Special Episode: Chris Low, FHN Financial

Live from DCG’s 39th Annual Conference, Vin and Zach are joined by Chris Low, Chief Economist at FHN Financial. Chris has a long and strong track record forecasting rates, and the three explore an array of topics including: Chris’ latest rate forecast, the magic behind another hike (or two) from the Fed,  soft landing skepticism, and a Mini-Minsky Moment.

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Transcript

[Vinny, 0:00]:

Welcome to On the Balance Sheet Season 2 Special Episode. Today we have FHN Financial Chief Economist Chris Low. And Zach, why don't you give us a very, very impressive resume of Chris.

[Zach, 0:19]:

We're super thrilled and pleased to have Chris here. We're actually at our annual conference, and Chris is the keynote economist tomorrow morning. He's very active in the community banking space. I think most of our listeners will know he's had over 30 years of experience tracking the US and global economies, markets, fiscal policy. He writes daily and weekly updates, and he's been quoted in the press, whether it's Business Week, Bloomberg, The Journal, Fox Business, etc. Bloomberg even has him as one of the most accurate forecasters of Treasury notes of all time. What we're going to talk about today too is going to get into some of his forecasts, which I think are again very widely read and listened to. We've got a number of other questions we have up our sleeve to ask him. But I think the listeners are really going to enjoy hearing Chris's thoughts as we tape this in early June.

[Vinny, 1:05]:

Absolutely, Zach. So, without further ado, Chris Low. Special episode of On the Balance Sheet, we are joined by FHN Chief Economist Chris Low. We're so pleased to be joined, Chris, as he has been on several occasions, will be our speaker tomorrow morning at our annual Balance Sheet Conference, and Chris, thank you so much for joining us today. We are absolutely thrilled. Our listeners are going to love this.

[Chris Low, 1:35]:

It's my pleasure, and you know it's always great to be here. One of the things I love is that you guys are unflappable. I came in last night, had a little bite to eat for dinner, went up, changed all my slides, sent them in, and got a hey thanks, no problem. They'll be ready for you tomorrow. So, I love it.

[Vinny, 1:58]:

Well, yeah. I mean, a couple of weeks ago, the markets thought the Fed was going down 100 basis points by the end of the year. Now they're thinking they're not going anywhere. So yeah, there's so much volatility in the markets. Would you mind speaking to some of that? What is your forecast, particularly with regards to the Federal Reserve, for the end of this year, and then on into 2024?

[Chris Low, 2:17]:

So, my forecast for the Fed, I try to pay attention to what they're saying because, you know, at the end of the day, for whatever reason, they don't call and ask me what I want to do before the meetings. But when you look at the last dot plot, which is getting a little stale, right, because it's from March. But even then, most of them were actually where we are right now. So, there would be no further change in rates at the end of this year. Seven were thinking rates had to go at least a quarter point higher, and it's actually three for a quarter, three for another quarter on top of that. And then one more was thinking 75 basis points. And then there was one who didn't want to hike last time, and presumably that dot disappears when we get fresh ones on June 14th. So I am of the opinion that you also have to weigh who's saying what. And there are clearly some, because they've said so, who say, I don't think rates should go up, but if they do, maybe only one or two times, and that's going to depend on inflation. And then you have others, James Bullard stands out, Loretta Mester stands out, saying probably another couple would be good. Bullard pointing out he thinks we're actually in restrictive policy territory now. But he also thinks inflation's too high. It's not coming down fast enough. It needs to be more restrictive. So, putting all that together, I've got another two hikes by the end of this year. And then even the doves, Raphael Bostic, a great example, saying he thinks once we get to peak rates and decide they don't have to go up, then they need to stay where they are for a long time, well into 2024, he says. And so that's my forecast.

[Vinny, 4:20]:

And thank you so much for sharing that. What is the magic, right, and two more rate increases? You know, and I think in whether they're in July or September, whenever they come, this question is really in the context, I guess, of the idea of long and variable lags. You know, your perspective on that. So, I guess it's really a two-part question. What is the magic in 50 more basis points, being that we're already up 500, and then how long does it actually take for monetary policy to cascade, if you will, through the broader economy, in your opinion.

