Lab to Market Leadership with Chris Reichhelm

Lab to £30m+ in revenue and a $310m exit | Eric Mayes | CEO of Endomag

• Deep Tech Leaders | Chris Reichhelm • Season 1 • Episode 18

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In this episode of Lab to Market Leadership, Chris Reichhelm sits down with Eric Mayes, CEO of Endomag, to explore the rare journey of building a medtech startup from the ground up. Eric discusses the strategies that propelled Endomag to the forefront of cancer detection technology and culminated in a $310 million acquisition by Hologic. Perfect for medtech entrepreneurs and all Deep Tech innovators, this episode uncovers the milestones, challenges, and insights on transforming groundbreaking tech into market success.


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Podcast Production: Beauxhaus


Eric Mayes:

It's one thing to say you're setting out to make a difference, um, but when they come and interview and they meet people, they really feel that this organization is set up to do that. And I often, you know, it's, it has grown organically, so it's difficult to really pick elements apart, but I think some elements of it are, um, it's sort of passion, um, across the team for what we're doing, but also a focus on education, um, and educating ourselves Um, and in that, you know, I talk about, you know, taking people out to a conference and having them discuss the products, but we've also had a couple of past presidents of the American Society of Breast Surgeons fly them over to talk to the whole company and take everyone through, you know, basically the development history of, of the, the standard of care and breast cancer, um, in terms of surgery. And, you know, even our admin understands, what does this ultrasound look like? Why is this one concerning? Why is this one not concerning? Not that they're going to go out and become. You know, ultrasonographers or anything, but, but we had this culture where we valued the space in which our customers were understanding and learning how they do what they do and understanding how we are a part of that process of advancing their practice.

Chris Reichhelm:

Welcome to the Lab to Market Leadership Podcast. Too many advanced science and engineering companies fail to deliver their innovations from the lab to the market. We're on a mission to change that. My name is Chris Reichhelm, and I'm the founder and CEO of Deep Tech Leaders. Each week, we speak with some of the world's leading entrepreneurs, investors, corporates, and policymakers about what it takes to succeed on the lab to market journey. Join us. If you're an entrepreneur, or if you're an investor, if you're any kind of stakeholder with an interest in getting companies from lab to market, you need to listen to this week's episode. This week I'm talking to Eric Mayes. Who's the CEO of a company called Endomag. Endomag in 2010 were a spin out from University College London and the University of Houston. As CEO, Eric has been responsible for leading their development to having solutions in the market and an eventual exit to Hologic just this past year for 310 million dollars. This is going to be a special episode. We get to talk to a CEO who has done most of the journey. Now, Eric is an unusual CEO in the UK for a startup, and I'll tell you why. He's unusual because he has a lot of startup experience. Eric has started two of his own businesses in the advanced materials area. One was called NanoMagnetics and the other one was called Apaclara and he's also been part of the management team of yet another materials business called Cambridge Display Technologies, or CDT. One of the first, if not the first, Cambridge spun, spin out to float on the NASDAQ. And so Eric brings with him, or brought with him, lots of experience, lots of skills and talents when he joined Endomagnetics. And I want to find out from him what that journey was like. The different phases and stages and the milestones, the key obstacles. What were the useful experiences and skills that he brought into that role? What were the skills that were developed in him while he was there? What kind of different skills, experience, and talents did he bring into that team along the way? What surprised him about that journey? What did it take for them to get their solutions to market? How did they know when they reached product market fit? And what were the key ingredients that led to their eventual exit? All of these things and more, I want to discuss with Eric today. This is going to be a great episode. I hope you enjoy. Let's get into it. Eric Mayes, thank you for joining me.

Eric Mayes:

Chris, it's great to be here.

Chris Reichhelm:

You've just had your, your win, your exit. Endomag, I think this summer, announced the final acquisition by Hologic for 310 million dollars. How does that feel?

Eric Mayes:

Feels a lot of ways. Um, it feels great, obviously. Um, but it's, yeah, kind of a mix of emotions because, you know, it seems like it's, uh, the end of something, the start of something new. Um, you know, is it everything that, uh, we all hoped for? You know, partly, um, always hope for more. Um, but, uh, but. In, uh, in an average or full sense, um, it was a great outcome and I'm really pleased with it.

Chris Reichhelm:

What stage did you get the company to at the point of exit? Like where was it in terms of its development and so on?

Eric Mayes:

So we were, um, on the path to profitability during this year. Um, so in terms of, uh, the overall revenues, I think our revenues in 23 were about 30 million pounds, um, post channel, uh, revenues. And this year we're on, still on target for 40. Um, and One of the things that we've done to help really inflect our growth curve was to, uh, transition from, you know, basically a channel relationship, um, a sole channel relationship to partly direct. So in January 23, we transitioned to being direct in our major European markets. Um, and that, uh, really helped impact our growth. It's a big, uh, management challenge. Happy to talk about that. Um, but. I think some of the big milestones we achieved this year is, you know, we've treated over half a million patients on, uh, on a global basis in over 45 countries. So, you know, huge clinical impact, um, you know, significant revenue impact, um, grow the team to, you know, over 150, uh, employees, uh, across five countries and yeah, and we're getting to profitability. So it was, um, you know, a, a nice point, um, to have the acquisition.

Chris Reichhelm:

Was there a particular reason to sell now?

Eric Mayes:

Uh, so they say that companies are bought and not sold. Um, and, and that was very much the case in, in our, uh, in our journey. No, I, I had taken that to heart that people had told me that before, you know, plan for growth, don't plan for an exit and, and it was just that we happened to have some approaches, um, in the middle of 2023, um, two approaches, two separate approaches independently didn't, so we weren't running a process, um, but once we had two bidders, we decided to, uh, to create a, you know, competitive environment for, uh, for them. Um, but you know, didn't run a big process outside of, outside of those, they were serious, serious bidders, fit strategically, um, knew both of them, um, competed with one of them, uh, which is Hologic who ultimately acquired us, and um, but yeah, it wasn't, we weren't setting out to be, to be sold, um, and it just, it happened at the right time as well, you know, I think our investors, as in many deep tech plays, you know, it had been a long journey. Um, you know, 14 years, uh, for me and we've had, you know, strong backing, obviously committed to, uh, to our growth, but, um, good, good, good approaches at the right time in the market.

Chris Reichhelm:

It was time. Yeah, I get that. So I am really interested in taking you kind of all the way back to the start and working our way forward because you're one of the few, particularly in the UK that has been on the full lab to market journey, and not only, you know, getting the products out in the market, which is what most companies hope to achieve, but actually working up towards a path of profitability and then ultimately getting the exit as well. So you've been on the whole journey. You're, you are why we made this podcast to, you know, you know, to learn from people like you. So for the, you know, for the entrepreneurs and leaders that are out there trying to go on this journey now, I want to understand Uh, as much as I can about it, so that people can benefit. 2010 is when you join, and at, at what stage is Endomagnetics, as I think it was, as I think it was called back then? At what stage was the business when you joined?

