What Just Happened in Iran? Ethan Chorin Explains the High-Stakes Strike

Why would the U.S. strike Iran’s nuclear facilities—and what does it mean for global stability?

In this episode, former U.S. diplomat and Middle East expert Ethan Chorin returns to break down the escalating tensions between Iran, Israel, and the U.S. Chorin, author of Benghazi and writer of The Middle East Told Slant, gives a nuanced view of how the region arrived at this inflection point—from the JCPOA withdrawal to the October 7 Hamas attack and the long shadow of the Abraham Accords.

With deep knowledge of regional proxy wars, U.S. foreign policy, and Iran’s theocratic regime, Chorin explores how power, ideology, and politics collide across borders. He unpacks why Iran's nuclear ambitions are so destabilizing, how Israel’s strategy has evolved, and what the American public often misunderstands about both allies and adversaries.

🔗 Resource Links

Ethan Chorin’s Website: https://ethanchorinauthor.com/
The Middle East Told Slant (Substack): https://ethanchorin.substack.com
Benghazi: A New History: https://bookshop.org/a/112456/9780306829741

Guest Bio:

Ethan Chorin is a former U.S. diplomat and Middle East expert with over two decades of experience in diplomacy, strategic consulting, and regional analysis. He served in Libya with the State Department and has worked extensively across the Gulf and Red Sea regions. He is the author of Benghazi: A New History of the Fiasco that Pushed America and its World to the Brink and writes the Substack newsletter The Middle East Told Slant.

Transcript

0:17

Hey, welcome back, Faithful Politics listeners and watchers. If you're watching our new YouTube channel, we are so glad you are here. I am your political host, Will Wright, and I'm joined by your faithful host, Pastor Josh Bertram. What's going on, Josh? Doing all right, thanks Will. Yeah. And hey, today we are joined by a returning guest, guess is what I wanted to say. Ethan Chorin. Wait, dang it. Did I get that right? Chorin? Okay, good. So Ethan Chorin is here with us. He's a former US diplomat, a Middle East expert whose work expands diplomacy, policy advising, and on the ground analysis across some of the region's most complex crises. He is also the author of Benghazi, which is when we brought him on initially. and writes the newsletter, The Middle East told slant where he writes about underreported Middle East politics and conflicts. And we are so happy to have him back on the show, Ethan. Welcome. Well, we wanted to have you back on to tap into some of your experience because you have a lot of experience in the Middle East. But but before we before we dig into that, before we dive into some of the headlines, can you just share us a bit about your background, particularly particularly your time in the Middle East regions just to kind of give our audience a sense of your expertise and kind of where you're coming from. Sure, and again, thank you for having me on the show. um I have uh spent about 30, maybe 25 years in the region um as a diplomat. uh I've worked for port companies and an oil company briefly um and have had my own. strategy consulting firm for about 10 years. uh I've lived in Libya for several years. I was posted there with the uh State Department um in up and down the Red Sea in the Gulf. uh And I uh did some work on Iran at the State Department. I actually spent a year uh teaching me Farsi in an immersion course. uh Yeah, I've seen the region from a number of different perspectives, I think. Yeah, so uh just to kind of set the stage if people are only following the headlines, uh can you give us the 30,000 foot view of, if we could rewind the clock, we're here to talk to you about the US strike on the Iranian uh nuclear facilities, but what got us up to this point? And you can go back as far as you feel is necessary. Sure. Well, as most people know, think the Iranian regime has been working towards nuclear capacity for several decades. And there was a famous attempt to sort of a hold on that process with the 2015 JCPOA or It's a plan of action, which was essentially a means of trying to freeze Iran's program within certain parameters for a period of 10 to 15 years uh in the hopes that, well, one, to keep a uh buffer of about a year between their capacity of... uh breakout capacity, essentially their ability to sort of use the technology and enriched uranium to sprint towards an actual functional weapon. Anyway, that was a big moment. Of course, the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA agreement in 2018, which threw that process a bit into into flux and Iran proceeded beyond the bounds that were established by the agreement and was essentially non-compliant. And then we had, there were a number of other events that came into play. One was the 2020 Abraham Accords, which were signed between the UAE and Israel and then later three other Arab states, uh introduced sort of inverted the sort of conventional thinking about Middle East peace, ah where the basic premise was closer uh collaboration on economics uh and also security issues uh would produce an environment in Israel in which was more uh amenable. to peace, broadly speaking. And specific part of the problem there was that the uh Palestinians weren't directly consulted in that process and felt it was a betrayal. um And this was sort of the Abraham Accords were kind of a fuse or maybe a window in which a spoiler and notably Iran, would try to intervene to um disrupt that process because it stood to lose quite a bit from this, from a unified Arab-Israeli front against it. m And the next step was going to be an Israeli-Saudi rapprochement uh and essentially the attack by Hamas uh on Israel on October 7th. was essentially the manifestation of effectively a joint program between the Iranians and Hamas, one of its proxies, to disrupt the, to essentially foil the Abrahamic chords and put Israel a bit on the defensive. um Of course, the exact... uh of collaboration between Iran and Hamas has been debated, but there's quite strong evidence that in fact, for one, a number of the Hamas commandos were actually trained in Iran in the year before the attack. even if Iran didn't explicitly