 [Chris Low, 4:54]:

The operatable word isn't long. It's variable. Variable’s the really important thing, and in that every cycle is different, and we look at where Fed funds is relative to inflation. We look at how big is the output gap and therefore how rapidly should they step on inflation before it gets out of control? And then on top of that, a lot of guesswork, a lot of looking backward, a lot of rearview mirror, Lorie Logan, president of the Dallas Fed, recently said. She actually doesn't want to pause at the June meeting, but she said if we do, we should skip and Chris Waller, one of the Fed Governors, said maybe skipping makes sense too, because if we tighten it every other meeting, we have a little more time to see policy catching up with us. So how did the lags work? Well, they work n all kinds of ways, but one is look at what banks charge for loans. Some types of loans have moved up pretty quickly with Fed funds. Credit card lending, for example. Usually, every cycle lags. This time it's been right up there, and actually average credit card rates have gone up more than the Fed fund rate did. On the other hand, car loans, which historically have moved up pretty quickly, they didn't move up this time, although that might be happening now. So why would the lag vary like that? Well, in this case, a big part of it is that credit unions have become really important in auto lending, and credit unions, unlike banks, their mission is to their constituents, and they can fulfill their mission. You know, they're not pursuing profits, they're actually nonprofit. They can do that by paying more for deposits or they can do that by offering lower lending rates, and most of them decided to offer lower lending rates. Now what I'm hearing as I sit in on ALCO committee meetings at credit unions at banks all across the country is that the average cost of funding at a bank or a credit union is still pretty low. They still have a lot of deposits, a lot of those deposits are in interest-free checking. However, the existing deposits are sort of spoken for by outstanding loans that were made at low rates. They have a marginal cost of funding that has gone up. They're not getting new deposits in. If they want to make more loans, they're borrowing from the Fed. They're borrowing from the home loan bank or they're borrowing from the market, and that's going to be at a rate close to Fed funds. So as a result, we're finally starting to see those sticky loan rates move upward. We've seen, for example, the spread between mortgage rates and Treasury bonds, which tends to be relatively constant. Well, that's gotten wider. We've seen car loan rates come up. And I think one of the things the Fed is worried about, and you ask what's the magic thing about that extra 50 basis points is, it's a guess, it's a guess by the members of the Fed for how much tightening is going to be required. I think Chris Waller is probably smart to say, let's do it slowly. And every tightening I've seen in the 30 years that I've been doing this. It didn't seem to be working until all of a sudden it did, and it worked in a big way. And that's because lenders in the private sector suddenly raise rates to bring them back up into line with where the Fed was going.

[Zach, 8:44]:

Thanks, Chris. That was a great response, and I want to keep down the banking path for a minute. Just because a lot of our listeners are bankers, but before we go there, could you, maybe, delineate a bit more or expand upon a skip verse, a pause, because I think it's a whole cottage industry of parsing the Fed language, and I just feel that that's gonna be a lot more of a of a distinction if they do decide to skip or pause in June, what that might mean going forward.

[Chris Low, 9:11]:

Great question. And in fact, my senior economist this morning, we spoke and she said, you know, I think after this meeting, no one will use skip and pause interchangeably, but right now there's still people saying, well, a pause, pause or a hawkish pause, right? So, the idea is, as Lorie Logan first laid it out, and then, as Chris Waller explained on top of that, there's a lot of unknowns right now and, in particular, we know that there was a huge drop in aggregate bank deposits in March and April because - to put it into perspective, right? Just a handful of banks were lost. Compare that to 2009 when 160 banks were lost, but the assets managed by those banks were 1 1/2 times the assets managed by those 160 banks that were lost in '09. So, this was a big event from that standpoint. It was big enough, certainly, to wake up the Fed, wake up everybody on the Senate Banking Committee about the need to look at regulation again, and so on. So, you would think that every bank, every credit union in the country right now is looking at their balance sheet and specifically looking to see if they're making the same kind of mistakes that those banks that imploded made, and I know many of them are - they're hedging some of their loan risk; they are rethinking loan standards, but we don't have aggregate data that really shows much of that yet. And so, the thinking, as Waller laid it out, was we're gonna have a lot more official information at the July meeting than we have at the June meeting. So, since this is the big thing we're worried about, the big indication that maybe we've gone too far, why don't we just skip a meeting and tighten in July? And of course, that's a skip made with the intention that if it turns out credit's tightening a ton, then they won't tighten it in July. So, a pause would be we're not raising rates and we really don't know when rates will next change, and as Loretta Mester, Cleveland Fed president, said, ideally a pause is one where the next move could equally be a tightening or a cut. They just don't know. Skip on the other hand, there's some language that additional rate hikes probably will be needed or something along those lines to indicate that they're still in a tightening mode.