Eric Mayes:

So from a technology readiness level, it was sort of a 7 8, um, if you do those things, but I think, you know, TRLs are technology, it's not a business readiness, uh, scale. Um, the So the company was originally a spin out of two universities, so the University College London and the University of Houston. So back when the Department of Trade and Industry existed, they had sprinkled some money on academics between the UK and the state of Texas to collaborate. And the founders came together to develop a system initially, um, in the diagnostic space. So, UCL has some expertise in use of magnetic nanoparticles in, in, uh, human health for contrast agents for MRI, etc. And the University of Houston had expertise in, in, um, superconductors in particular. Um, superconducting based sensors. And so they thought they'd do some diagnostic play, uh, unlike many academic founders of companies, they actually spoke to some customers, um, and, uh, And the customer feedback had been, listen, we don't need any more sensitivity in this area. Um, you know, this isn't so interesting to us. And then they managed to happen across a surgeon who said, well, you know, there's this new technique being developed to, um, to assess the stage of breast cancer that looks like it's going to become, you know, set as the standard of care and it relies on radioisotopes and your magnetic technique might be more available, might solve some of the problems around that. And so that's what got them started. Um, the Technology Strategy Board or Innovate UK now, um, as it was then with the TSB, uh, gave a grant of about, you know, a quarter of a million pounds to the company that helped convince the tech transfer office, uh, to put in some money. And to fund the two academic founders and one of their partners, uh, who was affiliated with the university, so basically three academic founders, um, a tech transfer office that Between the two universities, UCL business took, took precedence, um, because they put in the money. And so it, you know, became, despite the cross Atlantic start, became a UK balanced organization. And, you know, basically the remit was come in and help develop this company. And, you know, start the early part of that journey. You know, take this innovation that had some clinical evidence, take it, uh, get it approved, get it into the market.

Chris Reichhelm:

Yes.

Eric Mayes:

And that was kind of where we stood.

Chris Reichhelm:

And that was it. Okay, so that was the mandate.

Eric Mayes:

That was the mandate and what they had done, as well as they had engaged with, uh, with a surgeon, a breast cancer surgeon, who had, uh, used a developmental system and shown sort of proof of concept in 10 patients in a sort of paired, uh, paired context. So there was clinical evidence, um, that looked compelling based on 10 patients. Um, they had a prototype device and this Technology Strategy Board grant, um, was a collaborative grant such that it involved the university, but also, uh, clinical, sorry not clinical research, but, uh, uh, contract research, sorry, contract manufacturing, a CMO, contract manufacturing organization called Integrated Technologies Limited to basically productize their prototype Um, and help them get through some of the early regulatory hurdles.

Chris Reichhelm:

Were you their first CEO?

Eric Mayes:

I was their first CEO. I think the sort of the UCLB, um, partner, uh, had acted as sort of de facto CEO early on, you know, and it was sort of in between them and the founders, um, to, to structure those agreements with, uh, with ITL. Uh, to get the grant in the first place, but, um, yeah, they'd looked, they'd done a bit of a search, um, but because of, because of my background, um, that maybe we'll talk a little bit about.

Chris Reichhelm:

Yeah, we will.

Eric Mayes:

I felt right for this opportunity at the time. Um, even though I was joining as, in effect, employee number one.

Chris Reichhelm:

It sounds like they had done, what's very interesting about this, is it sounds like they had done an awful lot of work prior to almost effectively starting the business. So to get to TRL 7 ish, Um, you know, before they've really started on the, you know, the outreach, the market outreach and the, and the building or the, or development of the rest of the business, um, take, you know, uh, organizing the trial, even if it's a relatively small one, but taking that on board, so that's quite unusual in my experience.

Eric Mayes:

I think, yeah, and in my experience as well, and that was one of the things that was compelling for me is they had done so much work and, uh, sort of a funny irony of, of this all is the, the founder from UCL, um, I've actually had come visit my very first startup called NanoMagnetics. We would have a lecture series where we'd bring in academics that were talking about magnetism to inspire our team. And Professor Quentin Pankhurst, one of the founders of Endomag, came along to give a talk, and he presented on some of the ideas behind what became Endomag. And I remember looking at what he was doing at the time That's never going to happen. So NanoMagnetics died, I ended up working for the company that he had founded, but you know, that was, it was a number of years, um, in development. And, and I think critically they utilized the resources of the university. Um, the relationships between the tech transfer office, the relationships between the university and the hospital, UCLH, um, to, to really advance, um, advance this idea, both clinically and technically, and get it to a stage where someone would jump in and, and, uh, and lead.

Chris Reichhelm:

And be able to take it, and be able to take it forward. Now, you joined with a lot of experience. And you had had two startups under your belt by that point. You had had some time with CDT. Talk a little bit about the, I guess the, the core skills and experience you felt you had under your belt by 2010, by the time you took this on.

Eric Mayes:

So I think, you know, fundraising was, was one of them. So I had a lot of experience fundraising for the first company. Um, and, and had a network and, and actually had a reasonable amount of credibility despite the fact that that first company wasn't, uh, you know, wasn't a success. Um, I had really stuck with that to try to ensure that it was a success and, and pivoted a couple of times. Um, to, to, to try to rescue investor money. And, uh, and because of that had some very strong relationships, supportive relationships that, that I knew I'd be able to, to go back into. Um, also I had, you know, the first company that, that there wasn't a spin out of, uh, the university. I set this up during my PhD, there wasn't a tech transfer office. This was NanoMagnetics involved in data storage that I had set up basically in 1997. Um, you know, pre TTO at, uh, Bath University in Bristol, you know, we were Amadeus first and only, I think, um, seed investment, um, which didn't, didn't play out for them, so probably the only one they'll ever do. Um, But, uh, you know, so I learned quite a lot through that. So I, you know, I was doing that in the midst of my PhD. So I knew nothing about management. I knew nothing, you know, I knew about project management and about development, but didn't know about hiring people. Didn't know how to build a team, um, had views on how to do it. that were all, um, sort of idealistic. Uh, we did pretty well despite that. Um, but I kind of learned some of the limitations of my approach, um, in terms of managing people. Also learned some limitations in terms of how I approached, uh, the strategy of taking a technology into an industry, in particular, uh, a new technology into the consumer electronics industry. And that's actually what ultimately took me to Cambridge Display Technology, as I was speaking to David Fyfe, who was the CEO at the time, um, we had known each other from, you know, uh, events, conferences we'd be presenting at, and I went to him for advice when that first company, NanoMagnetics, had, uh, came, came to a halt and said, you know, you've had a great career, you've been at ICI, you know, big companies gone smaller, smaller, smaller. Um, I've started out the wrong way around. I started a small company, developed my own experience through that. Um, corporate research is disappearing. I, I don't know how to follow the trajectory that people would normally take. You know, what, what would you do if you were in my position now? And he said, well, have you ever thought about working for CDT? And I said, no, I hadn't. So basically kind of offered me a job, even though they didn't have a position, but what was, you And I think what's important about that is I was pretty embarrassed and depressed having failed with the first company and joining CDT was a chance to And Um, to sort of stabilize, you know, here was a company that was NASDAQ listed. It was, you know, had customers, it was growing. Um, so there was some stability, uh, for, for me, for my wife. Um, but also it was an interesting chance because it had a very similar approach, which was, it was developing a technology that it wanted to license to manufacturers and consumer, consumer electronics. So it was, you know, displays rather than data storage like NanoMagnetics. But. What was interesting is I saw the strategic approach that I had had with NanoMagnetics was the same approach being taken by CDT and, and I could see the, the, some of the challenges with getting that to, to work out and they had managed to avoid some of the, the broader challenges. I'm happy to talk about those too. But, um, but it kind of, it gave me a chance to revalidate myself. Um, so I had, you know, kind of been ego destroyed from that first experience, feeling that I didn't know anything. Um, I saw how a larger organization, um, worked, saw some great things about how they organized and managed their organization, but also saw some things that I didn't like, um, that, uh, gave me a chance to sort of try out ideas or, or see how those ideas would play out in that organization and really kind of refine what I thought it would take to make something work. And it was sort of that. reflective experience that I had with CDT in the context of that first, uh, you know, failure or first experience that allowed me to I think put the right puzzle pieces together when I joined Endomag.

