The History-Politics Podcast: Putting the Past to Work
"The History-Politics Podcast: Putting the Past to Work" connects past to present, using historical analysis and context to help guide us through modern issues and policy decisions. Then & Now is brought to you by the UCLA Luskin Center for History and Policy. This podcast is produced by David Myers and Roselyn Campbell, and features original music by Daniel Raijman.
The History-Politics Podcast: Putting the Past to Work
The Rise of the Religious Right in U.S. Politics: A Conversation with Neil J. Young.
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In this week’s episode of then & now, LCHP Assistant Director Dr. Rose Campbell is joined by historian Dr. Neil J. Young to examine the evolution and ongoing influence of conservative Christian family values in contemporary U.S. political discourse. Neil offers a nuanced account of how ideals such as monogamy, cisgender heterosexual marriage, and rigid gender roles within a patriarchal framework became central both to conservative grassroots activism and to the ideological messaging of the Trump presidency and its supporters.
Drawing on the intersecting histories of religious and political movements in modern America, Neil traces the crystallization of the so-called “Christian nation” narrative to the Cold War era and the emergence of the ecumenical movement, a collective effort by various denominations toward unity and social engagement. Despite the ecumenical movement’s intended progressivism, it inadvertently prompted conservative backlash, resulting in a “religious right” coalition. Looking ahead, Neil notes increased uncertainty regarding the durability of the Trump-evangelical coalition. As the Trump campaign intensifies its deployment of culture war rhetoric—framing contemporary politics as an existential struggle to preserve embattled Christian values—the question remains whether these strategies will sustain coalition cohesion, or whether shifting social and political dynamics will prompt fragmentation.
Neil J. Young is an award-winning historian, writer, podcaster, and author of Coming Out Republican: A History of the Gay Right (The University of Chicago Press, 2024). Neil holds an A.B. from Duke University and a Ph.D. in history from Columbia University. Neil formerly served as a contributing columnist for The Week and, before that, an opinion columnist for HuffPost. He writes frequently for leading publications, including the Washington Post, the Atlantic, CNN, the Los Angeles Times, Vox, Politico, Slate, and the New York Times.
Welcome to Then and Now, a podcast by the UCLA Luskin Center for History and Policy. We study change in order to make change, linking knowledge of the past to the quest for a better future. Every other week we examine the most pressing issues of the day through a historical lens, helping us understand what happened then and what that means for us now.
SPEAKER_00Welcome to Then and Now. I'm Rose Campbell, Assistant Director of the UCLA Luskin Center for History and Policy, and your host for today's podcast. One of the major talking points of the second Trump campaign and presidency has been the preservation of the so-called conservative Christian family values. Now, what this mainly boils down to is a monogamous cisgender heterosexual couple with rigid gender roles within a deeply patriarchal system. Central to this vision is the belief that the United States of America was founded on these beliefs as a Christian nation and should remain so in perpetuity, to the exclusion, or at least minimization, of other religions and ideologies. This particular set of religious views has risen to prominence among conservatives over the past few decades, and the re-election of Donald Trump as president was supported by many religious groups throughout the US. What gave rise to this phenomenon of a conservative religious movement? And how does this cut across the divisions of faith and politics? Joining me today to discuss this issue is Dr. Neil J. Young. Dr. Young is a historian, writer, and podcaster who received his PhD in history from Columbia University. He frequently writes for such publications as the LA Times, The Atlantic, The Washington Post, and the New York Times, as well as many others. In 2016, Oxford University Press published Neil's first book, We Gather Together, The Religious Right and the Problem of Interfaith Politics. Thanks so much for joining us today, Neil.
SPEAKER_02Thank you. It's good to be back, Rose.
SPEAKER_00So let's start with this idea of the United States as a historically Christian nation. How much do we see this actually reflected in history? And how much is this a more recent construct?