[Zach, 12:00]: 

Based on your answer to Vin's question before about some of the margins tightening, the deposit base obviously going up a bit faster with what happened in the past year and loans starting to pick up a bit more, you can't go anywhere but talk about how credit standards are tightening or we think they are. You got the Fed, you know, the SLOOS survey; the Senior Loan Officer survey. How do you think they stack that piece in the equation versus inflation versus unemployment, you know, in your opinion, how do you think that plays into this whole kind of inverted yield curve situation we're in, right now?

[Chris Low, 12:29]:

I think as far as that goes. Chris Waller, James Bullard, both have made the point repeatedly that the whole point of tightening is to tighten credit, right? So, what they want to do is they want to look at that bank data and if you look at the SLOOS data, the senior Loan Officer survey, the first indication banks were tightening credit was in the October survey and then there was a further tightening of credit in the January survey. Then April was the first one after Silicon Valley Bank, but the answers were due for that survey in the first week of April. So, it's really only a couple of weeks later. And I think that's why, you know, you look at that data and it doesn't show any acceleration in the pace of credit tightening. It just happens I participated - I gave a presentation to an ALCO committee of a huge West Coast institution about two weeks after Silicon Valley went under and from their questions and from - I got to ask them some questions. It was clear they were going to change their lending standards pretty significantly, but they hadn't done it yet because you don't do that kind of thing without talking it through. You have loan committees. You have ALCO committees. You have a board that sets the tone. And with something as big as that, you want to make sure you do it right. So, it takes time, and I wouldn't be at all surprised to see the next SLOOS survey shows actually a more significant tightening.

[Vinny, 14:08]:

Yeah, we're seeing that kind of first-hand anecdotally, and it does run the gamut in our opening remark, Matt Pieniazek’s opening remarks at our conference today. He did talk about how loan pricing is a topic when you travel to these institutions, it's all over the map, and I thought what's kind of interesting is like you see a curtailment of the extension of credit before we actually have a credit event. I got asked this at lunch today, “What's it going to take for credit in this environment to change?” It's a really interesting sort of paradigm, maybe because it's like if rates go back down, maybe that's better for the credit environment. I'm not sure it's as simple as unemployment rocketing. What scenario could we paint whereby credit becomes a real issue that I think everyone's kind of afraid of, but it just hasn't come to fruition yet?

[Chris Low, 14:56]:

Yeah, I think it probably doesn't in many ways. And what I mean by that is look at household balance sheets right now, they're really healthy, income growth has accelerated, we've had massive job growth. So, not surprising that income growth has picked up. We came out of the pandemic with huge savings thanks to very generous fiscal support. And even though some aspects of household borrowing, for example credit card use, has accelerated quite a bit in the last year, but what it's done is it's accelerated back to the old trend and that's looking at nominal data. Then when you realize, well, you know, we've had pretty significant inflation. Compare that nominal rise in credit card debt to the rise in nominal income, and it's not much at all. And then you look at other aspects of household borrowing and it's slowed down. So, when you look at the total credit burden on households, it's very low and by the same token, corporations is still a little bit more complicated because they have borrowed more. There's been a bigger pickup in corporate debt, but there's also being just astonishing profits growth. So, when you compare their debt burden to their income again, that that service cost has fallen. I think one of the reasons the Feds having trouble gaining traction in this cycle is because usually certainly in in my experience in the last 30, 35 years, by the time the Fed gets around to trying to slow the economy and tighten, there's quite a lot of credit in the economy, we're really reliant on debt. This tightening was very early in the cycle because we had inflation that didn't come from excessive private sector activity. It came from excessive public sector. And so, you know, the people who borrowed too much during the boom. That's the federal government. And now that the debt ceiling's gone up, there's absolutely nothing preventing them from borrowing. They don't particularly care how much it costs.

[Zach, 17:05]:

Chris, one of your former colleagues who we found out last night, Doctor Lacy Hunt was a guest on our podcast. We actually started out the conversation with him and asked him if we were in fact, and wait for it, in Minsky moment and so - I knew we were gonna get a smile out of you. You know, I was reading through one of your more recent releases in mid-May that, had your forecast and I think you actually alluded to the Minsky moment, not saying we're in it by any stretch. I'm just curious, Lacy's opinion was that yes, to a degree, we were in a Minsky moment. Just curious how you would answer that question.

