102: Athens Doubles Down

A general sends home a letter that sounds like a warning and Athens treats it like a challenge. Nicias lays out the ugly reality at the Siege of Syracuse: stretched supply lines, sickness in camp, fading morale, and a siege that is slipping out of his control. He offers two paths, reinforce hard or abandon the Sicilian Expedition, but the city’s leaders hear the part they can live with politically: the campaign can still be won if they just commit more.

I walk through why that interpretation takes hold. Nicias’ cautious reputation shapes how readers judge his words, and his own incentives push him to be indirect and share responsibility for the decision. Underneath it all sits the psychology of sunk costs and prestige. Athens has already spent silver, ships, and lives, and a withdrawal could look like weakness to allies across the Athenian Empire and encouragement to Sparta. The result is a dramatic escalation as Athens raises another fleet and army under Demosthenes and Eurymedon.

Meanwhile the war widens. Sparta fortifies Decelea in Attica, turning pressure on Athens from seasonal to constant, disrupting routes and revenues. In Sicily, Gylippus and the Syracusans push the Athenians back toward the Great Harbor, seize crucial forts and supplies, then finally crack the Athenian navy with adaptation and deception: fatigue tactics, tight harbor geometry, and missile troops aimed at the rowers. Reinforcements arrive at the last moment, but the stakes only grow larger.

Subscribe for the next chapter of the Sicilian Expedition, share this with a friend who loves military history, and leave a review so more listeners can find the show.

