Implications & Consequences of US Policy in Latin America

Latin America Correspondent Jon Bonfiglio speaks to Richard McColl for the LatinNews Podcast. 

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:02

This is the Latin News Podcast. I am your host, Richard McCall, here in Bogota, Colombia. We have a very special guest on the episode this week, no less than John Bofilio, who is Latin America correspondent. He reports for the Times in London, LBC Radio, ABC in Australia. He's been around the continent for some time. He's based in Mexico currently. And you know, it's the time we need to discuss something pretty topical at the moment, US policy towards Latin America. So, well, John in Mexico up there, thank you so much for your time and agreeing to come on the Latin News Podcast.

SPEAKER_01 0:42

No problem at all, Richard. Nice to see you to meet you, and it's a it's a pleasure to be here.

SPEAKER_00 0:47

It's a great thing to be able to discuss something so wide-ranging. And it's it's a little hard to know exactly where to start with so much going on. Leave it to say at this very moment in time, as we are recording, uh Colombian President Gustavo Petro is in Washington, D.C., meeting with President Trump up there. So we'll wait and see what happens there before we actually focus on that for another episode. So I think perhaps we should start with you know the most topical. Well, is it the most topical, really? But let's start with Venezuela, John. Everything has obviously been overshadowed in 2026 by the events of the 3rd of January, and of course, seizing President Nicolas Maduro, or was the leader of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro, and taking him up to face justice in the United States. From your perspective, I mean, let's go beyond the basics here. Let's let's look at this a bit deeper. How does this how does the US justify keeping Delcy Rodriguez in a leadership position when she is clearly, you know, one of the key members of the regime that espoused 21st century socialism? And this really, you know, comes up against what Marco Rubio in the US would have to say about Venezuela and issues there.

SPEAKER_01 2:14

I mean, I think what's particularly interesting is it doesn't even try to justify it. It's that would be this administration, of course, operates, we know by now, in a completely different sort of parallel sort of sphere, speaks differently, relates very differently to. I mean, of course, how it relates to Latin America is an echo of a sort of an imperialist past, but this is a whole new manifestation, not even an evolution, a change, a metastisation of that of that sort of history. Notwithstanding, I think that the US administration of Maduro Rodriguez, you know, whatever you want to call it, but basically it's the same thing, nothing has changed. Those two autocracies have a lot in common. I mean, they they fundamentally recognize each other. I think everything is in the service of power and personal enrichment. I, you know, objectively, I don't think that's a that's that's questionable in any in any way, shape, or form. And sort of the pursuit of both and entrenchment of both. So those are, I think, fairly favorable terms to be to be discussing. Venezuela hasn't changed in the last 20, 25 years. It's the USA that interestingly has has changed. And so it's it's uh silent justification is that it is a viable partner. I think also clearly it recognizes almost spirationally how uh government, the government of Maduro, has been able to, not in a sort of capitalist context, but certainly in the sort of levers of power, maintain control over the country, and it recognizes that if it wants to appropriate, extract, use Venezuela in a sort of mercantile way, that it behoves, it befits the US much more to operate within this understandable political remit that it recognizes and appreciates than entering into the potential mess of democracy. That's not something that is going to assist it in its fundamental aims in the slightest.

SPEAKER_00 4:22

And the fundamental aims, you know, it's mercantile, as you said. Fundamental aims.

SPEAKER_01 4:28

Yeah, I mean, you know, that is oil, of course, it is rare earth minerals, but if you look more broadly across the region as well, in uh as regards potential free trade zones in Honduras, which are linked to members of Trump's sort of inner circle. And if you listen to the sort of subtext about the loans that were given to Argentina and Javier Malay before the midterms, there, which were tied to telecommunications contracts, everything relates to an enrichment, if you like, giving primacy to mercantile access to the US, US economies, and very specific individuals who have the leaves of power in North America.

SPEAKER_00 5:05

Mercantile access is a nice way of putting it. So could we could we suggest that that Venezuela under Delcy Rodriguez, I mean, we don't know how long she'll be in power for, but she's certainly digging in. I mean, that's all we can see. She's certainly digging in and repression is up. But could we say that that Venezuela will is is likely to become a client state of the US, or is it something different to that?