direct Hamas to do this, everyone knew what the timing was critical. And there is certainly a strong reason to believe there was a direct link. This then precipitated everything we've seen over the last nearly two years now of horrible reprisals against Hamas and lots and lots of civilian Palestinian casualties. It also created a kind of a, may I continue? It also created a kind of a... a cover for a broader and a motivation for a broad longer term plan on the part of Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu to roll back the Iranian uh regime, which he has framed as an existential threat to Israel for the better part of the last 30 years. uh And so then we saw in, you know, after a period of, sort of a period of where the world's attention was focused primarily on what was going on in Gaza, the Israelis basically decapitated the Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon. Hezbollah was essentially the sort of tip of the spear of Iranian proxy uh warfare in the region. uh and uh dealt some blows to the Houthis in Yemen who were conscripted by the Iranians as late as 2011 after the Arab Spring. And um then you had the uh fall of Assad in Syria shortly after which was, uh seemed to be a surprise, uh but potentially a lesson as well, uh essentially without the... uh the support of Russia, which was engaged in the Ukraine War, and without uh Hezbollah, um Assad was in an untenable position, and the House of Cards kind of fell quickly, which then also allowed Israel. uh Somewhere within the first year after the Hamas attack on 10-7, the Israelis shifted gears and were clearly thinking much bigger than just trying to decimate Hamas. And what we've seen is a uh progression of steps against Iran, starting with its proxies. And each one of those steps basically made it easier, opened a window through which Israel could then attack uh their biggest prize, which was the nuclear facility. And it wasn't just the nuclear facilities, it was also, I think this has been underplayed, but the ballistic, Iran's ballistic missile uh capabilities, which uh had advanced apparently quite rapidly over the last few years, and to the point where the effectiveness of the Iron Dome, the protective missile defenses of Israel were in question. So Israel had a number of reasons to act now. uh Basically, this is the product of a long period predating the Hamas attack of preparations for this outcome. And of course, as the Gaza debacle has uh deepened, the civilian casualties, etc. uh Netanyahu's grasp on power was increasingly dependent upon a bigger win. And the biggest win politically, domestically, that I think he could aim for was neutralizing the Iranian threat. Hmm. So I just for people that don't really understand They haven't followed it they you know They they know that there is an issue. Obviously just explained it really well like what precipitated this Initial attack that we're talking about today this strike on Iran um On their nuclear facilities and their ballistic facilities What is the danger? And even it might sound like a simple question, but what's the danger about Iran having a nuclear weapon? Like, why have we been so uh adamant about making sure they don't have one when some of our other, maybe we consider enemies do have them? Obviously, once someone has them, then I guess you can't, you know, it's hard to turn that back. But it's like. Even if they don't, the embodied knowledge and capabilities the Iranians have now means that you're never going to completely eliminate that threat. So what is the big deal? Why is this such a national security threat to Israel and then the USA for people that don't really understand it? Well, I mean, it's a very good, it's an excellent question and gets to the heart of the issue. The, I mean, the danger here is not so much that Iran is going to lob a nuclear weapon at Israel. I mean, they understand, you know, the principles of Israel is a nuclear power and they will suffer, you know, horrible consequences if they did that. The thing about having a, being a nuclear power in this region is it gives them, You know, just as we're seeing with Russia now, you know, there's a resistance, the principle barrier to effective resistance is the idea that Russia may come in and use nukes. um And Iran has shown, and I think the focus on the nuclear. side alone is a bit distracting because the main issue is Iran's use of its proxies to essentially uh keep many of the region's potentially most productive uh players. uh on their heels. Lebanon has been decimated, know, Iran, Iraq has been also with its Iranian proxies has been destabilized. And the Saudis, of course, have been, you know, and all of the other Gulf states are constantly on edge, lest the Iran retaliate and so there be a conflict and they become the targets. So a nuclear, in short, nuclear Iran basically just gives them an added uh layer of invincibility or protection to uh expand their uh undermining activities across the region. So that's the major issue. And of course, with the JCB way that the Iran deal signed in 2015, the focus was almost completely on the nuclear program. And with the idea that expanding that to Iran's other activities might make that deal untenable for Iran. Fact is that the United States failed to essentially identify what was going on in places like Yemen and actively uh exert some pressure to push them back. And we're seeing the consequences right now is essentially Iran managed within the course of the last 15, 20 years to accumulate a number of assets in the region that were highly destructive. um So I think that's the issue, mainly. And of course, for Israel, it's an even sort of more symbolic uh issue where uh just the fact that another hostile region has that kind of power is extremely sensitive to the Israeli psyche. So you have that. You know, one of the reasons why this particular strike and this particular event is of interest to us, and I think our audience as well, is because the US's connection to Israel. uh I mean, on our show, we talk to a lot of folks about the topic of Christian nationalism, know, Israel always comes up, and... You know, does appear America has this very special relationship