[Chris Low, 17:40]:

It so much depends how you define it. The thing about a Minsky moment, and I think for most people the example that that would really ring a bell is what happened to housing in 08-09 is that you have so much debt outstanding. That sort of the whole system collapses in on itself and for years you have no growth. You have this absolute stagnation. It is supposed to be something that rocks the system to its foundation, and I don't think we have that.  So, my sense is this isn't a true Minsky moment. I think though what's tricky about what the Fed is trying to do is we clearly flooded the economy with way too much liquidity and because the dollar is the global reserve currency, it caused massive inflation, not just here in the US but globally and we bear responsibility for that. Now what the Fed is trying to do, of course, is drain that excess. Is it going to trigger a bigger reaction than they'd like? You know, if you think about it, it's almost certain that it will. Because when we have a soft landing, the absolute ideal scenario it's when the economy's chugging along at bout 2% or so and income is growing at about 2% or so and inflation is chugging along at about 2%, right? So, everything is nice and easy and what the Fed is doing is they're going from this highly accommodative, which they always seem to be coming out of a recession and normalizing interest rates and as soon as they get there, they stop. Mission accomplished, and they've managed to pull that off in my professional lifetime arguably twice, in the mid 90s and in the mid 2000s and that’s it. Anytime they're trying to stabilize things and they also have to lower the inflation rate it's too many variables, it's too complicated and the problem is, you know, you have to drain liquidity, you're draining cash out of the system. And if you look at money supply, for example, M2 money supply mirrors bank deposits. So, there's no question where the money's coming from, they're pulling it out of the banking system and there is this initial phase where it didn't matter. Every banker I talked to said don't worry about it we've got excess deposits that's funding costs. That's not our primary concern, until it was. And at that point you see loan rates going up, you see credit standards tighten, what a lot of bankers are saying is, you know, existing customers, we're very interested in doing more business with you, new customers, well, we may not have room for them. And so, the screws tighten, and the problem is knowing when to stop and I think that's always the challenge for the Fed. That tightening works very slowly until inevitably it works all at once, and even in the best sort of gentlest circumstances, the economy breaks,. And in that sense, yeah, there's too much money in the system. It is generated by debt. It was public sector debt, not private. But a Minsky moment is when you have too much debt and the system collapses under its own weight. And I guess maybe a mini-Minsky, if you want.

[Vinny, 21:32]:

I like that a lot. That's a that's a great answer, right? Yes, a mini-Minsky. I want to follow up, you know, reading through some forecasting even I think in the Feds last - when they released their minutes a week or two ago, they have projected a mild recession. I think even some of your stuff says that you folks have a I guess a high probability on some sort of mild recession. Can you help me understand what that looks like? Who are the winners and losers per se in that scenario, and what does unemployment rate look like and what we would characterize as a mild recession.

[Chris Low, 22:05]:

Well, first off, I think it's important to note that the data right now in its totality, especially when you look at job growth, income growth, consumer spending. That there's nothing in the data suggesting recession yet.  The reason I have a recession in my forecast and have had for more than a year and I've had to move it out a couple of times is because the Fed has told us they are really eager to bring inflation down quickly. They're afraid if they let it linger it will become sticky. It will affect expectations and ultimately it will be a lot harder to fix. And then they also tell us, in order to bring inflation down, they need to push the unemployment rate up to 4.5. Well, you know, we were 3.4 a month ago. Now we're at 3.7 and I think there's, you know, there's choppiness, there's weird noise in the household survey but. We've been in this neighborhood of 3.4 to 3.7 for a year and they haven't been able to climb above that that level. To get to 4.5, it's so unlikely to do without a recession that there's a rule. The Sahm rule, right? Claudia Sohm, Fed employee who noted, “Hey, you know all these inflation models, sorry, recession models we have where we try and predict when a recession is coming? In fact, we can't even predict when we're in one.” And by the way, that’s nothing against the Fed. No economist is very good at that, because by the time you see the coincident indicators confirming that it's already been going for a month or so. So based on the Sahm rule, I'd say it's inevitable that if you're going to go to 4.5, you're going to have a recession. That's why it's always been in my forecast for the last year and a half. That said, the Fed says if we have one that's mild, they, in other words they think they can take their foot off the brake fast enough. I think it's more likely if we have one that's severe because again the Fed is chasing a really high inflation rate. They're trying to knock it down pretty aggressively. And then, you know, ask me what inflation expectations really means and that that opens a whole other can of worms. Because I think, in fact, inflation expectations are already elevated to an extent that's going to make it more difficult to tame inflation.