SPEAKER_01 5:31

You're totally right, the repression is up, and political releases are also up. And we often see this. Of course, she's playing to a domestic audience, she says one thing sort of locally and then reacts in a different way. But often, as you have this sort of this evolution, which is not any kind of evolution with autocracies where they there's this sort of pretense towards moving to a to a different political model, there's often these mixed signals. It's a very deliberate muddying of the water, which doesn't clarify anything at all. As regards the client states, I mean, could you call it anything else? I would I would struggle to.

SPEAKER_00 6:44

But the US, this armada, as they call it, they can't stay there forever. So, I mean, and it's and I know that uh as things build up in the Arabian Gulf and so on, I mean, surely they're going to start sort of minimizing some of their uh machinery, war machinery there in the southern Caribbean.

SPEAKER_01 7:04

Yeah, and significant portions of that armada have gone over to the Arabian Gulf. Clearly, the Trump administration regards what took place in Venezuela as a massive win and is now going to reproduce that structure, which is very overt, a very overt military threat and presence approaching or off the shore of a particular country in order to sort of get what it what it wants, what it desires. And again, is is making no sort of is not hiding it in in any way. As regards Latin America, it is important because, of course, well, since this the build-up started to happen in this in last during last summer, it was clear that this was going to have implications for the region, that this was Venezuela was never about Venezuela, it was about sending a message. You mentioned at the top of the programme about, of course, Cuba, which I'm sure we're going to come to shortly, but but also about how it wants to engage with Latin America, not just Latin America, of course the Caribbean. I mean, Greenland, we see exactly the same thing. Interestingly, we just had sorry, the very first, it seems like such a long time ago, but the very first time, the beginning of last year, that we began to get a sense of this was as regards the Panama Canal.

SPEAKER_00 8:15

Yeah.

SPEAKER_01 8:16

When there was this discussion about these Chinese companies, which now a Panamanian court has rejected, has said that there wasn't sort of due process in the awarding of the of the contract. So I think the company is called CK Hutchison, the Chinese company. So it's removed those, and that's going to be run by MERS. But but throughout the last 12 months, we've seen this strategy with some vagaries repeated across the Americas. And as again, this the Trump administration regards this as being eminently successful, it's going to continue on through the next three years of its time. One thing which is slightly different now is some of the language related to Cuba, just to go quickly onto that, because they've sort of self-administered a period of time to get Cuba to fall, to change, to evolve, to speak, which is the end of this year. And that's of course entirely about the midterms, because at the moment there is no break whatsoever on international foreign policy as undertaken by the USA. So this period between now, early February 2026, and sort of October, November at the end of this year, are going to be when the Trump administration accelerates, if anything, its existing policies.

SPEAKER_00 9:29

As you say, I mean, if we talk Cuba, Trump's disapproval rating is over 60%. I think it's 63% today. And of course, it's a lot of you know, the Latino diaspora, of course, who, you know, those who voted him in are now obviously uh turning their backs or are rejecting a lot of what was uh what has been done. And yes, I can see that how Cuba plays into that, and of course, the Florida voters and elsewhere. Very interesting that, yes, for the midterms, that should be something that is so so very connected to this. But if I mean we talk about Cuba, Cuba has long been an aim of US sort of say foreign policy is to restore democracy, and to put that in inverted commas, but restore democracy there. And of course, we know that Marco Rubio has you know sets sets his presidential hopes on this as well. What what kind of what kind of uh further actions can you imagine the US uh taking between now and the midterm? So, you know, to speed this up in order to move Cuba ahead regarding their own sort of I let's say uh plans?