Chris Reichhelm:

Was it when you were looking or comparing the two, uh, in terms of business model, in terms of strategic approach, was it, was it a function of, was it a function of the decisions they were making? Was it a function of business model? Was it something else?

Eric Mayes:

Yeah, it's, it's, uh, partly business model and really understanding your customer. So It seems obvious in the case of a display industry that you know who your customers are. You know the Sonys, you know the Panasonics, um, Data Storage, you know the IBMs, you know the Seagates, the Western Digitals. But, but that true customer understanding of, you know, how do they want to use this technology, um, was one of the big challenges. So the first company, NanoMagnetics, we developed a liquid Um, that, you know, offered the promise to, uh, really improve the capacities of the then technology and actually the still technology, which is a thin films evaporated in a vacuum chamber. Um, and we understood what they wanted ultimately out of the product, but we hadn't really appreciated that they didn't want to change all that infrastructure that they had invested in to manufacture. And that if we were going to really try to break into that industry. We needed to integrate up to the first differentiable point, which is making a disk that fits into the supply chain. Cambridge Display Technology? Okay, we've got this polymer. Um, we need to, and they had taken the steps to try to solve that problem, you know, uh, partnered and, you know, worked with a Litrex company in the U. S. to make, um, big format printers. Um, tried to basically demonstrate that a printing technique would work for these display manufacturers, but a lot of display manufacturers, what were they doing? They had big, uh, vacuum chambers and they'd evaporate material, and, and so to try to change them from their existing investments was a, was a, was a huge ask, and, and, You know, it's sort of natural to look to, you know, where could you make a differentiable product that could go into consumer electronics? And some of the areas that they did this early on when I joined in the hand revenues was working with, you know, a lighting manufacturer, Osram, that made some small displays and they made those displays, those displays could go into products. And, and, and that was the, the aspect that worked, but, you know, clearly the big driver their own hope to get to was to get into television panels, to cell phones, to

Chris Reichhelm:

absolutely

Eric Mayes:

iPads.

Chris Reichhelm:

Yeah. So you joined EndoMag in 2010 and you've accumulated these skills in this experience and what proved to be the most valuable skills in those early days for you?

Eric Mayes:

So I think the, the skill was Uh, initially, um, you know, being able to research and analytical skills around understanding the space. Cause I've never done anything in the life science industry. I knew nothing about the regulatory environment. Um, I knew nothing about, really, I knew nothing about breast cancer. And so to go from a career in consumer electronics into life science industry is, is a, was a huge ask. comes with a lot of ignorance. And actually, that's not a skill, but that was a characteristic that I had that actually I think was pretty valuable. In that, I know that if I had had a background in life science industry or medical devices, I would have looked at our system, in particular, a system that a surgeon uses to wave over the patient and to help find either primary tumor or lymph nodes involved in the spread of cancer, but also an injectable, an injectable magnetic nanoparticle. Had I had experience, I would have expected that injectable to be a drug. And. And, you know, and this would be a drug device, you know, combination, um, but I really didn't know, you know, was it a drug? Was it a device? And so it started with the first principles of, you know, what, how, how are these things defined from a regulatory perspective? Someone that knew what they were doing would have automatically assumed, oh, this is a drug. It's got to be a drug. Regulators will say it's a drug and they would take it forward as a drug. And it probably never would have existed had someone done that because it would have needed to go through, you know, developmental trials. And, uh, no one probably would have funded that and, and it would have run out of cash before it got started. But in speaking with our, uh, notified body, you know, representing the regulators, um, asking the question of, you know, having a discussion with them of, you know, what, what What makes a drug and what makes a device? And they said, well, it's related to the primary mode of action. Is the primary mode of action, is it immunological? Is it biological? Is it chemical? In which case, it's a drug. If it's not, then it's a device. And I thought, ooh, that's quite powerful. Because at the nanoscale, you know, what is physical? What is chemical? Um, and, and so, you know, it was inspired to build up an argument about why this was a device, um, that it gets physically trapped in lymph nodes, filtered out, and that it's excited temporarily by this magnetic probe that, uh, creates a signal within these particles that you can then read, read back out and detect and localize them. Um, and, and that was pivotal, um, had that not gone our way. Well, one, we would have run out of cash because our investors were sort of waiting to see that that could be possible. But, um, but it was pivotal because it meant that we could get into clinic. Very quickly, and uh, and so that was, you know, it was my ignorance, um, that helped guide me on that path.

Chris Reichhelm:

That's fascinating.

Eric Mayes:

Or at least my pure ignorance.

Chris Reichhelm:

And that's not something, yeah, but that's not something that had come up before. That's not something that had been thought of before by the founders, by the academics, by anyone else that was around the business at the time.

Eric Mayes:

Correct. People, you know, they didn't, they just knew they would need regulatory approval. Um, They hadn't really thought through what that journey would be. Um, they were, you know, very much involved on that process with me. But it was me driving that and asking those questions.

Chris Reichhelm:

But that's fascinating that that lack of experience and insight, the and that, that inability to do the pattern recognition, which is why you often want that domain appreciation or insight experience. How, how not having that in these occasions can often lead to the more innovative breakthrough.

Eric Mayes:

Yeah, and I'm, and I don't know whether it's a good or bad thing, but that's sort of influenced how I've approached talent in general as grow, as we grew the organization, is that

Chris Reichhelm:

Oh, that's interesting.

Eric Mayes:

If I use a meat analogy, um, I like, uh, Rare talent, not, not completely raw, um, but, but not well done. Um, you know, experience is a good thing, but too much of experience. Yeah. It needs to, you know, it's a, it's a fine balance, but I like people who have enough experience and, and good analytical capabilities, awareness of themselves and want to prove something. Cause I found those to be people that really can grow effectively with an organization and, and, you know, hopefully ultimately, you know, lead, lead teams

Chris Reichhelm:

At all stages of the company's development?

