Yair Wallach: The Ceasefire, & The Future of Israel-Palestine

In this episode, we are joined by Yair Wallach, Chair of the Centre for Jewish Studies at SOAS, University of London, to discuss the January 2025 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Gaza officials.

The conversation examines the immediate and ongoing impacts of the ceasefire, including humanitarian aid access, the temporary pause in hostilities, and the challenges of maintaining peace amid Israeli military operations in Jenin. Yair Wallach also explores the political dynamics shaping the ceasefire’s future, as well as the broader implications for the region.

This episode provides critical insight into one of the most pressing developments in the Middle East today.

Let us know your thoughts in the comments, and don’t forget to subscribe for future episodes.

#MiddleEast #GazaCeasefire #Israel #Palestine #Politics #CurrentEvents #genocideingaza

00:00 - Opening
01:18 - Introduction
02:01 - War Goals: Were They Achieved by Hamas and Israel?
07:51 - Who Won the War: A Genuine Victory or a Pyrrhic One?
10:49 - Operation Iron Wall: Ongoing Conflict in Jenin Despite Ceasefire
15:59 - The May 2024 Agreement: Why Did It Fail, and What Changed?
17:56 - The Ceasefire: A Hiatus or a Genuine Step Forward?
26:44 - Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Role and Goals Compared to Hamas
27:47 - Hamas as a Political and Military Entity: Prospects for Long-Term Peace
30:38 - The Olmert-Kidwa Peace Plan: A Feasible Blueprint for Peace?
36:44 - Steve Witkoff’s Inspection Team: Diplomacy or Political Provocation?
39:52 - US Diplomacy and Power in Israel
44:43 - Sanctions Lifted: Impact of Trump’s Decision on Violence
51:07 - How Will History Remember the Gaza Conflict?
54:56 - Genocide vs. Ethnic Cleansing
59:29 - Ethos and Credibility: Who Should Write About the Middle East?

Transcript

0:00

Winning is not an objective fact and people can celebrate terrible losses as victories. We know this very well. I cannot see how you can reconcile the narrative that this is a Palestinian victory. If you say that this is a genocide, and I think there's a good reason to say that this is a genocide and there is no victory in genocide. Yair Wallach is the Chair of the Centre for Jewish Studies at The School at the University of London, as well as a scholar and historian.

His recent article “The peace paradox: 1:28

The political calculations that allowed the Gaza ceasefire could yet be its undoing.” is available now on the New Statesman. The following conversation will discuss the January 2025 cease fire agreement between Israeli and Gazan officials. While it has allowed for humanitarian aid into Gaza and a temporary pause in direct hostilities, significant tensions persist. Notably, Israeli military operations in Jenin in the West Bank have caused displacement, casualties and criticism of the ceasefire’s integrity. To what extent were the aims of war achieved by Hamas and Israel? Okay, let's start with Hamas. And that's an open question. What exact was the aim? So there's two schools here. One is that Hamas was seeking a regional, much bigger war, that it wanted to draw other actors and into this in the West Bank, in Israel. Of course, Iran and others. And that failed. First, it has to be said, I mean, of course, Israel was attacked by the Houthis in Yemen and by Lebanon, by Hezbollah. But it wasn't much more than, a war of attrition rather than something that amounted to the kind of apocalyptic scenario that if you read the Hamas statement from the 7th of October, it suggests that it wanted an all out war, and that didn't happen. The other explanation, the other aim was that Hamas wanted a more a limited operation from afterwards, it could negotiate better, especially on prisoners, but maybe on this situation in the strip and even in this regard, I think that even if Hamas is successful in getting thousands of prisoners out in the current deal, it still came with an absolutely catastrophic price that it's very difficult to see how the release of some prisoners came with the cost of the entire destruction of the strip. I don't think anyone can say that Hamas achieved what it wanted to. It did survive as a political actor, as a military guerrilla movement. It has survived. So in that sense, this can be seen as an achievement, I think. Nonetheless, I think this was given that Hamas launched the most sophisticated, the most carefully planned and the biggest military attack on Israel on the 7th of October. Given the success to overwhelm Israeli forces on that day. Then the question is, was this actually a victory? And I think this was a Pyrrhic victory. I think this is a kind of achievement that brought catastrophic defeat more than anything else. But we'll have to check it again in a few years and decades. In terms of Israel. I think, again, the question is, what are the war aims here? And for most of the Israeli public, the first aim was to return the hostages. But it's not clear at all that the war helped to return hostages. And I think we can say that the war led to the death of hostages rather than the negotiated agreement, which is going to return the bulk of those that survived. So in that sense, to launch a military campaign was not the obvious way to return the hostages. The second war aim was to hit Hamas and hit back at Hamas for what it did and degrade its military capabilities. That certainly happened. But the Israeli government promised much more than that. It promised to destroy Hamas. Also, as a political movement. And it promised a total victory. Total victory is, again, the kind of apocalyptic language that doesn't say much. And clearly that was not