SPEAKER_01 10:37

Cuba's fascinating because it is, I mean, it's a Caribbean island, it's it's big, but in the grand scheme of things, it's not that big, of course. It's positioned just off the coast of Florida, they're sort of making it sort of giving the middle finger across the water to Florida and Cuban Floridians has for a long time been been an issue. And it's and it's been on the brink, I mean, since what? Since a special period in in the 90s, but it remains, Cuba remains the greatest prize. And if we think about again Trump's guiding instincts, even as regards the military, I mean, you can make military threats without sending this the biggest armada collected in the last 20 years somewhere, but these are all television moments and these are all moments made for media, and it's the same thing with these with the seizures of the Venezuelan oil vessels as well. So, in the same way, the the potential, the fall of Cuba, the taking of Cuba, whether that's physical or spiritual, is the greatest prize that Trump can present, not just to the sort of Cuban diaspora, which of course is hugely relevant and and important and has leverage in in Florida, but also as a win to the sort of capitalist philosophical belief system that is that exists in the USA. The Trump administration has openly spoken of a real blockade now, of stopping anything coming in or out. The question here is because Cuba lost all of its major points of strength, whether that be Venezuelan oil, whether that be sort of Russian support, lost all of those a long time ago. Its health system now, which is one of its its big international success stories, of course, is now crumbling even for the Cuban people. So the sort of the heart, the soul, the guts has been ripped out of collateral of the Cuban revolutionary project. But the only thing that is left standing is the Communist Party of Cuba. The infrastructure, the political infrastructure of Cuba is the last thing that is still there and is stronger than I think Trump understands it to be on the island itself. So I'm not necessarily convinced that however hard you push the Cuban people, that that is going to make change happen. Because again, there is no great history of uh demonstrations or uprisings on the island of Cuba. Those have been clamped down on since time immemorial really partially and quickly. So there probably would have to be some kind of military strike at some point. And again, if we think of, I mean, it it seems crazy to say, right? Of course it seems crazy to say, but nobody would have thought that before January the 3rd, 2026. And again, knowing this, seeing this reproducibility of protocol that is being undertaken in the brain of the Trump administration, at some point, if Cuba doesn't fall, that's going to be put on the table. Again, I think it's it's fairly clear that that is that that kind of strike is an option for them.

SPEAKER_00 13:39

It's it's fascinating. You come to this point. It seems crazy to say that's I mean, a conversation that I've been having with analysts all for the last like four or five months, and then of course, you know, January the third, it just seems crazy to say. It seemed crazy that a few weeks ago or a month ago, we were actually genuinely discussing strikes on Colombia. You know, I mean, these things coming out that what that perhaps the longest running ally to the US, of course, the standard bearer in the war on drugs and recipient of so many billions of dollars in in direct military aid, and then of course USAID and other soft soft mechanisms and backing up with the what you call it, with the peace accords and so on. But it you we are in a different time. And as you came to say, it's not Latin America that's changed, it's the US that has changed in the last 25 years, which makes this so very interesting to discuss it, flipping it on its head. I wanted to before we moved on, you know, we took there's Cuba in there, and it again such an interesting discussion. Oil, we've discussed briefly, we we touched on that, you know, the we said the word a few times. Venezuela's oil, that still to me doesn't mean it doesn't appear to be any clear details about who is going to go back in, invest, and how I mean Trump is a c is controlling the accounts. How does this work? Big question there, John.

SPEAKER_01 15:18

I mean, of course, we we don't know, and I suspect that they don't fully know either. I think that there's a few things to say related to that. Clearly, there is when Trump pulled in the the oil executives into the into the Oval Office to uh again in his sort of in his brain to present another win and the fact that this was going to be and to have these these individuals, hugely power powerful oil executives, be in service to the administration as well, much in the same way as the tech companies had been before, and we'll see others and and and actually Petro it's his foreign policy is interesting because he does go to other places, but not very much. They tend to be sort of summits, but generally people go to him, and again, this is really this is all part of how he presents this sort of not just a national fiefdom but an international fiefdom where people come calling to ask him to sort of beg his beg his leave. Going back to the oil exacts, there's definitely space between there's a gap between what he wants them to do and what they are willing to do, which is the fact that the Venezuelan oil sector industry needs massive investment in order to get it back up to speed. Trump wants the oil companies to invest, that the oil companies are resting because they don't know which way it's gonna go. But actually, I would argue it's a little bit more cynical than that. They know that Trump wants this to happen and that he can probably find money somewhere else, and that's gonna save their shareholders some cash. So I would expect that's gonna be bridged at some point, or potentially there's gonna be sort of favorable contracts in other areas that encourage some US oil companies to invest there. Bear in mind, Chevron's had an ongoing contract. Chevron in August was issued a new contract to be able to sort of circumvent sanctions in Venezuela by the very Trump administration that then imposed the blockade. So again, sort of these sort of mixed signals there. What we know at the moment, or what's been said at the moment as regards the operation of profits from Venezuelan oil, is that they're gonna continue to be sold, but the money is currently being held in a Qatari account that is being administered by the United States, and that further down the line, of course, the United States is going to make money from the sale of these. Again, unclear whether that's gonna be a percentage term or how that's gonna work. But what's been said is that the the Venezuelan government will then be able to apply to that fund for certain sanctioned projects which would be admissible by the Trump administration. Now you can pretty much guarantee that that's gonna be that those funds are then gonna be released to be able to pay US contractors to undertake certain infrastructure projects, development projects, and and so on. In the view of the Trump administration, making Venezuela great again means taking new markets, generating new markets in Venezuela, which are going to employ Venezuelans but are going to enrich offshore.