SPEAKER_02Well, I think that this is a notion and really a construct that has particular developments through the 20th century. I mean, if you were to ask someone in the 18th or 19th century if the US was a Christian nation, it would almost be like a like a sort of quick crazy question to ask them or a question that didn't really need to be asked in a country that was overwhelmingly Protestant. But I think it's really important that in the 20th century, as you have the nation really diversifying, especially in religious ways, but also just other demographic changes, this notion of asserting the nation as Christian becomes increasingly important. It gets sort of supercharged in the era of the Cold War, um, and as this way of distinguishing the US from the Soviet Union, from the godless atheist communist of the Soviet Union. And so this sort of um upgrowth of religiosity in the US as a as a sort of political um response to the Cold War develops this notion of the Christian nation. Um, and then you also have particularly conservative religious political activists in the 1960s and 1970s who take this notion of the Christian nation that's sort of broadly shared, and they start to make it increasingly partisan and increasingly sectarian.
SPEAKER_00So, can you talk a little bit about the ecumenical movement? This is a concept you introduced early in your book and how this impacted the idea of interfaith politics. How does this relate to that surge in religiosity that you just mentioned during the 20th century after World War II and during the Cold War era?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, so the ecumenical movement is something that comes out of mostly the sort of moderate or mainline Protestant denominations and also the Catholic Church in the sort of mid-decades of the 20th century. You see the developments of this in the 1930s a little bit, but it really becomes um an increasingly uh large movement in the post-World War II era, especially in the 1950s or the 1960s. So you have these moderate, um, even liberal Protestant denominations and religious leaders who are arguing all sorts of different things. The ecumenical movement had a lot of different forms. I mean, there was a lot of it was just we need more interfaith collaboration and alliances and affiliations and conversations. That was one sort of form of this. To others who are advocating we need to get rid of religious divisions, we need to end denominations, and we need to reunite as one church. That was sort of less popular position, but it also was a component of the ecumenical movement. Um, and I think a really significant part of it was the way in which the ecumenical movement started to make real strong connections between several Protestant denominations and the Catholic Church. They had a long historical animosity between uh or among these different groups, um, particularly a lot of, you know, very virulent anti-Catholicism that was expressed both theologically and sort of culturally through the years by Protestant denominations and leaders. And you see the ecumenical movement in a lot of ways trying to set that aside and to strengthening Protestant Catholic relations and Protestant Catholic conversations through this time period.
SPEAKER_00So you've mentioned Protestants and Catholics. Who is the religious right? Is it just the Protestants and Catholics? Who were the main players of this movement that you found in your research?
SPEAKER_02Well, my argument is that the religious right actually happened in large part in reaction to this ecumenical movement, because those who were involved in the ecumenical movement tended to be more moderate to liberal denominations and churches. And the players, the really the religious participants in the religious right or the Christian right came from much more conservative, um, even right-wing um uh denominations and and faiths. So, you know, religiously, I define the Christian right or the religious right as evangelicals, Catholics, and Mormons. Um, with Catholics, though, we're of course talking about a conservative subset of a very large and diverse faith, um, but of evangelicals and Mormons. And one of the things that I argue in my book is that in the 1950s and 1960s, as the ecumenical movement is taking shape and really developing and getting all this attention and has increasing power and influence, you have these more um separatist or isolationist branches of Christianity, particularly evangelical Christianity, fundamentalism, and the LDS or Mormon Church saying that they're opposed to these sort of ecumenical developments because they believe that they, each of them, have their own, that they are the true faith, right? That they they have the lone way to God, um, that they alone offer the plan of salvation. Um, and so that's in opposition to any ecumenical spirit that would be seeking to minimize religious division. And so I argue that the religious right in a lot of ways begins as a religious movement that is opposed to this ecumenical movement, and that these conversations that these separatist groups start to have with each other sort of religiously about their opposition to the ecumenical movement leads to the development of what we would recognize as the political movement of the religious right that in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s starts organizing around different political issues of school prayer, uh, abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, the gay rights movement, et cetera.
