Socialism, Anti-Politics, And Power Today with Joseph Sciortino

A lot of people call it populism, but the engine driving today’s politics is anti-politics: the organized channeling of frustration without a stable program for governing. Joseph Sciortino of the Rabble Report and I dig into why that matters for socialists, progressives, and anyone trying to turn protest into power—and why the effort so often stalls once it hits the wall of debt, police unions, and low-turnout city halls. Using New York and Zohran Mamdani as a focal point, we unpack DSA fractures, backroom deals, and the deeper contradiction of running as a disruptor while needing the very machinery you promised to challenge.

From there, we widen the lens. We trace the rise and fall of mass parties into today’s catch-all, cartelized party systems that govern the state more than they represent society. That shift helps explain why left populism rarely lasts in office, why the right is often better positioned to capitalize on anti-state sentiment, and why the working class keeps drifting from parties that talk redistribution but deliver management. Along the way, we compare Corbyn and the Brexit realignment, Macron’s narrowing options against the French far right, and Morena’s pragmatic coalitions in Mexico—an uncomfortable, useful counterexample for American left expectations.

We also wrestle with the hard stuff: policing and recallability, standing armies versus civic defense, NGOs as pseudo-public power, and the fiscal constraints no mayor can wish away. If socialism is society’s self-organization—not just nationalization or technocratic administration—then the first task is rebuilding institutions and habits that live outside state offices. Without that base, anti-politics only deepens; with it, opposition can become leverage instead of mere posture.

If this conversation helps you see the terrain more clearly, tap follow, share it with a friend who’s frustrated by “vibes” politics, and leave a quick review. Your notes shape what we dig into next.

Musis by Bitterlake, Used with Permission, all rights to Bitterlake

Chapters

• 0:00 Setting The Stakes: Socialism And Anti-Politics
• 4:07 DSA, Bernie, And A Shifting Left
• 7:37 Mamdani’s Deals And DSA Fractures
• 13:17 The Limits Of Progressive City Governance
• 19:32 Israel, Identity, And Campaign Strategy
• 23:47 From Mass Parties To Cartel Parties
• 28:57 Populists And Party Takeovers
• 34:27 Representation Versus Governing
• 40:07 Policing, Recall, And State Capacity
• 46:17 Conscription, Administrative States, And NGOs
• 52:47 Global Left Populism’s Record
• 59:27 New York’s Turnout And Local Power
• 1:05:17 Class Realignment In The UK
• 1:12:07 Insulating The State And Democratic Drift
• 1:18:17 Generic Candidates And Obama Lessons
• 1:23:57 Why Right Populism Outruns The Left
• 1:30:47 Parties Without Social Bases

Transcript

C. Derick Varn: 0:49

Hello, and welcome to Varmblog. And I'm here with uh returning Gress and old friend of the show, uh Joseph Corentino. And we are talking the left. Actually, I would say probably socialism uh in quotation marks more than the left because the left is actually a really big concept right now. Um and uh anti-politics and the trends that show up. I mean, I think people are going to recognize a lot of what you call anti-politics, is what a lot of other people call populism, but I think anti-politics is actually a better way to frame it because most of the projects don't really have a positive politics in any mass sense. Um they they deal in channeling dissatisfaction, so you have political entrepreneurs who can take advantage of that. But as far as positive programs, the moment you try to build positive political programs out of a lot of this stuff, uh you start seeing some real problems. So um uh I was gonna ask you, you've been you and I have known each other and been observers of the socialist left in America for a a decade at least, maybe longer. I've known you for longer than that. Um and we saw the DSA go gangbusters mainly in response to Trump one, um, also in response to the seeming anti-political message of Bernie. We saw the Bernie Sanders movement not be able to pick up the same anti-political steam um in 2020. Um and definitely post-2020, Bernie is almost a Democratic establishment figure, even if he's not formally a Democrat. Um, and you know, yes, the moderates suppress him, etc. But I mean the guy was given key uh key committee um uh assignments, so it's hard to say that he didn't have any uh establishment power in the Democratic Party. So I what I wanted to ask you though, we talked about this in terms of Mamdani, so we'll start there. There's already beginning to be fragments in the honeymoon of the of the DSA unity around Mamdani. It's happened very quickly. He uh is making backroom deals that uh go against the DSA's um endorsement process, uh, often to help other progressive Democrats. If you've heard about the Avellas versus Broadlander and Avellas stepping out of the campaign and what seems to be a broker deal by Mamdani.

Joseph Sciortino: 3:49

Um yeah, there was also uh what was it, Chiance? Is that his name? He was yeah, including running against you know uh House Minority Leader Jeffries. And I think Mamdani stepped in to stop that. I I do think it it doesn't speak to a lot of the limitations of this, actually, because the problem for Mam Dani, of course, is that uh he's running as a political disruptor, but not really from a very strong standpoint. Uh right. Because again, he he actually does he does depend on making some of these backdoor deals just to be able to govern it all or to deliver on any of the promises that he made. He actually has managed to get some. I I I guess Hokel has been sending out peace feelers to him and like is willing to work with him right now, so maybe he can get some things done in that sense. But um, yeah, uh as far as this uh fragmentation that we were talking about too, though, it's interesting. I I feel like the more that uh or if he's able to retain his popularity within New York, I think the left will go with it. The less he is, I think the more that they're gonna kind of they're going to kind of shuffle him off and like ignore him, really, or pretending he doesn't exist. I feel like we saw this with De Blasio, and I feel like even with AOC, you've kind of seen some of this to an extent, really. Um it's really more about I think the left is like the sort of political faction that wants power. Right? And if they see Mam Dani as a vehicle for that, they'll they'll keep on board. If not, they'll jump off. A real fragment.

C. Derick Varn: 5:29

Right. Well, I mean, it's definitely clear that it's fragmented. We also saw this attempt with the left populist uh around the DSA with Graham Plantner, who was not endorsed by the DSA, has no relationship to the DSA whatsoever. Uh, but you you saw the kind of professional DSA face uh around Jacobin magazine um move in that direction. I mean, one of the things about the fragmentation though is like I can tell you I'm now in the DSA, and the the DSA has moved significantly left of where it was in 2017, 2018, 2019 in rhetoric in an internal politicking, but Mamdani actually shows that it hasn't moved significantly less than what it actually does. Um, but the buyer's remorse seem for certain factions seems to be immediate. Uh you know, um and I I I wonder what you make of that. Like, how how do you deal with that?

Joseph Sciortino: 6:43

Like, um right. I mean, I I think most will go along with it, even if they don't want even if they're even if there's grumbling. That's kind of the sense I get. Uh, if Montani actually does manage to be a successful mayor, but ironically, a lot of his success will come out of actually being fairly distant from them.

C. Derick Varn: 7:05

Right. I mean, there's a couple of things I think we should uh I've talked about this on a on weirdly on a podcast I did about Marxist writings in Ireland, but we were talking about well, who's the actual constituency? We refer to DSA electeds, but if you think about even even someone like Mamdani, who was a cadre candidate, meaning he comes out of the DSA. Um if you think about the DSA electeds in a certain way, though, who are the like are they are they even the DSA is elected? Because what the DSA asks of them and what the DSA can give them are disproportionate. So the DSA asks them to hold some kind of line, but Mamdani's a Democrat and he answers to a constituency of New York City, right? Of which the DSA is probably at the very high end 10,000 of a city of what? Like what is how many million? Yeah, I mean it's just it just doesn't really stand to reason that uh that a city that's larger than many countries is uh you know is beholden to a group that is not is not a formal party, it's actually technically a political nonprofit. Um it's it's not separate from the Democrats. I mean the DSA was founded to be a um a caucus organization within the Democratic Party when uh Peter Cameho's uh New America movement joined with um uh one of the many um Harrington groupings in the Democratic Party. And we saw a cycle that had a similar issue with the Rainbow Coalition and the election of David Dinkins. And you and I talked about that. Uh, and you hear you know rumblings about like you know, the Republican Socialist uh LaGuardia and and and stuff like that. Yeah. Go ahead.

Joseph Sciortino: 9:15

I mean the thing about LaGuardia too is that um ultimately he's the last successful reformist mayor of New York. What do you think about it? And the reason why is because he was a uh he was a client of the most powerful president in American history.

C. Derick Varn: 9:33

Right, he was he was he was like he was a client of our Bonaparte, and for those of you who don't know, that is that is Fred Randarinoid Roosevelt. So and when and when the New Deal dried up during the war effort, what happened to LaGuardia?

Joseph Sciortino: 9:53

Yeah, this authority.