to, you know, our Middle East ally, which, hey, that's okay. It serves maybe a strategic interest. But like, why now? Like, in your opinion, like the US striking a target in a Middle Eastern country, you know, because we think they have nukes. Like, why? I don't understand exactly why we would do that. I mean, we wouldn't... we wouldn't do that for any of our other European allies. I don't think we would. So like, there something in European that is happening or is there a uh treaty or some sort of like agreement between the US and Israel that, you know, would precipitate us just striking this uh other, you sovereign country? Well, I... think the major issue is that there is an opportunity to the threat of Iran going nuclear has been growing progressively over the last despite the JCPOA or even because of it in part for the last, I'm sure that would be a controversial statement, but for the last couple of decades and you've got an opportunity now. The attack on, Hamas attack on Israel is, I mean, nobody could have, very few people could have imagined a few, you know, two years ago. that Hezbollah would essentially cease to be one of the most active and effective non-state actors in the region, um or that... Any of this would have seemed quite unlikely. So you've got a clear opportunity right now to potentially set back Iran's, at least the most formal elements of Iran's nuclear program. Of course, that comes with risks because you don't, mean, right now the question of what actually has been done is being hotly debated. Did we actually take out the enrichment facilities at Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz or did we did we kind of sort of uh do much less than that? um think it uh but in some ways that also is not the major issue. I think we've also sent a, and I don't want to sound to bellicose here, but I think this is a psychological correction in the region whereby Iran has effectively learned that it does not have complete free reign over to do what it wants in the region. uh Again, are potential risks to that. Are we now seeing Iran's, know, so essentially running for a nuclear weapon faster with a more limited number of resources? to become that nuclear power? uh Are they going to respond with asymmetric warfare and uh try to make the US and Israel uh pay in other ways? um These are the of the questions right now. uh But I think, I'm somewhat optimistic that this is going to turn out, it may be messy, but it may turn out to be, uh At least it's an opportunity for the region to essentially try to come up with some muster the resources to become more integrated and secure rather than uh increasingly lawless and um stuck, for lack of a better term. Yeah, I listened to em the emergency, like UN Security Council meeting, um which is something I don't regularly do. But like, uh it popped up on my feed and I was like, you know what, I'm going to take a listen to this. And it sucked because I was thinking about that meme where like, you know, when the person you hate like says something you agree with because like it was like the the russians and iranians and mind you like i'm not i'm an american like i'm team america not team russia or team iran but they were saying things like well you know the u.s was the only you know country here that's actually dropped a nuke before and i'm like Yeah, they're kind of right about that, you know, but but one of the other things I picked up from from listening to it was it didn't sound like there was overwhelming support from our allies about the strike. in in your in your experience, I mean, our our our allies responding in in a way that's different when the US does something or or are you getting the sense that they were a little bit shocked and kind of surprised as well? Well, nobody should be watching what's going on over the last year and a half. Nobody should be completely surprised at this particular move. in itself, there's a precedent here. It's not just the US sneaking in and dropping 14 bunker buster bombs. It's a major escalation. And it's also a major demonstration of US interest and power in the region. And I think, you know, some of it, you may recall Chancellor Mertz's comments that which were not well received, that uh Israel was doing the West dirty work. But there is, and you know, looking at this through the lens of uh domestic politics, subtleties get, anything approaching a subtlety gets a bit lost. um It is true that Iran has expanded its influence up to the 10-7 actions afterward, has expanded its interest at US and US allies' expense in a dramatic fashion. um And it's not a good thing. uh And even if the Gulf countries are very highly sensitive to being in the crosshairs and are not going to come out and say, we uh approve this, ah my sense is that the Gulf countries and our allies, many of our allies in Europe, ah are somewhat relieved at this point that uh something, that collectively all of this has happened, despite the fact that you've got an obvious question of what's going on in Gaza, which is indefensible. yeah, of course, with any bold move, there are going to be unknown consequences. My main concern is did the Trump White House actually sit down and look at all of the data that they needed to make that decision? Or was this working off of Trump's intuition, feeling that this was the right time to do this? um we going to see? And then of course the whole question of what's going to happen in Iran next, um which is a big one. um And there's some lessons and things that aren't lessons with respect to what's happened in the Middle East prior in our US intervention and past conflicts. um And a lot of it depends on what we do next. Are we going to take advantage of this? We have a strategic advantage at the moment. Israel certainly does. Are we going to just walk me look from Trump's recent statements? It almost seems like, OK, we're going to declare victory and and retreat. That I think would be a mistake. You know, we've done regardless of your views on what has happened, we've done it and we can't sort of. leave it alone and assume that everything that we've been, know, all of our objectives were met. um Does this mean invade Iran? Most definitely