Transcript

Setting The Siege Of Syracuse

Nicias Sends A Warning Letter

Athens Orders Massive Reinforcements

The Psychology Of Doubling Down

Sparta Fortifies Decelea In Attica

Gylippus Strikes The Harbor Forts

The Great Harbor Naval Breakthrough

Demosthenes Arrives With The Fleet

Thanks, Support, And Where To Follow

SPEAKER_00 0:50

Such was the pulpit of Nicus' letter. The Athenians, after hearing it, did not allow him to resign his command. The Athenians voted in favour of sending out another military and naval force. Thucydides. Hello, I'm Mark Sellick, and welcome back to Casting Through Ancient Greece. Episode 102, Athens Doubles Down. Last episode, we looked at the beginnings of the Siege of Syracuse, which had begun due to the Athenians being unable to deliver a decisive victory on the battlefield. However, Athens had put themselves in a strong position to commence siege operations. They had captured the Epipole Heights that overlooked Syracuse and the surrounding countryside. They had fortified areas atop the heights and anchored their siege walls to encircle the city from this strong position. Further good news arrived for the Athenians in the form of cavalry reinforcements. They had requested the previous winter, which would allow them to proceed with works on the siege with a bit more security against the Syracusan cavalry, looking to harass their progress. During the early stages of the construction of the siege works, the Syracusans continued their unconvincing military manoeuvres. They would attempt to come out and challenge the Athenians, but their commanders would be discouraged after seeing the disorderly manner in which their troops operated. The only real resistance that could be provided was in the form of their strong cavalry, threatening the Athenian work parties, though with the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements, they were able to clear them from the field when they became too much of a threat. With Syracusan forces being essentially useless in direct confrontation with the Athenians, they would attempt another approach to try and disrupt the Athenian construction. The Syracusans would gather together their own parties of engineers and look now to build a counterwall to the Athenians in an attempt to cut them off from completion and in turn keep Syracuse open to the rest of Sicily. What would develop during this period was a series of battles within the walls, with each side looking to disrupt the progress of the other. The Athenians were able to maintain dominance in these skirmishes. However, the Syracusans would almost capture the main fort of the Athenians at the circle in an all-out attempt. Although the Athenians had been in great danger of losing their main fort and Nicius along with it, they were able to recover and rout the Syracusans, seeing the morale in the city drop to an all-time low. However, Athens had also suffered a loss within its command structure with the death of Lamarcus. It was at this point where it looked as though Syracuse was in the process of arranging terms of surrender to Nicius. However, fortune would now turn for both sides, as the Spartan commander, Gilippus, with reinforcements, along with some Corinthian ships, were able to make it through the incomplete blockade from sea and land. This had put a stop to any talks of surrender in the city, as Gallippus took over command of the Syracusan forces. The Athenians would be surprised in the initial battles of Gallippus, as they had been expecting surrender any day, not an enemy willing to fight. These initial battles would begin with some hesitancy, as Gallippus was feeling out the forces he had to work with. However, after gaining their respect and trust, the Syracusan battlefield performance increased greatly. Gallippus continued the counter war strategy, but also would lead much more organized attacks on the Athenians. The result of this would see the northern Athenian Wall incomplete and the Syracusans destroying the supply fort in the Athenians' rear, on top of the Epipolae. In addition to this, the Syracusans were able to keep access open to the rest of Sicily, with the construction of their own fort on the heights. These successes would see the morale within the Syracusans soar, while other Sicilian and Italian cities were now more inclined to lend support to the city. Nicius found himself in a position far from the surrender he thought he was about to receive. He now moved his headquarters and supply forts closer down to the Great Harbour, after the losses suffered on the heights. However, this now found his soldiers, work parties, and supplies much further spread out from one another. Although it was now easier to bring in supplies to his forts, it was also now much harder to keep his men well supplied due to the distances needed to be covered, while it would also see the risk posed by the Syracusan cavalry increased. During this period we would hear that the Athenian forces would begin to suffer a decline in their effectiveness and overall condition. It would be in this context that Nicius would pen a letter to Athens, outlining the failing siege, the logistical issues, the growing rates of sickness, including himself, while also showing how all of this was contributing to the dangerous levels of morale. Nicius essentially put forward two options to Athens and wanted a decision. He urged for immediate and overwhelming reinforcements, or the complete abandonment of the siege. With it appearing Nicius favoured abandon. As it seems, he thought his request of what would amount to reinforcements equaling the initial expedition would be too much for the government back home to stomach. This episode we will continue on with the unfolding events around the siege of Syracuse, but first I want to focus a little more depth on how Nicas' letter was received in Athens and how and why Athens would respond the way they did. Let's first start with a decision that Athens would make in response to Nickyus' letter. As we have seen, Nicias presented two options recall him or send enough reinforcements to finish the war. In Athens, these choices ultimately gave the impression that the campaign in Sicily could still be won. The letter