SPEAKER_00So let's talk about that a little bit. You mentioned, you know, prayer in school. And one thing that I noticed a lot throughout your book and in discussions in politics is this concept of religious freedom and specifically as envisioned by the religious right, which is a very specific view of religious freedom. Can you talk a little bit about how federal policies around free speech and freedom of religion have shaped this conservative religious movement?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, so just, you know, one of the really interesting things I think about religious freedoms, especially now, is we hear it, it's very much back in the discourse. And um, you know, this Supreme Court that we currently have is incredibly um amenable to religious freedom arguments. And there's a lot of religious freedom cases before the court right now. Um, but it has a really long and interesting history over the over the course of the 20th century. For much of the early decades of the 20th century, um, litigants who are making religious freedom claims in courts and up to the Supreme Court are mostly pursuing this against the Catholic Church. So they don't want the Catholic Church to get federal funds for their parochial schools or for all sorts of other things that the Catholic Church is trying to get public monies for. And so Protestant litigants are using religious freedom arguments of, you know, we are a secular nation. You cannot privilege one religious group over another. Um, so that's a very different version of religious freedom arguments that we see today, and even in the last several decades, that tend to be about defending religious actors, almost always conservative religious actors, though not always, but for the most part, religion conservative religious actors to do what they want. To um, and that, and that even includes to um to take public monies for different things. So that is an enormous transformation of this idea and also also this legal strategy around religious freedom. And you know, you mentioned the court cases of the mid-uh of the relating to school prayer and and and Bible reading in in the public schools. These happened in 1962 and 1963. The Supreme Court, in a series of cases, rules that um it's unconstitutional for public schools to have any sort of morning exercise or really any sort of exercise that involves reading from the Bible or praying in school as a religious act. And this is something that shocks a lot of Americans across the religious spectrum, um, but particularly conservative religious um activists. And it galvanizes uh, especially those who were less involved in in American politics from religious communities to become more active. And it's an important moment that that I think really plants the seed to develop into what we see as the religious right in the 1970s.
SPEAKER_00So another issue that comes up is something like bodily autonomy, re women's reproductive rights. And this is frequently tied to discussions of religious freedom and the religious right. So one thing I want to note that you mentioned in your book is that the Supreme Court, when they actually passed Roe v. Wade and a woman's right to bodily autonomy in 1973, the decision was not, in fact, that controversial. And in fact, most Americans polled around that time, and including a large proportion of individuals who self-identified as religious, supported this law, this Roe v. Wade, and a woman's right to make these decisions with her doctor without the involvement of politicians or anyone else. But of course, as we know now, the right to abortion has become an incredibly contested issue, especially among the religious right. And in fact, our current conservative-leaning Supreme Court repealed Roe v. Wade on June 24th, 2022. So can you talk a little bit about how abortion and women's reproductive health care was viewed within the church and the political right before and then also after the original Roe v. Wade decision? And how does that compare to attitudes today?