not. um But there are other ways of trying to take advantage of this situation to restrict Iran's nuclear and other military. uh movements ah and try to encourage uh a shift towards a more um collegial regime in the region. uh I can go on about that, but. um Yeah, mean, well, I think one of the things that I would really love for you to paint the picture for us, and I think you've been doing like a really good job of like, hey, this is in many ways in the interest of the West and America. um but also bringing out the tension of like what's happening in Gaza, the way that Israel has acted. There's been so much protest, so much angst about it, and then people even getting in trouble with the State Department or being taken by ICE for some of their views or like pro-Palestine, pro-all these views against Israel. And so it's like we're stuck in this tension in America. who is the good guy and who's the bad guy? Because it seems like sometimes the good guys are acting like the bad guys and the bad guys are taking on the mantle of like, look what the good guys are doing. And they're so evil. They're just like to us or they're worse than us. Look what's happening. And it's like, it can be confusing for the average American. Well, just for me to even sort through any of this stuff, because you hear on one hand, look what they're doing. They're killing all these innocent families, innocent people talking about Israel. and then almost like putting Hamas almost like putting some of these even Iran in a positive light and. ah that's where things get problematic because it's easy to play along those. Paint a picture like what is, and I'm not talking about a, just to be clear, I'm not referring to, I separate, obviously, and I think everyone should separate a government from its people. Obviously, there's a connection there. Obviously, there is a deep connection, but a government making its decisions and all that isn't the same thing as the people. And so, but with that in mind, that caveat in mind, What's the deal with Iran? Why are they so, like, are they an evil regime? And I know that's an extreme word, but are they, like, are they as bad as people say or as been kind of the narrative that's been told? And then how do we deal with this stuff that's coming in from Gaza? I just would love to hear your thoughts on it, on... Yeah, do you understand the question? I know I kind of was. I'm not sure how productive it is to characterize regimes as evil. We've seen what did us in Iraq and the acts of evil, etc. Of course, Ron was part of it. The question really is one of interest and security and values. But uh most directly, interests. uh Again, as I was trying to convey, think that what we don't see so uh well put is the net negative impact of Iran on regional stability. uh And then of course, with Israel, of course the whole question of what to do about Iran is, as you mentioned, vastly complicated by the fact that it's linked and not obviously so to the general, you know. readership or audience to the Palestinian conflict just looks like, okay, Israel is doing all of these absolutely horrible things, which we are, and Iran is doing all of these theoretically horrible things, but we can't really quite quantify it quite because it's really complicated. And how are these things connected? And the instinct is to sort of go with the, well. We're completely opposed to violence of any sort against anyone. And the Iranian regime becomes synonymous with the opposition uh to genocide in Palestine. um And those are just heuristics that are easily manipulated by the powers that be for their own purposes. m So uh I don't know. I think unfortunately the government's uh uh main activities these days and our government is not trying to clarify things, it's trying to confuse things. um you know, the more you get into it, the more complicated it becomes. ah less, ah nothing is black and white. um And that makes sense. I guess what I'm wondering, so why should the average American person be concerned? they're just like, hey, Iran, we're not even going to care. Iran, we're not going to care what you do. Just go ahead, do it. America leaves you alone. We're doing our own thing. Why should the normal American me, well, why should we be concerned if Iran is allowed to just do what they want in the region, so to speak. Well, if you look at all of our military engagements and their political and economic repercussions on the United States, the Middle East, you know, well, like it or not, constantly intervenes in American... know, we're essentially, it's a wagging the dog scenario. If we could actually divorce ourselves from the region completely, which I think is impossible for some of the reasons we've already discussed, you know, okay, we could leave Iran alone, but we can't. There are constituencies within this country on multiple sides that are constantly engaged and putting pressure on the government, and it's a useful political tool as well. So I think anything that happens in the, I mean, just look at the consequences of it. You look at what Al-Qaeda managed to do by attacking us on 9-11. Essentially, there's this meme that I keep referring to which shows a bunch of Al-Qaeda operatives lounging on a couch watching the news. And the caption is, Al-Qaeda, Bin Laden comes up with new plan, sit back and watch America collapse or destroy itself. So, I mean, these things have huge consequences and 9-11 reverberated within the American public and allowed us to do things that otherwise we would not, one would hope we would not have done. um So I think, yeah, even from our looking historically, it's interesting that some of America's first intervention, first major diplomatic, military interventions abroad were in the Middle East, the Barbary Wars in Libya. That was essentially our first uh formal military engagement abroad. um And some of the same themes echo across our history. And it's partly because of the religious aspect, the fact that the Middle East is the place where uh all of the three main monotheistic religions uh were born. It was sort of wired to be connected to the region. Yeah, I want to kind of talk about that. Oh, yeah, yeah. I. I wanted to to actually