C. Derick Varn: 9:56

So there you go. I mean, you know, you and I have talked about the the bomb markets, the city council, these are all things momdani is going to have to deal with. Uh the police department, and we know that the police uh the uh the the relationship with the police is part of what strained David Dinkins. It was a strain on de Blasio as well. Um while I support getting rid of Tish, I think Tish's politics is are terrible, but the the the thing is like will the mayor be able to withstand open warfare with the with the police? Although I guess the other thing you can say is like are they going to stop just because he's nice to Tish? Like historically they don't. They don't like uh the the concessions de Blasio made to the NYPD did not win him any support or favors, so it's hard to say. Um but I bring all this up because I do think Mam Dami, the the interesting thing about Mamdani to me is one part of it is tied into international international and national politics about Israel, which the mayor of New York City can do jack and shit.

Joseph Sciortino: 11:16

And two I did want to adjust something actually, if you don't mind. Uh, because I saw a comment actually on the old actually, I don't even know like if what the live comments are on this right now. I don't have a link to that, but um I I wanted to comment because there was a a commenter on the old uh on our previous discussion on Mam Dani. I I didn't notice this, but it was actually a very insightful thing. I noted that like something that Mam Dani did do was sort of he did not take the the typical New York City politician line on Israel. I do think that actually helped him because he didn't he managed to step away from the sort of obligatory virtue signaling of the typical New York City politician. Like at the debate, it was this was talked about too. Like every other New York City mayoral candidate was saying, I'll go to Israel. Mamdani said, No, I'm I'm gonna govern here, right? And he managed to balance that out with um he was able to come across as pro-Palestinian without seeming insensitive to Jews, and I think that that that is something that left-wing politicians have struggled with. But I do think he managed to actually tow that line pretty well, and it also made him look different from other politicians, including other left-wing politicians.

C. Derick Varn: 12:27

Oh, absolutely. I mean, even compared to Blad Lander, for example, who has you know liberal Zionist inclinations. Um and and he also, you know, not to remind people, he also doesn't have the problems of Jesse Jackson. Uh um who couldn't thread that needle so cleanly in the 1980s.

Joseph Sciortino: 12:52

Um yeah, I mean, that might be a problem for him later on, though, if you have like advisors or you know, people or underlings that you know say inflammatory stuff. But if he steals something quickly, he could probably stir by.

C. Derick Varn: 13:10

Well, I mean, I think it's clear to me Mamdani is a is a gifted politician. I don't know if that's what the left, uh, the socialist left in America actually wants. Um I don't think they know what they want. I think they want power, but they don't know how to get there. I don't even, yeah, they want power, but do they even know what power is?

Joseph Sciortino: 13:29

Like, you know, I was I I was thinking too actually today. Um, because I've been thinking about this a lot actually. And it comes out of the Piping Shrike, who you know, he's one of those Australian writers that I've dealt into quite a bit in the last decade. Um I think there's kind of this inversion too of uh I I actually think, although there is a lot of um a lot of role play that they're trying to, I think on the socialist left to uh as far as I I think they want to repeat the past in terms of like building mass party, but they appro I think they approach democracy in a very inverted way compared to the old uh the old social democratic parties, for instance. Go ahead. We don't um well, I mean, like it's really we have passed from a period of representative democracy to a period of political democracy. Political democracy defines a current period, representative democracy defined mass politics from maybe the late 19th century, more or less, up to most of the 20th century.

C. Derick Varn: 14:35

I would like up to maybe to me the in the mass politics is the 1950s, but uh it's harder, yeah. I mean, you can have you have you have like mass political movements, but you don't have like mass uh the the fragment the the the like the fragmentation of uh for the unit for the United States for me, for example, um the the fact that all the civil rights stuff eventually started having to come through the courts was an indication that mass politics as something that can be manifested in Congress was over. Um but maybe you disagree with me.

Joseph Sciortino: 15:20

No, I I actually do think there's been a uh I do think there was a an attenuation because you know once okay, uh civil rights and and voting rights are won. But then I think the I I think the movement wound up, you know, kind of at a point of now uh because again, like social conditions are still rough. You you you want formal political emancipation, but you uh but but social conditions are still rough, and you're this rather isolated group within American society. And I I I don't think uh I don't think the movement really figured out what to how to like break out of that really. It probably couldn't, actually. And I think what happened is that well, I I guess we saw that process happen throughout the 60s and 70s. Uh there was a move towards pressuring the courts, which that didn't go well eventually. Um eventually the courts wound up putting barriers, especially on bossing, for instance. Um but um yeah, no, I I agree with you on that actually. Like I I think the uh the movement starts to really attenuate from like 1965 onwards. I think it's something like why there's there was definitely like a degree of despair that comes with that as well, actually. I think even gets on like why actually the move actually the social movement aspect moves from the organized civil rights movement into like say the the urban rights. It's sort of a it is kind of an expression of frustration that there wasn't really any way there wasn't like a clear there wasn't a clear break, really, I think.

C. Derick Varn: 16:52

Well to me that that that leaves us in kind of lurch. I mean, like like um I told you my theory that I got for that I've taken from Michael Sendell that you have like basically five American republics. You have the the early kind of um elitist yeoman settler one, you have the the the the post uh the local representative uh republicanism of 1820s to 1860, you have the national representative that was still pretty local from 1860 to like to the to world war one, and then you have the beginning of an administrative republic that still got mass politics all over it. I mean, I would agree with you on that, uh, from World War I until the end of the of what we might call the post-war consensus, and then you had the like uh political democracy administrative state of 1965 forward, and then you've had crisis since the late 80s, so you have crisis justifications.

Joseph Sciortino: 18:05

I think there's something to that, yeah. Um, when I walk off of mirror, it's mostly about the European political parties, but I do think there's sort of a rough like, you know, you could see, you know, the you could see the elite cadre parties, that's of the pre-mass political period. Uh then there's the rise of a mass party. That's the so the social democratic parties of and the labor parties of late 19th to the early 20th century are really the prototypes of that. But also even like confessional parties. Confessional parties are another example of that. So that that the mass political party, yeah, that that lasts really up until about World War II. And eventually uh there's a but I think there's a process that happens afterwards where they the parties become catch-all parties. Uh they they start uh moving away from like their traditional bases towards like trying to catch like other uh broad sections of this of society in the rest of the electorate. Here's the thing though, I think the left tends to think that neoliberal that what happens is that you know parties fatally declined in the 70s and 80s due to neoliberalism. That actually isn't even what Mare argues. And they tend to read that into Mirror. Mare says that the decline really starts after World War II, right? You know, and it does, you know. Um because you already see the parties moving away from explicit socialism or trying to catch or on the center left trying to catch middle class voters, because that sharp so social antagonism, that that class war aspect is already that's already starting to decline. You know, it declines like immediately after World War II. And yeah, yeah. Yeah, so the parties have to adapt to that. And then eventually the uh the parties gradually cartelize. And after the 1980s, you have a cartel, you have like a cartel party system where the parties are they're they're pretty hollowed out, uh, they're pretty ideologically identical. They're all chasing general, they're all chasing the general public. And uh, of course, I think I think we're actually moving into a post-cartel period now because again, populists have wiped out the old post-war political establishment to a large degree.

C. Derick Varn: 20:06

Do you think that's true for the Democrats and Labor? I'm not sure.

Joseph Sciortino: 20:10

It's a very different beast, I think. I mean, the thing about like I think the thing about the US parties that they were always kind of catch-all.

C. Derick Varn: 20:16

Yeah, they they seem to have always been catch all parties. Yeah, with a brief period of mass political ideology, like yeah.

Joseph Sciortino: 20:24

Well, they had a they had ties to society, right? For sure. Um, but it is a different system. It it's it's it's weird compared to Europe. But like I do think that broadly, though, I mean, yeah, they they are kind of they are kind of cartels, though. I I'd have to, you know, I want to formulate more of my thinking on this, and you know, and that's still a bit of a work in progress, but uh yeah, I think the thing is too is that uh Also, these populist political interpreters, they can take over the parties theoretically. Obviously, Trump already did that. Right. You know, uh, and he has it's a different Republican Party than it was 10 years ago, completely.

C. Derick Varn: 20:59

Absolutely. Uh like you think about the rise and fall of Paul Ryan. Like, yeah, like, you know, uh a guy who seems to be consolidating the kind of Bush fusionist libertarian wing. And as soon as he comes to power, that's already over.

Joseph Sciortino: 21:15

And uh Mark Arubia has basically been body snatched by Trump. Right. Or at least Trump isn't. I don't know what's gonna happen with Venezuela, but you know, uh that's another thing, though. Uh, Trump isn't well, I could get to that at some other point.

C. Derick Varn: 21:28

But um I think I'd like to talk to you about Trumpism because you seem to think that his anti-political uh impetus is almost gone, but uh it's heavily eroded, I think.