achieved. Hamas is still in charge of what remains of the Gaza Strip, and that is very much due to Israeli government decisions which ruled out any alternative to Hamas. So in a way, while they said that they wanted to destroy Hamas, they allowed no other alternative and they created the conditions for Hamas to survive. So from an Israeli perspective, generally, this does not look like a very successful campaign. The only way that it was successful is if you read the campaign as a as a campaign designed towards the destruction of Gaza and to create the conditions for a complete the population of Gaza, ethnic cleansing, and to create the conditions for what the right wing called the decision of decisive plan, which it basically is a plan for mass ethnic cleansing of Palestinians and destruction of political existence between the river and the sea. If that is the aim and that was certainly the aim of the right wing, then the war seems like a significant step towards achievement of that goal. And that's the risk here. So my question then, we also hear different accounts across the media of either side celebrating this ceasefire. And there are conflicting accounts, of course. So people speak about winning the war. Can we say that there is a winner? And if so, is the win genuine? I mean, these are subjective questions to an extent. Winning is not an objective fact and people can celebrate terrible losses as victories. We know this very well. I cannot see how you can reconcile the narrative that this is a Palestinian victory. If you say that this is a genocide, and I think there's a good reason to say that this is a genocide and there is no victory in genocide. So there's an inherent tension. And it is the fact that Hamas actually does not talk about genocide. It's avoided that language because it still wants to pretend it won. Well, I think the vast majority of Palestinians in Gaza think otherwise, even though that we will find Palestinians elsewhere who are celebrating it as a win, but it not the people who had to pay for this alleged victory. In terms of Israel, we do not find really anyone in Israel celebrating it as a victory so far. So the general, I think response is that either the victory has not arrived yet, and that's what the right wing is promising or that the government has failed. And that's what the opposition is arguing. And so but there is generally, clearly unhappiness about the fact that Hamas still survives. But also there's a question, why did we have to endure 15 months? Because also for, of course, Israeli society did not suffer in the same way the last 15 months, Not remotely. But still the war came with a huge price, economic price, social price in terms of, you know, tens of thousands who were displaced in the north on the Lebanese border, but also in the south. Communities that haven’t been rehabilitated or have been recovered yet. And also international loss of esteem, of reputation, of, you know, Israel's standing in the world was so heavily damaged. So I think there's a lot to ask about, and I think no one seriously claims in Israel that this is a victory. Israel has continued attacks on Jenin, dubbed Operation Iron Wall, as its agreement was limited to a ceasefire in Gaza, not West Bank. So in parts of West Bank, in the last few days, IDF soldiers have threatened people to “Leave their houses or else”. So it hasn't ended, has it? Settlers have also called some of the establishments they have taken over as Trump blocks to pay him as a Trump homage. What do you have to say about this? So in a very literal sense, to keep one of the right wing ultra right parties, the religious Zionists, in government, in coalition, and that's the finance minister Bezalel Smotrich and to keep them in government, they were promised this escalation in the West Bank. And that allowed the government to survive and for the time being. But still, the threat is that if the cease ceasefire continues, they will bring down the government. Now, from the very beginning the government sought to destabilize the West Bank and cause an uprising there. There were a number of ways that they tried to do it. First, settler violence; an increased settler violence since well before the 7th of October. Even before the current government. We see a massive escalation of settler violence, daily attacks in Palestinian villages, and it's only become worse after the 7th of October. A rapid increase in the number of outposts established all over the West Bank. And these in turn are bases for settler violence and intimidation of rural Palestinian communities and other means. For example, denying money transfer from the Palestinian Authority, and the idea is to destabilize it, to bring it down effectively. That's been a constant game between Smotrich and the Americans and other parties. Palestinian workers that work, tens of thousands of them even more worked in Israel before the 7th of October. Who would cross daily from the West Bank, have been barred from entering Israel, and that's a significant amount of money, going into the West Bank that came from these workers. So that creates an environment of instability, of poverty that obviously will result in violence at some point or another. So all these steps indicate an attempt by the settlers, by their sponsors in the government to provoke an uprising. And they say it quite explicitly that once there is an uprising that would be used as a pretext to implement similar practices from Gaza, in the West Bank, and the conditions are quite different, you can't copy and paste these practices. The topography is different, the urban environment is different, and so forth. But nonetheless, we will have to wait