ask you about like religion and all kinds of other stuff, because, you know, kind of to Josh's point, all this happens. It's really easy for us to forget that there are people that live in Iran. um So could you maybe just give us a little insight of like like like. Who lives in Iran? What are the people like? What's the culture? What kind of government system they have? I I'm reluctant to say that I learned from Tucker Carlson recently that there's like 90 million people that live there. I didn't know that. So can you just give us just some insight on what is Iran, day in the life of a person who lives in Iran? I don't know about a day in the life of a person that lived. I I've never been, even though I've, know, Iran related matters took up some of my time in the past and I can't, you know, couldn't avoid it if I tried now. um You know, I've never actually, Iran is one of two countries in the region that I have not been to. um like the average person couldn't just buy a plane ticket and fly into Iran, right? For a while in the early, in the 2000s, you could go to Iran on an educational tour, something like this. It still was not horribly advisable. Since there's a lot of hostility in Iran, in the regime, obviously towards the United States, I think in general, You know, what you've got here is a highly corrupt uh military intensive theocracy, which essentially has a stranglehold over the vast majority of economic uh activity in the country. And it's deeply entwined. At the same time, you've got a people who are generally like, you know... percentages are probably up for uh grabs, but a majority of Iranians, think you could say safely, uh are highly opposed to the regime. They see this as uh squandering their best years and their intellectual. And the Iranians are a highly educated uh people with a profound uh history that binds them. uh perhaps more so than many other countries in region. um And what's happened to Iran is a tragedy. They've essentially been, again, their uh creativity and productive abilities have been squashed since the Iranian Revolution in 79. Not that things were perfect before then, but... oh leave? Can people just leave? Like if they aren't happy? Also, lot of Iranians have left. Some of the best and brightest, if can get out, they have done so. Many of have come to the States. But a lot of people can't, obviously, and lot of people don't want to. you've got this, you know, and it, but it, it's sort of an, you know, again, it's, that's the sort of measure of the difficulty of the situation. is Kareem Sajjadpour, who's one of the, one of the prominent American commentators on Iran, knows a ton more than I do. It was saying that the, um You could look at this as it's a country in which 20 % of regime diehards have a martyrdom complex and 80 % don't, which is the fundamental problem here, is that how do you get rid of a regime that is so... And the regime has learned from each potential uprising like the 2009 Green Revolution where the US stood back as Iranians tried to oh to do this themselves, which is one of the things that they've insisted on, uh and a problem, because of course, Ibranians tend to cohere around nationalist threats, exterior threats, even if they can't stand their own regime. So how do you deal with that as well? But. Wait, uh real fast, because you said something that I don't think a lot of people have really thought about is the impact of uh turning something that normally we could have capitalized on, sort of this population angst against the leadership, and now there's this external threat and the potential of... getting these folks to become more cohesive. can you talk just a little bit about that and maybe where you've seen that happen in the country before? in say in Iran or in Iran, because I don't think a lot of people know, you know, um or are aware of what you just said about how folks may coalesce around, you know, this external threat, i.e. Israel or the United States, or if I'm completely reading what you said wrong, feel free to tell me. No, think this is, mean, with every major, I the Green Revolution is probably a very good example where, you the Iranians in 2009 tried to essentially take advantage of a sort of a liberal opening to, or rather a, you know, this fluctuation between sort of... trappings of liberalism and something much more conservative as Ahmadinejad exemplified. uh uh to essentially solve their own problem. of course, the revolution failed. But every time an external threat comes, and the Iran-Iraq war is another great example, but every time the country itself is threatened, you national pride comes into it. Nobody wants to see, nobody in Iran wants to see an invading force. I think it's sort of a historical theme, least of which uh Israel or the United States. But the same, so let us do it, the message is continually, let us do this ourselves. And one of the really interesting questions is how might that happen? And Libya is an interesting example. I mean, that's an area and I know much much uh much better. um You know the the typical, ah well you know the fall of the Libyan regime really saw its roots in the 2003 uh deal between the US and Libya whereby Libya would give up its nuclear weapons as it I should say the big parentheses such as they were. and Iran are very different in their at these two points in time in terms of their capacities. Libya basically had a starter kit with long fold out instructions and were way up at the top. Iran has a highly sophisticated scientific cadre and a very advanced program. But, know, whole, retroactively the lesson drawn from Libya, or at least the one that was broadcast to the world, was that Iran looks at Libya and says, okay, well, Libya gave up its what, its nukes, then, you know, fast forward, Gaddafi was killed. that the situation is much more, you know, by the United States intervention. So we're not going to give up our nuclear weapons, which, you know, in general might be a actually reasonable strategy. But the real problem in Libya was the fact that the deal itself opened up the atmosphere for a lot of other things to come into this highly sort of enclosed cocoon like structure. And people started to