly alone, they had several military advisors from Prussia, Britain, and, surprisingly, the Ottoman Empire. To top it off, Napoleon's closest advisors warned the General not to try to invade Russia as it was far too risky. Napoleon believed that the Russian peasants would be more than happy to overthrow their government, very much like the French peasants helped tear down the monarchy. 

His other major mistake was believing that his Grand Armee would be capable of living off the land, not believing that the Russians would follow a scorched-earth strategy. All they needed to do was create a series of supply depots along their lines if they were unable to find food on their march into the interior of Russia. Adding to the insanity was Napoleon's ego, fed by fourteen years of victories over all of his opponents. 

There is one other problem that the French faced that is not often talked about; Napoleon of 1812 was not the same man of the previous fourteen years; he had grown fat and was having lots of health problems. The energetic military genius was no more. Instead, he was lethargic and not as mentally sharp as in the past.

The French continued to win battle after battle while marching deeper and deeper into foreign territory. The problem they faced, though, was one of Russia's greatest defenses: the weather. It wasn't the cold and snow; it turned out that the summer of 1812 was particularly hot. This weakened both the men and the horses. 

The uprising of the peasants that Napoleon was so sure of turned out to be the exact opposite. Not only did they not rise up against their enslavers, as most of them were serfs, as we learned in the last episode, but they embraced the scorched-earth policy of the Army. This had an unexpected effect on the size of the invading Army. Because they were unable to gather enough food on the journey inward, they needed to create more depots. In order to protect these stations, they needed to leave additional troops to guard them. This would reduce the force facing the Russians, the massive force Napoleon required to win the conflict.

After the disastrous Battle of Smolensk on August 17, 1812, General Barclay de Tolly ordered a retreat before his Army could be surrounded and destroyed. Many criticized him and believed he took the coward's way out, especially General Bagration. In hindsight, though, it turned out to be the exact right thing to do and set up the Russians to inflict significant hurt on the invaders. 

The Russian forces cheered Kutuzov's replacement of de Tolly, as they did not respect the General as being fully Russian. However, some Generals did not see Kutuzov with the same positivity as the ordinary soldiers. Many thought him too old and not a brilliant military man. They would be proven wrong quite quickly. 

Kutuzov knew he was going up against one of the best military minds in history. The Russian General had seen firsthand how dangerous and brilliant Napoleon was at the Battle of Austerlitz on December 2, 1805. This battle was part of the War of the Third Coalition, and it marked the end of that conflict and forced Austria out of any further conflict against Napoleon until 1813. 

It is now September 4, 1812, and Kutuzov had seen the state of his troops and had made his decision as to where he would put up a defensive stand against the Grand Armee. As General Bagration wrote on the night of September 3, "The army has set up its camp near the village of Borodino." This small village was perfect as it protected the Russians in two of the three positions. As Kutuzov wrote to Tsar Alexander I on September 4, “The position at Borodino where I am currently halted is one of the best places one can find on the plains. The weakest spot of this position is the left flank, but I will make up for it with engineering art.”

While Kutuzov exuded confidence, he was still quite concerned for those in Moscow. He had two daughters in and around Moscow, and he told each of them to move as far away as possible. Secrecy was also crucial, as one of his daughters was married to a man who was sympathetic to the French. As Kutuzov put it, “Everything I just told you must be kept in the utmost secrecy, for if this information is made public, it will cause me great troubles.”

Napoleon was informed of Kutuzov's appointment as the head of the Russian Army shortly before the fighting began on September 5. As author Alexander Mikaberidze puts it in his biography of the Russian General, Napoleon thought, “For him, and for the French army as a whole, Kutuzov was simply le fuyard d’Austerlitz (the fugitive of Austerlitz) and there was little doubt in their minds that he would be beaten again.”

This overconfidence caused the French leader to make a series of mistakes leading up to and during the Battle of Borodino. The fighting began on the 5th, with the French attacking the Russian redoubt, which was built to slow down the enemy, not stop them. Even though the French Army had a three-to-one advantage in manpower, they were repulsed numerous times that evening. 

Napoleon was feverish and suffering from a terrible cold. This prevented him from assessing his Army's actions and making adjustments, as he had done over the previous decade of fighting. While not having the energy he once had because of age, Kutuzov was still more mobile and energetic than his French counterpart.