SPEAKER_00 18:06

Okay, but no no real talk about the restoration of democracy in any of that at all, is there?

SPEAKER_01 18:13

It's an absolute irrelevance. Yeah, it's exactly again, it's crazy to say. Yeah, it is certainly, but it doesn't even think there's not even lib service paid to restoration of democracy. I mean, the very fact that the meeting with Mary Corina Machado took place out of the spot, like going back to Donald Trump's television, he did not want that to be a narrative to happen behind closed doors.

SPEAKER_00 18:34

Yeah, yeah. So let's let's move on. I mean, and we've we've discussed that, we've discussed Venezuela, we've had Cuba in here as well, Panama's been mentioned, not not so much on the front page of late, but well, let's move on to some of the countries here in South America. We've got elections coming up, I guess Colombia we should probably touch on. We have the congressional elections in March, and then of course, first round of presidential elections in May, with a second round most likely needed in June. I I mean, I'm sitting here in Bogota. From your perspective, how do you feel? How do you feel this is going to unravel? I mean, I can see lobbyists are are moving strong and hard up in Washington right now. And of course, Petro is up there and President Petro is up there. But what do you what do you see traveling, let's say, or developing surrounding Colombia being, you know, the historically the number one ally for the US in the continent?

SPEAKER_01 19:32

I mean, Petro has it tough. The Colombian left has it tough for many reasons. Foreign policy reasons would be would be one of them, but of course the perceived failure domestically of the peace accords in Colombia would be would be another, the ongoing violence, the the growth of a number of militant factions, and it's not as though the Colombian economy has done enough to be able to point to that as a as a big win for the left as well. So a sort of a continuity narrative for the Colombian left and for is complex, I think. You add to that an almost certain Trump stick carrot intervention. And that is likely to go the way of the last few elections that we've seen. The way of the election in Costa Rica, a few days ago, the way of the election with the win of Najitas Fura in Honduras in the last month, just over a month, yeah. So I think the big question for Latin America for the year as regards elections is Brazil.

SPEAKER_00 20:36

Yeah.

SPEAKER_01 20:37

That's the that's it also because of its scale, but also because of its leadership, its international leadership, its international counterpositioning of relations as part of the BRIC nations, but also its its relationship with the likes of, I mean, openly with South Africa, there's a big critical opponent of the USA, but specifically Russia and China, of course. That election at the end of the year, given Brazil's economic importance to the region and its its ideological outlook, but also its political parallel engagement internationally, is that's almost the last the last counter-argument that Latin America can provide as regards resistance to the domino effects that we are seeing unfold across the region at the moment.

SPEAKER_00 21:24

Domino effect, as you say, Honduras, Costa Rica, of course, what's taking place in Venezuela on one side, Chile, of course, Malay being in charge in Argentina. Can't think of obviously Paraguay is pro-US at the moment. So how about Peru, with all of the mining interests there in the ports and so on? Of course, and Chinese interests in the Changkai megaport.

