North Korea’s Historic War Strategy Shift, Explained

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has appeared in a slew of new propaganda videos, promoting technological advances in the regime’s nuclear program and issuing warnings to South Korea and its allies. For the first time since the Korean War was paused seven decades ago, the dictator has talked about South Korea as an enemy, rather than part of a peninsula that had to be reunified under the regime, marking a historic shift. 

As Pyongyang reinforces its military cooperation with Moscow, stepping up support for the war in Ukraine, Kim Jong Un has embraced its enhanced international status as a weapons provider, while also preparing for the outcome of the U.S. election. 

Meanwhile, reports from inside the country indicate furtherly stepped up social control, with human rights violations and harsh punishments helping Mr. Kim to tighten its grip on power.

In this episode, Asia Matters host Paolo Bosonin taps two veteran experts for intelligence and analysis: General Chun In-bum, former commander of South Korea’s special forces, and Jenny Town from the 38 North program at the Stimson Center.

Transcript

00:00:05:03 - 00:00:18:15
Unknown
Hello and welcome to Asia Matters, the podcast that zooms in on the world's most dynamic region. I'm your host, Paolo Busson, and today we're taking a closer look at the historic changes happening in North Korea.

00:00:19:10 - 00:00:33:21
Unknown
What you're hearing here is a selection of reports from Pyongyang's official TV channel. Footage shows Kim Jong un overseeing large tests of rockets that can carry nuclear weapons.

00:00:34:17 - 00:00:44:16
Unknown
Launching the country's first spy satellite to space and issuing warnings of a potential conflict with South Korea.

00:00:44:16 - 00:00:45:12
Unknown
will hey

00:00:45:12 - 00:01:02:26
Unknown
Today, North Korea has a new international role since it provides weapons to Russia for its war in Ukraine. And inside the country, Kim Jong un has touted economic progress, and he appears to have increased even more. His regime's surveillance and punishments.

00:01:02:29 - 00:01:15:27
Unknown
So what is going on in one of the world's most secretive regimes? And what are Kim Jong-Un's goals this time as he steps up his aggressive rhetoric? And how is the U.S. going to respond to all of this?

00:01:15:27 - 00:01:21:10
Unknown
To help us answer those questions, we have two very well-informed guests on the podcast today.

00:01:21:25 - 00:01:32:23
Unknown
General Chun Inbar is the former commander of the South Korean Special Forces. He has worked with several American universities, including Johns Hopkins. Thanks for joining

00:01:34:00 - 00:01:36:20
Unknown
Thank you for your invitation.

00:01:36:20 - 00:01:45:10
Unknown
calling in from Washington, D.C. Jenny Towne is the director of the 38 North program at the Stimson Center. Welcome to Asia Matters. Jenny,

00:01:45:10 - 00:01:47:18
Unknown
Thanks for having me. It's great to be here.

00:01:48:11 - 00:01:59:21
Unknown
Let me start with a key question for you, Jenny. What is North Korea doing exactly and what is it trying to achieve here with its latest wave of propaganda?

00:01:59:21 - 00:02:33:05
Unknown
North Korea, these days has made really significant progress on its WMD programs and its weapons of mass destruction, especially against the goals it set in 2021, its five year goals. It is it has achieved most of the technologies that it put forward, including hypersonics, including greater ranges, diversification of delivery systems, as well as now, as you mentioned, a reconnaissance satellite in orbit.

00:02:33:07 - 00:03:09:07
Unknown
So they're really, really working to achieve those goals on paper. We've also seen them step up actual missile deployment drills as the U.S. and South Korea also engage in back to back large scale live fire military drills as well. So I think there is a lot of posturing going on on the peninsula, on both sides of the DMZ and and that where with the energy is sort of feeding off of each other as well, making it really difficult for either side to back down while both sides really do

00:03:09:07 - 00:03:14:01
Unknown
try and demonstrate that they will not be intimidated by each other.

00:03:14:01 - 00:03:20:06
Unknown
there is a lot of posturing, but how should that posturing be interpreted?