Eric Mayes:

Pretty much at all stages of the company's development, um, have tried, uh, tried some senior people at times and find that, you know, experience is great, but, um, But it comes with other things. You know, sometimes it comes with people are tired. You know, they've had a great career. They've got a lot of experience, but they don't quite have the energy that it takes. Or they have come from a larger organization and they've got a lot of infrastructure around them that they don't fully appreciate. And so when they go into a small company context, they don't perform that well because they They don't rely, you know, remember that they were relying on, uh, additional people. And I've had, not just with, with, uh, Endomag, but sort of throughout my career seeing that where, you know, people can come in a bit too experienced and, and too experienced or too developed for the state of the organization that they're joining.

Chris Reichhelm:

Yes. What were the key milestones for you along the journey? So, You started in 2010. What was that first big key milestone moment for you? You remember?

Eric Mayes:

The first, yeah, absolutely. So, it was basically an existential crisis for the company. So, when I joined, um, all they had was a device. So, they had this, this product called the Sentimag® for, for detecting magnetic particles in the body. Um, and it was pretty well down the, the, the productization path with the manufacturing partner. And I came in, uh, Brought on a consultant to help set up a quality system to move towards getting that device at CE mark approval. But that device was only good if you use it to detect something and needed the something to detect. And at the time, you know, strategically, everyone agreed where we wanted to get to is to have our own concealable that we could inject and then localize. But that hadn't been been done yet. And so the plan was clinically to use a material um, produced by a company, Guerbet in France, that was making a contrast agent for MRI, but use it off label to inject and detect lymph nodes that would be implicated in the spread of cancer. And so from the very start, you know, I got in contact with them, said, you know, this is what we want to do, want to build a relationship with you. Almost no sooner did we get the CE mark for our instrument, the Sentimag® than I get a call from the BD people at Guerbet saying, just wanted to let you know we are stopping manufacturing of our material. And the, uh, material that's out there clinically will expire by the end of March 2011. Um, and, uh, so I thought, I think I've made a very big mistake. Because, you know, I'd left this nice, stable job with Sumitomo Chemical that had acquired CDT. Um, told my wife, yeah, I know exactly what I'm doing this time with this startup. And, uh, and we had, you know, a system and nothing to use it with. And, and so, that was the very first crisis, is basically I'd started, um, had early started the process of identifying potential manufacturers. We thought Guerbet would be our partner, they were out, um, I flew around the world to anyone who was manufacturing anything that had ever been clinically approved. Um, to source the material to, then also, you know, this question of, well, what do we want to source? What's the right size? So, doing some, you know, clinical work at the same time to decide, you know, what is the right, uh, criteria for us for acceptance tests. Um, while also speaking with the regulators and having this discussion of, you know, is it a device? Is it a drug? Um, Being very fortunate at a time that one of the existing manufacturers of contrast agents, Schering, was acquired by Bayer. And Bayer already had some contrast agents that were based on gadolinium, which has become the sort of favorite contrast agent in the world of MRI. And Schering had this iron oxide agent that the Bayer said, we don't need that anymore. And so I contacted the manufacturer who had basically just lost one of their biggest clients and said, would you be interested? Uh, we've got a, an application for, for that product. And it turned out that their, their product really met the design criteria that we had. Um, also, fortunately, they were, they're our Japanese organization and having worked for Sumitomo Chemical, um, for a while, I understood how they operate and I felt, uh, a bit more familiar and a kinship with the Japanese organization in terms of taking a longer term view on building the relationship and then growing a business. And so managed to secure a supply to that, managed to get it packaged, managed to get the regulators to review it and guide that it would be regulated as a medical device in Europe, and then got a CE mark by the end of 2011. So basically that was well, no, no, it was 12 months. So I joined in June 2010. By the end of 2010, I had this news, and so 2011 was this running around the globe trying to sort this problem, uh, and, uh. And also tried to raise some money to keep the show on the road, um, as the sole employee. So that's kind of, I feel like that was my year that I really gave it all to Endomag.

Chris Reichhelm:

That's crazy. Was it just primarily you at the time?

Eric Mayes:

Yeah, I had a chairman that brought on that was from the space, super supportive. You know, the founders were, you know, involved, um, some consultants, but, but yeah, I was the only full time employee.

Chris Reichhelm:

It was you.

Eric Mayes:

It was me.

Chris Reichhelm:

Holy cow.

Eric Mayes:

Yeah. But, you know, there's nothing like. The risk of failure to make sure that you, uh, leave no stone unturned.

Chris Reichhelm:

And the chip on your shoulder from the last one.

Eric Mayes:

Exactly. Exactly.

Chris Reichhelm:

As you saw it. As you saw it. As you saw it. Yeah.

Eric Mayes:

I had something to prove.

Chris Reichhelm:

So, right. That's the first one. Exactly. To me, really. I think that's so valuable. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But that's the, you know, that's the audience for so many of these things that we're working on personally. It's always us. So, that's the first key milestone. What do the milestones look like thereafter?

Eric Mayes:

They, uh, they don't get any less existential. Um, but, uh, but just kind of grow in magnitude. So, at the end of 2011, um, you know, basically it was halfway through 2011 that we got the notification that we could take this forward as a device, that release and investment. Um, was able to then start building out the team and, and really the way I wanted to build it out was to build a strong skeleton of, of executives who could, you know, wear the many hats that are required, had enough skills in the areas, but not too much that they wanted to prove something as well. So brought on a person who's CTO and still CTO and brought on a person who is chief operations officer, still COO. Um, they were director of technology and operations at the time because needed to give them some, some, uh, space to, to grow. Um, but they've stayed with the organization the whole time and we've, we kind of built out that way from the core out. And then they've now, you know, the COO's got a team of, you know, 35 odd. The CTO's got a team of, you know, nearly 40 now. But coming back to, you know, what were the crises, what were the challenges that we had? Um, probably the, the next, um, big one was, uh, the development of, of the next product. So, we'd managed to commercialize with a distribution partner, um, in Europe and, uh, and again, another Japanese owned business called Sysmex. Um, we can come back and talk a little bit about that journey, but in terms of the, the challenge is that, um, they were quite enthusiastic about our product. Um, the market was enthusiastic, but, uh, they had sort of overordered from us. So we had a sort of peak year that then they had to sell down the next year. So our revenues do what a lot of early stage companies revenues do and sort of porpoise up and porpoise down and, and, and, and rumble around. Which, um, you know, despite the fact that we were generating revenues, it looked uncertain and that created a challenging background to raise money at a time when we were also, we had developed a second concealable to address what we learned was an even bigger unmet need in the industry, which was, you know, we were helping to find lymph nodes that were implicated in the spread of cancer. But surgeons are coming to us saying, oh yeah, we love that product, but do you know what we have to do to find, you know, the primary tumor now and minimize the amount of healthy tissue we take? They're like, oh, what's that? I said, well, we have to, you know, insert a wire or the radiologist inserts a wire with a little barbed hook at the end and that's done under image guidance and then patient goes from radiology to surgery and then we follow that wire down cutting as we go until we get towards the end and then we take out a ball of tissue. In about a quarter of the cases between the time that's placed and the time we do the surgery, that wire can move and we end up having to bring back a quarter of these patients because we've taken out the wrong tissue or an insufficient, um, level of tissue. And so if you guys could do something that would ensure that we go to the right spot and just take out the bit that we need and that part doesn't move, then that would be transformative. And so we developed a product, um, and got that approved in the U. S. in 2016. So it was a, strangely, it was a U. S. approval easier than the European approval because The regulations were continually changing, uh, and are still continually changing from country to country. Um, and so we knew this was going to be a big problem.