Joseph Sciortino: 21:40

Um but uh yeah, I I do think we have a uh what what was the point that we were getting at actually with this?

C. Derick Varn: 21:48

We were talking about the the the kind of strange way the left relates to politics and anti-politics.

Joseph Sciortino: 21:53

Like yeah, yeah. Well, I think the thing is too is that uh what was representative democracy? It was this idea that uh the social groups would they would enter the political arena with political parties that were supposed to uh that were supposed to represent that were supposed to fight for them, basically. They were supposed to, you know, sort of force their interests on parliament or the legislature, etc. etc. They were less concerned about governing. It's not that they were against governing necessarily, but they were mostly about representing, making noise. And uh what's happened, of course, you know, ever since then, because that's a product of the mass political era, really, is that uh the parties become entirely about governing. You know, they become uh you know, the the parties become very much about the state. They they rely on the state more, uh the parties are more centralized around uh around political offices rather than grassroots activists or or the the mass social ties that they once had, especially. And uh I think what's happened with uh I think what we see with I think these uh these entrepreneurial like these entrepreneurial moves by the populist left is I think they think that you can build a movement out of office. That is not what that that's not how the people thought, or that's not how the socialists approached this in the past, I don't think. I think it's it's sort of an aversion. I the move I think the thing is that the movement had already existed. And office was more of a they they treated office as a way to sort of make noise or discipline the par or discipline the uh the rest of the political system around it.

C. Derick Varn: 23:39

Right, yeah. I mean, they were you know, particularly the the social democratic parties, um in theory, anyway. Now in practice, this is not so much true, but in theory anyway, they were interested in more opposing what other forces could do. They were upstent, they were they were oppositionists and even abstentionists and negationists at at times. Yeah, and it sounds anti-political, doesn't it? Right. And like you you try to get socialists to do that today, and like, oh, we need Medicare for all.

Joseph Sciortino: 24:10

And I'm like, Yeah, I'm like uh what I should be opposition if they about stop I think I think that's one of the I think the problem is not the historical. I think the problem is we can actually believers in government. And that's you're not that that's a very hard thing to sell working class voters on, actually, because they're actually quite skeptical of government. They're not that doesn't mean that they're Reaganite, but they're not I I think that they think that there's limits on what politics can actually deliver for them.

C. Derick Varn: 24:46

I I feel like they know that. I mean, yeah, they did. I mean, this is one of the things that I keep on pointing out when you have someone like Chomsky who oh no this Chomsky's a little bit controversial to mention today, but uh Mr. Manufacturing Consent hanging out with Steve Manon and being all up in the Epstein files. Uh not up in the Epstein styles and anything on toward, but in a way you would not have expected, even knowing that he had relations to Epstein, which I've known since 2020. Um but anyway, back to Chom Like Chomsky, who always you know seems anti-political, anti-establishment, goes through all the problems of the American Empire, etc. etc., but then can never because he's so invested in one end of the political spectrum, can never say, like, we should truly be abstentionist or we should truly not engage in uh policies because you don't control the policies once they're implemented. You you know, you can't make make sure they're done with fidelity. I mean, just look at what happened to both the Great Society and the New Deal. You you don't actually that's not actually political power just to elect someone, have them implement a policy, and then let the administrative state, often under other parties who are ideologically opposed to you, uh administer that policy later on. Um, and yet there are a lot of uh people in the center left of American politics and in the left of American politics, and maybe not socialist, who are fundamentally against like abolishing anything or changing anything. Um, you know, you you have people like Matt uh uh um Matthew Glacius and other people being like, oh, we can't even abolish ice. And by abolish ice, they don't mean get rid of border control, they actually just mean move it back to the to the alcohol, tobacco, and firearms. Um uh and maybe like putting D uh putting uh Department of Homeland Security back in um general policing terms, that's all they mean. But you know, it they're like, oh, it sounds too much like abolish the police. And and to be fair to politicians, um, I think the general public is also kind of incoherent on this stuff. Um, I don't think it's just left-wingers who are incoherent on this stuff. I mean, like, if you ask people how they feel about police, most people don't like them. But if you ask you, you say we're gonna get rid of all policing in your neighborhood, uh, I think your responses are gonna be pretty damn varied. Uh right.

Joseph Sciortino: 27:32

I mean, there is ambivalence. I I think the the key is that uh people want policing, they don't want unaccountable policing. Right. I I the thing is too, I mean, I don't mean doesn't Marx talk in like the in the Paris comment about uh the police like having their political attributes removed and becoming instantly recallable? Yeah, I don't see a lot of talk about that actually. Like that that actually that actually would make more sense as a reform to push. Like recarable policing, it makes sense.

C. Derick Varn: 28:02

Recarable policing and also universal service and and militias, which would which would be there would be a militia, there would be a militia-like police force. You know, that's another thing that comes up. Actually, classical anarchists believed in that too. They weren't gonna like have ever all the police be social workers, they were going to have everybody basically be the police.

Joseph Sciortino: 28:25

So um, um, of course, you know, that can go in other directions too.

C. Derick Varn: 28:29

But absolutely, um, I mean, you know, there's an ambivalence here, like, for example, um, historically speaking, the left also supports universal conscription, um, and not just the socialist left. And the reason why they do that is it supposedly makes wars less likely. And there's some evidence for it, there's also some evidence against it. Um stop World War I did. No, it did not, yeah. Um uh, you know, and if you go back to historical left liberal and even you know early Lenin's position, uh Mao opposed it, but Lenin actually says it in State and Revolution. Uh, there should not be a standing army in a socialist state. Like, and for those of you who don't mean that doesn't mean that there aren't people who can fight and get military training. What that means is there's no army that's professional and separate from society. Um, this is dropped with Mao, but uh you know that that was also, by the way, argued by liberals in this in the 17th century that there should not be a standing army.

Joseph Sciortino: 29:42

Um it wasn't interesting ideas, didn't they? Or they had some interesting critiques. Yeah, they did. Well, there was something I was gonna say on this. Um, I guess the thing is that uh it's almost a non-starter, isn't it? Really? Yeah, well, I think too, like it even like I think it gets at a change relationship. It gets at the changed relationship of society to the state anyway, really, in a way that I think might be irrevocable, or very hard to revoke anyway. You know, like how easy is it gonna be to how can you get the this public invested into a you know a conscription right now? I I guess they're trying they're trying to do it in Europe, yeah, but and it's not gonna it's not gonna help people you know feel more invested in the state over there. Quite the opposite, I think.

C. Derick Varn: 30:38

Uh well, this is one of the things I think where Americans tend to be American-centric and they don't realize that a lot of the problems we have actually exist in Europe, and in some cases have existed in Europe for longer. Um you know right-wing populism and as a response to left populism, left populism. I mean, my argument against a lot of people is like, oh, we just keep trying the left populist game, but I'm like, I can't find a place on earth where it's actually worked, and I don't mean that like like no, they never win. No, they win all the time, and then they immediately get voted out because they cannot do um, they cannot, you cannot maintain both an anti- and pro-state position in power. Like you can't do it.

Joseph Sciortino: 31:32

I think the only person who I recently has is or the only outfit that has is Morena in in Mexico. But I think a lot of that is because they actually do things that would be that would be poison to leftists in the United States. Nobody likes to talk about that, but it it is true. I mean I I think well, you know a lot of it. I mean you could elaborate on that.

C. Derick Varn: 31:55

Well, I mean, they'll make coalitions with with uh like the pawn, uh, which is the the party theoretically to the right of of the pre. And they do things in civil society while also building up state capacity, but they they are able to say, Hey, we're not the party uh of the revolution institution out, which by the way used to be a member of the socialist international and used to be considered a left-wing party, it's been neoliberal for why it's in the 70s, but like um, nonetheless. Um, they also have to do things like manage the cartel system, they don't read uh there's no including the pre, there's no party that either lets the cartels really rule, um, because that would be a disaster for them, but they are kind of there is some truth to the idea that they're almost parastate actors in some ways, that they do have a relation to the state, um, and even functions in Mexican governance that I think Americans just can't wrap their minds around. And uh and and and and Morena actually opposes that to some degree, uh, although can't do it completely because you know it would it would uh well I mean it would be really nasty if she did.

Joseph Sciortino: 33:18

Um also like you know, he I think also I think that they like they they helped cut the bureaucracy and and defunded NGOs. Actually, a lot of a lot of the activists left in Mexico hates Marina to some extent, right? Right.

C. Derick Varn: 33:33

Um I mean the people who oppose her are like right-wing boomers and and like a lot of the NGOs and stuff because that because and I think rightfully so NGOs are weird public-private entities that like there's very little control of and are dominated by financial interests, which is true, like structurally, it's true. Like, um, an American activist will talk about the the the NGO industrial complex, but then like the DSA is technically an NGO, right?