00:03:20:06 - 00:03:24:22
Unknown
when North Korea does issue its warnings, it is still very much couched

00:03:24:22 - 00:03:38:21
Unknown
the rhetoric of in a contingency. This is what they will do if forced to do these things, if forced to go to war, if tested too much, that that these are the actions that it's going to take.

00:03:38:21 - 00:03:57:02
Unknown
And I think there's a lot of the messaging that's going through on the North Korean side that's very deterrence oriented and making clear sort of what they envision as as red lines and what their actions and responses are likely to be.

00:03:57:02 - 00:04:00:12
Unknown
what is the state of North Korea's nuclear program

00:04:00:12 - 00:04:40:12
Unknown
And they've made great advances over the past, you know, two or three years, especially, Lee, like I said, really hitting a lot of those goals that it set for itself in 2021. So they have a very diverse array of delivery systems that are nuclear capable, and they are working on improving their naval capabilities, including, you know, cruise missiles and submarine launch ballistic missiles and new submarines themselves, as well as now trying to improve their reconnaissance capabilities and and intelligence gathering capabilities.

00:04:40:12 - 00:04:50:15
Unknown
So, you know, they have a pretty robust program and one that does, you know, really challenge their capabilities

00:04:50:15 - 00:04:55:20
Unknown
on the U.S. South Korean side of the equation.

00:04:55:20 - 00:05:14:18
Unknown
there have been several waves of North Korean provocations over the decades and you have dealt with them on the South Korean side multiple times. How serious do you think this one is? What's changed and what hasn't changed this time?

00:05:14:18 - 00:05:15:14
Unknown
So first,

00:05:15:14 - 00:05:50:27
Unknown
we need to think about the definition of provocations. When I hear provocations, what comes into my mind is a North Korean submarine infiltrating into our waters and torpedoing one of our ships, killing more than four dozen sailors. When I hear provocation, I think of North Korean infiltrators coming within the demilitarized zone and laying landmines as traps or our soldiers.

00:05:51:00 - 00:06:25:16
Unknown
But now we've been accustomed to not using the word provocation for North Korean missile launches, both cruise and ballistic, which is a provocation which is a defiant act against all U.N. resolutions. But it's not the kind of provocation that a military man like myself would come to mind. So because we've been using the word provocation so loosely, it seems as if the North Koreans are now provoking South Korea.

00:06:25:22 - 00:07:05:13
Unknown
And with the verbal barrage of insults going back and forth between the north and South, it seems as if tensions are at a high point on the Korean Peninsula. But for a South Korean like myself living here, it's business as usual. Now, having said that, there have been changes on the Korean Peninsula, as Jenni has mentioned. The North Koreans have surely and steadily and improving their nuclear capability and their delivery capability, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, they can.

00:07:05:13 - 00:07:36:26
Unknown
They've demonstrated the fact that it's all operational. They're now going to improve their submarine launch capability, which will be a direct threat to the United States. And they're getting there step by step. So but added to that, the North Koreans, Kim Jong un, has announced just months ago that they consider South Korea their main enemy. They they haven't used this term before.

00:07:36:28 - 00:08:13:10
Unknown
So at first, one might have thought that it was just, you know, rhetoric that they've been using, threats that we had become accustomed to. But they've been putting these things into practice. They've changed all their subway station names. That has any implication of peace or unification. They've not only designated the South as their main enemy, but they're erasing all establishment s and institutions that worked for peaceful unification on the Korean Peninsula.

00:08:13:13 - 00:08:49:03
Unknown
And they've been very adamant in their announcement that they will never give up their nuclear weapons. And so right now, those kind of actions are indeed very provocative. But I think what Kim Jong un is doing is he knows that rather than go on the offensive right now, because he's not strong enough, he is trying to make sure that he is more capable, that his military is better trained and ready and that his people are more indoctrinated.

00:08:49:06 - 00:09:05:10
Unknown
There's been some loose ideological challenges that the North Korean society has to face. And I think right now he is more inclined to focus on his internal improvement of his internal strength.