Chris Reichhelm:

Do you recall how that problem was identified within the company?

Eric Mayes:

Yeah, I'd love to say that we were all

Chris Reichhelm:

I mean, clearly by speaking with customers, but

Eric Mayes:

Yeah, really that was it, speaking with customers.

Chris Reichhelm:

Yeah.

Eric Mayes:

Um, so, you know, I'd love to say that we had, you know, whiteboarded this and looked at all of the feedback that we had had. Um, but no, it came directly from customers saying, hey dummies. You know, I know you're doing this, but we've got this problem over here and it probably took us a couple of those interactions before we said,'Oh, that's a good point.' And then we, what we've developed over time is, is realized that part of the secret to our success is that our clinical customers, particularly the ones who adopt new technologies are the ones that are leading not only clinically, but academically. Um, and so. We'd kind of done this early on, but we started rolling it out to the whole of our organization to make sure the whole of our team understands the history of, of breast cancer management. Um, you know, what are the big papers, what are the big moments in history, what are the big innovations, and, and that we always stay current in that because when we talk to customers, if we understand where they're coming from, we understand what's happening within that industry, they treat us collegially. And that makes development so much easier because they trust us to understand and develop their problems. And so it wasn't just going out and speaking to customers, it was really getting to understand our customers and trying to almost become our customers, as it were, so that we would be accepted within their midst. And it was those sorts of relationships that led us to that. Uh, that product. Um,

Chris Reichhelm:

Who's having those discussions? Sorry, who's having those discussions from your side? Is it just the commercial team? Product teams? Everyone?

Eric Mayes:

Actually, everyone. Um, now, you know, who makes the most of it? You know, we have a market development team, we have a clinical team, we have a technical team, but um, but when we were, you know, small, you know, e. g. sub 10, uh, or sub 20 people, we We would take everyone to a conference. We would put our CFO on the stand to talk to surgeons. Um, absolutely he hated it, but, uh, but it was, it was a chance to help reinforce what the company does for him. So, you know, it's not that we put them out for every single customer, but get them on there, speak to the product and, you know, after that first conference, we didn't, and we sort of did this early on and don't do this now because we've got, you know, such a large team. But, you know, he had come back from that first conference saying, Oh, I really understand the business now. You know, I thought we were in diagnostics doing this or that and the fact that he had to explain it, um, not just to his family or his parents, uh, but to a surgeon, uh, that level of discipline helped him really fundamentally understand the nature of the business. And I think that made us stronger. But, um, but that's also something that our customers ultimately appreciated as they, you They know that the organization is really committed to understanding the challenges, understanding their needs and, and working to develop them. And that's developing that relationship and that, that, um, I guess reputation for how we work with, with those customers has, has really differentiated us in the market.

Chris Reichhelm:

I mean, that's about culture, I'm guessing, an awful lot. Yeah. How did you, uh, and from discussions with other CEOs and entrepreneurs and executives, Inculcating that kind of spirit, that sense of urgency, that willingness to be a partner to the community you're serving is what they're trying to do. Lots of people try it, few achieve it. How do you think you were able to make it happen?

Eric Mayes:

That's a good question that I kind of wrestle with. Because, you know, our, our mission is one that when, when people join the organization now, they all comment that, you know, they love the, you know, we're setting out to make a difference. They understand it. And it's, it's one thing to say you're setting out to make a difference. Um, but when they come and interview and they meet people, they really feel that this organization is set up to do that. And I often, you know, it's, it has grown organically, so it's difficult to really pick elements apart. But I think some elements of it. are, um, you know, sort of passion, um, across the team for what we're doing, but also a focus on education, um, and educating ourselves, um, and, and that, you know, I talk about, you know, taking people out to a conference and having them discuss the products, but we've also had a couple of past presidents of the American Society of Breast Surgeons, fly them over to talk to the whole company and take everyone through, you know, basically the development history of, of the, the standard of care and breast cancer, um, in terms of surgery. And, you know, even our admin understands, what does this ultrasound look like? Why is this one concerning? Why is this one not concerning? Not that they're going to go out and become, you know, ultrasonographers or anything, but, but we had this culture where we valued the space in which our customers were understanding and learning how they do what they do and understanding how we are a part of that process of advancing, um, their practice. So it's really tying, that education process ties people's work to the outcomes and helps provide that motivation.

Chris Reichhelm:

And I suppose it, to an extent, because lots of companies talk about culture and they talk about the importance of serving their customer. Um, one could be forgiven for getting the sense that they almost say it in an agnostic kind of way, as in, um, It's important to serve customers. Yeah, obviously. But what you're doing with the education piece is making it more real. And, you know, so it's not just the boss saying this. It's not just my line manager saying this. Not just going to another conference, which gives you a sense of that, a bit of spirit, a bit of energy. You get into it a little bit. But that, you know, the education piece where thought leaders or, uh, academics or researcher or consultant surgeons are coming in to talk about how they're treating this on a regular basis. So I guess a bit of consistency is quite key there too. To constantly reinforce these messages. This is why we're here. We're here to make a difference to breast cancer. We're here to help solve the breast cancer challenge. That's why we exist. If that indeed is the, uh, the mission of the company, you know, you know, you know, but that's what we're doing here. And so I, I, you know, I guess kind of gradually, slowly, slowly, then all at once people start to believe, okay, no, this actually is really why we're here.

Eric Mayes:

Yeah, and we continue those things to this day, you know, surgeons that are either, you know, based here in the UK or ones that are passing through, they like to come see us, visit our labs, talk about new products, get, you know, hands on with the things that are going on, um, but we also take the opportunity to interview them, um, and to try to disseminate that within the organization, you know, show them around, give people inside the organization a chance to speak to a customer and understand, you know, You know, why what they're doing is valuable, um, you know, at all levels, because I think that's one of the, you know, challenges as the company grows, you know, the people that go out to the conferences are the, you know, sales and marketing team and, you know, R& D may not get out there, or the quality team might, or regulatory team might not get out there, and so they sort of become distanced from those great motivational events when customers say, oh, we love what you're doing, we love how you're doing this. And so to bring some of that back into the organization is critically important, particularly as it grows, because you very much. Uh, you can end up diluting one of the things that really helped make you, you know, differentiated.

