Sizing Quantum Reality with Itan Barmes

In this episode, Itan Barmes cuts through the hype surrounding quantum computing and breaks down what actually matters for security leaders. He explains why qubit counts alone are a poor indicator of progress, and how his layered framework helps separate genuine scientific breakthroughs from noise. The discussion dives into the real quantum risks facing Bitcoin and Ethereum, highlighting why some assets are far more exposed than others and why dynamic attacks remain a universal challenge.

Itan shares the story of how his work in cryptographic inventory led to founding Qiz Security, and why most organizations misunderstand what a C-BOM should be. He outlines the practical steps CISOs need to take now, stressing inventory, governance, and realistic prioritization over fear-driven messages. The episode wraps with a grounded look at timelines, the coming inflection point in scalable quantum demonstrations, and why starting early is far better than arriving a day late.

Framework discussed on how to qualify news you read around quantum breakthroughs: https://www.deloitte.com/content/dam/assets-shared/docs/services/risk-advisory/2025/why-quantum-computers-are-not-cracking-rsa-yet.pdf

Takeaways

• Quantum computing hype often oversimplifies complex realities.
• Understanding quantum risks is crucial for organizations today.
• Bitcoin has vulnerabilities to quantum attacks, but not all are at risk.
• Dynamic attacks on cryptocurrencies pose significant threats.
• Cryptographic inventory is essential for risk mitigation.
• Organizations must prioritize actionable steps over exhaustive inventories.
• Procrastination in addressing quantum risks is common among executives.
• The future of quantum computing is uncertain but potentially transformative.
• Community collaboration is vital for addressing quantum challenges.
• Pragmatic approaches are necessary for effective quantum readiness.

Sound Bites

• "The devil is in the details."
• "Everything is going to break."
• "You need to start taking action."

Transcript

Francis Gorman (00:02.179)
Hi everyone, welcome to the Entropy Podcast. I'm your host, Francis Gorman. If you're enjoying our content, please take a moment to like and follow the show wherever you get your podcast from. Today I'm joined by Itan Barmes, the co-founder of Qiz Security, a startup that's aiming to turn cryptographic chaos into operational clarity in an age of post-quantum readiness. Itan has a background in physics and spent the past six years at delight as the global quantum cyber readiness capability lead. Itan, it's great to have you with me here today. Thank you very much.

Itan Barmes (00:29.986)
Thank you very much for inviting me, Francis. It's good to be here.

Francis Gorman (00:33.676)
It's great to have you, Ethan. I know it's not so long since we were together at the Quantum Safe Financial Forum in Bilbao and I twisted your arm to come on the show. So it's great to have you with me. Ethan, there's one thing you talked about at that conference and I kind of want to dig about a little bit on the topic area and it's to do with the hype around quantum.

all of the noise around Q day and when Q day will land and if there's any such thing as Q day and you have a really nice framework that kind of qualifies the news we may be seeing on social media or elsewhere around the hype of a quantum computer and it's not just about qubits. you tell me a little bit about how you approach breaking down the realities of scientific breakthroughs or

large breakthroughs in the quantum computing space and what that actually means for the listeners please.

Itan Barmes (01:29.678)
So you start with a big question. So I'm a physicist by training, and I've learned about Schor's algorithm and how quantum computers work 15, 20 years ago. And it's a fascinating topic. And as a physicist, I studied it, and I believe that I understand it pretty well.

But how do you, my work as a consultant, I had to convey the message to others. So I've worked for quite some time and talked to a lot of different people on how can we take this information that is, let's say, more for physicists and make it accessible for people without the background in physics.

And there were a lot of iterations. The article that we eventually published is work of really a few years of thinking about this. And as you said, people focus on the number of qubits because it's fairly easy and it is important. We need many more qubits than we have today for Shor's algorithm to actually work and break cryptography. But in principle, you can build more more and more qubits and have millions of

many millions of them, and that still won't be enough because they need to interact with each other and you need to do all kinds of operations that become a little bit more involved to describe. And that's why we built this framework in a fairly simple way. The first version was very detailed and we realized that it's not really accessible for a lot of people. And our goal was to...

as many people as possible would understand this, we started fairly simple. So without going into all the details, just in a very high level, you need memory. That's one thing. need one of the problems with qubits is that they're very sensitive. So they lose their information very quickly. So we have the three layers that you need to take into account. And the first one is just memory. What do you need to do in order to keep information alive? That's one thing.