00:09:05:16 - 00:09:06:20
Unknown
can I

00:09:06:20 - 00:09:09:00
Unknown
pause for a second to

00:09:09:00 - 00:09:12:19
Unknown
delve a little bit more into this idea of reunification?

00:09:12:19 - 00:09:14:13
Unknown
Because, General, as you said,

00:09:14:13 - 00:09:18:25
Unknown
North Korea started calling South Korea an enemy,

00:09:18:25 - 00:09:27:16
Unknown
It's no longer saying we are one people. What does that mean going forward and how significant is that shift?

00:09:27:26 - 00:10:07:14
Unknown
well, one line of thought is that by saying that we are a won people, the rationale was that the South Korean people were oppressed by the evil Americans and their puppets like myself, and that the masses of South Korea needed to be liberated. But now North and South Korea has gone apart so much. I think Kim Jong un realizes that the South Korean public is never going to be willingly under his terms.

00:10:07:17 - 00:10:31:17
Unknown
So by identifying us not as one but separate, it's going to be easy to go to war with us because just imagine if we are one people and the people that they said needed to be liberated don't want to be liberated. What does that mean? Does that mean that the North Korean soldier is going to have to kill us to liberate us?

00:10:31:19 - 00:11:01:08
Unknown
So it doesn't make sense. So now, by defining all South Koreans as not one of us, but something else, they've just allowed themselves the rationale to go to war with South Korea. So this is a was in like a mindset that the North Korean I would say the evil leadership has come up with. So right now, North Korea is having challenges.

00:11:01:08 - 00:11:25:23
Unknown
But for instance, last year their rice production has increased by about 6.5%. So they're doing better. They have better relations with the Russians because of their better relations with the Russians. They can deal a little bit more liberally with the Chinese. And so Kim Jong un is in a better position, and he's using it to make sure that he has better capabilities.

00:11:25:26 - 00:11:48:20
Unknown
He doesn't have it now, but he's using the present situation that he has to improve his conditions. And one of his ways is to indoctrinate his people by telling them that that it's not just the South Korean leadership that is evil and their enemy, but now the entire South Korean people are are their enemy.

00:11:49:09 - 00:11:55:26
Unknown
agree with a lot of what General Chan said but I think there's also another way to look at that is

00:11:55:26 - 00:12:03:21
Unknown
back in 2018 when the summit process started between King's Lynn and President Moon, I think there was

00:12:03:21 - 00:12:10:27
Unknown
a lot of optimism that the inter-Korean agenda was going to once again move forward.

00:12:10:29 - 00:12:49:08
Unknown
And I think throughout that process, what the North Koreans learned was that there was no longer really an inter-Korean agenda that could move forward independent of North Korea's relations with the rest of the world, a.k.a. the United States, for instance, and the United Nations. And so I think there's a bit of, you know, that recalibration that's gone on since 2019, since that the failure to get an agreement between the U.S. and North Korea in Hanoi that really stopped the inter-Korean agenda as well.

00:12:49:08 - 00:13:33:19
Unknown
And you saw during that era, Kim Jong un really issue a issued statements to President Moon himself saying don't let external actors get in the way of the inter-Korean agenda. So there's a certain degree to which, if there is no longer the ability to carry forward an independent inter-Korean agenda, then why maintain special status and why maintain resources on something that isn't going to move forward until North Korea has a very different relationship with the rest of the world, which right now seems very unlikely given the trajectory of the geopolitical situation.

00:13:33:19 - 00:14:03:02
Unknown
So I think there's a bit of that recalibration that's been going on with the again, the reimposition of a lot of the indoctrination that came, you know, that that historically has existed that got especially loose during the summit process when you had, you know, K-Pop exhibition in Pyongyang and you had, you know, into a new kind of, again, optimism in that inter-Korean agenda.

00:14:03:04 - 00:14:46:05
Unknown
But I think if you if you look at also the geopolitics of this, you know, and the disputes that are going on between Russia and Ukraine versus how people characterized, say, for instance, China and Taiwan. I do think there's also a bit of paranoia that exists in this in changing that relationship from the North Korean side, that they don't want to be seen as, you know, that they have to reunify either and that this is a that that a one state is the natural state, knowing that the international community is less likely to back them in case of an actual unification events.