was read as more resources were needed to win the war, not this war cannot be won. If the campaign was a lost cause, surely Nicius would not have provided an option to keep the war going. Athens did not read the letter as Nicius had intended. However, given the costs at stake here, we can also fault Nicius for failing to be direct. We are all too aware of how intent can be lost in the written word from the author to the reader. Athens would ignore the first option of recalling Nicius and would instead look to reinforcing the army in Sicily. They would name two new commanders that were present in the army to assist Nicius in his command burden until the reinforcing army could arrive. The assembly voted to raise another fleet and army, partly from the Athenians and partly from their allies. This fleet would be commanded by two generals, Demosthenes and Eurymedon, who were to also become Nicius' colleagues once arriving in Sicily. Eurymedon would be sent off at once with ten ships carrying money and the instructions from Athens' decision. Demosthenes stayed in Athens to arrange the fleet, gathering the men of Athens and its allies, as well as the vast amounts of silver needed to keep the army active, so far from home. We covered what Nicius put in his letter last episode, and the options he was attempting to force Athens to decide on. We also brought up how Athens failed to interpret the letter in the way Nicius had intended. But why did Athens lean into the idea that they needed to send more resources, even though Nicius was providing descriptions on the terrible state of things in Sicily? There are probably a couple of reasons the Athenians saw the letter as a request for support, rather than a request for abandonment. Firstly, Nicius had a reputation as being a cautious man, and they had seen how he had attempted to persuade the assembly from launching the expedition in the first place. He was now the only overall commander left. Both, his more adventurous colleagues, had either fled to the enemy or been killed in battle. This left only the cautious element of the command structure running the operations. So we can imagine that those back in Athens couldn't but help assume there was a level of exaggeration in his letter. Other considerations the assembly would have been making regarding Nicius' temperament also possibly explain why he failed to be direct in his letter, calling for an end to the campaign rather than providing choices. Nicius, in how he crafted his letter, was most probably looking to protect his political career and shield himself from any blame. By providing options, one for Athens to recall him and the other to resupply and reinforce, although on such a grand scale, Nicius was removing the ultimate decision in Sicily from himself, and could still point to the fact that he had provided an option to keep the campaign going. Here it is clear his tactic was similar to the one that failed him when arguing against the expedition in the first place. He had thought if he outlined such a ridiculous number of forces and resources needed for victory, the assembly would lose any desire for the campaign. Here again his tactic would fail to have the desired effect. Secondly, it seems likely Athens' decision was also influenced by a deeper psychological layer within the city. They had already committed vast sums of money and resources to the expedition. Thousands of soldiers and rowers had been sent, and the prestige of Athens was at its height, with the rest of the Greek world seeing the largest Athenian fleet head west. If Athens were to withdraw it, it would risk putting Athens in a position of perceived weakness, with its allies and enemies. It could encourage revolts amongst those within the Athenian Empire. It could signal to Sparta that Athens was vulnerable and therefore give an overall indication that this city, at its height of its power, was no longer unstoppable. Further added to this psychological view was the emphasis Thucydides repeatedly places on Athens through his history. They were energetic, prone to taking risks, they were restless and unwilling to concede. Given that Syracuse had not destroyed the Athenian army, and it was still operational, the siege works, although incomplete, the majority of the work still remained. Vast reinforcements could restore the initiative, as it had in the past. And the possibility of victory in Sicily could mean crippling the Peloponnese. Athens would decide to double down on their initial commitment. To them the reward still far outweighed the risks. Over on the Peloponnese, the Spartans were also responding to the unfolding events taking place. We have touched on the fact that the Spartans will construct a fort within Attica at Decalia. This decision had come about due to two main factors, the first being that the Athenians had been continuing to mount raids all along the coastline of the Peloponnese. For the most part, Sparta ignore them diplomatically, so as to avoid entering back into an all-out war with Athens once again. However, what Thucydides describes as an action that violated the treaty in the most flagrant way. The incursion into Laconia proper would see the Spartans now shift their focus to actions that were in direct breach of the official peace. The second factor that helped them decide to head back down the road of open war with Athens was the strategic situation they were now facing in Sicily. The majority of the Athenian resources was being poured into keeping that campaign alive. For Sparta, the time seemed right to act, as Athens would not be in a position to send their fleet home to deal with whatever crisis they would face in Attica. In the spring of March 413 BC, King Agus would lead out an army into Attica to ravage the countryside. This time around instead of turning back for the Peloponnese after laying waste to what they had come to burn, they would fortify the hill at Decalia, some twenty two kilometres north of Athens. Previously, Athens had weathered the Spartan incursions and then gone back to their fields when the army left. This time around, however, the Spartans could now pose a threat continuously. While Athens itself was put under more pressure with it having