Itan Barmes (03:44.93)
But if you solve that, it's just like you have a hard disk. You can keep information. Then you need to process it. And then we've built on top of it the layers of actual operations and explained what are the difficulties in quantum computing, and then specifically for Shor's algorithm. Because Shor's algorithm has some requirements that are very unique. So we've built that information that way.

It's very interesting to see how people consume this information. For some people it's interesting and people respond well to it. Not for everyone. There are still lot of debates whether this is the right framework and I actually really enjoy how people respond to it. It's really, really difficult to write something in such a way on such a complex topic.

that will satisfy everyone. So I'm not aiming for that. But I think that we've done a fairly good job introducing some of these concepts to new audiences.

Francis Gorman (04:55.844)
I think you have as well and the beauty with your framework is you can lump it into a generative AI and ask it to use it as its basis for logic and it does a level of critical thinking for you which I think is quite cool. I'll get the link off you and I'll stick it into the description of the episode so people can look up the framework and play around with themselves. I'm sure it'll only be a week or two before new breakthrough comes that you have to put a critical lens on so super useful for that.

Speaking of a critical lens, Etan, think one thing that everyone is worried about, and it's not will cryptography be broken, it's will Bitcoin be broken. What's your view on how susceptible Bitcoin is to a quantum-based attack if we ever get to that stage?

Itan Barmes (05:43.5)
Yeah, that's a really interesting question. And actually, one of the first things that I've done when I started my career as a consultant on this topic of quantum risk, back then I worked at Deloitte, which is a very large firm. And I actually went to the blockchain team and asked them, what do you think about this? And they didn't really have an answer.

So it was actually joint work that we've done together. And you know, the headlines, Bitcoin is going to be obliterated by quantum computers, which stays kind of on the surface. And we want to dive deeper. And we did an actual technical analysis on both first on Bitcoin and then later on Ethereum to really understand the risk, the low level risk.

and again, it's a, it's a rabbit hole. I, we published another two articles about this. They were very surprising and I've that that's why I really, what I really love about my job. I get to ask these kinds of questions and then find people who can help me actually answer them. So very, very simply, there are different kinds of attacks. If you just look at the, at the Bitcoin blockchain, and it's been a while. So back then when we.

did the analysis, 25 % of all bitcoins were vulnerable to a quantum attack. So not all of them. And maybe that's something that is interesting to just to mention here. What do you actually need in order to break cryptography with with Shor's algorithm? And I hope I'm not making a mistake here, but I will assume that your audience knows a little bit about this. I hope that I'm that I'm right.

We're talking about asymmetric cryptography. You have the private and the public key. Private key, you should keep to yourself, not share with anyone. And the public key, you should give everyone because that's the way they can either decrypt the messages that you sent to them or verify the signature that you generate. And in Bitcoin or any cryptocurrencies, it's about signatures. So you create a transaction, you sign it.

Itan Barmes (08:02.614)
with your private key and anyone who has your public key can verify it. And the public key is embedded in the blockchain. But it's not always embedded. When you do a transaction for the first time with your own wallet, you actually publish your public key. And that's where the magic happens. Because before you created the first signature,

the Bitcoin blockchain doesn't know your public key. So no one can take this public key and with short-circuit algorithm, that's what you do. You take the public key and you derive the private key from it. So if you don't have the public key, you cannot do that and you cannot steal Bitcoins. So there were 25 % of all Bitcoins where the public keys were exposed and exposed, I mean...

They should be exposed. It's just that Shor's algorithm uses that to break cryptography. But they were published on the blockchain. And all the others weren't. So you could say that 75 % of Bitcoins are not vulnerable to a quantum attack. That's one side of the story. The second one is that when you sign a transaction,

before it's actually mined and kind of embedded in the blockchain, people can intercept it quickly. Because when you publish it, when you send the transaction, you also publish the public key. And then someone can capture it quickly with a quantum computer. And quickly, that's another question, but can try to quickly.

created a competing transaction and kind of still impersonate you and steal your Bitcoins. This is a more dynamic attack and there is no solution for it with current cryptography. So 100 % of all transactions are vulnerable. So this balance or the difference between static attacks and dynamic attacks,

Itan Barmes (10:13.192)
is very interesting. It was very surprising to us when we found it. We thought we would just find that everything is broken and you need to migrate. But all these details, there was also a difference between Bitcoin and Ethereum that was very interesting. Because of the structure of how Ethereum works, it's much more vulnerable to quantum attacks than Bitcoin. And I guess the lesson from all this is the devil is in the details.

things are usually different, to what they seem. And it's very interesting to dive deeper and you get a lot of insights from it. So, again, I was very fortunate to, you know, to, ask these questions and, and find people and going into the details. That's where the, that's where it gets really, really interesting. So I explained it now in a, you know, just a couple of minutes. we actually wrote two very detailed articles about this and, and talking about all the different,

all the differences between Bitcoin and Ethereum and the different types of attacks. One thing that we didn't do is write about solutions, which is another really interesting topic. But I have to say that I haven't analyzed that very deeply so far.