[Zach, 24:34]:

Chris, you've mentioned a few metrics and data points kind of throughout this interview, different questions and we're just curious, are there any ones that you place a higher level of confidence on or place more emphasis on when you're developing your forecasting, whether it's unemployment, inflation, other - you mentioned the Sahm rule, other things, money supply and have those changed much over the last year or two, meaning before we're looking at things, some things now the rates are higher, you're looking at different metrics to kind of, you know, shepherd, your forecast when you're developing those?

[Chris Low, 25:06]:

You know, I think the biggest thing that's changed in the last couple of years is we've stopped trying to do a current quarter GDP forecast cause what's the point? The Atlanta Fed is actually good enough at it now that they're consistently better than everybody else, that doesn't mean they get it right every time, but they're constantly updating their nowcast and their hit rate is better than anyone else. So, we use that as our forecast. And when I do presentations, I use it as well, in terms of forecasting, you know, that over the course of my career, the consumers share of GDP has consistently grown, and so we've put a bigger weight on retail sales and consumption than we used to. We're paying less attention, certainly to housing. Housing was like the variable from O4 to O7. Now it's such a small part of GDP, it almost doesn't matter. Consumers rule. And then the last thing which I think is kind of interesting is even though I'm a fixed income economist. I talk mostly to banks. They're very focused on interest rates. I'm therefore very focused on interest rates. You would think inflation would be absolutely the most important thing, and yet, through most of my career, inflation was so quiet that we cared more about the employment report than anything else. Now if you look at two year note volatility on a day by day basis for the last two years, the CPI has mattered more than anything else. So, we're paying very close attention to that. And the only thing I would mention on that note is that the Super Core CPI has come down a lot, but the Super Core PCE has not. And at the end of the day, the Fed cares about the PCE. So, you have to be sort of aware of why they're different. And you know why one is coming down and the other isn't.

[Vinny, 27:18]:

What will crack? Very stubborn, or I should say, persistent core services inflation numbers. Like what is gonna break the back of that? And then the feds gonna say, “OK, you know, we'll start. We'll revise kind of what our outlook is on interest rates.” What's going to change what we've got from this consistently higher than they would like inflation number.

[Chris Low, 27:40]:

You know Vinny, I'm really glad you asked me that question because it gets exactly to this concept of inflation expectations. You know, the Fed thinks about inflation expectations in terms of, well, they emphasize consumer expectations. If you're used to paying a lot, you will pay a lot. I think in fact, they almost have it backwards. They ought to be thinking about it in terms of price setters. What are companies charging? Why is the supermarket raising cereal and bread prices when wheat prices haven't budged, they're lower than they were a year ago. Why are those prices still going up? Why did my rent go up 10% this year? You know, I've lived in New York for 20 years and I've never seen a 10% rent increase, but this year it happened. And I think the answer is there's expectations on the other side, too. Supermarkets have gotten away with big price increases since the pandemic lockdowns ended and because of that, even though their material costs aren't rising anymore, if they're used to getting away with it, they're going to continue doing it. Same thing with my landlord. You know, rents in New York in the last two years have gone up a ton. I'm just coming out of a two year. They're used to being able to raise those prices so they're raising prices. So, what's going to stop them from doing it? And I think the answer is this high level of inflation will stop when it becomes painful to raise prices, when the loss of sales means a loss of margin that's bigger than what they make up with the price hikes. You know it's the reason when you think about Paul Volcker taming inflation in the late 70s, early 80s, it's the reason it was so painful because it goes beyond the pain of the consumer and it has to actually get painful for the producer and the seller. And we're definitely not there yet. Are we getting close? I think maybe, you know you're starting to see in surveys, for example, you know the ISM surveys, when they ask about pricing power, some companies say they're having difficulty raising prices. They're meeting some resistance, but it's a really small percentage.

[Zach, 30:10]:

It is wild how – when are some of these things going to give? It's like - and the expectation now as a consumer, I'm not expecting prices to go lower. I guess maybe my next question would be to you would be what's your outlook for wages and wage growth? What does that look like? It seems like maybe they're starting to see a leveling off to a degree. I'm just curious. What you're seeing and what your expectation is moving forward for wages.