to see how this plays out. But I think in Jenin, we see early indications of that. So massive population, mass destruction of roads, of infrastructure, of houses. That's the direction in which this is going. Now, how far they'll go and what will be Palestinian response is, you know, we don't know yet. It's very clear that the PLO, the Fatah in the West Bank, are very much aware of the Israeli plan here, and there are statements from them that they are rebuking Hamas for giving Israel the excuse to destroy Gaza and they say that national responsibility demands that they prevent as much as they can from giving Israel similar pretext in the West Bank. That's their rationale for acting against Hamas in the West Bank, in Jenin, Palestinian Authority. This is highly unpopular, but I think they understand the stakes and understand that the very survival of the Palestinian Authority is at stake. And even more than that. So they will try to prevent it. I think over the medium term, if the ceasefire survives, I think their ability to do these kind of things will be diminished and they're aware of it. So they're acting quickly to prevent the ceasefire from taking hold. Hamas had agreed to the same terms that we have now back in May 2024, but this didn't go through. What changed this time? The main thing that changed is, in my view and the view of most analysts, you know, almost all analysts and commentators in Israel think that it's the Trump intervention and specifically it's Trump's emissary to the region, which applied undiplomatic pressure on Netanyahu and made it very clear that he has to find flexibility to make this agreement happen. And Netanyahu agreed to things that he ruled out completely in May. So that is the first thing that Netanyahu repeatedly found excuses why this deal could not happen. He repeatedly went back and added additional demands. So that is the main reason why this now is going ahead. And it didn't before. At the same time, I think Hamas were more, desperate for a ceasefire now. So they they did show some flexibility on some technical details. But still, I think this is not a considerably different agreement than the one in May. So in that sense, they they haven't given up anything fundamental which a demand that this ceasefire would pledge the end of the war not immediately but in stages and that they received. So Israel would have to find a way out of this if they if they don't want to abide by it. You know, as you also mentioned, Donald Trump, the 47th president of the United States of America, is being given credit for the ceasefire. But many commentators also say that the ceasefire is a mere hiatus, that it will not really solve the problem, that Hamas will come back stronger than ever. And Netanyahu’s plans for the future are also arbitrarily couched, I understand this to be a leading question, but is this an opinion you share as well? I don't know yet. I mean, I think it's hard to know at this point and it depends on two factors. First is the question of how committed the Trump administration is to this framework. And we hear that at least for now, it is. So it will not allow it to collapse in a month or five weeks. And I think that's yeah, that's not guaranteed, but it's it could very much happen. I think the question is further down the line, will the Trump administration be invested enough to apply the kind of pressure necessary to bully Netanyahu into something that he really isn't interested in? And that I'm really skeptical myself. I think that there's a very good chance that Trump will very soon lose patience and interest in this and will move to other things, especially if, you know, the kind of fascist agenda that is being implemented in the US will trigger a backlash. I doubt he will have any, bandwidth to deal with the extent of this. But the second element here is Israeli public opinion, and I think this is a crucial one, at least for the short term. The Israeli public is very much against this government. It is very much behind the agreement of returning the hostages. There is 70% support. There was before the agreement, and I wouldn't be surprised if it's even higher now. And the number of people against this agreement is I think, in the 20-25% and so forth. So there's a, you know, overwhelming support for this. And the question is, can this support be translated into preventing the government from derailing the ceasefire? And I think that's the big question, because the government will try to derail the ceasefire. The Israeli public can prevent it from doing it. And by going out to the street, by basically bringing the country to a halt and not only the majority support agreement, but I would say that the elites, the much of the upper middle class, much of the institutional elite of Israel, supports it if they are willing to throw their weight behind it, even at the price of confrontation with the government, I think they would be able to at least force the government to go ahead and not continue to the second stage. This may come at the price of triggering early elections. So I think we will have a situation of instability, but not necessarily a return to the war outright, at least in the number of of coming months. I think the question that is beyond that, what will happen? That's more difficult to see. I think the best case scenario that I can see for now is a kind of unstable ceasefire for the coming month and even year. I think that, to hope for more than that, we need to see a political settlement that establishes a new kind of rule in the Gaza Strip that replaces Hamas. This is something that Hamas is willing to live with and, you know, with certain conditions. But I think it's