Joseph Sciortino: 34:08

I mean, I mean how how many work in other NGOs too? You have to wonder. It is New York, right? I I mean, yeah. Honestly, that's actually the secret reason like why DSA has so much pull in New York in a lot of ways, because it is kind of a political class citadel in a lot of ways, because we have the financial industry, you have media, you have publishing, you have uh you have nonprofits, those are big in New York as well. And of course, you have like government and international institutions in in New York City as well, and a pretty powerful public sector union or public sector, you know.

C. Derick Varn: 34:44

Yeah, you have public sector unions still at the table in government, effectively, as opposed to in other places where they actually have a hostile position towards government.

Joseph Sciortino: 34:52

Um right. But I guess the thing is though, is that like the the the that is sort of like the contradiction, though. Like you want socialism, but you're also the sort of sort of it's also like uh how do I put it actually? There is a contradiction in wanting socialism, but also being uh I guess all your fast interest being tied up in the political state, right?

C. Derick Varn: 35:19

I will, I mean it's one thing that the PMC debates tried to get to, but I don't think they could because their notion of what professional managerial was was too vague.

Joseph Sciortino: 35:32

No, I think it basically was anyone with a college degree, but right. I mean, I think the problem is that like a lacks of critique of politics to get closer to that, really. You know, and I think that I think the curl of truth to it is that if you're if you're highly educated, uh you're more likely to view the world, and your profession is more likely to sort of guide you into viewing the world ideologically, or you have to treat the world ideologically. You know, uh if you're a lawyer, you know, that's a good example.

C. Derick Varn: 36:04

Yeah. Um and I also think that's true on the on the right for the petite bourgeois because because taxes and and state policy disproportionately hit them. Um whereas the working class, I mean, for example, yeah, a lot of people in the working class would do the following. They're gonna vote who whoever they think is disruptive because they don't think their life is gonna fundamentally change. If you ask them, like the right way I brought up Chomsky, and I dropped it, but I'll bring it back to it. If you ask them what policies they prefer, they will give you what would be considered relatively progressive answers, even on things people like, oh yeah, but only on like economic policy. No, even on social policy a lot of the time. But they don't believe anyone's gonna actually do that. And frankly, as I've said many times, they're not wrong. There isn't a track record of that stuff being delivered, like, even when politicians sincerely tried to do it, like back in the 60s, it wasn't delivered, and they have it, you know, you're almost out of living memory for when people were actually trying to do these things at anything above a municipal level. I guess you have some of this weirdly in California, although you do have this weird phenomenon where like the DSA, even though it's really big and it's really big in LA, is really underrepresented underrepresented in the Bay Area and uh and isn't really that strong in California for all of like California's lefty credentials. Um uh political podcasts don't do as well there, but left-wing political podcasts don't do as well there. That hub is definitely New York and then maybe Chicago. Um, I can just tell you from my own numbers. Um uh the that in so much that there is a strong uh DSA, it tends to be people downstream of the entertainment industry, not the tech industry. Um it's it's very very interesting. And when a lot of these people from California talk about politics, you know where they're talking about New York. You know, and it it does reflect that whole culture mover post-60s thing. Um, that that like you know, everybody's battling between New York and California as who's the cultural dominant thing, and yet it leads to these weird paradoxes, like um, a lot of progressives in another place, barring Brad Lander's relationship to to liberal Zionism, would be totally happy with a Brad Lander. But because of the dominance of the DSA and the DSA want to assert itself as its own political force and cadre system, um, it comes direct smack in conflict with them because that's also where they're at. They're in the same places as standard progressives and and moderate democrats who had you know their constituencies vote for them for long periods of time. And I find it very interesting. I mean, it's it's one of the paradoxes of American anti-political thought is like we're anti-political except for a local government, which sort of makes sense because that's the government where you are most likely to have actual knowledge and ties and actual effects. But um, even that's wearing down.

Joseph Sciortino: 39:47

Well, the thing is too like public there isn't a whole lot of participation in local governance either, really. I mean, no, none. Yeah, I I mean, and I mean I think that even gets to a sense of that gets to actually like how weak the parties are, too, even because I mean it wasn't always quite that attenuated. Um but like with New York City, though, I mean, New York City historically has very low turnout in its elections. I mean, I I I'm not even sure if what was the turnout for this one? Did it did it actually hit 50%? Because that would actually be unprecedented in that. No, it hit 40. Oh, the turnout is 43 percent.

C. Derick Varn: 40:21

Yeah, 43, which is big for that. It's way bigger than 10. Yeah, no, and it's it's big for New York City, but uh yeah, I mean, yeah, and 29 voted in the primaries. That and that was it.

Joseph Sciortino: 40:36

Yeah. And it's big, but like um for now. But compared to 75 years ago, not really.

C. Derick Varn: 40:45

No, I mean can't can't. You like one, I think there's been a lot of presumptions that uh high turnouts favor the Democrats. I think that that used to be true, but it's probably isn't as true as it used to be.

Joseph Sciortino: 40:58

No, I think the uh there's been enough class depolarization that that isn't true anymore. Right. Um I mean Europe as well, of course.

C. Derick Varn: 41:07

Oh, yeah. I mean, I I talk about I mean whether or not we consider um uh the the UK Europe, but I mean like like Corbin was the first election that you saw American-style voting demographic pattern. So you saw poorer people from richer cities vote for Corbin, but working class people in poorer areas voted for Tories. Um, and that started with Corbin, it has not really changed. Um there's a bunch of reasons for it.

Joseph Sciortino: 41:45

Um, it was yeah, and there was a trend that way for decades. Brexit really was a big accelerant of it. Uh, and actually, like the red wall fall, you know, well, it's called like the red wall in Britain. That that, you know, like it's old like mining and industrial constituencies that voted labor since time immemorial. That completely collapses with Brexit. Yeah. And Corbin never really got it, he never angled Brexit. And I don't know if he ever could have really. I I do think it was a that that was a hell of a difficult thing for him, actually, because if he embraced Brexit, it would have killed him on the left, probably. Right. Um but to embrace remain remainderism, which is what he basically had to by 2018-2019, he had to cut off labor's old base, which presumably you would think, you know, a sort of left populist revival project would find would have problems with. But uh at the same time, like how populist was Corbinism really? Was it really uh, you know, uh I I don't know. Like it it can I I guess the thing is, yeah.

C. Derick Varn: 43:00

Sorry, go on. Well, I mean, Corbinism's hard for me. I we're gonna say this as people who are not in the UK, but and Corbinism is, you know, I've always heard that we underestimated it. Uh like you and I even talked about this and during the I think the 2019 uh lost that Corbin had. Um but I have pointed out to people that Corbin on his own in this uh our party scenario has not proven to be particularly effective, particularly populist, or particularly coherent, or particularly popular. Um the space, yeah. Despite the fact that uh you you're seeing the labor party run itself into the ground like faster than predicted. I mean, it actually makes Biden's handling of 2020 to 2024 look kind of competent. Um, you know, Starmer's Labor Party has been uh often pulling to the right of the Tories and also doing stuff that's deliberately unpopular. Uh I guess to try to secure some kind of admin. I I don't really know what they're thinking, honestly. I don't think they know what they're thinking either, honestly. Uh I mean, you know, they're you they're getting rid of things like jury trials. So uh I just don't understand what's going on over there.

Joseph Sciortino: 44:33

Yeah, uh I I there there's uh I wondered about that actually. Like I I it's something I've wanted to unpack more or like think about more, but I do wonder like if you're seeing the political class tending to try to insulate itself more or the state trying to insulate itself more from public accountability. I mean that that's what it that's always been a trend, but I do think we're we might be seeing an acceleration of that a little bit now, right?

C. Derick Varn: 44:53

The anti-democratic democracy proponents, like there are also people who talk about democracy all the time.

Joseph Sciortino: 45:00

And the thing is, I do think I do think actually populists getting into power have had some role in that as well.

C. Derick Varn: 45:07

I mean, that's one thing we can say is that actually really hasn't happened, and I mean you could argue that Brexit was populist, but there has not been a populist prime minister of of the UK.

Joseph Sciortino: 45:18

No, and even Johnson wasn't. I mean, the thing about Johnson is he ran his whole thing was basically I'm gonna deliver Brexit because nobody else is, and I'm going to save the party to do it. And I'm gonna purge you know everybody in the party that doesn't, you know, that doesn't go along with it. And it worked because it paralyzed the British political system for years. Um, but he wasn't really a populist. Um Ferage might be the first one.