to essentially become a fortified garrison, given the possibility of an attack that could come at any time, only 22 kilometers away. However, the presence of the Spartans at Decalia would present other pressures also. The silver mines at Lorium were notorious for the atrocious conditions the slaves working them had to endure. Supposedly, some twenty thousand slaves from here and other areas of Attica would flee to the Spartans. This would then have the direct impact on the money being generated from these mines. Also, from the beginning of the war, due to the constant Spartan raids, Athens had relocated much of its livestock onto Eubea. The fort at Decalaea had blocked the land route to Eubea, and now they had to rely on the much more inefficient sea route. Added to these additional issues was also the fact that Sparta was in constant contact with Thebes. Since the Boeotian border was now only around 20 kilometers or so to the fort's rear. This would mean that they could also participate in whatever actions the Spartans were planning much more easily. While all of this was taking place, the Spartans had also decided to further reinforce Gylippus, given the success he was having. If the Spartans wanted to take advantage of the vacuum left in Attica, they also wanted to ensure Athenian fortunes would not turn favourably in Sicily. Three separate contingents were arranged to set off to aid Syracuse, with the first consisting of 600 helots, and freed helots under Spartan command. The second would be under Boeotian command and be made up of 300 men coming from that region. These two contingents would meet up on the southern Peloponnese and then sail over open water to Sicily together. While the third would be made up of Corinthians, Sicconians, and Arcadians, they would sail out through the Gulf of Corinth. To ensure their safe passage past the Athenian base at Neopactus, they would be escorted by twenty five Corinthian triremes out into open water. So, coming out of the winter of 414-413, and into the spring, both sides would see to it that further assistance would be heading west. They were hoping to reinforce themselves out of the terrible situation they were facing in Sicily. While Sparta was reinforcing the success achieved by Gallipus in the hopes it would continue to cause the Athenians trouble and in turn keep them weak at home. Back in Sicily, the pressure on Nicius and the Athenians was to be applied even further. After the initial success around the siege walls, Gallippus now looked to continue the momentum against Athens. This time around, Golippus was looking to try a more complicated operation by attempting a combined naval and land operation against the Athenians. So far the Syracusans were untested against Athens' navy, and one would think, given the reputation of Athens' naval power, the naval component of the plan was intended as a diversion, rather than a main effort. The land forces had gained important morale raising victories, so it would make sense to take advantage of this while they could. Nevertheless, Golippus, after having received many reinforcements into Syracuse, addressed the Syracusans. He proposed that Syracuse must man as many ships as possible and bring the fight to the Athenians on the water. Hermocrates, now not in his position of general, but still hugely influential within the city, placed his backing behind Golippus. He was obviously addressing the concerns of the Syracusans over the reputation of the Athenian navy, when he told them, Athens had not inherited their naval prowess, nor would they retain it forever. They had been landsmen, even to a greater degree than the Syracusans, and had only become a maritime power when obliged to by the Meade. Here we can see Hermicrates was drawing the parallel of the Syracusans of now to the Athenians before the Persian invasion. The speeches by Hermicrates, the support by other influential Syracusans, as well as the reputation earned by Golippus, would see the Syracusans being in favour of sending out their fleet to challenge the Athenians. On land, Golippus was looking to attack the new forts that had been constructed by the Athenians down towards the Great Harbour. Although Nicius was on the backfoot, Gallippus understood that if he paused now, it could allow time for the Athenians to recover. Nicius was on the backfoot, and Gallippus understood that if he paused now, it could allow time for the Athenians to recover. A few sizable armament resupplies could be enough to tip the balance back in the Athenians' favour. We need to remember here that Syracuse was now paying quite large mercenary forces, and were now faced with the burden of the upkeep of a sizable fleet. Not being an empire, Syracuse did not have the constant cash flow to see these forces maintained for prolonged periods. In Gallippus' eyes, Syracuse potentially had one shot to get it right, and if Athens could receive substantial resupplies, Syracuse may well be back in their position of seeking terms of surrender. Gallippus, under the cover of darkness, would lead out the Syracusan army towards the peninsula on the Great Harbour. While around the same time, some eighty triremes were directed at the same peninsula, from the sea coming from different directions. The approach of the Syracusan ships were detected, and the Athenians were able to launch 60 ships from their fleet in response. As we have seen many times before, even though outnumbered, they were able to fight the Syracusans to a standstill and prevent their making it to the coast. On land, however, the story was different. The Syracusan army, having advanced before sunrise, were able to approach undetected. The unfolding naval engagement had also seen much of the garrison distracted and focused on what was happening out in the harbour. The largest of the forts was assaulted first, and taken with the defenders caught by surprise. The men of the garrison that managed to flee were able to board their ships and get out of the water. However, they had great difficulty in reaching the main Athenian camp, as the Syracusans initially held the advantage on the water at this stage. Once the largest of the forts had fallen, the Athenians were now aware of what was