very clear that they are willing to take the back seat. The question what does it mean exactly? But is the Israeli government willing to accept that kind of scenario? That's the big question. And I think it's not clear to me that we'll see this happen. And that will have to, you know, stabilize in order for reconstruction to start. And without reconstruction, we will see the current misery going on for months, years. And that in itself is a recipe for disaster and instability. But that is still not as bad as the alternative scenario, which is an outright continuation of the war and the kind of apocalyptic nightmares of the envisions of Smotrich and Ben-Gvir becoming reality. This is a very real scenario. This is a very real danger. And I think people that think that we have reached, you know, we can talk about this genocide in past tense. Do not understand that maybe what we have seen in the last 15 months is only the beginning and it could get much was. So I think we have to keep this in mind and be aware of the risks because also the way to stop these things, I do not see a lot of levers and mechanisms that allow an intervention to stop it. If it really goes beyond that. And the main way to stop it is for Israelis themselves to stop the war. So that's the main question. So, I mean, I do want to go back on this, but I think it's clear that there is no benefit to either party, to wage the kind of war that happened over these 15 months. Is that right? There is nothing that they could gain from it any more. Again, for the 25% of Israelis, 30% of Israelis that want to establish the second Israeli Republic, the Kahanist Republic, following the rabbi Meir Kahane and the idea of a theocratic supremacist state in which very few Palestinians would remain. For them, this war is a gift. The 7th of October was this gift, and they have been promoting this vision at least since 2016 as a realistic political horizon. So for them, this is what they are interested in. Now, for most of Israeli society, this is not what they want. But are they able to provide an alternative vision? Because I don't think you can go back to the 6th of October. I don't think you can go back to that status quo, which the settlers have worked very hard to destabilize. And Hamas also destroyed. So I think we need to see an alternative vision for Israel and also for Palestine. And I so far, the Israeli center left has not been able to put forward a coherent alternative. So that's an open question. And they keep being, you know, dragged by the right wing to play along and play to their fruit. So that's the real question for me in the coming months and years, are they able to put forward an alternative vision? Because without this, the ascending vision, the Kahanist vision of a Jewish state, a non-democratic state between the river and the sea, that's going to triumph. Let's talk about the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement, which is allied with Hamas. What is their role and how different are they in what they are doing from Hamas in their political goals? So historically, they have been a vanguardist group, unlike Hamas, which has had at least a wide social base. So they were much more focused on the military action. And by proving their credentials through military action and not by creating this network of welfare and education, which is the Hamas way. Otherwise, I don't think there's a huge difference in terms of ideology, but they just a much smaller group and they've been also under the egis of Hamas. It was very clear that they are, you know, obeying the kind of Hamas overall plan and dictate. I want to go back to what you were saying earlier about the future of Hamas as both a political and militant entity. In a recent interview, senior Hamas official Bassem Naim reflected on Hamas's dual role as both a political and militant entity, perhaps playing a role in the second stage of the ceasefire. How does the future of Hamas as a political party impact the prospects for a long term peace? And what challenges does this duality pose for ceasefire agreements and governance in Gaza? So I, I think I cannot see how Hamas, in its current incarnation, can rehabilitate itself and become, you know, a diplomatic partner, even, you know, even on the back seat even. And I think their vision was the kind of Hezbollah model that they are not leading the government, but a significant enough party to destabilize. And/or dictate terms and still be involved in the political Palestinian political system. I'm really doubtful this could work. And while I think there was a chance of them becoming a legitimate political partner, a diplomatic partner in the 2010’s I think there were elements within the movement that really tried to go in that way. And it didn't get them very far because, Israel refused basically to go very far. They were willing to reach some kind of agreement, but not real negotiation. And that's partly why that the faction within the movement that wanted military escalation won, but the scale of the 7th of October was so huge that Israel and Israelis, it would take generations for them to be able to, I think, to be willing to sit down with Hamas. Now, you may say you can say the same about Palestinians. Why would Palestinians sit with the Israeli government after this horrible destruction of Gaza? I don't think I mean, I would agree, but there's relations of power here, which are very clear. So Israel is the powerful side and therefore has much more choice about who it negotiates with. And who it doesn't. The Palestinians have much less choice, just as a reality of things. Staying on that subject of post-October 7th, Israeli-Gazan relations. The