C. Derick Varn: 45:45

And he might be the you know, he might be the the the first far-right prime minister of the UK. I mean, uh I I for one don't see don't see how Macron. I mean, unless Melishon does better than he's seems to have been doing. I know I have some true believers in France on Bao, but I just like no they don't pull well right now.

Joseph Sciortino: 46:10

No, they they pull terribly, yeah. They pull like 50 points behind Bardella. Right. I I'm not joking, like it's it's bad.

C. Derick Varn: 46:17

I mean they actually made the the their last round to power where they seem to not be able to consolidate. Uh they made at one point I think Holland was pulling as high as Melchon, and I was like, oh my god, like you're missing the old socialist. Um, but you know, I I know a lot. The the one thing I'll tell you is even in France, I know a lot of true believers in France unbouded um who come and talk to me and make these like wild predictions about how they're going to like you know limit the presidency and rewrite the republic. And I'm just like, but while you're an order of magnitude larger than the DSA, I mean they're like almost 100% larger uh in a smaller country, but you're you're still not popular properly speaking. Like it does seem like even though um uh Le Pen can't sit in power, that uh the National Front's gonna eventually come to power if if Macron cracks, and the only way Macron's not cracking is the government becoming less and less democratic. Like I don't see a Rayware on that right now.

Joseph Sciortino: 47:35

Yeah, it it's hard for me to first see, too. Um I guess so the only thing is um like I mean political interpreters always emerge out of the out of the blue. That's yeah, so who knows? I mean, that's even the case with like you know, with reform in the UK with Farage. I mean, like he could I mean you know something could crack there, who knows? Because none of these parties are really solid, they're just taking advantage of the situation.

C. Derick Varn: 47:59

Absolutely. No, they they don't have I don't have a solid base.

Joseph Sciortino: 48:03

I mean right. I mean that's the thing about representative democracy that I was talking about before. Like these parties, they would uh they would lose that because of events coming up, but they would always bounce back in that period, usually, uh unless there was a unless there was a a takeover, like Hitler, you know. But um but like in the post-war period though, like I mean, yeah, a part yeah, parties would get shit canned that they'd come back because they had a they still had some base in society. There's still a solidity to the political system there. That's gone. Because the parties we they're not representative except of themselves, and that's how you have political democracy now. Now we have we have politics that is increasingly self-referential, right? Like these these parties, they're for themselves, and even like these entrepreneurial vehicles, they tend to be highly centralized.

C. Derick Varn: 48:53

I mean, I guess this leads us, leads me to a a couple of questions. Like, um, you know, there's a lot of people, there are even some DSA people who are who are pretty realistic about the best Mamdani is going to be able to be, is a slightly more progressive de Blasio. And Blasio was not that was pretty progressive, I mean, uh on the spectrum of of American politics, even compared to someone like Brandon Johnson in Chicago, who's unpopular. But but progressives have a terrible historical track record of running cities because they run straight into the bond market, like over and over and over again. Um, you know, and when people will talk about sewer socialists, I'm like, well, yeah, but that's before the modern bond market really was how cities really funded themselves. That's back when they more funded themselves through taxation, which they don't want to do now.

Joseph Sciortino: 49:50

Uh and yeah, you know, that's not gonna get better either. I mean, like, how I mean how many cities have pension bombs right now? I'm sure near the city does, right? Exactly. Yeah, like like everybody every government needs to like deficit finance itself now. Um that's a problem. That's what I think even for like national politics. I mean, this is way off topic, but I wondered, like, you know, the uh the COVID response has really constrained ec uh governments in terms of responding to recessions now. Oh yeah, I mean, what are they gonna do? Um there's a recession, I don't know. I mean, like they can they can cut rates, bring inflation back.

C. Derick Varn: 50:33

Yeah, but that won't really work if there's high tariff. Yeah, that's it. Like, um, and if you get rid of the tariffs, I mean, plus, there's all kinds of other problems. Like, we're very low at we're very low job growth, but that actually means that things are worse than people realize because baby boomers and even older Gen Xers are ex are exiting the job market now. So, and those are big, you know, Gen X is not a big generation, but baby boomers are, and we are declining in population. So, you know, if if job numbers are bad, it means they're probably would have been way worse in you know 20 years ago. Um uh and there does in the United States we seem to be basing everything off the gambit that will basically create electronic god with very little evidence that we're doing so.

Joseph Sciortino: 51:30

So Right. I mean, AI was basically a gambit to avoid a recession, right? Um and now it's a super bubble. Yeah, and it's all because you know nobody wants to everyone's afraid of like the bond dropping out, really. Um, and the problem too though is now like, I mean, what are you gonna do if there is a recession? You can't really how much how much more stimulus can you do before your debt isn't serviceable at this point?

C. Derick Varn: 51:54

You that's what people don't realize. And people are like, oh, you you don't, you know, modern monetary theorists, they're right. The state can't run out of money, but you know what it can do? Uh not be able to purchase things in other countries because it doesn't because people don't want your currency anymore. And if you can't pay your debts, they don't want your currency. I mean, really, it really is kind of that simple, right? I mean, I guess both states are on the city. We are now but when people are like, oh, you know, let we we need to raise taxes on the rich, and I was like, for what to pay money back to the rich, and like, what do you mean? I'm like, the largest portion of the budget now is servicing the federal debt. I know I sound like uh conservative, but it's true. If you if you are taxing the rich and most of it is going towards the federal servicing the federal debt, it's going back to the rich because those are the those are the primary people who own bonds. Like I I don't know how else you don't buy bonds. I don't buy like when's the last time you and I have bought bonds. I'm probably have some in my 401k holdings, which isn't you know, my 401k is aren't amazing, but like yeah, I might have one of my pension. I don't know, maybe. Yeah, but but uh you know, like my grandparents gave me bonds for gifts, like um, you know, uh short-term investment bonds and stuff, some of which they had kept like since the 60s, and people don't do that anymore. Like, that is not something that the average working class person would even conceive of doing, much less do. And I and I say that my grandparents, because my grand my grandfather was a brick maker, like you know, it's we live in a completely different economy than that. Um, yes, it's true that the stock market, like, I mean, the stock market really does have us all in hostage because so much of our bonds and municipal funds and all that are tied up in it that we really would be hurt by it. But none of us are actually investors. Uh, I mean, like, not none of us, but like even most investors who own private stocks do not make enough of their living to be considered investors, they aren't making that as their primary form of uh uh of of self-success sustainingness. So it's it's a weird, like it's almost like a hostage situation. Um, and what I see coming out of both the Democrats and the Republicans is ways to further tie people into the stock market with like stock-supported um savings accounts and shit.

Joseph Sciortino: 54:39

I mean they should have ideas, yeah. Um it's interesting too, because like I remember looking at uh there was a uh I I think some uh I think a GLP poster put it up, but like it was about uh the economy. It was about like how they how voters want the economy to be run, and it's very self-contradictory. You know, they they they want inflation, they want prices to basically drop to what they used to be, right?

C. Derick Varn: 55:08

And uh there's a but they want high wages, yeah. They want high wages, and yeah, and they want local domestic production, like which you can't have all three.

Joseph Sciortino: 55:19

Yeah, no. I think the thing is too is that like politicians have overprised. And they shot their bolt a little too hard. Because they they they they've done a lot of crazy policy in the last 10 years that you know that that or plus 25 even.

C. Derick Varn: 55:34

Can you give me some examples? Because people are might be confused by what you're what you mean here. But well, I mean, look getting back to the debt even.

Joseph Sciortino: 55:41

I mean, like uh a lot of this comes out of yeah, or well what one of the major things that like hmm in terms of debt, really. I get like why we went into debt for counter-cyclical policy after 2008. But the Bush tax feds, for instance, and funding the wars on a credit card. That's a good example. Um yeah.

C. Derick Varn: 56:00

Today we're like almost everything Trump is doing is off the the off chance that tariffs will uh bring in enough revenue. But of course, if tariffs bring in revenue, it means he's not returning domestic production, which he isn't returning domestic production. It's actually like the bottom's actually fallen out of domestic production under him. It's gotten worse because he's busted up all the supply chains. Um, and I do think like like Trump's Trump knows how to stump speech. I mean, uh, we're recording this right after he did one yesterday.

Joseph Sciortino: 56:34

Uh yeah, it's never preaching to the choir, I think.

C. Derick Varn: 56:37

I don't know if anybody's convinced by it, but well, I mean, no, I mean it it seemed preaching to the choir, and it seems like he wants to ensure that MAGA is still his movement once he's gone. And I'm like, that's already out the door, buddy. Well he didn't, yeah.