SPEAKER_02Yes. I mean, given, you know, the the way that abortion inflames so much of modern American politics of really the last several decades, I think it's hard for us to imagine a moment in which a major decision like this would have been made and that it actually wasn't controversial. It wasn't um something that elicited huge opposition or really uh spirited response. Um, as you've already noted, it was widely supported, um, including by religious peoples from all different religious backgrounds in general. One of the things that's really important is that when the Supreme Court issues its decision in 1973, almost the only voice of opposition in the country against abortion reform is the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church had a long theological history in opposition to abortion that really dates back a thousand years. And in the U.S., they had opposed all sorts of medical reforms around this for well over a century. And leading up to the decision in 1973, the Catholic Church had been very involved in fighting individual states that were reforming their own abortion laws through the 1960s. So the anti-abortion movement before Roe was almost 100% led by the Catholic Church and Catholic religious political activists. Um, when the decision is named or issued in 1973, there are small numbers of Protestant and evangelical opponents of abortion, but they're really few and far between. But they start to build a movement within evangelical churches to come to a place of opposing the abortion decision and of really sort of radical, you know, mobilizing um church members into political opposition against abortion. But that takes almost a decade. And if you look at the 1970s, a denomination like the Southern Baptist Convention, um, the largest evangelical denomination in the country at the time, they are issuing these resolutions through the 1970s that offer sort of a mild to even moderate support for abortion rights through that decade. I mean, this is shocking today for anyone who knows much about the Southern Baptist Convention. But all of this represented a general belief that, as you said, abortion was a private medical decision that a woman would make with her, and this was the way they understood it, with her husband and with her doctor, and that this happened in rare occasions. Um, and it was something that the state that, you know, politicians had no um involved, should have no involvement in. That notion of abortion begins to change over the 1970s. Um, in large part, a lot of this is a reaction to the women's rights movement and this and the sexual revolution that are really starting to change the culture of the 1970s. And so you have an increasing sort of sexual conservatism from all these different evangelical actors, and they're tying that sexual conservatism also to the issue of abortion. Um, but it's sort of a slow-moving development across the 1970s in which evangelical churches start to say, oh, wait, we actually are opposed to abortion, um, and and develop a theological basis for that, um, and then turn that sort of theological basis for the opposition into incredible political activism, um, which I think really we start to see fully developed in the 1980s and beyond.
SPEAKER_00That's so interesting because I feel like this is an issue that can often sink a politician now amongst religious groups, as opposed to being a non-issue like it might have been in the past.
SPEAKER_02Right. And even that, I mean, if you go back into the 1970s, you know, some of the most prominent uh abortion opponents in politics were Democrats. Um, because if you were Catholic, you were probably a Democrat. And it really was sort of Catholic housewives, and there's been great history, histories written of this, including by my friend Stacey Toronto. Um, Catholic Democratic women um were sort of leading activists here, and a lot of Catholic Democratic politicians um shared that politics. Um, and then you have someone like George H.W. Bush, who was known as Rubbers in Congress when he was a congressman from Texas, because of how much he supported federal funding for planned parenthood. Um, and so the politics were not drawn along a neat partisan line in this period, but there's a huge re-uh shifting of um not so much affiliation, people stay within the parties for the most part, but both parties become increasingly identified with one particular position on this, and all the politicians sort of fall in line.
SPEAKER_00This polarization that we talk about so much in current politics.
SPEAKER_02Exactly.
SPEAKER_00Yeah. So let's talk a little bit about where things stand today, right? Right? How, what is this relationship between conservatives and religion today, especially the religious right? We see a lot of talk amongst the Trump administration about religious and especially Christian values. How have these forces that we've talked about shaped this second Trump administration and the current political climate writ large?