happening on the landward side. However, with them seeing how easily it had fallen, they did not wait around to put up a defence at the smaller ones. They were able to flee across the water with much more ease. By this time the Athenians had started to gain the upper hand out in the harbour. The diversionary naval force of the Syracusans had started out with promise. They were able to get eighty ships manned and sent against the Athenian positions, converging from different directions. However, the Syracusan fleet was untested and was coming up against the Athenians, who had amassed a great deal of experience since the Greco-Persian wars. Thucydides does tell us that the Syracusans were getting the best of the battle in the beginning. However, with the Athenians responding to Syracusan movements, it seems they were probably still in the process of assessing the Syracusan intentions, as they went out to meet them. It wasn't long before the experience of the Athenian fleet took over, once they had come to grips with the Syracusans. It would appear the inexperience of their fleet also had a major impact, as when the chaos of battle began, we hear that the Syracusans were falling foul on one another. It appears their fleet was suffering from the same problems their army had in its early stages. In the end, the Athenians were able to retain control of the waters, with eleven of the Syracusan ships sunk, for three of their own. However, strategically, the Athenians had suffered much more. The capture of the forts had seen much of their supplies fall into enemy hands. This included stocks of food, equipment for their fleet, and entire triremes that were caught ashore. Added to this was the fact that the Athenians now no longer had a base from which supplies could be brought in safely for the forces on land. The Syracusans had recognized that with each success against the Athenians, they were able to gather more support for their effort. The more outsiders saw the Athenians on the backfoot, the more would be willing to now throw in their lot with the Syracusans. This strategic victory was also exploited to gain further support. As we have said, the Syracusans didn't have an empire to support their military operations, they needed to rely on others adding additional support in the way of money, supplies, and men to keep their operations against the Athenians going. Messengers were sent out to the Peloponnese to inform Sparta and their other allies of the capture of the Athenian forts, in hopes that they would press the war even further. A fleet was also arranged with dual objectives, the first to attempt to cut off the Athenian supply route from Italy, while ambassadors from Sparta, Corinth, and Ambracia accompanied it to spread the word of the victories over the Athenians and provide more credibility to the claims. Thucydides tells us that this effort would see many who had stood on the sidelines of the conflict now begin coming over to lend support to the Syracusans. However, for the Athenians, the loss of the forts was yet another dent in the morale of their army and would lead to further hardships with the Athenians in Sicily. With Nicius and the Athenians being pushed onto the back foot even further, momentum was on the Syracusan side, and Gallippus wanted to take advantage of this. Syracuse was also aware that the Athenians We were sending out another expedition of around equal size as the first. So they wanted to destroy the forces currently in Sicily before these reinforcements could arrive to potentially turn the tide. Once again operations on both land and sea were being arranged to attempt to deliver further blows. On land, newly recruited Sicilian Greeks were arranged to march against the Athenians around Syracuse, while on the sea, an opportunity for a naval victory over the Athenians was identified in the Corinthian Gulf. This was not within the waters of Sicily, but any meaningful victory over the Athenian fleet would help the cause on Sicily. In the Gulf of Corinth, we had seen that the Corinthians had a fleet to escort supply ships, and transports parts near Pactus. This Corinthian fleet had increased to thirty triremes, while its commander had taken steps to alter the vessels themselves. He had structurally reinforced his vessels so that the tactic of ramming head on to another trireme was feasible. Ordinarily this move was avoided, as it would generally cause as much damage to both ships. The Corinthian fleet positioned itself outside Neopactus, to where the Athenians would send their thirty-three ships out. The Corinthians watched them come on, and when they saw the opportunity right, they also advanced. A stubborn engagement had developed, where the Corinthians lost three of their ships. Although no Athenian ships were sunk, seven of their trioms had been severely disabled, from the strengthened Corinthian vessels. In the end, the naval victory that had been hoped for ended in an inconclusive result, though the Corinthians claimed it as a victory, and it was reported as such back in Syracuse to increase morale. On land in Sicily, word of the advance on their newly recruited Sicilian Greeks had reached Nicius. To prevent these forces from making it to Syracuse, he was able to convince some of his Sycle allies to lay ambushes as they entered the passes on their advance. The Sicals would arrange for ambushes to take place at three points on the advance, catching them off guard, where some eight hundred of these newly acquired allies were killed. With these attacks failing to gain the continued success the Syracusans were seeking, Nicias was able to just keep his head above water. The Athenian reinforcements were still approaching, and it wouldn't be long before they would arrive. While Golippus and the Syracusans were attempting to defeat the Athenians, the second expedition was getting ever closer to reinforcing Nicius' position. The forces of Demosthenes and Euromedon had rendezvoused at Corsaira, and the United Expedition departed for their crossing of the Ionian Sea. Their first stop upon crossing the sea was in Italy, and Metapontum, where alliances were negotiated and more troops and ships joined the expedition. From here, the Athenian fleet