Chris Reichhelm:

I want to go back to a point you raised earlier. You mentioned that in terms of hiring practice, you've tended to go for the, let's say, perhaps not the most experienced hire, obviously not the most corporate hire, but people who were high quality generalists who could adapt well, who could work in a variety of different situations, who could problem solve. Uh, Yeah. Uh, we hear of that profile, we draw up that profile quite a lot, obviously, for companies at the early stage. It's, uh, I guess it's less usual or less normal to hear about it at the more advanced stages. In that scenario, though, how do you build up credibility with that kind of audience if you don't have that depth in the domain, if you don't have that expertise around breast cancer? Or if you haven't been doing this for the longest period of time, because, you know, that boils down to trust, and getting these people to trust you, forming this community, getting them coming back to you, and getting them to want to engage with you, a lot of that has got to come down to trust on their part, for some reason they like dealing with you. They start to trust you, but you're not experts. So what's that secret?

Eric Mayes:

A very interesting point, because it's one that vexed us in terms of fundraising, um, but benefited us in terms of customer engagement. So for years we, you know, debated, oh, do we need a scientific advisory board? Do we need a clinical advisory board? Um, and, and maybe it's a consequence of the space that we play in that quite often those can be quite political. So. in, in, in, uh, spaces where, um, this particular surgeon, you know, has done this and they've got these views. Well, they may have a cadre of people that, you know, they're all on team X, but there's a team Y that thinks that person's a complete jerk and doesn't know what they're doing um, and, and, so we've kind of shied away from users, it's not that we haven't engaged with, with customers and tried to, you know, figure out who is sort of more valued as an opinion leader, um, but if we had gone out and brought people in, we could have limited our audience by, in a sense, the political affiliations that come with people, particularly the people who maybe get involved with industry. Um, you know, you'll have these surgeons who will be on every trial for every new device and The industry, well, the clinical industry as it were, says, oh, they're just a shill for industry, you know, we don't take what they say, so if you get them on board, then, you know, you might think you've got an advocate, but really, you know, you're sort of relegated to another one of those companies that just, you know, is paying this person off.

Chris Reichhelm:

And you hear this from partners or potential customers?

Eric Mayes:

Absolutely. Absolutely.

Chris Reichhelm:

Okay. That's interesting.

Eric Mayes:

And so the way

Chris Reichhelm:

So that's where you begin to be speaking to your customers and partners on a regular basis, even about stuff like this.

Eric Mayes:

Absolutely. And yeah, so every time we go to a conference now, and it started informally, we just have a social meal with some of these surgeons who just liked us because we were different than other companies out there. You know, we, we educated ourselves about the space they were in. We were able to talk about current issues. We were able to understand. You know, technically, uh, what they were doing, you know, not that we were surgeons, but we knew enough to have a conversation and, and they were like, well, you know, I'd rather go hang out with these interesting people compared to, you know, some, you know, yeah, we'll go to that big, you know, J& J or Medtronic, uh, soiree just to, um, you know, have some free nibbles, but we'd rather hang out with those Endomag people because they're really interesting. We can grab a drink and really chat through things. And, and so we fostered that type of interaction and through the internal education side, um, and particularly when it came to us building our own sales teams and market development teams, we put everyone through a rigorous process. education process with Aviva. And if they don't survive that, they, they don't stay around. Um, because we've found that if they get through that process, the credibility is there. You know, it's not that they need to be, um, that someone says, Oh, anoints them as, Oh, these people are knowledgeable. They can just go out into the field and people see that they can communicate. Um, and you know, it's, we've built a reputation and so they, you know, come with that a bit, but if they, um, continue to show the qualities that we try to imbue, um, that gives them the credibility. So we've, we've rolled our own as it were, um, partly by necessity because of the political nature of, of, uh, you know, clinical field, at least the clinical field that we're in.

Chris Reichhelm:

Wow, that's, that's remarkable. I haven't heard that before. Where you've created your own education program. In the bigger companies, yes, I know that they take on, you know, these sorts of things, but in a younger company, this level of the bigger companies, you know,

Eric Mayes:

the logic were really surprised. And, you know, I think when they originally approached us, they were just interested in the products, but the more they got to understand the company, they said, actually one of the comments they had was, we hate selling against you in the field. Because your customers are so damn loyal. And I mean, they even think that they prefer something else technically, but they'll stick with you because they believe in the company. And, and that is a core element of value that we built. And I do, I don't know whether that's generally applicable to other companies. I often think, how would I do this if I were in a different industry? You know, what's the equivalent here? But it has been super powerful for differentiating us.

Chris Reichhelm:

How early were your first revenues?

Eric Mayes:

As far as I know, we're in 2012, so we got our CE mark for the Sentimag instrument at the end of 2010, when I found out we don't have anything to use it with, CE mark for the thing to use it with, MagTrace, at the end of 2011. Um, it was clear that we could not build our own sales team. It was, you know, a big challenge and, and the value, all the things, you know, I've talked about the things that we've done that helped differentiate us, but we could have not achieved all these things without. a variety of partnerships, supply chain or distribution or otherwise. And so one of the earliest relationships that even goes back to 2010 was with this diagnostics company called Sysmex, a Japanese firm, but we met with the European side of them. And they had developed a diagnostic system for analyzing lymph nodes and breast cancer, particularly to basically Interoperatively, during the surgery, take out a lymph node, pop it in this machine, and it would tell you whether it's cancerous or not. So rather than doing the surgery and waiting for a week for the pathologist to come back and say, oh yeah, there's cancer in these nodes, you need to bring the patient back and take out the rest of the lymph nodes, they could do this while the patient's still on the table and, you know, save the pain of a follow up surgery. And so they analyzed the patient and they were able to find the lymph nodes. Um, met them at a conference, they said, Oh, we should talk. And so we started talking, um, and, and they took a chance on us. They basically said, you know, we're really excited by what you're doing. We think there's an opportunity here. And so we chose for them to be our distribution partner across EMEA, gave them, uh, exclusivity and, but in order to, to get that deal on the, on the road, they wanted certainly more than 10 patients and a prototype device. So we had these, you know, these two approved devices. We were running a trial, which we thought would be the trial to end all trials. 150 patients using the standard of care, using radioisotope versus our Magtrace material and showing that we had the same, uh, same outcomes, uh, or at least non inferior outcomes. Um, and they said, okay, well, we'll, we'd love to see some of the early pull of the data. And based on that, then we might, you know, sign to this agreement. Um, but despite having put Uh, uh, a data review point in that agreement, the, the academic partners who were involved in that said, no, we're not going to share this information with a, you know, commercial partner. And, and, and so it was sort of dragging on and they were interested enough. They said, listen, we're just going to take some of your devices, we'll do our own evaluation. And so they basically ran the equivalent trial that finished about the same time as our, our trial. Again, 150 patients and saw non inferiority to the standard of care, but it had all these upsides of a simpler supply chain. You could use it in any rural setting and you don't need nuclear medicine. And that was enough to convince them to sign an agreement. And so in 20, 2012. Uh, we started, they bought their first systems from us, and we started, you know, commercializing across Europe, Middle East, and Africa, um, and, and, and that relationship continues to this day, although we, uh, terminated the exclusive arrangement at the end of 2022. So in 23, we took certain countries like the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Nordics, direct. Thank you very much. Because we felt that we had advanced such that our teams could do a better, a better job, um, partly because, you know, their teams did a great job, but they were selling diagnostic equipment to pathologists, not surgery systems to surgeons, and, and so it became clear that, that we felt we could do a better job. We had an amicable parting of the ways, but then we had to, you know, post Brexit, uh, do a lot of infrastructure setting, you know, we had not been doing direct sales at all until 2023, and we were, you know, by that stage, you know, 80 odd, close to 100 people, um, and, you know, didn't have customer care, didn't have all the logistics, didn't have a third party warehouse, You know, there was a lot to, to implement, um, leading to January 2023. And that was, that was probably the, I, I skipped over or kind of missed your, um, second big crisis, uh, which was going to the U. S. This was the third crisis, which is going direct, uh, in Europe. It wasn't a crisis, but you know, big, big challenge.