Olmert-Kidwa peace plan developed by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and former Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Nasser Al-Kidwa, proposes a framework to resolve the Gaza conflict. Their plan suggests creating neutral governing entity in Gaza, independent from existing factions, but linked to the Palestinian Authority, as well as adhering to the 1967 borders with mutually agreed land swaps, of course. Notably, it also envisions placing Jerusalem as old city under an international trusteeship involving both Israeli and Palestinian representation along with other states. Given the historical and political sensitivities tied to these proposals, like you have just mentioned, what are your thoughts on the feasibility of such a plan? And does it effectively address the complex challenges that need to be overcome for sustainable peace? I think if we zoom out, because all these details are complicated, but if we zoom out and we can see that the last 15 months in many ways put the two state solution, and this is a kind of, you know, one version of it, but it's there are not huge differences, I think, in the kind of the realistic versions that we heard. On the one hand, the last 15 months put it back on the table and not just because it demonstrated the urgency to various powers. And you know, you can't ignore it because it will destabilize the entire region. But also you look at the leverage on Israel and you look at the international legal interventions, which will have wide implications. The ICC and the ICJ, these all rely on a two state logic at their based on the idea that the West Bank and Gaza are occupied and they have to become a Palestinian state. And that translates to a series of steps that are taken against Israeli settlements and so forth. And this will have a cascading effect even during the Trump administration. So on the one hand, we see the potential here and we see that this framework can actually create pressure on Israel, and that's the only framework that is discussed internationally. So what other alternatives we have? But the other side of it is do we see seriously a political scenario that leads us to that two state solution? And my answer is no. And that's a conclusion I came to in 2007. Some people came to much earlier, some later. I do not see a political pathway that leads us to an agreement of a two state solution, an agreement that would be lacking in many Palestinians eyes, I think, because it would not address a lot of issues. But let's say the Palestinians vote for it because they feel a need to get some kind of rights that even that agreement would demand huge pressure on Israel diplomatically. And there's not going to be such pressure in the next four years. I mean, I think that's really incredibly unrealistic to think that Trump would actually put the kind of necessary pressure for Israel to agree to something that looks like a viable Palestinian state. So and if we talk about 2029 as, again, the starting point, I mean, there's no reason to think that the Palestinian Authority will still be there in 2029. And now it's lasted much more than any of us thought. I mean, this was an interim administration for five years. It lasted 30 years. But all things must end at some point. So what happens when this collapse? And I think there's a very good chance that this collapses in the next in the next four years. And what happens with Mahmoud Abbas is no longer the president and do we see any kind of ability to translate the dynamics in and towards some kind of agreement and so forth? I really don't know. I mean, I'm very skeptical that this is this is possible. But it should be said that it's not like there is an alternative. I mean, there people talk about the one state solution, but that doesn't have a basis in international law. And there is no political faction in Palestine, in Israel that advocates for a one state framework of any kind. No political faction, I would say. So it's a complete pie in the sky at this point. I'm not saying it's impossible, but first we need to see some of somebody actually putting it on the table and getting people behind this, because even Hamas, when it's asked what does it want? It's kind of begrudgingly said talks about a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. So we are still in that kind of wasteland of political solutions and frameworks. You talk about the leverage that other states can put on Israel or a global kind of tension or pressure that is put on Israel for this. President Trump's Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff recently was announced to enter Gaza as part of a inspection team. Witkoff has described role of the inspection team as ensuring the cease fire progress is into its second phase. What is your assessment of such an endeavor and is it a sound political gesture or is it a demonstration of a politically provocative action on part of the Trump administration? And if you can talk about if any third party actors like the U.S. or Qatar have any effect on the outcomes in these three stages. So I think Witkoff’s signal so far really towards Israeli government, like that's how I read it and he's you know, it looks like he's willing to apply leverage and threats where the Biden administration was unwilling and that's the impression so far. So it looks like he's committed, at least in the next few months in terms of Qatar and Egypt, I think they have a lot of interest for this to survive. But also, I think Hamas has an interest for this to survive. I think that Hamas will bite its tongue, whatever happens in the West Bank, you know, unless they Al-Aqsa's destroyed and a Jewish temple is built to