Joseph Sciortino: 56:50

I mean, he didn't he didn't he didn't whip them into shape basically this year. That that was his, you know. Now, could it be? Uh I don't know, but uh the the problem is that like because he didn't discipline the right, he's become less authoritative. His popularity's been slipping gradually, and I think it's made the right think, oh, we can kind of get away with what we want now, but we also don't have any sense of direction. Like that's sort of finding that the right is in now. We can get away with criticizing Trump, even, but what are we gonna do now? Because they kind of looked at Trump as sort of their lone star, really, because Trump is the first guy since Bush that could get elected.

C. Derick Varn: 57:29

Right. Um, and actually, like Bush won the popular vote the second time. Yeah, so so it's it is it is hard for people to, I think, completely and totally deal with in the sense that um Trump may go down like Bush, where like people like think Bush was hated, but but Bush was pretty popular in 2024, and by 2006, the man like I mean his exit numbers were low by any standard.

Joseph Sciortino: 58:11

Um well thing about Bush, he shut up after he left office. That's also true. You know, people like President said shut up after they leave office. Bush did that, he went away. And imagine if he did it, I think his popularity would, you know, it wouldn't be so good.

C. Derick Varn: 58:28

No, I actually I actually think he his numbers were bad when he actually left. He's been kind of fixed in memory. Um, whereas and similar, I think it's similar with Bill Clinton. Bill Clinton didn't say that much, and as he's talked more the longer he's been out of office, he's you know not loved.

Joseph Sciortino: 58:48

Um I think Hillary's kind of baggage in that sense too, I think. Um, because of a package deal.

C. Derick Varn: 58:55

But I I mean I worry about the I mean for the sake of the Democrats, I don't I mean, I am not a Democratic party booster, but I am sort of like I also don't want like a political movement emerging out of Trump being in charge of anything once once Trump is gone. Um, I don't know what I want, actually. So yeah, I'm like everybody else in that regard. But um uh I I still don't see myself voting for a Democrat next term, but can you imagine if they run Kamala Harris again? Someone who's never been legitimately popular pretty much ever.

Joseph Sciortino: 59:32

I don't think it's gonna be nervous, you know. It might be newisome, but I don't know. Do they have anybody? That's kind of the issue. I don't I guess this gets back to mom donnie, too. Do I see AOC taking up Mam Dani's mantle? I I don't know. I don't think she has a skill. I don't think she has what it takes. She has a weak persona, and she's already she already seems compromised.

C. Derick Varn: 59:52

She's not gonna be, she she was able to seem like Bernie's hand-picked successor for about 30 minutes, but it didn't stick.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:00:05

Well, I think the problem is she treats Bernie like her seeing guy dog, kind of. It doesn't scream presidential to be, you know, like don't like you don't you don't gotta treat the old man as your therapy dog. If you want to be president, you have to do these stumps on your own on your own two feet. And I don't think she can.

C. Derick Varn: 1:00:21

And she's sort of lost the socialist left, uh for reasons that are predictable. What they wanted was never gonna happen.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:00:29

Yeah, yeah. I mean, um they're golems for political powers, so I mean, like, if if she did get up, they would they would jump on the boat regardless. But that being said, yeah, I I I know what you're saying, yeah. They would be fully committed.

C. Derick Varn: 1:00:44

But well, this is the thing, they were like when Talk about the moderate the the moderate socialist left the Jacob magazine left they jumped on Biden's bandwagon too, which which was stunning and looked so craven to outsiders. That's you know to me, that's when like all the anti-political uh visage was gone, and people forget this, but like Bernie endorsed Biden early, and so did AOC. Like they the left was more you know, the the quasi-socialist left was more on the Biden train than uh than Biden really was.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:01:33

I remember after that uh that debate last year. Remember the debate? Yeah. Uh after after you know Biden crapped himself or whatever in front of Trump. Uh you had Bernie and ALC trying to like wring like stuff out of Biden. They're all defending him and like trying to get stuff out of him. And it kind of struck it struck me like what a weak position they actually were in. Like they I think the thing is they they don't know what do you make of that actually? Like that was a weird moment to me because it kind of struck me as oh, they uh they kind of see this as their their one shot at like getting any any kind of power relevance anymore at this point, right?

C. Derick Varn: 1:02:08

Well, I mean that seems to be true, except that you see um Bernie like go on uh Tim Dylan and talk about border policy in a way that like no, he's not exactly agreeing with Trump, but he he he uh said that Biden had too loose of a border policy. And I'm like, Biden's border policy was pretty much Trump won't burda policy. Like, so what's your complaint here? And so it seems like they're trying to do a kind of you know nationalist pincer move, but I don't think it's gonna work. I mean, one thing that really will alienate a lot of their base, and the other thing, like it seems it seems insincere, right?

Joseph Sciortino: 1:02:54

I mean and that's that's death for it for a conviction politician. That's kind of the issue. I mean, even I've seen I actually have seen like some Democrats like make pivots like that in 2025, but again, it kind of same issue, really.

C. Derick Varn: 1:03:07

I mean, does anyone believe like I mean Newsom seems sincere in opposition to Trump or mocking Trump, but if like anyone looks at his actual policies, they're gonna have a hard time coming up with anything but establishment politics for him. And I I like I'm just gonna remind people, these same people used to be Cuomo stands, and I'm not talking about the people who were Cuomo stands in in this last uh Miro election. I mean the people right after COVID who thought that he should run for president.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:03:42

Yeah, I mean, I I would trust the the political instincts of people like that as far as I can throw them. But um as far as Newsom goes, uh I mean I think he's the type of candidate that uh he can appeal to Democrats, right? That's it. But like who's a Democrat anymore? I mean, uh 50% of Americans identify as independent now, right?

C. Derick Varn: 1:04:07

Right, which which which is bad for both sides because um because uh Trump only pulls well amongst Republicans, he does not pull well amongst independents anymore. But believe it or not, and even in even as unpopular he was during his first term, he polled fairly well most of the time amongst certain kinds of independents. Um, you know, I get you know, and to talk about independence, I'm technically an independent, so like you don't know, like that's a big broad category that concludes everyone from the five libertarians to still exist to your weird normie uncle to socialists who refuse to who refuse to register Democrats, the few of us who do. Um, you know, like what are you gonna do?

Joseph Sciortino: 1:04:53

Right. I mean But I mean that that is where 50% of the country is too now. I mean, and uh yeah, as you said, like it does kind of it does cover a lot, it covers a lot of people that I think it even covers a lot of people that I think they they vote one party or another most of the time, but they don't want to be associated with it. Correct. Uh yeah, a lot of people say you're basically a Democrat or you're basically a Republican, but I think I I think it's an important distinction, though, actually, because a lot of politics it really is driven by negative partisanship rather than close attachment at this point.

C. Derick Varn: 1:05:31

Yeah, I I think uh I think that's absolutely true.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:05:36

Yeah, and on both ends, too. I'm not saying that's a Democrat or Republican thing.

C. Derick Varn: 1:05:42

Um so I guess you know if I'm in the DSA and I saw a five uh five thousand uh member increase and I've seen a bump uh and compared to when Trump is in power, and I am in the DSA, so this is actually true. But what happens when the DIMs come back in the power? And I know there's uh the industrial democratic uh but democratic small D defense fund, all those former neoconservatives at the bulwark and whatnot who um do their thing, but uh and they'll talk about Trump being uh you know declaring yourself dictator for life. But even I've been like, the man's so old, what would that even mean? Like, you start your dictatorship for life at 80?

Joseph Sciortino: 1:06:38

Like um, come on, yeah. No, I I don't think Trump is Philip Pitane, no. Um I mean what I think is gonna happen is like you know, he he he might threaten to run a third term just to like try to discipline his Republican successor, whoever the hell that is. It might be Vance, but he doesn't seem very hot on Vance, as you've noticed.

C. Derick Varn: 1:06:58

Um, I don't know who is hot on Vance. So I mean, other than maybe Peter Thiel.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:07:04

But I don't think he I do think he initially had more goodwill among Republican voters.

C. Derick Varn: 1:07:13

But he because they forgot how he started, like yeah, yeah.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:07:18

And he is he he does know how to be aggressive of media, which I think they like. Right. Um I I think that's even like why I was confused why people thought that Tim Waltz would like beat him in a debate. I was like, I I he's actually fairly savvy when it comes to handling media, so I I I didn't buy that for a minute, really. But yeah, I mean it is kind of yeah, no, it is hard to picture him as winning an election. It's not impossible. I mean, consider what his competition is, but yeah, no.