SPEAKER_01 21:47

For a long time now, I've seen Peru as something of a not an outlier, but almost a I mean, it does fit into Latin American narratives. Of course it does. But it's also sort of an nth degree case study. I mean, it is it. Everything that we see play out in Latin America seems to be accentuated and accelerated in Peru and has been for a long period of time. Now, if you think about Odebrecht, if you think about corruption, if you think about instability, if you think about conflicts, ongoing conflicts between Congress and the presidency, and how all of that plays out. Civil unrest, of course, I mean civil unrest happens in other places too, but in Peru it's been particularly accentuated. So I think it is honestly impossible to know what's going to happen in Peru over the course of the next few months. But what we can certainly say is that it's going to be sharp, it's going to be live, it's going to be contentious, and it's going to sort of that there's nothing that's taking place in Peru at the moment that would suggest that there is a sort of a thinning down of the political emotions that run very high in the country. And part of its infrastructural political difficulties as well have also been one of the reasons why actually a lot of major international infrastructure investment projects, extractivist projects, run to Peru because they see that there is a sort of a fractured political landscape that is fairly easy to inveigle and enter into, and that sort of pays lip service to that at an elite level.

SPEAKER_00 23:18

It's so interesting to think of it. I mean, as you said, not an outlier, but separate to what's going on. Of course, I forgot to mention Ecuador, of course, Aboa there. So with the pressure, I guess you could have Ecuador on one side, Chile on the other, you know, applying pressure either side of Peru. But of course, the the political landscape in Peru is always so volatile. You really just could not say who will be in power in six months' time. I mean, it's it's one of those things with the the way that they can they can oust presidents with such alacrity that it's it's almost shocking. I'm I'm thinking directly at the moment of the you know, if we look back at Honduras and there was US involvement, you know, a few days before, we're not throwing good money after bad, uh I think was the direct quote. And then of course the you know the congressional legislative elections in in Argentina where the agreement for all that money to the Millet administration, can we see something similar taking place? Either I could we see something in Brazil taking place? That kind of that kind of element?

SPEAKER_01 24:23

That's sort of, I mean, whether it be tariffs, punitive tariffs, or whether it be suggestions of investment, clearly Trump believes that the economic again stick and carrot, the sort of push, push and pull is is a strong part of his toolkit. As regards Brazil, what's I mean not necessarily unusual at the moment is that there does seem to have been a thaw in the relations between Lulusilva and Trump when they apparently met in the corridors of the UN and had had a conversation. And we've seen it happen in a couple of other, I mean, who in a couple of other instances, as with the meeting with Zoran Mandami, the New Yorker mayor. So it's definitely not something you would have predicted there, but I think there's a lot of water to flow under the bridge on a personal level between Ludit Silva and Trump before we get to that point. What is clear though, whether you look at Lula, whether you look at actually Petro's acceptance of the visit to the White House, whether you look at how Shane Baum deals with Trump, is the importance of a personal relationship. He does listen to individuals. So whenever, I mean, Shane Baum's strategy very clearly is whenever something comes up, again, about whether it be the cartels or about Mexico not doing enough for whatever it might be, or trade inconsistencies, she gets on the phone, she speaks to him directly, and she reaffirms as part of their relationship one-on-one, in a place in a context in which he doesn't have to say face, what actually is taking place. And that seems to be actually what what a number of political leaders now are trying to undertake as a as a strategy. So whether Lula can continue that process and without inflicting damage on Brazil or without compromising his beliefs up until the end of this year is a very open question. I mean, a week is a long time these days, 10 months.

SPEAKER_00 26:17

I mean, it's it's impossible to predict. I mean, that's that's the thing. Sometimes things were so easy. Right now, not so much. I think your your point on the importance of a personal relationship is key and something perhaps we should explore more as you discuss Mexico, indeed. Scheinbaum has been she's been very pragmatic in this, of course. I mean, she is a frontline country to the United States, the fentanyl, obviously coming China that way and then manufactured up into Mexico, will always keep her, you know, not far from Trump's thoughts. And indeed, of course, it's a I would say it's a domestic policy rather than a you know foreign policy when you have to when you're dealing with Mexico. And I I just found it so very interesting the uh this this element of the extradition. Was it 36 people were extradited, even despite you know, claims that this would never happen. So so what can we uh what can we attribute this to?