SPEAKER_02Well, I think, you know, I would go back to the 1980s and just point out this is the decade in which um religious conservatives, um, especially evangelicals, become the base of the Republican Party. And it's developing through the 1980s in the Reagan administration, the Reagan presidency. We really see it sort of fully um take hold in the 1990s when evangelicals become the biggest demographic of the Republican Party base. Um they also take over uh the Republican Party infrastructure, especially at the state and local level. Um, but they build their network of influence through the party um in the 80s and the 90s, into the 2000s, of course, when George W. Bush is president. And obviously, um, from that network of power, they also start shaping policy. Um, and all of that has a long history that is really developed decades in the in the making. But I think, you know, your question is about Trump and the sort of current relationship of the Trump administration to religious conservatives. I mean, one of the sort of fascinating things when he came on the scene in 2015-2016 for that first presidential run was this expectation that there was no way that a guy like this could win the Republican nomination. Because how in the world would religious conservatives vote for a thrice-married casino magnate who clearly had no connection to organized religion other than just the most perfunctory one, um, that cursed like a sailor and, you know, had this really um tawdry personal life. Um, but one of the things that I think is really important here is the way in which George W. Bush, who of course was, you know, at the time seen as the best example of what the religious right would want. You know, a true believer, uh, a devout evangelical, um, uh someone who was conservative, but also was putting forward this politics of compassionate conservatism. Um, there is a huge disillusionment with George W. Bush over the course of his presidency by the religious right, and particularly by evangelicals. And I think that sort of disillusionment gets turned into anger during the Obama years. Um, and that it all of those conditions made for the sort of perfect storm in which someone like Trump could rise to power and influence among them. Because he came in and he said, I mean, and actually he didn't say this so much as like his religious backer said it as we're not looking for a pastor, we're looking for a president. And we've backed the guys before who sort of, you know, look like the folks in the in the church pews beside us. But what did we get from this? This guy is a tough fighter, and he said he'll fight for us. And the word that Trump used over and over again in that first run for the presidency was power. I will restore you to power. And evangelicals ate it up, as we know. They fell in line with him and they became his biggest backers. The highest level of support of any voting demographic for Trump in all three of his elections have been white evangelicals. And it is a match, maybe not made in heaven, but certainly a match that has reshaped American politics, um, both in terms of you know what it means for the Republican Party and the huge transformation there, but also what it means for all of. Living in this country.
SPEAKER_00So as we wrap things up, I wonder if I can ask you to speculate a little bit about what happens now. What do you see in the future, this relationship between this religious right and this Trump administration or just the Republican Party? Where's where are we going?
SPEAKER_02It's hard to say as we're amidst, you know, and every day there's a new executive order, um, you know, um, an inconsistent economic policy that's sending, you know, global markets into all sorts of chaos and disarray. Um what I think is the ongoing open question for this first year of the presidency is does the coalition hold together? Um, the broad coalition that Republicans made over the last half century, but I think that Trump really took and transformed and built in new and interesting directions, um, if it falls apart as things really start to get scary and worse. Um, and if in that climate or in that scenario, if Trump's religious backers, if the religious right remains his closest supporters, I think that's what I'm predicting because there is a blind faith in him that I think aligns with a lot of sort of religious belief systems and a lot of the ways in which the Trump universe has made him a sort of messiah figure that I think have a deep resonance with this particular demographic of American, um, of the American electorate, in the way that, you know, I don't know, Wall Street guys or national security hawks or those sorts, you know, don't have that necessarily that same adhere uh uh affiliation with him or that same connection with him. And so we shall see. Um, but I think also in a moment of all sorts of uncertainty and decline, I also think this is one in which we're going to see increasing culture wars um strategies, culture war strategies from the Trump team, because that's a sort of um, you know, meat, red meat that they can throw to the base that I think they know they'll eat up and that keeps that connection, that relationship really strong.
SPEAKER_00Silvering predictions.
SPEAKER_02Yeah.
SPEAKER_00Well, thank you so much for joining us again today, Neil. It's always such a pleasure to have you with us and to hear all of your really thoughtful insights and knowledge on these topics.
SPEAKER_02Great to talk with you again. Thanks for having me.
SPEAKER_00So for our listeners, I encourage you to check out Neil's book, uh We Gather Together, as well as his more recent book, Coming Out Republican, and of course his podcast, Past Present, where Neil and his co-hosts bring historical insights to discussions of pop culture. And as a reminder, if you enjoy listening to Then and Now and think we provide something of value, please like and subscribe wherever you listen to your podcasts. Thank you so much for joining us today.
NarratorThank you for listening to Then and Now, a podcast by the UCLA Luskin Center for History and Policy. You can learn more about our work or share your thoughts with us at our website, LuskinCenter.history.edu. Our show is produced by David Myers and Roselyn Campbell, with original music by Daniel Reichman. Special thanks to the UCLA History Department for its support, and thanks to you for listening.