00:14:46:05 - 00:15:07:11
Unknown
And so that, you know, the idea that there can be a peaceful reunification process that that maintains still two governments and you know and and a role for Kim Jong un and the Kim regime within a unified state is just no longer realistic.

00:15:07:24 - 00:15:22:22
Unknown
Could you please help us put that into context? How does Korea fit into the global picture today with conflicts in the Middle East, Ukraine and other issues, including in the South China Sea?

00:15:22:25 - 00:15:51:01
Unknown
I think Korea is actually quite involved and and quite an important player right now in larger global conflicts, especially because of Russia, Ukraine and North Korea, his willingness to support Russia, its war, to provide arms to Russia, to really deepen, you know, Russian military cooperation as well as economic cooperation, getting economic cooperation out of it.

00:15:51:03 - 00:16:26:13
Unknown
But also, you know, North Korea has really leaned into the concept of a new Cold War. And so you know, actions that really hit, you know, these blocs and these these hardening blocs against each other really creates a lot of space and a lot of political value and cover for North Korea in that process as well. You know, and North Korea's also providing our has, at least in the past, provided, you know, weapons to Iran and the Iran backed militias like Hamas and Hezbollah.

00:16:26:13 - 00:16:54:05
Unknown
So they are a player in all of this. And South Korea has, of course, been also providing artillery and and other arms, not directly to Ukraine, but, you know, indirectly through Poland. So, you know, while while the war may seem far from the Korean Peninsula, you know, it is certainly still part of Korean Peninsula affairs these days.

00:16:54:05 - 00:16:57:19
Unknown
Yeah. I think Jenny explained very correctly the

00:16:57:19 - 00:17:42:20
Unknown
contribution and that North Korea is doing to the conflict in not only Ukraine, but in Gaza as well. We found ample evidence of small arms being used by the Hamas and throughout the Middle East. And that's despite the sanctions that that has been levied on the North Koreans. If cannot if you can imagine what that might have looked like without the sanctions and the tight control that we've had on the North Koreans on the effects of North Korean proliferation would not be just on nuclear weapons.

00:17:42:20 - 00:18:09:06
Unknown
So what is Russia giving North Korea? Probably everything. Also, there are reports that it's not just ammunition that the North Koreans sent, but actually an entire factory. Now, it's been known that North Korea has been trying to export munitions and equipment factories abroad rather than try to send, you know, finished products.

00:18:09:06 - 00:18:31:01
Unknown
So I think it's it's a very serious example of North Korean capability. But what what's more frightening to me is that Putin actually opened the limousine door for for Kim Jong un.

00:18:31:03 - 00:18:54:15
Unknown
And Putin was not late for the meeting between Kim Jong un and himself. And Putin is notorious for making world leaders wait for him. But in this case, when Kim Jong un visited last time, it was Putin who waited for Kim Jong un for 30 minutes. These are the little things that I find very interesting and very frightening.

00:18:54:17 - 00:19:39:01
Unknown
If Putin is putting that much effort, if Putin is that much desperate to seek help from Kim Jong un, then probably what Kim Jong un has his weaponry is ammunition is probably not that bad. And in return, Putin will either provide technology for nuclear and surveillance capabilities or he might just look the other way. And the factory owner in Russia or the scientist in Russia, knowing that his government is looking the other way, will be very susceptible to a North Korean bribe.

00:19:39:04 - 00:20:06:28
Unknown
I mean, Paolo, how how hard to think or how much do you think what would it cost for a Russian, you know, storage manager or a scientist to be bribed into providing critical information? So it's going to be a catalyst for North Korean technology, both in weaponry and intelligence. So I think those are some of the things that we need to be concerned about.

00:20:06:29 - 00:20:09:20
Unknown
I certainly am.

00:20:09:20 - 00:20:18:11
Unknown
military person, do you think this can also really help North Korea test its weapons on the ground at scale?