SPEAKER_01 27:14

It was her providing evidence of what she told him in the phone call that Mexico was already doing. So it's it's uh it's a sort of a front and center manifestation of Mexican government policy, at least in theory, that demonstrates to the Trump administration what what Mexico is doing, which is, I mean, Shane Bom is stock is is increasingly boxed in. She's boxed in by the cartel, she's boxed in by Trump, she's boxed in by her own party, who clearly, I mean, a lot of the members of Morena, the ruling party now, have links that go way back to the to the pre and clearly have ongoing open relationships with the historic political elite and historic links to transnational criminal organizations. She's she's definitely stuck, and she's also she is of the let's say center-left, she has a particular sort of sociopolitical outlook which is very present across the streets of Mexico as we speak, and which sort of conflicts a little bit with this ongoing militarization of the country, which is again very tangible, very very palpable. But she is increasingly, when she argues, for example, with the with the delivery of these 36 cartel operatives to the USA, she argues that it's a sovereign decision. She says it was made in isolation of the US in much the same way as when she was sending a tanker load of oil to Cuba and then brought it back and it was never delivered. She said that was a sovereign decision, too. But it's pretty clear that that increasingly she is also that this sort of the personal cachet or collateral that she has with damage with Donald Trump is losing its its capacity to keep a domestic audience and specifically a domestic political audience content. Her problems are they're already significant, they're going to accentuate over the next few months.

SPEAKER_00 29:08

So this careful wording that she's she's employing is just not going to cut it in coming months.

SPEAKER_01 29:15

I've said this before, the thing about Shane Baum is she's not a politician. She is a she's a scientist, she's a principled individual, and one of the things that characterizes politicians is you can, let's say, career politicians, is you can never tell when they're lying. They they have the same face. Now, I don't I don't want to leave myself open to to libel here, but Shane Bomb's face does a particular thing when she is speaking questionably. Okay, let's say.

SPEAKER_00 29:49

I mean, that's a follow-up question there.

SPEAKER_01 29:52

She just contorts, she's uncomfortable with lying.

SPEAKER_00 29:54

Really? It's her change.

SPEAKER_01 29:56

She knows that she didn't come into politics for this. She came into politics to with belief systems, with principles, with values to make change happen. And she's been put into this corner now where there's things happening that are completely outside of her power, her remit, her ability to change, and she's she's stuck in this corner in which she has to take deeply uncomfortable, unprincipled positions, and she has to justify them to a domestic audience, to a media audience, and she it just doesn't, it doesn't physically work with her, it doesn't physically sit with her, and that's very palpable.

SPEAKER_00 30:33

Wow, it's so interesting that there's such an obvious tell, but then it would make perfect, it perfect sense. Sometimes, you know, and then when we've been talking, but sometimes also in the analysis, I think that the US comes at all of these negotiations more stick than carrot. But let's talk about China. Let's talk about China as we you know, we're coming to the sort of the latter end, later end of this conversation, you and I. We talked briefly about Panama, but China has deep inroads into Latin America. A lot of, you know, a lot due to the US. I mean, what does Latin America cry out for? It's infrastructure and investment on that level, and that's what China has offered. Whereas the US came in more with a lot of the time with soft power, USAID and other things, which are long-term, uh obviously long-term policy things, but now that's over. I mean, where do you see US policy towards combating China on this level? I mean, can can the US combat China on an infrastructure level? Are they looking at it differently? Is it is it all going to be defined by Rubio and Heggseth, really? You know, the strong hand? What what what can we look at here?

SPEAKER_01 31:42

I mean, a lot of the infrastructure now has been built historically right across Latin America and the Caribbean by by Chinese money, billions and billions of hundreds of billions in direct investment and loans. The US has never invested in the same way or does not have the same sort of perspective as regards the way in which you can use economic investment to garner political influence because ultimately that is what China is doing and has been doing since the very beginning. That's it's very clear that China has a bigger project in mind, which is about being able to control an international an international landscape. China is the spectral of the feast at the moment. It has huge amounts to to lose, it has huge amounts economically to lose in the region if it becomes marginalized, if it be it's forced to remove itself from what's taking place here. So then I think China has some choices to make, some big choices to make. I mean, on the one hand, it's bad news for China because it's got a lot to lose. On the other hand, it automatically makes permissive its actions in its own region. I think what the US is undertaking in the Americas, extrapolated, doesn't, you know, it's a pretty straightforward math to some, means that logistically, China and politically, China has the ability to engage in whatever way it wants in its own hemisphere, which of course problematizes things in a different context. What is unclear is how China will react to live investments, to live loan structures, to live infrastructure bills that are taking place. At the moment, of course, this isn't a sort of a night and day one moment to the next thing, but as we've we've marked out the domino effect of the sort of switching of political power in the regions that continues to take effect, it has it has to make some pretty significant choices, and at the moment there is no indication on which way it's going to go on those.