C. Derick Varn: 1:07:54

Well, it's one of these it's one of these times where generic democrat does pretty well, but generic democrats don't exist, they're in abstraction.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:08:03

But right, I I tend to think when polls say generic D or generic R, people picture ideal D ideal R. Right. You know, actual candidates never outpoll them. You know, you need somebody like I don't know. Actually, one thing I always found interesting is that, you know, the Obama comparisons to Mamdani. I'm not saying that there's nothing there, actually, because Obama had his own. I mean, Obama ran against the party.

unknown: 1:08:29

Yeah.

C. Derick Varn: 1:08:30

People forget this. Like he ran pretty hard against the party, actually.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:08:34

He did. And uh, but the thing is too, though, um he won 40% of Republicans in Illinois in 2004. And I think I I'd have to like look, but I'm I'm pretty sure he might have had a 50% approval among national Republicans at some point. Or at least close. I'd have to look at that. Let me look at that again, actually. Let me search it. But let's see.

C. Derick Varn: 1:09:23

But that's that's very high actually in terms of that's very high in a highly polarized electorate, which we've been in since what, the fucking 90s? I mean Right, right.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:09:31

Um Right I I mean Obama started an office with what a 70% approval rating. You know, um it's it's it's difficult to imagine a care a candidate like that now. I I can't imagine one, but it it would be something that's completely out of the box that you're seeing now. Yeah. It has to be something that ran completely against the the against the entire political setup and was very non-ideological. Um I'm personally likable.

C. Derick Varn: 1:10:01

I mean this brings us to like the the a point you've been making for now for about maybe eight years. That um both right and left populist engage in anti-politics, but right wingers are usually better positioned to actually take advantage of it, take advantage of it because they have a clearer negative relationship to the state. Whereas left wingers like I mean, I the the the amount of like far leftists who defend the administrative state is like on one hand, I very much know why people want to defend the administrative state because it is it is deep in everyone's lives, and if it goes away, all sorts of social supports and systems fall away now. That's absolutely true. On the other hand, um, if you were going to imbue a socialist project, you would have to tackle that, and if you didn't, you would likely end up like the I don't know the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Like or a sort of soft Soviet system, right? Like, you know, the apparatus will be running everything, and they don't necessarily share your politics, which by the way, trying to control the apparatus in the Soviet system and in the Chinese system were violent. They like because because they had no other control of them, the only the only way that they had to control the apparatus was fear, and when that fear went away, you know, I'm not saying I actually don't think it's good to try to control even apparatus through pure fear, it's a bad idea, but that's like that's what the purges were about to some degree. Um, and that was definitely what the cultural revolution was about.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:11:55

Yeah, definitely. I think that's forgotten about too, actually, with the purges. I think it's very personalized with Stalin, and it really in all reality, it's it sounds perverse, but it was like a uh it was an anti-bureaucracy move, right? Um, one that killed, you know, how many people?

C. Derick Varn: 1:12:13

A million, two million, yeah, a bunch, uh, a lot, and and got rid of like most of the old Bolsheviks, like almost all of them, like and many, many people who were innocent. There's no way around that. Um, so you know, even if even if you believed in their goal, they got a lot of people who weren't guilty. Um, but my point is like if you don't have other ways to tackle the apparatus, uh, that happens. It you know, it's not like that that's the only place that's ever happened before. You think about apparatus getting out of line in tributary empires, like uh like in the caliphates, when that gets out of hand, there's usually massacres. And you know, um are you think about the gutting of the state under and the restrengthening of it under Henry VIII. Um, you know, I'm not saying this is transhistorical by any sense, but it's not unique, and so you do have to deal with that. Um uh and one of the ironies that you do have to deal with is like an executive or a king or whoever can be seen as both a very anti-democratic and a very pro-democratic figure at the same time. Because while it is actually just logically true that the legislature is a better manifestation of democracy in a representative sense, um, it's also easier for the legislature to have all kinds of oligarchic and elite capture in it. Uh, whereas you have a strong central power that you it can seem like it's manifesting the will of the people against a bureaucratic center. I mean, that's and again, that's not a modern phenomenon. We can look at the at the early modern and medieval periods for very clear examples of this. Um, and I I think one of the things that we have to think about is like, well, like, how do you do how do you run politics this way? Like, if I want to do class politics in America, which would necessarily be a mass politics, uh um, I would one have to deal with the fragmentation of the working class in general and its own fragmentation, which is pretty significant, and two, um, I'm gonna have to deal with the fact that most of the people who want to do that class politics aren't of that class. That's always been true. That's not a new thing, by the way. That's kind of always been true. Um, the people most interested in working class politics have historically not been uh the people from the working class itself for the most part. There are exceptions, uh, the the Debsian uh period being one of them. But like in general, it's just you know, the anarchists play, oh, the socialists are all of a different class, and the people who complain about the PMC or PMC. And I'm like, Yeah, that's true, but it's kind of always been true. Um and I mean that's also gonna be true for for you know a lot of socialists today, like um well, I think too, like uh I mean it becomes a question of like why why is there that that level of detachment really?

Joseph Sciortino: 1:15:31

Uh why was why was the working class amenable to this in the 19th to early 20th century, but is closed off to it now? What is actually that's a good question. What do you think is the reason? Well, what's happening I guess the thing is what happened in that period? Well, the fall of the Soviet Union, I mean between between what the uh let's say between like 1900 to 1990.

C. Derick Varn: 1:15:59

The okay, fall of the Soviet Union, the establishment of the Soviet Union, um the uh national liberation movements, but most of them ended up still implicated in global capitalism, reform movements became more and more neoliberalized, the union movement became more professionalized and state and eventually more or less reduced itself. There is a workers' movement, but it now has no clear. I mean, I would even say today people will come up, well, there is a workers' movement. I'm like, well, if it had if there's a workers' movement, it's constipated because it actually cannot be manifested in the unions right now and be mass because the unions do not have mass membership.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:16:40

Like they don't have no yeah, yeah. I I think too, like um actually, well, maybe I should narrow it down too. Because I actually think I wonder if I think it's there's there's something it's something I'm even I'm trying to like fully unpack right now for uh for rabble report. But um what even happens between 1900 and 1950? We see the smashing of the most radical workers' movements, right? Mm-hmm. Uh what do they get smashed on? They get smashed on they get smashed in the Russian Civil War, they get smashed on fascism, and uh the remnants of them kind of get vacuumed up into fighting World War II. And I I think what happens is you see this exhaustion, I think, where the working class kind of is like, okay, fine, we'll we'll sign into a well, maybe the state will give us something. And you kind of you see this sort of like retreat from high levels of class conflict, because it isn't worth it, I don't think. It isn't you know, it isn't seen as worth it anymore. Because and I think it's because of like the limitations and embodiment uh and embodiment and representation that they were dealing with at that point, really. Um I I do think it could have gone a different way in some ways if the revolution in in Germany succeeded or in Italy, but that isn't what happened. What did happen is that uh I think what did happen is that mass politics was actually quite a disaster for the working class. And they I they never really quite recovered their organizational capacity or their uh or their or even like I think their uh or even I think that a sense of like uh of I think both mass politics and also like uh and civil, I think even like the civil association of of trade unions as the as of their vehicle, as of their own autonomous vehicle for their own power, and to and that and that you could pursue that to an end where they control things. It got messy.

C. Derick Varn: 1:18:53

It got real messy because you had professional union payment, you had unions in the 70s, people union leaders being paid in stock. You had um you you had the fact that sectional interest of of unions could sometimes actually hurt other sections of the working class. Um, and that was never, you know, supposedly that was supposed to be dealt with in the socialist movement, but it never really was.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:19:19

Um it's interesting too. I was thinking about this, but the German Revolution, I mean, uh the German Revolution actually came out of the rank and file and middle and middle rankings of the German trade unions. It didn't come out of the top. Um politicians either. Yeah, that's true. But the revolutionary shop's words, right? I mean, I I think that says something actually about like uh I think there was already, I mean, even though it was a mass party, uh, there was already a I think a sense or there was already a sort of movement towards cardinalization with the state by 1940, by by by by World War I, really. A sense that like uh there was already a that early inkling of uh the socialist parties becoming state parties.

C. Derick Varn: 1:20:09

I mean, even today, if you talk to the average socialist, the idea that socialists oppose and even in the long term, you know, uh working class dependence on the state would you'd be laughed at by a lot of people, like a lot of you know, I mean, particularly even Maoists who historically were the most hostile to the state, um, you know, of the various socialist groups in some ways, uh that today you just wouldn't you wouldn't get that anymore. Um, so it's it seems like a lot of you know, a lot of this is is uh Kind of unserious. I was gonna ask you about the most controversial thing that you and I kind of agree on, which is that for all that socialism is based on pro-social impulses, the the irony right now is most a lot of the people attracted to it show the same kind of antisocial tendencies that you see on the far right. And I I I wondered why you think that is. Do you agree with me that I'm that that that's true that you see a lot of antisocial tendencies among socialists?