Chris Reichhelm:

Did it prove to be the right move?

Eric Mayes:

Absolutely. A hundred percent. Um, it stepped, stepped up the level of our organization's professionalism, um, to the right degree at the right time. It was a big challenge, it was a big lift for us, but you know, um, putting in a customer care team, um, setting up a warehouse, uh, getting logistics, getting the systems in place so that those groups could talk to one another. The things we had poked at in the past, and this sort of was the forcing function to get all of that stuff established. And I was really proud of how our team was able to do that. And when, when the taps turned on on, you know, January 1st, 2023, it was a question of, you know, have we done all the right things? Were we missing anything? And to, to go from what was sort of quarterly orders and quarterly revenues to daily revenues, um, and, and, uh, and having that sort of cadence. I'm glad that we waited until then to do that. But now that we had done that, it was hugely transformative business and I think that was one of the big, um, I think accelerators in terms of valuation that we had.

Chris Reichhelm:

Yeah. Um, when it came to a nice was having your own sale team, having your own commercial team. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Eric Mayes:

And having all the parts in place

Chris Reichhelm:

you mentioned

Eric Mayes:

can see how that scale.

Chris Reichhelm:

Yeah. It's interesting you say just the level of professionalism it brought the rest of the organization to having that commercial team in-house. The kind of impact it had on the rest of the group. Can you talk a little bit more about that? Where did you see the impact the most?

Eric Mayes:

It's a good question. Uh, where did we see the most, I mean, certainly in, in, uh, in growth of revenues, that was, you know, an immediate, um, impact.

Chris Reichhelm:

Yeah.

Eric Mayes:

I think it was also an impact across how the organization worked together. Um, so as you go through these sort of periods of, of, of scaling, uh, where people are wearing multiple hats, sometimes You have to, you know, cut people's hat in half and say, okay, this is where you focus. And this is where you're going to focus. And so transitioning from using distributors, um, to having a direct team means that you have different teams involved in more of the process. Um, and in those interdepartmental relationships can, can change because responsibilities sort of change and people feel like, you know, part of their. Uh, their function is being taken away from them. So, even though, you know, we've expanded and professionalized, um, you're telling some people, Oh, you now have to focus on this narrow aspect. And, uh, and that can be a negative impact because, you know, people loved having visibility across all of these other things, and you're telling them to just stick to this narrow lane, um, because we've got this other team here that's, you know, professionalizing the customer interaction. They're like, well, where were we? Well, were you bad with customers? No, no, you were fine with customers, but you need to focus on this side and we've got these other people to do that. So it was, it was, uh, probably the more fundamental impact was just the intra departmental impacts across the organization and trying to help people realize that We weren't minimizing their contribution, um, we were just, you know, working in a much more defined and, and, uh, and distributed way to scale the organization. Um,

Chris Reichhelm:

you mentioned that going to the you,

Eric Mayes:

sorry,

Chris Reichhelm:

you mentioned that going to the US was a huge challenge as well.

Eric Mayes:

So the 2016, this, uh, new product that we had developed to replace the wire that I mentioned, uh, a product called Magseed. We got that approved by the FDA and we knew that that was going to be a, a strong product in the, in the US. The challenge was that we didn't know what route we'd gone in Europe with this, uh, you know, distribution or strategic distributor relationship. Um, for North America, what we wanted to do was try our hand at being direct. We weren't going to go direct across the U. S. all from day one. But wanted to focus in a state where we already had a lot of clinical relationships with hospitals, and so we chose the state of Texas, because we already had some systems at MD Anderson, had some in Dallas, Texas quite a big state, a lot of diversity in terms of hospitals and payers, and so What we were going to do is try to build up a mini direct team in the state of Texas to get our feet wet, um, to then use that to decide whether we partner to, to distribute in the U. S. or whether we can demonstrate enough that we can then, uh, scale that organization. But, um, but I mentioned about our early revenues being sort of porpoise y. You know, we'd have, you know, a big up where they ordered a lot, but then they'd over ordered versus their customers. And so, you know, even though our revenues, uh, had, had shot up and theirs were pretty steady, you know, we had to wait until they caught up, uh, with, with the customers before they'd order again. And with, with that background, despite the fact that we were growing in terms of clinical utility, our revenues. looked a bit questionable. And so we struggled to raise money to build that mini direct team in the U. S. And that put us on a path to basically use the same strategy we'd used in EMEA, which was find a strategic partner that could act as our distributor. And, and so we, we actually partnered with effectively our competition. So the manufacturer, the largest manufacturer of the systems to detect radioisotopes, um, which is the competing technology to do a central lymph node biopsy. We said, well, hey guys, you just make that instrument. It's just a capital sale. You don't control the consumables. It's pretty, uh, diffuse, uh, supply chain on, on that side. What we have is we've got consumables, you know, one to do a central lymph node biopsy, one to find the primary tumor, and this instrument. If you replaced your global installed base with our systems, that could be generating, you know, half a billion a year in terms of consumable revenues. And they're like, this is interesting. For us, it was interesting, you know, to access their installed base. For them, it was interesting to access the consumable revenues. And so we, we partnered with a company called Mammotome, which is part of Danaher to act as our distributor. And And, and at that time, you know, we were, uh, we were raising money and, and struggled to, to raise money. And so they, um, basically partnered with us to make an investment, which suddenly convinced our own investors that maybe this was a good thing. Um, and then we, then we closed the round that we were seeking to, to, to close at the time. But, um, but, but that really set us on the path to using their existing infrastructure to commercialize in the U. S. But it wasn't necessarily smooth sailing and what we found was that, um, as you'd expect if they, if all their sales team was doing capital sales, the fact that they've now got a consumable, meant that their motivations or compensation was slightly misaligned from, from strategizing towards, uh, optimizing for Endomag's technology. Um, and then also like many corporate relationships, um, people move on and, uh, you know, some people we originally did the deal with had moved on, new people came in, those new people come out, new people come in, and the rationale for the original, uh, you know, arrangement changes. And so we started putting our own people in to support them, even though we couldn't sell directly, we could support the sales, uh, because we didn't feel that they were, you know, addressing the market the way that we wanted, and so that was, that has been a big challenge, and that's kind of the context in which, um, we were acquired, which was you know, we have this team of people in the U. S. growing the business or supporting the growth of the business, but we aren't able to grow directly. We saw the value of going direct in Europe and the impact that had, and, uh, and, and we wanted to find a way to, to have that impact in the U. S. And as it so happens, you know, Hologic, they've got, you know, an excellent sales organization, um, and they were able to. You know, acquire the company and, and we'll be, you know, taking our products direct. So we, you know, they'll see the benefit of that, uh, that growth that we expect in the U.S. Um, you know, we couldn't have done it without, you know, without Mammotome. They were, you know, a great partner, that original, uh, deal motivator for them and, and for us, um, you know, we could have easily run out of money had they not done that. And then, you know, some great people, you know, helped, uh, helped us commercialize. But it was also, you know, you hear so many horror stories about the US, that wasn't easy, but at least it wasn't a complete horror show.