[Chris Low, 30:38]:

Wage growth is slowing down and the Atlanta Fed has an industry weighted wage number, which I think is more useful than average hourly earnings because the highest paying categories are manufacturing and construction. And we've seen job growth there, slow down a ton. The fastest job growth is leisure and hospitality, which is dominated by, you know, hotels and restaurants and also the healthcare sector. Those happen to be the two lowest paying sectors in the economy. So, average hourly earnings are slowing down because there are so many low paid workers entering the workforce. But within those industries, we're still seeing 4% wage growth, 4 to 4.5 in fact. So, if you are in food service or are working in a hotel, you are still seeing decent raises, which by the way is why if you go out to eat, you're seeing much hotter inflation than food at home. It's much higher and it hasn't come down at all from the peak. OK, so are we seeing some slowdown, yes. And the place where you're beginning to see some cracks is in the employment cost index. So, that's also - it's economy wide, but it's industry weighted. It includes benefits as well as wages and the thing about benefits that I think was really clever by some CEO's in the last two years is when companies were fighting over employees when we had, you know, an 11 and a half million job openings and 6,000,000 unemployed. Some companies rather than bumping starting wages by a ton instead offered a lot of one time perks, signing bonuses and maybe more generous medical benefits. Maybe more time off, but they were all things that didn't necessarily have to increase next year. So, you know you start with four weeks of vacation instead of two. But next year you don't get six. You know so from an employment cost standpoint, there's this big upfront cost that boosted the ECI for a year. But then in year two, it comes down some. And we're beginning to see the ECI, but believe me, we're talking like the ECI's running at about 5% and it's maybe a tenth or two off of the peak level. So, it needs to come down further and that's the other big frustration, frankly, with core inflation is that we're trending lower. Which is great news, and Jay Powell can stand up now as he has at the last couple of press conferences and saying, you know, disinflation is a wonderful thing and it is. But at this rate, we're going to get to 2% in a decade. It's you know, that's too long.

[Zach, 33:45]:

Chris, this is my last question. For you for today. Is rates will becoming lower because inflation is coming down to a degree here. What about the other side of the story? What should we be on lookout for? What if inflation picks back up? What type of things could happen for the for fed to have to hike even further than anyone's kind of wildest expectations? It seems clear to me that they don't want that to happen. That's the last thing they want is for inflation to come back and jolt back up. 

[Chris Low, 34:11]:

You know, this is definitely something that lives in the back of my mind. When I did my last forecast, it came down to three potential outcomes, and I said the most likely was a mild recession because that was the middle outcome. But actually, there was a slightly higher probability of a severe recession. And then the other side, what if we don't have a recession at all in the next 12 months and what likely would happen is you don't get a recession because the Fed pauses and it gives people a chance to get used to interest rates where they are today. Well then, what happens is, and actually a great example is what's happening in housing right now. What happens is home sales stabilize and then they begin to grow again, and then housing construction begins to pick up again. And then housing employment begins to pick up again. Now multiply that out across the economy, cars and student lending, and et cetera, et cetera. And you start to get this surging credit activity again, which fuels money growth, which fuels economic activity, which fuels ultimately inflation. And then the Fed has to step on things again. And you know, that's why I'm so skeptical of a soft landing. Because can the Fed avoid a recession? Absolutely they can. They can stop tightening and be prepared to ease if they need to, and they could avoid a recession. But if they do that, I think odds are very high inflation rate accelerates and they have to do what Powell said he wanted to avoid more than anything else when he started on this whole thing, which is we don't want to do what we did in the 70s, which is allow inflation to become entrenched by not beating it the first time around. Because if we have to go at it twice, it's always worse for everybody the second time.

[Vinny, 36:16]:

That might be a great place to stop, but I think we have two great taglines. We've skeptical the soft landing and the mini-Minsky, so that we've got some tremendous content. But thank you so much for your time, Chris. This has been fabulous, and I know you'll put together a great presentation for our conference tomorrow. And again, thank you for your time.

[Chris Low, 36:38]:

Yeah, Vinny, Zach, great to be here. Thanks for having me. And let's do it again sometime.

[Vinny 36:45]:

Well, that's a wrap for this special episode with Chris Lowe. We thank you for listening in and please stay tuned for future special episodes of On the Balance Sheet.

[Outro, 37:01]:

On the Balance Sheet is a podcast produced by Darling Consulting Group, DCG. All views and opinions expressed by hosts and guests are solely their own and may not represent those of DCG. All third parties are independent entities and are not affiliated with DCG. This podcast is intended for informational and educational purposes only and is not considered as advice. All views and opinions expressed are based on the information available at the time, it may have changed on current market and other conditions. For more information about DCG; please visit www.darlingconsulting.com or email us at info@darlingconsulting.com. Today’s background music is provided by John Sib at Coma-Media and can be found on pixabay.com.      

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