00:20:18:11 - 00:20:18:22
Unknown
Maybe

00:20:20:23 - 00:20:50:06
Unknown
yes, definitely. I believe that North Korea is benefiting, as you just said. They've been testing on their own ground, but it's now being used in real war conditions. And I'm sure they're getting feedback about, you know, this is good, this is bad, and their weapons are getting better. So it's just a very high likelihood that that's a benefit that they will be receiving.

00:20:50:06 - 00:20:53:00
Unknown
I'd like to open the next question to both of you.

00:20:53:00 - 00:21:07:16
Unknown
What does this mean for China, which is traditional, be the single most important ally for North Korea? How does this change that axis between Beijing and Pyongyang?

00:21:08:18 - 00:21:42:25
Unknown
Let me just start by saying that it is my understanding that the North Koreans have no love affair with the Chinese. In fact, the situation with North Korea and the and China is quite different from our relationship with the United States. Seven out of ten Koreans genuinely appreciate the United States for helping us to defend ourselves. But that is not the case in North Korea.

00:21:42:29 - 00:22:16:05
Unknown
It seems a vast majority of the North Korean population is quite dissatisfied with the fact that during the great China did not help as much as it could have. So they have a grudge. It's only purely by necessity that China and North Korea tolerate each other. The Chinese seem to have concluded a long time ago that it is better to have a nuclear armed North Korea along its borders than to have a democratic country along its borders.

00:22:16:08 - 00:22:35:27
Unknown
North Korea, despite their distaste for China, realizes that China is the only nation that is capable and willing to provide them with much needed economic aid or support. So they they do it for their national interest

00:22:35:27 - 00:22:49:18
Unknown
just to tie this back to the last question, you know what is, what is North Korea doing with Russia and North Korea has called Russia its number one priority right now, foreign policy priority.

00:22:49:20 - 00:23:18:13
Unknown
And a lot of that is because of what Russia is willing to give North Korea. And it's something that North Korea hasn't gotten since since the Soviet Union days. And that is in addition to economic trade and assistance and development. But but real military cooperation, I mean, that just hasn't happened in decades. And if you look at, you know, what is Russia doing, why would they want this?

00:23:18:13 - 00:23:52:15
Unknown
You know, the the idea that he you know, he was waiting for Kim Jong un, he opened the Darfur Kim Jong un. And it really speaks to how Russia is viewing the role of North Korea right now. It isn't just about an arms deal. This is a much broader political calculation going on as to, you know, what role can North Korea play in Russia's war against the West in trying to undermine, you know, a US led order or Western led order?

00:23:52:17 - 00:24:22:11
Unknown
And so in that, I think, you know, the Russians have basically looked at North Korea as a strong military partner in a war against the West, whereas Russia's relationship with China, for instance, tends to waver. You know, China does not give open military cooperation to Russia, even if they are helping, you know, the Russians along the way. And the same with, you know, China's relationship with North Korea.

00:24:22:11 - 00:24:50:24
Unknown
They'll never again North Korea open military cooperation because it's not in their interest to do so. And and China still cares about its, you know, international reputation. And so, you know, I think there there is that, you know, again, dynamic playing out of the big power politics Cold War alignments that again really works in North Korea's favor in this aspect.

00:24:50:24 - 00:25:30:12
Unknown
And and I think the Chinese while there there may be some who are uncomfortable with the level of Russia North Korea cooperation that is growing and developing it still at the same time fits within a Chinese world view that's being that they see as being driven by US expansionism and NAITO expansionism in East Asia. And so this idea of, you know, Russia is looking at the world, he's looking at sort of encirclement on the on the European front and China's looking at the world as encirclement in the East Asian front.

00:25:30:12 - 00:25:44:11
Unknown
And so I do think there is a level to which, you know, China is still willing to continue supporting North Korea in the ways that it's comfortable with, which is, you know, economic development and trade

00:25:44:11 - 00:25:47:05
Unknown
in order to maintain

00:25:47:05 - 00:25:51:06
Unknown
undemocratic ally in the region or friend in the region.

00:25:51:06 - 00:25:56:27
Unknown
it isn't necessarily happy about the way that relations are developing.