Chris Reichhelm:

Yes, yes. I have two more questions for you. What, what skill did you not have when you went into this role that you feel you've developed as part of this? as part of this engagement.

Eric Mayes:

I think communication, hopefully this comes across, the potential irony of saying this, but my ability to communicate has improved dramatically. Um, it's not that I wasn't able to communicate with the early, um, companies, you know, communicating You know, uh, complicated technology and, and, and into...uh... Customers, but, but it's more than that sort of technology translation, um, ability. It's more about, um, distilling the complex, uh, for investors. Um, about abstracting what our teams learn and sharing that throughout the organization and in different, different modes of communication. Um, and in honing my skills to find the right way to communicate to the right people and to understand the information such that I can be an effective communicator. And that was something that I feel has taken years to develop. Not that it's perfect, um, but it's better than it was. Um, but I think that's an essential skill for me today. And I think one of the things that has made me at least successful within our organization, um, and I think if you pulled anyone out of the team or anyone out of our partners, you know, what is the, the thing that they feel positively about, about me is, is, my understanding of the organization and ability to communicate it.

Chris Reichhelm:

That's, um, there's a lot of gold in that, that piece, you know, that communication piece for all of the, for, uh, for all of the focus on all sorts of different skills. But for leadership, it still comes down to communication and that ability to find the right form of words with the right audience and articulate it in the right way so that it's understood, so that it resonates. And it sounds so simple. It sounds so basic. It's so hard.

Eric Mayes:

You still have this. We do, you know, our engagement surveys with the organization and one of the things that still comes back, you know, one or two people say, I don't know what the strategy is. And, um, and, you know, we have town halls, we've got, you know, a mixed leadership team that goes throughout the organization. I even stand up in town halls and say, listen, if anyone doesn't understand the strategy or has any questions, I'm happy to, you know, just book an hour with me. I'll sit down with you. It doesn't matter who you are. Um, you know, I don't have my own office. We're all sort of open plan, very open environment, very communicative. But even with all of that, still people don't get all the answers that they want.

Chris Reichhelm:

Yeah. Yeah. I get Last question, Eric. That chip that you had on your shoulder when you started this.

Eric Mayes:

Yeah.

Chris Reichhelm:

Is it still there?

Eric Mayes:

You know, I think it sort of still is. Um, you know, I feel like, you know, having had this exit, you know, my God, it was a textbook, you know, textbook exit, you know, great returns in a really difficult environment. Um, you know, I looked through the list of all the things that we had, but, uh, and it's not imposter syndrome. Um, even though, you know, occasionally I'll have that. Uh, when I reflect on myself, I realize, oh yeah, I've learned a lot in all of these decades, and I feel really confident in my skills. But, um, but there's an element of always thinking, ah, you know, I could have done that better, or I wish I had made this decision then. Um, which is probably not a healthy, I think it drove me. earlier. Um, and it's probably, but it's probably a healthy thing to get rid of. Um, so I'm hoping that that chip is, is maybe just a nice, nice level of scar tissue, no longer a chip.

Chris Reichhelm:

Yeah. Would you dive back into it again? Go do another one at some point?

Eric Mayes:

I would. Um, but I've got a great opportunity. I mean, Hologic has, yeah, one of the, I think the nicest things about, you'd ask about the exit. Uh, earlier, and it was a great exit for a couple of reasons. One is, you know, a, you know, this textbook for the investors got back what they were hoping for. The board is happy. Our team is happy. But the thing our team is happy about the most, and what I'm happy about the most, is Hologic has recognized that, has recognized what we've built as more than just a product. That we've got this, this culture, um, that was so deep, they hadn't appreciated it when they first approached us. And, they're also, you know, they're a lot larger than us, but they're also still going through, they're growing. Uh, growing pains and they see a lot in us that they would like to absorb. And so they said, you know, this is, even though we're doing an integration, they kind of want to reverse integrate some aspects of what we have. Um, they, uh, they recognize that we've got an advantage when it comes to innovation and then we innovate on a global basis, you know, we, we focus on products from a global perspective, whereas they have traditionally focused on the U S perspective, U S products for U S customers, whereas we're global products or global customers. And so they're turning Endomag into their, you know, global innovation center for breast surgery. And so we've got a much broader, um, remit, uh, for new products, potentially for, you know, business development, you know, doing inorganic as well as organic, um, developments. And have asked me to, you know, stay on and lead that. So for me, it's the perfect exit in that if I had written down all the things I'd want, it's to be able to keep doing what we're already doing, but do it at a much larger scale. You know, it's great to get the exit alongside that, but to be able to continue to drive this organization and do so much more for more patients around the world is perfect. But if, you know, if they get tired of me, if I, uh, or if I get tired of, of this somehow. Um, yeah, I still have the energy. I feel like I, I still want to, it's like I've proved to myself that I can take something out of a university and commercialize it. And that was the original goal. I just wanted to prove to myself I could do that. And then, then the bar just keep, kept changing as, as time went on. But now there's part of me that says, okay, well you, you know, had a lucky break here, can you do it in another, in another field, you know, are the things that you've learned really applicable, or did you just get lucky and you just, you know, hired the right people? So I kind of feel like, so there's maybe that's the, that's the scar tissue from the chip, is I feel like I need to do it again just to prove to myself that I actually did know what I was doing rather than just getting lucky.

Chris Reichhelm:

Yeah,

Eric Mayes:

yeah,

Chris Reichhelm:

that's no bad thing. Uh, Eric, thank you so much. I have freaking loved this. I have really, really loved this. I have learned a ton. It's been super interesting, super insightful. So thank you so much.

Eric Mayes:

No, I really appreciate it, Chris. Good to, good to chat with you and good to see you again.

Chris Reichhelm:

You've been listening to the Lab to Market Leadership podcast, brought to you by Deep Tech Leaders. This podcast has been produced by Beauxhaus. You can find out more about us on LinkedIn, Spotify, Apple, or wherever you get your podcasts.

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Chris Reichhelm

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Eric Mayes PhD

Guest