see what was going on, you know, outside outside in the real world and how how much been taken away from them. And in addition, the United States essentially uh supported a deal that Gaddafi felt was necessary for his own survival, whereby we essentially repatriated uh members of essentially, know, Al-Qaeda's most effective franchise and then reformed them into, uh you know, tried to flip them. uh Of course, we didn't see what was going on with the uh The Arab Spring was a surprise, right? And uh that unleashed all of these collective forces that managed to, with our help, simply overturn the regime. going back to Iran now, what happened? these last couple of weeks is a major embarrassment, to put it mildly, for the Iranian regime. um And their biggest question, as we've seen with the attack on the US base in Qatar, which didn't produce much, but that was a show, right? It was also telegraphed in advance by Iran, um was an attempt to save face. And the question, the future of the Iranian regime is going to depend on how weak the population actually thinks the Iranian regime is. ah And that's where I don't, know, anything could happen. You could see sort of some sort of spontaneous, it's unlikely that I think we're going to see the end of the Iranian regime immediately. But as with Libya, was a 10, in the Libya case, there was a seven year delay and the, you know, this accommodation or, you know, perceived weakness essentially metastasized and allowed for this, this. know, complete change, which has not been to the benefit of Libya since, right? Libya has been a failed state essentially for much of a year since then. And that's what we have to have to try to, you know, but at the same time, Iran is not Libya or Iraq or Afghanistan. There are some sort of unifying forces in Iran uh that... think, again, you can't necessarily make the say, okay, oh, it's gonna be, the regime falls and we're gonna have another Iraq. Well, we may have a messy period of instability, but it's not necessarily the same. There's not a direct comparison to be made, least not yet. Is the Iranian attack there at Qatar different than the attack they did in Iraq after Qassem Soleimani was killed? um So the Iranians, you know, essentially have tried to use their, again, that was an example of Iran using its Shia militias in another country to essentially harass or attack the United States as a means of retribution. In this case, Qatar ah was, I mean, it really was for domestic... Well, I guess there are similarities, but the Qatar feint, if you want to call it that, sending missiles to Turkey against this US base in Qatar was an attempt to show the Iranian people, uh we're launching uh missiles against the, you know, most of the Iranians didn't see the commentary that came after it, like we didn't hit anything. They saw the missiles launching and the regime was doing something. I think that was the use of that issue. Iran knows if it strikes the Gulf states, they're going to get retribution very quickly, which is not to say that they also, Iranian parliament, the Mejlis uh passed a law recommending the closure of the Straits of Hormuz. Realistically, all of Iran's oil revenue goes through those straits, and if they do something like that, they're going to get another swift retribution from the United States. The international community isn't going to stand it. So they're very much constrained at this point. m Hmm. So, so if we're thinking about that, that region, like, you know, you kind of, and again, I'm, I don't know if I'm speaking for the average American or not, but it kind of just seems like they think of the Middle East as just one big conglomeration. And they're just like, that's kind of monolithic, right? Except for Israel, cause they're, you know, it's just Jewish and then Islam. And there's the conflict there and they just think, okay, well, you know, there's this monolithic, you know, Middle East, except for the, except for Israel. And um that's not the case, but kind of help us understand like, what is the kind of, what is it like geopolitically in Iran? Cause you've mentioned a couple of times that Gulf States wouldn't do this. A retribution would be swift. What's going on there with the Gulf states that like, they friends of Iran? Are they kind of uh uncomfortable, know, odd bedfellows? Are they really just frenemies or enemies, but they're kind of working together because they have to right now? What's going on, do you think? Well, first and foremost, the Gulf is an enclosed region where everybody is smashed together. Iran uh is right across the water there and very close in that case of the distance between Dubai and uh Iran is what, 70 miles, something like this. uh They're very close and historically have been uh very connected by trade and also very competitive. And the Gulf, Arab Sunni Gulf states, of course, that there is the religious dimension you've got since, you know, again, things were very different under the Shah, for example, but with the uh rise of sort of extremist Shiism, which you might call uh the regime in Iran. uh You know, sort of primeval uh Islamic rift, Shia Sunni rift is manifested in that, you know, across the water essentially. And uh to gain, you know, the Iranians feel that they are the, you know, the heirs to, and they are, the heirs to a great civilization and deserve to be the main arbiters of what happens in the region. And the Arab states obviously believe very differently and have their own ambitions. So... You know, this is complicated geostrategic game in which all of the Gulf states are concerned about either protecting themselves from being eaten up like the classic reference point is Saddam Hussein invading Kuwait. The Qataris have essentially, uh which is a much smaller state and extremely wealthy, know, also their policy is dictated by their desire to survive in this neighborhood. And Iran has attempted to protect itself and project its power at the same time by using proxies. And the proxies, if you look at Saudi Arabia, one of the biggest things, their nightmare scenarios is a cutoff of uh both the Straits of Hormuz and uh sea channel through the Suez Canal because that basically prevents them from