The delaying tactics worked, as by 10:30 pm, the Russian General was informed that his 2nd Western Army had successfully made it to the town of Semeyonovskoe. The Battle of Shevardino, while costly to both sides, aided the Russians far more than the French. The invaders lost 4,000 men, while the defenders lost 5,000. 

On September 6, Napoleon, whose health had improved somewhat, reconnoitered the Russian defensive lines, although much of the territory was shrouded in mist. The French commander saw that the left flank was the weakest part of the Russian defense, but because of the mist, he did not know about the formidable number of Russian Jagers hidden in the surrounding forest.

With approximately 130,000 men and 587 cannons ready at Borodino, the French Grand Armee was prepared to launch their attack. The plan was a full frontal assault at the Russian center with minimal attacks on the right and left flank. As Mikaberidze puts it, “This was perhaps the least imaginative and the costliest method of engagement. The plan displayed none of Napoleon’s usual energy and mastery, prompting Kutuzov to admit, ‘it is difficult to recognize him because he is so unusually cautious.’ Marshal Davout urged Napoleon to undertake a wide, sweeping maneuver with 40,000 men to turn Kutuzov’s left flank and cut his line of retreat; if successful, this maneuver would have driven the Russians into the cul-de-sac formed by the Kolocha and Moscow Rivers, where they could be hammered into submission. And yet the emperor rejected this idea and ‘too dangerous’.”

One of the main reasons Napoleon decided against what could have been a winning strategy was his concern that Kutuzov would retreat once again, taking minimal casualties and forcing the French deeper into Russia. 

A difference in command structure would come into play at the Battle of Borodino. Whereas Napoleon demanded control of the actions, Kutuzov gave his field generals complete freedom of action, trusting their expertise and bravery. While the Grand Armee had a centralized system, the three cluster system of the Russians, led by Barclay de Tolly, Pyotr Bagration, and Kutuzov, and aided by generals Kaisarov, Toll, and Kudaschev, could be seen as uncoordinated. Mikaberidze writes, “The high command was a minefield of competing egos, and Kutuzov had to tread carefully.”

The way the defenses were built around Borodino was designed to create a battle of attrition, or as Kutuzov put it, let the enemy “break his teeth on us.” The view of the Russian commander was that they could withstand any full attack and that even if the French would win, it would be a pyrrhic one. The losses they would suffer would be so great that they would not be able to recover while the Russians could. This would be a horrible mistake as Kutuzov had not manned the left flank adequately.

While the Russians had superior numbers, 150,000 men and 624 cannons, to the French, 130,000 men and 587 cannons, the invaders had a massive experience advantage. A full one-third of the Russian Army were new recruits. 

One of the benefits of defending armies within their own country was the ability to feed and take care of the Army. While the French had a very long supply line, the Russians had no such issues. Since they were just sixty miles from Moscow, they had far more provisions than their counterparts. Also, since the Russians were very religious, the ability to march holy icons held up by robbed priests through the camps gave the men a feeling of peace before the storm. 

Monday, September 7, 1812, was to see the beginning of the Battle of Borodino. The fighting began at 6:00 am with a barrage of cannon fire from the French aimed at the fleches of Bagration. This would be countered by Russian artillery until the fields the men were fighting on were covered with smoke, making it impossible to determine where the lines were and who held what ground. 

The carnage that ensued in the first three hours of engagement was astonishing even by Napoleonic War standards. While the French made initial gains over the Bagration fleches, the overall outcome to this point was a stalemate. To quote Mikaberidze yet again about what was happening on the field, “Amid incessant cannon and musketry fire, Russians, French, Germans, Portuguese, and Spaniards kept advancing and retreating, firing and reloading, colliding, tussling, falling, screaming, and dying. Dense gun smoke shrouded the entire area, making it hard for either their army commanders to make out what was happening, though messengers and orderlies kept them updated.”

You can only imagine the horrific sights that both sides witnessed. As one Russian officer commented, “Our division was annihilated… I am simply incapable of conveying the horrors I witnessed that day and still shudder remembering it all.” The 27th division, which started with 4,000 men that morning, only forty survived. Another lost 3,700 out of 4,000 within the first hour, as well as fifteen out of eighteen officers.