00:25:56:27 - 00:26:28:26
Unknown
And it certainly does undercut some of the influence that China might have had, which tends to be overestimated how much influence they actually have anyway. But it really does complicate the situation, but in a way that still the Chinese still have great sympathy for the North Koreans. I mean, the North Koreans, security concerns against growing US, South Korea growing U.S., South Korea, Japan, trilateral bilateral alliances.

00:26:28:26 - 00:26:44:21
Unknown
how has the U.S. reacted? And also with all the conflicts we've just mentioned and all the geopolitical challenges of the present time, how much bandwidth does the U.S. actually have to realistically deal with Pyongyang?

00:26:45:29 - 00:27:34:06
Unknown
Well, I think, you know, the U.S. has spent a lot of effort to demonstrate to the South Koreans, especially, that it is still a high priority. You know, we're not reducing troops. These are permanent troops on the Korean Peninsula. They have the US has gone out of its way on, you know, establishing a new level of extended deterrence, cooperation with the Washington Declaration, including a nuclear consultative group that helps, you know, greater visibility into a decision making process as well as, you know, really trying to start, you know, discussions about nuclear and conventional integration and in operations and stuff.

00:27:34:08 - 00:28:01:26
Unknown
All of these are signals that, you know, that the Korean Peninsula is still high and priority, regardless of what else is going on in the world. I think the the more difficult question that the US has not been very successful on is, you know, how to reduce the threat from North Korea in this kind of environment when the North Koreans aren't willing to engage on issues like denuclearization.

00:28:01:29 - 00:28:21:27
Unknown
And so we have a really recalibrated the US hasn't really recalibrated the approach of how to create, you know, channels of diplomacy and diplomatic efforts, you know, to to reestablish relations with the North Koreans, even for such things as tension reduction or risk reduction talks.

00:28:22:10 - 00:28:28:04
Unknown
And of course, we ought to ask, how does the U.S. presidential election shape things?

00:28:28:04 - 00:28:47:05
Unknown
Right. Many of our listeners will remember that Trump became the first sitting U.S. president to step into North Korea technically, when he met Kim Jong un in 2019. What can we expect now as Trump and Biden face off again in another election?

00:28:47:05 - 00:28:59:00
Unknown
I think it's it's uncomfortably close at the moment between Trump and Biden. It could go either way at this point.

00:28:59:00 - 00:29:25:08
Unknown
I think there tends to be this assumption that the North Koreans are waiting for Trump to come back. And I do you know, I agree with the idea that the North Koreans don't like Biden. But and, you know, in that sense, I do think they would prefer Trump, but it doesn't necessarily mean that they're going to come running back to negotiations if he becomes president.

00:29:25:11 - 00:30:02:05
Unknown
I think there's still a number of major policy changes that have gone on in the last couple of years, especially in North Korea, about its nuclear program and the status of its program within its broader identity that make it difficult to imagine nuclear negotiations in the future. But I do think there are some X factors here. One is that, you know, Trump was incredibly antagonistic towards South Korea while he was president before, which creates a lot of uncertainty of how that relationship will develop.

00:30:02:05 - 00:30:44:12
Unknown
And I know there's a lot of efforts to institutionalize this much, you know, this deepened, strengthened bilateral and trilateral military cooperation that's possible now leading up to the elections to try and create some greater sustainability if there is a political transition. And I think on the the North Korean side, I think there's there's an interesting dynamic here that may not be a direct U.S. North Korea link at first, But my guess is, you know, if Trump does become president again, one of his number one foreign policy priorities is actually going to be Russia.

00:30:44:14 - 00:31:14:02
Unknown
And I think there's questions about, you know, what a settlement of the war in Ukraine would look like under a Trump presidency and how Trump Putin relations might develop and what that might mean for, you know, relations with Jong-Un at that point in time, depending on how that forms. But it's all very uncertain at this point in time

00:31:14:07 - 00:31:17:29
Unknown
General, what is the view from South Korea on the

00:31:17:29 - 00:31:40:12
Unknown
a lot of South Koreans are concerned that Mr. Trump will come back as the US President. I don't necessarily agree. South Korean concerns are because fears of abandonment by Mr. Trump might abandon South Korea.