SPEAKER_00 33:45

And of course, everything that it that investment and the loans within Venezuela at this moment in time, we just we just watch and wait. I mean, there's just no way of predicting, as you say. There are big but I you know you sort of tend to look at the you know Chinese Chinese policy and and and some of the time we kind of feel that they're playing a longer game or they've played a longer game, Raj, and I'm not gonna say the term. I'm not I ref I refuse to say the portmanteau, but I will call it rather than this reimagining of the Monroe doctrine under President Trump, I will refuse to say the other term. I mean it can it is it will this newer or reimagined doctrine can you see it being totally effective in in in these coming years under the Trump administration? Or will it be I mean it's it's too hard to predict with all of the domestic unsettlement, unsettled nature of things in the US? I mean, what do you see, John?

SPEAKER_01 34:48

So I think a an interesting parallel anecdote to this would be to go back to the conquest and see what happened with indigenous peoples when the Spanish brought in their commerce, their gods, their belief systems. Latin Americans, indigenous Latin Americans, managed to hold two thoughts in mind at once. They managed to present an external front which said, yes, we are converted, we we we are part of this new project, whilst at the same time, privately, internally maintaining, propagating their own belief systems. Something that is not new to Latin America is having to deal with hostile external threats. That is something which is lived with for a long time. Of course, this is a very different kind of kind of situation that is currently playing out. But I think although things may change on the surface, I think changing the roots, the the underlying roots of of Latin America, its relationship to each to itself, to its broader context and what it is, I think is going to be much harder to change. That's not to say that there is not a particular political and business elite across Latin America that is seeing this as an opportunity for transformative change. I I would say that actually, looking just at how Millet also, actually, but Trump too, they don't regard their governments as being an extension of previous governments or an extension of history and evolution. They're in the in the game of nation building. They want to start all over again, build from scratch in the model that they believe desirable. And that's the opportunity that a lot of individuals, Naibu Gheli would be a similar case in point in El Salvador. A lot of individuals, and again, this this particular sort of elite seize that opportunity. Whether it has the ability to take that on for the long term is is another question. But then that's also where the question between democracy and autocracy comes in. I mean, in order to develop these projects, as Nai Bugeli has done in El Salvador, is continuing to do in El Salvador, you cannot trust to the whims of a democracy or a democratic process, even though Bukheli continues to have 90 odd percent, I mean, crazy approval ratings in. But even it's interesting that even then he does not trust the democratic process. So I think that's the I think that's the tension that we're going to see played out over the next few years, is it's not just about political shift between left and right. It's about to what extent do these political models decide to entrench themselves and become irremovable. And I think that that's where real tension, I mean not to say that there isn't tension now, but real existential tension in Latin America will take place.

SPEAKER_00 37:45

Truly an interesting way of looking at it. And taking us all the way back to, let's say, the conquest again. You've you've taken what I would always refer to as the religious syncretism of the region and transplanted it to the 21st century in a kind of political-cultural syncretism, I think. That's uh I think that's a great way of bringing this conversation to a close on a nice philosophical point for us to reflect upon. Let me take this moment to say thank you so much to John Bofiglio. You can find his website, Latin AmericaCorrespondent.com. And of course, he's all over the international media, the Times in London, LBC, ABC in Australia, and of course, available for comment on issues affecting the region. So, John, thank you so much for coming on the Latin News Podcast.

SPEAKER_01 38:39

It's been a pleasure. Thank you.

SPEAKER_00 38:40

Thank you very much. I've been Richard McCall here in Bogota, Colombia. We'll be back in a fortnight's time discussing further issues from the region. Remember, you can subscribe and never miss another episode. We are on YouTube and all of the other streaming outlets. So thank you again and goodbye.