something. But in terms of the Jenin operation, all these things, I think Hamas is going to as much as it can tolerate Israeli provocations because it has an interest for this to continue rather than collapse. So I think that there is a good reason to think that will not collapse in the next month or two, even though the Israeli government will try to make it collapse in various ways and instruments. And that's my impression. Again, mid-term, I think this is what is needed to overcome by Witkoff by various other players is so significant. That only a political change within Israel could maybe get us there and even this is a you know so we'll have to just see I mean, I'm not ruling it out. I think we could see a political change in Israel. I think it's possible. And we do see public opinion change after traumas like the 7th of October. So it's not impossible, but it would require a lot. People speak about the the fact that America had a lot of leverage in this negotiation, this ceasefire because of its involvement in the war since the very beginning in terms of, you know, the provision of arms and all of that. Is it true that we wouldn't be where we are if it had not been for us diplomacy, US negotiation, power and everything else? Absolutely. Absolutely. I mean, there's no doubt about it that this has been unbelievable. I'm not sure even if to call it failure. I'm not sure if the people involved look at it and say we failed. I think maybe they even like what they see. Some of them it's very difficult to explain it. otherwise. I think that we can speculate what if, but we know what happened. And we know that the Biden administration applied very, very limited pressure and they stopped the sending of some bombs at some point. But that was it. They especially in the early stages, they were in the room where decisions were made. They provided various advice. They and the Israeli government was very much in shock and wasn't functioning really in many ways. They could lay down the rules at this point and they could give a timeframe at this point and they could organize a U.N. Security Council resolution, all previous escalations. And the war was always ended with a clear Security Council resolution that Israel eventually obeyed. Often it took a few days, but they wouldn't do this this time. So we know what they didn't use. So I think it's very clear that they chose not to use any kind of leverage while supplying Israel with arms, while supplying it with a diplomatic shield in the UN and while giving a lot of rhetorical support. So it's very clearly that, they are full parties to what happened. Now, I think it's true that from some points they preferred a ceasefire, but it wasn't important for them to actually pursue it. And it wasn't important to pay a political price and the longer they waited, that meant a political price because it got closer and closer to the elections. But again, I mean, the I remember Blinken met with the Israeli cabinet and military officials in December, and they talked about three more months of fighting. And he told them, you don't have three more months. And that was the assumption in Israeli commentariat, Israeli generals, that the U.S. will stop it, by January, they will say enough. And what the U.S. did not say that it's very difficult to stop. I mean, there's a if you see Israeli brawls, there is a dynamic of two people fighting and they usually shout, at least one of them shouts, “Hold me back, hold me back. Before I kind of kick his ass.” And it's a kind of performative thing of kind of asking people to intervene in order to stop it in a way not to lose face. It's very difficult for the government to explain while it's acting if there's no meaningful pressure on it. Well If there is meaningful pressure, they can say we had to. The Americans were pressuring. And so I think they, a lot of people were hoping for American intervention. And when the more forceful one and when that didn't happen, it was tragic. Americans died as a result, of the lack of action, American hostages and probably also American Palestinians in Gaza. Back to what is going on over there. But Trump lifted the Biden sanctions against Israeli settlers accuse of violence against Palestinians. This was just a few days ago, on the same day the violence against Palestinians escalated. Is this something that you'd like to discuss? I mean, I think that the sanctions had an effect. A lot of people were dismissive about them. And certainly in relation to the annihilation of Gaza. I mean, it seems insignificant. But in the West Bank, it was quite significant. And the settlers were certainly genuinely worried about it made their operation difficult. But also it had the significance of the Biden administration effectively saying that the Israeli justice system is cannot be trusted with this. And this has a lot of implications for the ICC. The International Criminal Court intervenes because it says the Israeli justice system is not dealing adequately with war crimes. And while the Americans kind of spoke against the ICC effectively, they were saying the same thing, saying we're putting sanctions because these people are violent and they're not being punished by the Israeli justices. It's not a surprise that the Trump administration revoked these sanctions. And I think the question is, how far is it going to be willing to allow settler violence in the West Bank? And my expectation was and still very much, is that they will have no problem whatsoever. The incoming Israeli ambassador in Israel, Mike Huckabee, you know, is completely on board, in effect, the plan to empty the West Bank of Palestinian. And I think that his statements point in that