00:31:40:15 - 00:32:08:28
Unknown
I don't agree with that. It is not in the U.S. interests for the United States to abandon South Korea to cut a deal with North Korea. That just doesn't sound right. Other people are concerned that more cost sharing demands will occur. Right now, we provide about $1,000,000,000 worth of support each year for the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea.

00:32:09:00 - 00:32:28:12
Unknown
Previously, Mr. Trump demanded 5 billion a year, which is five times more. But from what? For me personally, I would say, okay, so what are we going to get for five times more money would be the better question rather than saying no to it.

00:32:28:12 - 00:32:41:20
Unknown
Finally, a lot of Koreans are concerned that Mr. Trump will cut a deal with the North Koreans by agreeing to withdrawing U.S. forces from Korea.

00:32:41:22 - 00:33:18:06
Unknown
I also think that that will not that's not a possibility. But if that happens, they would be under the understanding that we, South Koreans would ourselves be in a position to go and have our own indigenous nuclear capability. Maybe that's that's a better deal for everyone. North Korea has nuclear weapons, so why shouldn't South Koreans have its own nuclear weapons and free the United States from its commitments to South Korea?

00:33:18:06 - 00:33:23:27
Unknown
And so we're looking very closely at the elections in the United States.

00:33:23:27 - 00:33:39:11
Unknown
now. I'd like to switch to a different subject for my last question. Kim Jong un has celebrated some improvement for agriculture and for the economy after the pandemic and what has been some very difficult years for North Korea.

00:33:39:14 - 00:34:07:25
Unknown
On the other hand, we're hearing horrible reports of harsh punishments and human rights abuses that North Koreans are enduring even more these days. Of course, it's hard to get reliable information out of the secretive country. But what do we know about what's happening inside North Korea and how strong do you think is Kim Jong un's grip on power right now?

00:34:08:06 - 00:34:12:15
Unknown
So if I may, I think Kim Jong un is a

00:34:12:15 - 00:34:13:10
Unknown
cruel

00:34:13:10 - 00:34:44:23
Unknown
but shrewd dictator. He knows that he is in the midst of a changing world. And I think he has come to the conclusion that he cannot allow this change, that he and as a result, cannot survive this change. If this if this change occurs in his very unique dictatorship.

00:34:44:26 - 00:35:18:19
Unknown
I think that's why he is clamping down on his own economy and his own society. So he is most concerned about South Korean culture, South Korean music, South Korean dress and hair style infiltrating into his system, where in the end he knows that freedom and ideas of democracy will slip in as well. So he's making sure that none of that is coming in.

00:35:18:22 - 00:35:47:21
Unknown
Also, I believe that the North Korean military has been desegregated because of the harsh economic situations that they've had. We know that there's a great deal of corruption in North Korea, bribes everywhere. So that must have affected the North Korean military. And by designating the South Koreans as their main enemy. It's a good excuse to tighten the grip on his military.

00:35:47:24 - 00:36:20:06
Unknown
So more training, more harsh discipline is the call of the day for the North Koreans. All of this is to maintain his grip on his people. Added to that, I'm sure you're familiar with the 20 times ten policy. 20 times ten refers to the 20 province forces for the next ten years to come up with at least one project that will go to the improvement of the livelihood of the average Korean.

00:36:20:08 - 00:37:02:04
Unknown
Toothpaste, toothbrushes, soap, toilet paper, things like that. And so he is at the same time trying to increase the life living standards of his own people. So I believe that we still have a few years before he is competent of his capability to really conduct some sort of provocation. So we need to use that time to cooperate, to exchange our capabilities and improve our readiness for the eventual challenges that North Korea and its allies will pose to us

00:37:02:04 - 00:37:21:15
Unknown
you know, I think a lot of the economic the the rollback of economic reforms that we've seen in recent years again, stem back to 2019 where, you know, in before 2019 North Korea still had a an estimation that if they

00:37:21:15 - 00:38:02:03
Unknown
could just get sanctions relief, that it would spur the economy and they needed to be ready for that. Right. That there were growing markets, there were was growing market economic activity, there was greater autonomy and state owned enterprises. There were a number of ways of kind of smaller scale experiments that were going on and how to open up that socioeconomic space for people to make money while still maintaining social control, a certain level of social control, and even a lot of social control in those years was really much looser than it is now.