exporting uh their oil, which is powering their economic transformation. Anything that disturbs that balance uh is going to be highly concerning. So everybody's intertwined and Iran uh is a manufacturer of regional instability. I think that's the main... uh That's the main issue here. Yeah, so... Of course, you can argue that people will jump in and say, well, Israel is the manufacturer of regional instability. that's another question. And they're interrelated. uh you know, so this is a midterm year. um And what's funny or not funny is I have a friend who uh was in Special Forces. And I remember asking him once about his missions. And I was like, what percentage of the missions you go on do you think are motivated by politics? And he was like, 100%. And it really just, it struck me because in the back of my mind, I had always kind of maybe thought, but just to hear it from the mouth of somebody that has lived that life for so long. uh So I can't help but think that, you know, in this midterm season, we may see politics uh play into this conflict. uh Obviously, Trump is... opposite, you mean, the conflict playing into politics, yeah. yeah, yes, that too. So uh I'd for you just to kind of uh give us some different ways that you feel politics may enter and what can our public, you know, maybe be on the lookout for. um And also to whatever degree you feel comfortable. know that Netanyahu has his own set of political problems uh in his country. So I'd love for you just kind of talk about the politics of what's happening right now. Well, I if you look at, you know, I think the Middle East again played a substantial role in the last election where, you know, uh and this again is that you look back in recent American history dating back to Kennedy, you know, everything, the number of times the United States, you know, that United States election, presidential election has been impacted by. conflict is much more than not. uh Biden, you know, essentially got was was put in this position where, you know, he was hoping to be able to to to to show that he could resolve these issues. Palestinian-Israeli issue in some way, but was too hamstrung to be able to do to by fear that politics would come and derail his campaign to do anything about it. Which, I mean, that's a systemic problem on the United States part is that everything has become so incredibly politicized. And ideally you would want politics to play some role in American diplomacy and foreign relations, but not to dominate it. And that's the biggest threat I see. know, essentially the United States is kind of on a yo-yo with the Middle East and every, that's what Trump is worried about right now. He wants to declare victory and satisfy the part of his base that, uh you know, is rabidly against foreign entanglements. ah So the problem is that one hopes, as I was sort of alluding to before, that the decisions are not, know, ultimately the decisions are not made on such broad stroke basis that you're actually, you've got some sort of a longer term plan because otherwise the threat is gonna come back and bite you in some other way. You're basically just pushing the problem into the future. So, you know, but unfortunately politics these days and elections are run on perception. So, ah I don't know. mean, I generally, think, yeah, well, the more people look into, well, it's very difficult. mean, it's difficult for people to devote their lives to trying to untangle what's going on in the Middle East. And there are, there are so many unknowns and it's really hard to, I mean, there are good cases on both sides of this last. last set of military exchanges that either this was a horrible thing to do or actually this was the reasonable thing to do. And the people who have the data or at least should have the data, maybe I should say, are not the general public. uh And those details matter. um But again, mean, my big sort of theme, mean, the Benghazi book that you kindly mentioned is, you know, it was essentially uh looking at the Benghazi fiasco, political fiasco as an example of how, you know, foreign wars uh compound domestic political inefficiencies and problems and, you know, essentially just weaken the United States uh and compromise our foreign policy. um So, I don't know. It probably also adds to misinformation because I'd imagine most people probably don't follow world politics until they start hearing their politicians talk about it. And then they have to take their side because it's like who wants to do the research to figure out if they're... But we should have a system where, ideally, the president is, we have a robust democracy, and the president has a team of professional analysts and departments that work together well and offer as objective as possible. assessments. And now of course you're seeing this right now. You've got the agencies are competing against one another with regards to whether the the strike on Fordow for example was uh a success or not or how you know what exactly was damaged and the politics is visible. And that is the biggest, I think one of the biggest threats to this country is the dilution and politicization of those bodies that are supposed to keep us safe and allow Americans to get on with their lives without having to become experts on the Iranian nuclear question, right? uh And everybody's just parroting whatever their political idol is saying. But, you know, it's not to say that after doing a lot of research they're going to come to a different conclusion. That's the frustrating part, isn't it? It's like... It just feels like uh there's this endless pit of information that you can go into and it's just gonna lead you down more information. And then you might even be more confused at the end than you were at the beginning in terms of like, well, certainly probably, I don't even know if I even, like this has really even helped me to determine what's right and what's wrong and any of that stuff. It feels very frustrating. And I totally hear what you're saying. It's one of those concerning things that we're facing right now just because of the absolute deluge of information that anyone will receive at any point and having any kind of method and good and... executable