way, clearly against a Palestinian state, against the fact that the Palestinian people exist. So he would not have any problem with settler violence. Clearly, this clashes with the administration's hope for some kind of rapprochement vis a vis Saudi Arabia and maybe other parties. So we may see some kind of clash with India administration, with the kind of evangelicals pushing towards a genocidal agenda. And the the ones interested in Gulf relations pushing against it. But we're not in a good position if the people we have to trust in order to stop this are Mohammed bin Salman and the Gulf, it's not a good position to be. I'm not sure they care that much about Palestinians. What are the new political groups that have emerged and evolve lately as a result of this war, especially on the Palestinian side? In Gaza, there is constant protests against Hamas. There are constant civil mobilization also that started well before that. I mean, in the last few years have been a protest that Hamas put down very violently. And even now Hamas is shooting people in the legs and even killing some people with who they are speaking up against it. I mean, I can think of very specific example. People have incredible credentials in the fight against Israel in the occupation who were beaten up by Hamas. Civil society in Gaza does exist. And may, you know, if given the chance, may create alternatives to Hamas and maybe even to Fatah. But I'm not they're not given a chance right now. When Hamas is the only one with guns. And and even if the Palestinian Authority returns to Gaza, I'm not sure these are decaying, especially the Palestinian Authority and Fatah moribund, are seen as corrupt and inadequate. And I am not aware of significant mobilization that can replace them in that sense. You know, we are in the kind of interim moment and we've been there for some years. And of course, it may take time and we may see something reemerging out of this. Also, I would say in the Palestinian citizens of Israel, we haven't seen new forces reemerge. And there is this sense of a fear among Palestinian citizens of Israel would face a real clampdown and campaign against them. Legislation, and arrests and freedom of speech is taken away almost completely. People get arrested for Facebook posts and stuff. So and where we do see a lot of activity is Palestinian diaspora, especially in the West and very clearly important. But I do not think that can be a leading factor. I think the Palestinian politics has to take the lead from inside Palestine, historic Palestine, at least either from 1948 Palestinians or those in the territories. And I don't think the diaspora can help in solidarity, but it cannot lead to struggle. In my view. The topic of Ceasefire sort of podcast as I was, that seeks to collect what could potentially be archival is contentious for the very reason that the situation in the Middle East is very fluid right now. How will people in the future, you think look back on this 15 month long conflict between Israel and Hamas, another Nakba like in 1948 that caused a massive displacement of Palestinians or something uniquely different. I think this is different in in some important ways. And it's certainly cataclysmic in the same way. So if Palestinian identity, experienced society were all shaped by ‘48 and in such profound ways, I think what's going on would probably be similar. The main difference is here that it's concentrated very heavily on Gaza, so they bear the brunt and the West Bank, you know, although it's it's you know, we see in clampdown an escalation and so far it doesn't resemble the kind of stuff we seen in Gaza and also Palestinian citizens. So in 1948, most Palestinians were affected directly became refugees, lost their homes and couldn't go back to their properties, were prevented from returning here. On the one hand, it's far more contained, the devastation, but the scale of the violence is far fiercer. So I think 1948 cannot be called a genocide. It was ethnic cleansing to use a kind of term from the 1990s onwards. But what's kept what's happened in the last 15 months, I have no doubt that will be remembered as a genocide. It sadly compares to others the only way that it would not be remembered as a genocide is if it will be dwarfed by other things. And that's a real possibility. I mean, we may be seeing quite various kinds of catastrophes in the years coming ahead and that as a result, Gaza would be a forgotten. And that's a terrible scenario. I hope that's not going to happen. But I think that otherwise I think that the destruction of Gaza was so thorough and so systematic and the scale of carnage was so huge and so indiscriminate that I don't see how you could argue this is not a genocide while the Rohingya. case was a genocide. But what we saw in the last 15 months is that it doesn't matter if we use that word or another word. That word genocide did not carry with it enough power to startle people and governments into action. So and I'm not sure it matters that much if it's a genocide or crimes against humanity or something else. But I mean, like even back just sorry to go back on this, but I mean, just on the use of terms, we know that, as you rightly said, it was ineffectual for us to be spending so much time discussing about the technicalities of whether there was a genocide. In the end, we all recognize well, many of us recognize the fact that what was happening was the crime of crimes. That was enough for us to recognize it as outrightly egregious. Now, the only reason I wanted to make this comment here is because of word‘ethnic cleansing’ we recognize today was used as a euphemism back in the former Yugoslavia war and the term