continued south down Italy to Thirai, where further forces were added. The expedition continued on southward, through Italy, attempting to reaffirm old alliances and create new ones. The army marched on land while the fleet shattered it just off the coastline. When they reached Croton, the army was forced to re embark the ships, as they were not granted passage through the lands there. They would continue on by sea, touching in at a number of other Italian cities, before finally reaching Regium, at the southern tip of Italy. This was where the first expedition had established its main base before making its incursion into Sicily. With the news of the Athenian second expedition advancing ever closer, the Syracusans were now determined to attempt a second operation against the Athenians on Sicily, so that there would be no campaign to reinforce. Once again, if this was to be achieved, both Athenian, land and naval forces would need to be defeated. Although the first naval attempt had failed, the reported victory from the Corinthian Gulf had raised spirits and convinced the Syracusans the Athenians could be beaten. Since the failure of the first attempt, the Syracusans had been preparing their land and naval forces. If this was for a renewed effort at this stage is unclear, as these forces would have needed to be mobilized for the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements anyway. However, there was still now an opportunity for one last try. Word of the modifications that the Corinthians had made before their battle in the Corinthian Gulf had also been shared with Syracuse. They hastily began making the same alterations to their ships, so as to effect a head-on ramming maneuver. The Syracusans were convinced that this would give them the tactical advantage in the upcoming engagement. The plan was for the battle to take place in the Great Harbour. The Athenians relied on manoeuvring their ships to ram the sides of the enemy. However, the harbour would see that room for manoeuvring would be much tighter, so the Syracusans would have the advantage of just having to sail directly at the Athenian ships. Once all the preparations had been made, with both forces, Golippus put into action the combined attack, by first leading out the Syracusan army. They marched towards the Athenian wall that looked towards the city, while additional heavy and light armed troops, along with cavalry, advanced from Olympium, on the other side of the wall. The Athenians, probably having learnt from the loss of the forts in the first battle, paid close attention to the developments taking place on land and sea. However, it appears they would come to focus more on the threat presenting itself on land, when Syracusan operations did renew. Thydes tells us they had thought the Syracusans were focused on a land attack. This time around. Whether this was due to them thinking the Syracusans had been defeated on water already, or they fell into the same thinking, as with the first attack, where their attention was focused, on the first threat developing, is unclear. However, when the Syracusan army had advanced, and perhaps, as they hoped, taken the full attention of the Athenians, the Syracusan fleet was then sent out in the harbour. We are told that the Syracusans achieved this goal, as Thucydides would write, but when they saw their fleet also suddenly coming against them, they were thrown into alarm, and some were making preparations on and in front of the walls to meet the attack, while others marched out against those, who, with all speed, were coming from the Olympium, and the parts outside the city. Both horse in great numbers and Dartmen, and others proceeded to man the ships, and at once ran to the beach to oppose the enemy, and when they were manned, they put out against them with seventy-five vessels, those of the Syracusans being about eighty in number. It's pretty clear from this passage that the Athenians were thrown into panic, with the developing threats. They had attacks on land being launched from different directions on the same point. Then, with the commanders likely committing forces to meet these attacks, a new threat was now developing at sea they had thought would not come. Though the Athenians were able to deploy both their land forces and navy to meet these incoming attacks. The whole day would develop into somewhat of a stalemate, without each side gaining any advantage. Thucydides tells us that both sides would advance, then retire without committing to a full engagement, the result of which would see only one or two Athenian ships sunk. Eventually both fleets separated and no longer continued their advance, and at the same time the Syracusan army withdrew, without anything of note being achieved. The next day no new advances would come from the Syracusans. This now allowed the Athenians to recover from the initial surprise. Nicius had seen the first day was a draw, and it would be likely that the Syracusans would attempt another attack, given they had suffered very light, if any losses. The inactivity from the Syracusans now allowed the Athenians to prepare their fleet and the seas for battle. The ships were refitted and repaired, where required, while merchant ships were positioned out in front of the stockade to act as an artificial harbour. This would allow any triremes in trouble to retreat safely, recover, and return to the engagement without hindrance from the enemy ships. Early on the third day, the Syracusans recommenced their operations on both land and sea, in much the same manner as they had done on the first. Thucydides doesn't tell us why the Syracusans hadn't attacked on the second day, or what they had been up to. But given what unfolded now, it seems probable that they had also taken the day to prepare a new approach to battle, given the unsuccessful nature of their initial engagement. The action on sea would develop once again into an indecisive skirmishing, up to the afternoon. The Syracusans had arranged for merchants to be set up along the coast where they would retire their ships to. Seeing the withdrawal of the Syracusans, the Athenian fleet assumed that like the first day, this had marked the end of that day's fighting. However, the