Joseph Sciortino: 1:21:19

Sure. I don't think it's unique to them though. Um I think it's no, not at all. I think there's actually been a radicalization of the political. I use the political class as a term broadly here. Um I think there's been a radicalization of the political class, and I think the highly politically engaged against the public and against society at large, especially in the last 10 years.

C. Derick Varn: 1:21:37

Um and I think it's I do think I actually might I think that might be slightly better, but the antisocial uh tendencies have set in. Like what, but maybe you disagree with me. I do feel like I've seen a lot less of like, oh, you know, the average person is a flipping moron that you saw amongst even a lot of socialists in like 2019. But maybe I'm wrong about that.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:22:02

I think it I think it's always gonna come rearing back, honestly. I I think there's something I think it's kind of baked into politics, really, because I think the issue is uh I think the issue is uh treating social power as something abstracted from your own, really. Uh but so uh actually I I guess we can get into it at some point. Uh I don't know I don't know about tonight, but uh I do I actually do I I I do I I do think that there's sort of been a a sort of maybe a an an unconscious like tactical distance from that type of thing. Sure. And I think even like Mandani's victory is kind of I do think it kind of wrote on that really. It's like I said, he had to sound like he wasn't crazy, which he succeeded at.

C. Derick Varn: 1:22:52

Yeah, he doesn't feel like he wants to punish all of society. Like which a lot of a lot of both socialist and non-socialist leftists often do sound like they just want to punish most of society, right? And I think the right absolutely does, but um, yeah, yeah. So I think a lot of people I mean I hate to tell people, but the right and the left of America is produced by the same fucking society, so we shouldn't be surprised when they have some similar trend. Like uh, but anyway.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:23:23

I I think too, like um what was I gonna say on this? Uh yeah, no, I I I I I don't think there's yeah, there is a uh I I think too though that's related to this as well. I think I think because there has been a move towards, you know, what I call it political democracy, um there's a tendency. I think one of my friends said this actually. There's a tendency within politics to see like your narrow faction of politics as democracy itself, and everything else is sort of an antisocial threat that must be contained, including the public sometimes. I mean, uh I mean I guess the left the I think the left has cooled down on the rhetoric in the last few years on this a bit, but I don't know if the tendency would disappear if they actually got in power.

C. Derick Varn: 1:24:07

Well, I also they've cooled down on the rhetoric, but then if you look at the tendencies that are popular on the left, that they uh tend to be more lockstep, more uh more more sectarian, uh more LARPy, frankly, you know. There's certainly uh play the Soviet Union over and over again, etc. etc.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:24:28

Yeah, I do think there's like a fetishization of like pistolero stuff, too. Right, yeah. But I think it's still there. I I just think it's it's different now, right?

C. Derick Varn: 1:24:39

But I I don't think we you see as many people just like seemingly declaring war on an on all of society all the time, um, even even amongst some of the most uh uh I mean if we if we remember what rhetoric was like during Trump won and even the end of Obama, it was it was you know the average person is somehow worse than fascist, even though there's no poll supporting that they're as as reactionary as they're being portrayed. And you still I think you actually see this more amongst liberals still now, where they're like, oh, the entire world's become right wing, uh, Gen Z has become right wing. And I I was like, Gen Z was never left wing as it was as people were claiming in 2023. But I also think there's been a massive overcorrection because basically Gen Z is a bunch of independents, and like, oh, they're all buying into the manosphere and they're all they're all politically right ring. And I'm like, no, they're kind of apolitical. Um, frankly, I wonder why. You know, yeah. Why do you what obvious bunch of things happened that would like lead them to such a conclusion?

Joseph Sciortino: 1:25:50

Like, yeah, what happened in the last 10 years, Steve? Do you have it? I don't, I don't know, I don't know you're talking about. Um yeah, there is not like lack of self-reflection that's I think intriguing, but um there was something I wanted to say on this. I I think the thing too though is that um I I think the ultimate issue is, and I think this is why like that anti that anti-social tendency will always come rearing back sooner or later, is they don't see society as the wellspring of its own progress. And if you but like what is socialism then, yeah.

C. Derick Varn: 1:26:22

I mean, particularly if you read stuff like uh Engels uh Engels talking to uh Kotsky on like why socialism is not just nationalization, right? Like they're very clear on that. Like, if you don't believe that the society is coming with you, then I don't know what you think right is, other than social goods being provided for you by the state. Right. You know, okay, you you don't need mass democracy for that, really.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:26:51

So no, I mean the Arab country, the Gulf Arab countries can very good at that. Yeah, at least for certain people, yeah, for citizens, I should say. For for citizens, yeah. You uh absolutely, yeah. But um wasn't gonna stand this, but yeah, I I mean it has to be, you know, uh an aspect of it is self-governance, really. And if the and VLC society is like the well spring of its own progress, I mean it's out just anti-democratic. I mean, like there isn't really uh there is no viable path to socialism or human emancipation either, really. And I'm actually really I'm actually not that cynical. I'm like people will say I'm cynical. I I actually am not, but uh but I I do think that this I actually think that this type of thinking invites a type of cynicism. I think it's because there's a sort of misplaced conception of where what Marx called the real movement actually lays it exactly. And I think the left tends to see itself as the social, and it isn't.

C. Derick Varn: 1:27:51

Yeah, the already existing social, even though it's a mu you know, a very small portion of general society.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:27:59

Um right, and I think the thing is is it's I do think that the left tends to think that the real movement disappeared in the 70s or 80s because of neoliberalism, whatever. Yeah, whatever story you want to tell yourself for why, yeah. You know, but I but I tend to think that Marx was probably correct on this, actually, in that like it's it's an intrinsic part of capitalism um and capitalist development. There is still a degree of sort of secular social liberalization. Um and what else was I gonna say on this actually? There's something else. Um I think anti-politics actually is part of it in a uh is actually like is actually part of this real moment. And I think it it always was really, because there is that intrinsic uh separation between the political state and civil society that Marx wrote about very explicitly in his work. And that actually I think is intensified over the last several decades because there has been a mutual retreat of both the political sphere and of civil society from each other. And I I don't know how that doesn't like factor into the real movement, especially now, actually, because there has obviously like sharp class movement has or sharp class uh conflict has declined. So this main expression seems to be it's it seems to be like the first contradiction that Marx fell on, actually. Because in his in his first writings about communism, he's talking about politics. And he's talking about and he's talking about Hegel, and he's talking about you know how the uh how the political state isn't actually like the it isn't the realization of social will. It's actually very wanting in that. You know, and maybe that's sort of where that idea where civil society has kind of circled back to. There's something like even if it's not even if you're not seeing that type of um that type of class conflict there is across society, really, and across class too, actually, this uh this detachment from the political sphere, uh this detachment from the political state. And uh the I guess this realization that's we're all sort of uh we're all separate from our from our social potentiality and our social power.

C. Derick Varn: 1:30:39

Yeah, that makes sense. Well, Joseph, I'm gonna I'm gonna thank you for coming on. I think um I'm gonna have you back soon. And I think what we're gonna do next time is actually maybe maybe you can send me some of those Piping Strike articles and we can talk about them because I think maybe it'll make what we're talking about make a little bit more sense. And you and I have come to similar conclusions, I've said before in the last time you show, but from different outlooks. So maybe us talking about where those outlooks overlap and where they don't with specific text will be helpful for people. What do you think?

Joseph Sciortino: 1:31:09

Yeah, no, I mean I felt like I got Georgine by the end of it anyway. I'm throwing a lot of stuff that I've been thinking about for years, but um but yeah, no, I I I agree. Um I'll I'll send you articles I was looking at.

C. Derick Varn: 1:31:22

Yeah, send me articles, and we'll set up uh we'll set up uh episode in the next couple months, and uh and and uh or probably in the next month. And listeners will hear it in the next uh from when I release this in the next month or two. Thank you so much for coming on. They can find you at the Rabble Report. How much do you guys post? I fear I feel like fairly a lot.

Joseph Sciortino: 1:31:40

Um oh god, actually, no, it's been a couple months. I have a uh I have an eye surgery uh last week. Uh and we've been both really busy at work. I I we have an episode uh that that we're gonna be working on soon. Um it's gonna be a good one, I hope, but uh I just want to make sure it's it's worth the wait. But that's also that's also why I wanted to do this and I jump the gun on it quickly too, because I I realized actually we haven't pumped out content. We've been trying, but you know. You've all been busy.

C. Derick Varn: 1:32:09

Yeah, I understand. Well, people should look up the rabble report and uh follow you guys on um uh you can find it on Spotify and on YouTube. Um, thank you so much for coming on and have a great day.