ethnic cleansing was actually well, yeah, So it was used as a euphemism, but maybe we never reflected the Nakba in 1948 as a genocide simply because the term was very new. The term genocide was very new, and it had not gained the popular currency that it has today. And I think when we look back in history, we find that there are many instances of genocide, Yeah, I think that's kind of goes into the question of what, you know, is genocide can be seen as a kind of one implementation of ethnic cleansing as if to say the desired outcome is to clean the territory from undesirable. And you can do it either through actual destruction or just by expelling. I think though, if you look at the scale of killing in 1948, we are talking about I think the estimates are between 12,000 - 18,000 on a body of population that is 1.3 million. While here in Gaza, we are talking about numbers and percentage is much, much, much higher. So in that sense, I think just in that sense, I think probably that is that is a major difference. But in terms of destruction and here we see a case of a society is destroyed by destroying the habitat, is destroying the infrastructure, etc.. In the case of the 1948 Palestinian environment was destroyed, but mostly after Palestinians left were expelled. And so in that sense, I think it's you know, I think what's happening now is far more fierce and in a way the reason the Palestinians left, most Palestinians left in ‘48, those who weren't expelled at gun point was that they absolutely expected to be able to to go back. And I think now the expectation did not exist on behalf of Palestinians in Gaza, think they understood exactly what's happening and the stakes were much clearer. And so it's a question, I would argue that the intention is much clearer in this case. And in 1948, you have to really struggle hard to find genocidal language, and you can find it on the Zionist and Israeli side. But you really to find it and you there are all these arguments around it. I think this time it's all on plain view. it started. Well I mean, from the very beginning it was clear to me that the risks this time is clear cut genocide. And I said it on the 10th of October. I'm on the record saying that a genocide is entirely possible under the Kahanist government of Israel. And sadly, that's true. But I'm saying this all this as someone who was very much aware of the limitations of the term and the framework and the kind of cul de sac arguments that it leads us into. Do you think people writing about the Middle East should be experts in the area rather than just distant and presumably detached scholars and commentators on the subject, maybe missing out on the complexity and nuance of what is involved? Or maybe I should rephrase the question and ask: do you think people from the Middle East are right to be ascribed more ethos, more credibility on what's happening there? Do you feel people outside that world are getting a very distorted or adumbrated version of what's going on? So one thing I say to my students, usually in the beginning of the year, I say that if you know that complex is not good enough and everything is complex in this world, everything, every problem, the dynamic in the US is complex. Everything is complex. But that's not enough. If all that we can say is this is really complicated, then, what's the point? I mean, we are expected to offer insights and some generalities and some kind of observations that are beyond saying it's composed of lots of interesting details. And so that's one thing. I think that sometimes an outside eye is very useful. Sometimes people are really stuck in their way of seeing things and someone coming from outside can see things more clearly that you are. So if you are part of this, you know, and I know this about myself, I know that some things it takes me longer to recognize because they go against things inside me and the things I was brought up on and so forth. So that said, and having said that, of course there is value to people who know the languages have a very intimate understanding of these societies and their histories and their cultures. And so I think suddenly people should listen to Israelis and Palestinians, Israeli and Palestinian scholars, and people should not talk over them, and that's often the case, people pretend they know best and they have no reason to quote or to refer to anything local people wrote. But I don't think that, you know, that should be a condition of course, every on something that is so crucial to world politics. I think everybody is entitled to form an opinion. And I think everybody or lots of people are implicated in one way or another. If you're a US taxpayer, you're implicated if you want to or not. And therefore, I think you have a responsible to try to understand what is this about and and how you feel about this. So I think that that's the case. While at the same time I think if Israel-Palestine should be one state or two, I think that's really not the business of anyone external. I think that's a business for Palestinians and Israelis to decide for. And I would say firstly Palestinians, but then also Israelis. I can be against the persecutions of Tamils in Sri Lanka and not offer my view about the constitutional arrangements that Sri Lanka should take. I mean, I think this would be huge hubris and I unfortunately, I see this all the time, people saying one state when there is not a single political party in Palestine or Israel, which advocates for it, it's really none of your business in my view. This was Not to Forgive, but to Understand with our guest Yair Wallach. To our listeners, don't forget to like subscribe and stay tuned for more discussions.