and scalable method for a lot of people to be able to go and find the information and make a good decision about it. It just feels like it's more possible than ever, but then also at the same time, somehow less possible. It's very, it's very strange. And I think a lot of that has to do with the human psyche. And, know, I just for this, yeah, absolutely the media, you're absolutely right. And if you were to think about You know, I know we don't like making necessarily projections all the time, but give us two scenarios. What happens from here? Do you think with Iran? And this is kind of the last big question, but where do you think this is going essentially? And maybe you can, and two scenarios just gives you some freedom to say, hey, maybe this could happen. Maybe this could happen. What do you think? Well, I guess I'm sort of hoping that all of this on a higher level will uh indicate a more robust American interest in the middle. I think this is maybe a little bit delusional, or I don't think this is necessarily going to happen. again, there are all of these voices for America to keep out of the region and hold its peace. But I think that the stability of the region necessitates an active American. active and informed American uh presence. And I think that directly relates to how uh China and Russia react to us. This isn't just about the Middle East. It's how do our principal adversaries view us? Are we absent or are we actually out there staking uh some of our, you an interest? um I mean, this definitely plays into what ultimately may happen in Ukraine, for example. And again, relations with the power dynamic in the Red Sea and Africa with respect to China. um So it's not just about the Middle East. But in terms of what happens in Iran, I think there's a continuum of possibilities. But I would hope that ultimately... uh uh The ideal scenario would be that Iran, maybe uh domestic uh economic interests within the regime see that their interests being attacked, as in they've all gotten extraordinarily wealthy and they don't want to see their assets uh taken away from them and they basically affect some kind of an internal coup, as opposed to the military, much more hardline military forces doing the same thing. um And that ultimately, um you know, that Iran can essentially help right itself. I mean, it's very difficult. I I don't know, I tend to think that, you know, 10 years from now, whatever happens in Iran is going to be very different from what we're seeing today. I think we're seeing the end of this regime. um The question is, what is going to replace it? That is the major question, isn't it? ah And uh again, the more involved that, you know, I think that there is an opportunity for diplomacy here and we and the, you know, with Israel's uh help there have, you know, created a situation where the regime is on its heels and its capabilities greatly uh reduced. The question is, can we offer a deal that essentially keeps them, you know, keeps the uh peace but also gives the Iranian people an opportunity to essentially make their voices heard. ah And of course, one of the big dangers right now is that the regime is going to uh engage in a massive crackdown, which they have the power to do, and that that's going to be the immediate source of pain there. But again, if you look at other examples in the region, once things start to go in this direction, these regimes don't tend to last a long time. We may not see an immediate change of uh regime, and I do think that's somewhat unlikely. uh But again, five, six, seven years down the line, I imagine whatever is going to be there is going to be very different, whether it's worse or much better. Well, here's to hoping that it's much better as opposed to much worse. And of course, if I could jump in and say, economic integration, really, mean, that was one of the beauties of the Abraham Accords, I think, is that it laid out at least a framework whereby regional economic integration and swapping of critical natural resources, and the powers that have them to the powers that don't, that would create uh a disincentive to conflict. There are plans out there that would serve those ends and the United States should be actively supporting them. Well, I think that sounds I mean, at least from hearing you say it, sounds great. I mean, everyone wants their money, right? I mean, I guess you have politics, money and religion. The great leveler is climate change. And the region just simply is on the forefront of it. And none of these countries can afford to keep fighting each other when they've got water resources are becoming more and more scarce, the economy is in the tank. um That's one of the biggest strikes against the current Iranian regime is that the Iranian economy is doing so badly and they're managing it so incompetently. Yes, and that's always, that's gonna hit hard. That makes a lot of sense. You know, I could keep talking to you for hours, Ethan. um I really appreciate you coming on and spending some time with us. How can people follow your work? They hear this, they're interested. How can they connect with you, follow what you're doing? Well, most of my uh opining is through Substack. uh I have a blog called the Middle East Told Slant. uh I'm writing books, so um I'm currently working on a history of the Red Sea. So that's uh we'll be out in the next year or so. Well that's great, we'll to have you back on to talk about that. Thanks again Ethan for coming on and spending some time with us. It's been a real pleasure, very enlightening. Absolutely, and to our friends, our listeners, our viewers, thanks guys for coming again and joining us. We like to get you great content, so make sure you're liking, subscribing, hitting notification bells, sending this to people who could be interested in it because we want to get this great content out to other people because this is good stuff. It's not the garbage that you hear and the one-liners all out there and nobody goes in depth. No, this is, this is, we try to go in depth here and really ask the questions. So make sure you help support us. And guys, until next time, keep your conversations that right or left, put up. Thanks and God bless.