Syracusans had set up the merchants so that they could quickly land, take their dinner, and then re embark to continue the fight, in the hope of catching the Athenians unaware, and unrested. The plan would have the desired result, with the Syracusans suddenly manning their ships once more and sailing out against the Athenians. The Athenians were thrown into confusion and were forced to rush to their ships before they had even been able to recuperate themselves. The Athenians did manage to launch their fleet back on the water, however, still fatigued from the morning skirmishes. The fleets did not engage right away but stood off from each other for some time. Thysidides says that the fatigue started to get the better of the Athenians. The commanders seeing the men were not going to be able to remain deployed too much longer, now pushed for an attack. The Athenian fleet advanced with cheers in an attempt to raise their morale under this fatigue. While the Syracusans seeing them come on also advanced to meet them. In this engagement, the Syracusans deployed large groups of javelin throwers aboard their triremes, as well as on small boats. As the Triremes came in range of the Athenian ships, they were able to disable many of their rowers, while the smaller boats were able to get in under the ore banks of the Athenians and cause even more chaos amongst the rowers. By changing up their tactics on the third day, the Syracusans were able to gain their first victory on water against the Athenian navy. Their tactics of keeping the Athenian rowers in a state of fatigue, while then they were able to recover themselves, along with the tactic of using mass missile troops to target the Athenian rowers, had evened up the advantages the Athenians held in experience and reputation. The Athenians were forced to flee back to shore, retreating behind their artificial harbour created by their merchantmen. They had lost seven ships destroyed, and a number more were disabled. The Syracusans pursued the retreating Athenians, up to the protection of the merchantmen, and in the enthusiasm two of their own ships would be destroyed in this reckless advance. However, the Syracusans had won an unmistakable victory. The Athenians, although defeated, had escaped disaster thanks to the security they had constructed to protect their fullback position on the shore. The Syracusans now dominated the great harbour and erected a trophy to signify their victory. Morale in Syracuse was at an all-time high, with them believing this victory had them surpassing the Athenians in naval superiority. With the spirits' rays, they now looked to press their advantage and went back to arranging a renewed attack on land and sea to recommence as soon as possible. However, before any new attacks could take place, the Athenians, who were suffering setback after setback, now had a much welcome reprieve. Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with their reinforcements of 73 triremes carrying 5,000 heavy troops and many more light ones. Heading into 413 BC, Nicius had attempted to extricate himself and Athens from Sicily. However, the letter he sent back to Athens had probably too much of a focus on protecting himself politically, when a more direct assessment and resolution should have been sought. The result would see Athens double down on their commitment to the Sicilian campaign by sending an equally sizable force to reinforce the expedition. Word of the Athenian reinforcements reached Syracuse, and it was recognized that efforts to destroy the currently demoralized Athenian force in Sicily were paramount to secure victory before their arrival. Gallippus and the Syracusan leaders set about planning to reduce the Athenians' position to force their surrender. The Syracusans were now convinced to focus on naval operations so that they could attack the Athenians from both land and sea. Initial successes had been made with the capture of the forts down near the Great Harbour, hampering the Athenians' ability to supply the army. Further attacks would take place but would not result in any clear advantage to either side. However, a breakthrough would finally come on the seas, where the Syracusans would gain their first victory over the Athenian fleet. To achieve their victory, they had resorted to unorthodox tactics to even the playing field, that being the Athenians' experience. Through deception resulting in fatigue and the use of mass missile troops, they were able to force an Athenian retreat. This victory was a huge morale boost for the Syracusans, who now realize the Athenians were on the edge of defeat in Sicily. They just had to keep up the continued pressure on the Athenian army and navy. However, before they could launch any renewed attack, the huge reinforcements from Athens had arrived. The site would have been demoralizing for the Syracusans, who had worked so hard to gain the upper hand. For the Athenians, it would have been seen as their saviour from what seemed to be the looming defeat hanging over their heads. However, from hindsight, we are aware that this huge fleet that effectively amounted to a second expedition would only add to the scale of the disaster that Athens would face in Sicily. Thank you everyone for your continued support, and a big shout-out to all those supporting the series over on Patreon and through Buy Me a Coffee. I would like to give an extra special shout-out to all those supporting the series at the ACON level. So thank you to Nick Kabulafarkas, Neil Bennett, John, and Bresden. Everyone's contribution plays a big part in helping me financially keep the series going. If you've also found some value in the show and would like to support the series, please consider checking out the Casting Through Ancient Greece Patreon page or buy me a coffee page. Otherwise, leaving reviews and sharing episodes on social media also help the series grow through word of mouth. Be sure to stay connected and updated on what's happening in the series, and join me over on Facebook or Instagram at Casting Through Ancient Greece or X at Casting Greece. Once again, everyone, thank you for the support, and I hope you can join me next time where we continue the narrative in the series.