00:38:02:05 - 00:38:31:10
Unknown
And so, you know, at the end of 2019, what you heard from Kim Jong un was a real disillusionment with the idea that relations with the United States could change, that they were going to get, you know, that the sanctions relief was possible. And so you saw a real mandate at that point in time to to create an economy more resilient to a persistently hostile political environment.

00:38:31:12 - 00:39:17:18
Unknown
And then again, all this sort of rollback act of the economic reforms that would have moved them in a more market oriented direction. So, you know, I and and a reassertion of as we talked about before, a reassertion of political ideology, harsher punishments for violating those because at a certain point, some of that was okay. You know like and the idea that Kim Jong un himself was watching K-Pop demonstrations in Pyongyang and that you know, President Moon had come and given a speech to a live audience in 2018, and they went to come in and Moon went to Mount Paektu together to demonstrate that they were working together towards a better future.

00:39:17:21 - 00:39:38:22
Unknown
All of that changed after at the end of 2019, and I think that was part of the symbology as well of, you know, the famous picture of Kim Jong un riding the white horse on Mountain Dew by himself was that this no longer was a pathway forward together, but instead they had to do it on their own. They were going to do it on their own again.

00:39:38:22 - 00:39:48:25
Unknown
But I do think it also creates a very nationalist rationale for reinvesting in their military industry.

00:39:48:27 - 00:40:28:16
Unknown
And so, you know, with Russia as a client, you know, it isn't just the stockpiles that are being sold off to the Russians, but, you know, new munitions, new missiles. These kinds of things where, you know, it's hard to demonstrate that you're trying to improve living standards of the people while you're rebuilding military industry unless you now bring you know, so that's part of the rationale of really hyping up the threat about South Korea, is that, you know, this now gives them a real nationalist purpose for rebuilding their military industry.

00:40:28:19 - 00:40:33:13
Unknown
And without it looking like they're just the client state to another country.

00:40:33:13 - 00:40:46:26
Unknown
you think it is cyclical and that engagement, that era of relative openness can come back? Or do you think this time is different and there's no going back

00:40:46:26 - 00:41:11:00
Unknown
You know, I don't think this is cyclical. This isn't business as usual in North Korea. Well, there's been a lot of major policy shifts inside the country, both on how they view their nuclear weapons program, which has been their biggest bargaining chip in the past, as well as even just the position on South Korea.

00:41:11:03 - 00:41:36:29
Unknown
You know, this is a questioning of the logic of human sounds, principles, founding principles, right. So it isn't taken lightly. This these are, you know, woes that Kim Jong un is building identity and legacy off of to to to set himself apart from his father and his grandfather. And they're going to be hard to reverse in the future.

00:41:37:04 - 00:42:09:11
Unknown
subtle. I'm not concerned that war is going to occur on the Korean Peninsula. I think it's very slim. But accidental clashes are always something that I am worried about, and I think that we need to be very attentive to the circumstances on the Korean Peninsula so that it will not happen if insecurity does come to the Korean Peninsula.

00:42:09:13 - 00:42:12:20
Unknown
It will be bad news for everybody.

00:42:13:05 - 00:42:29:24
Unknown
Well, thank you very much, both. We will keep watching the situation in North Korea here at Asia matters and we will keep bringing updates to our listeners For now. Thank you very much to our guests for sharing their invaluable insights and thanks, as always to the Asia Matters team.

00:42:29:24 - 00:42:44:20
Unknown
Andrew People and Rebecca Baillie. Our music is by Alexander the Strange, and thanks, of course, to our listeners. Please subscribe to our feed wherever you get your podcasts like us Raiders and check out our new channel on YouTube.

00:42:44:20 - 00:42:48:29
Unknown
For now, goodbye.