General Bagration ordered a counterattack against the three fletches that the French had captured. They were successful in recapturing two of them but at a significant loss. Bagration was injured by shrapnel, hitting him on the shin and causing him to fall off his horse. They injury proved to be fatal, with Pyotr Bagration dying on September 12. This was a major blow to the men's morale, but it did not stop them from performing bravely. 

While this loss was grave, another general, Alexander Kutaisov, was lost fighting for the redoubts. He was a young officer who, although ordered to stay at headquarters, led a charge to capture one of the fletches, costing him his life. These acts of bravery were repeated time after time throughout the day on both sides. 

One of Napoleon's plans was to force the Russians into box formations, allowing light artillery to pound them into submission. As Paul Davis writes in his book 100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to the Present, “That was the plan, but the Russians proved remarkably uncooperative. Although within an hour French forces captured the towns anchoring both flanks, the Russians refused to be dismayed.”

The Great Redoubt held, but not for long. When Napoleon ordered a massive attack on the center, the pressure was so great that the Russians did not see the flanking maneuver from the French cavalry, which whipped out all the remaining defenders.

Napoleon finally ordered his cavalry reserves into the fray following this big win. Unfortunately for him, the Russians did the same. The reason for their attack was to protect the Russian Army's retreat. What the French emperor had not counted on was the stand that the Russians made at the top of a ridgeline above Borodino. He assumed they were readying themselves for battle, making Napoleon decide to stand pat as the sun set. He believed that he had achieved a significant victory. While he did win the Battle of Borodino, it wasn't the decisive one he needed.

What Napoleon did not know about the stand that the Russians were holding at the ridgeline was that their forces were terribly disorganized. Had the French emperor deployed his Old Guard, his most formidable forces, he may have been able to win the war and not just the battle. 

In his memoir, Napoleon wrote about Borodino, “The most terrible of all my battles was the one before Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory, but the Russians showed themselves worthy of being invincible.” 

The casualty numbers are staggering. The French lost 30,000 dead or wounded, and the Russians suffered 44,000 casualties. Among officers, the French lost forty-seven generals and thirty-two staff officers. The Russian loses were similar.

Kutuzov knew that he had inflicted a terrible price on the French. However, he also knew that they were still a very formidable force to be reckoned with. At a council meeting in the town of Gorky, he made the decision to abandon Moscow and retreat past the former capital knowing that one of the great defenders of Russia was about to enter the picture, the Russian winter. 

Napoleon entered Moscow on September 14, one week after the battle. The city was virtually empty except for some soldiers disguised as escaping prisoners. They began to set fires all over the city, denying the French any safe places to stay. Napoleon knew that keeping the city was likely not an option. However, he sent message after message to Tsar Alexander, demanding he surrender the entire country. It was a fool's idea, but the French emperor was getting desperate. 

Stupidly, because the weather was unusually warm, Napoleon and his Army stayed in Moscow for five weeks, only beginning their retreat toward Poland on October 19. This was also when Kutuzov and the Russians began to press forward towards the French Grand Armee. They would harass them time and time again but never get into a battle like the one at Borodino. 

Part of this strategy, which was widely criticized, was that Kutuzov did not want to sacrifice his men anymore than was entirely necessary. Every day, though, the Cossacks and Russian cavalry picked off any stragglers and any small bands of soldiers. 

One of the great tragedies in the retreat happened at the Beresina River. The battle that was fought here between November 26 and 29,1812, between Napoleon's Grande Armée and the Imperial Russian Army under Field Marshal Wittgenstein and Admiral Chichagov, would cost the lives of thousands of French forces when the hastily constructed bridges over the river collapsed, causing numerous deaths and stranded thousands more. 

The Russian winter had now set in, and with temperatures plunging to a low of -32 degrees centigrade, the French continued to lose men every minute of every day. Of the vast Army that invaded Russia in June, only about 10,000 of the over 400,000 made it out alive.

Napoleon was forced to race back to Paris after word spread that an attempted coup against his regime had occurred. The coup was squashed, but the damage to his reputation and his Army's strength had been shattered, and it all began at the Battle of Borodino.

Well, I hope you enjoyed today's episode. Join me next time when I interview International Political Scholar Marlene Laruelle who has authored a number of books on the rise of fascism in the world today. So, until next time, Dasvidania eh Spasiba za Vinyamineya.