Francis Gorman (11:32.673)
absolutely fascinating and I think you know that's a topic that some listeners of yours might perk up a little bit on you know I'll be watching Satoshi's wall at seeing you know will he ever make a transaction if he comes and maybe get ahead of the head of the blockchain on it it's an one thing that always amuses me is we talk about quantum computing and we talk about the threats of quantum computing but it's very hard to get into the mindset of what attack is actually viable and you know where would you start if you were

put that hat on as a quantum capable adversary today, what would you go after first? I think Harvest now, the Crick later gets thrown around quite a bit, but I think some of our conversations in Bilbao, there were suggestions you might break my wife's shopping list and other things like that. And it's of no value for the amount of effort and costs you put in. So if you were a quantum capable and you were going to attack something, have you taught this true in terms of how you might go about it?

just to work out the theory in your mind around how you explain this going forward.

Itan Barmes (12:38.658)
Yeah, thinking of how an attack actually takes place with a quantum computer, you need to realize that what you break is very fundamental. And I would even argue that what is being broken is our trust of cryptography. So at one point when things, when we realized that quantum computers are getting close to actually doing damage,

then the trust in cryptography is going to be diminished. I hope that by then people are going to be advanced enough to actually do something about it. And the whole problem is going to be kind of solved because people will move away to other types of cryptography. That's kind of avoiding your question. I have to give an answer, I'm not a criminal and I'm not going to break into anything with a quantum computer.

I think there will be indications probably some bitcoins missing from certain places. People talk about nation states, which you said, harvest not the crypto later. I guess it depends on the adversary. If you just want to make money from it, then probably you need to be smart.

and use it to steal bitcoins, but in a way that people don't notice too quickly because then the price will go down. I think that's direction a lot of people are thinking about. Bitcoin is really cryptography heavy and potentially will be one of the signs that something is really happening.

Francis Gorman (14:23.716)
It's really an interesting field, you know, and I think trust is the piece that underpins it all. know, why do we have cryptography? Well, it's primarily for privacy and therefore trust that, you know, we can do things in a way that is protected and not disclosed to the outside world. So the deterioration of trust in and of itself, I think, will be a key factor if we ever get there. I want to talk a little bit about cryptographic inventory and what it means to you.

and how you came about starting to put together the idea that is the foundation of case security that is your startup at the moment. It's an area that I find really topical at the moment and there's many different lenses on it and you know as I look at the term C-bomb being thrown around by everyone in these discussions my personal opinion is a C-bomb is a useless piece of information unless you can contextualize it and do something with it and be able to make it actionable. know what good is a

20,000 page Excel spreadsheet with lots of lines of cryptography pointing to lots of systems if you don't know your architectural dependencies or you know where to start how do you how do you go about eating the elephant that is enterprise-grade cryptography at all of the different levels that asymmetric cryptography is involved I'd like to get inside your head a little bit on your time as a consultant and the problems you saw and what what

cryptographic inventory means to you and how you approach the problem.

Itan Barmes (15:55.394)
Yeah. Well, first of all, maybe you should come with me and do pitches to clients because what you just said is really spot on. At one point, so I've been doing this now for many years and I've helped a lot of organizations to take the first steps in mitigating this risk on all levels, you know, from building a strategy to doing cryptographic inventory to actual remediation.

And the concept is very simple. You cannot fix what you don't know. And that's why the inventory is a really important first step. And that's something that I've been preaching for years now. I see a very interesting shift at the moment from that there are two types of people thinking about this topic. If you just started.

and you hear that the statement you cannot fix what you don't know that you have then of course inventory just creating this this huge inventory of cryptography that is everywhere so you find it you find it everywhere and as you say you don't really know what to do with it and now there is also a kind of a new stream that that kind of says you know inventory that's that's all nice but first of all

I don't need to make an inventory to know that I'm not ready for quantum because everything is no one. Well, that's also changing, but the usage of PQC is very, limited. So first of all, in assessments to understand your posture to do an inventory, I can tell most people that we'll probably find that everything is vulnerable. So people are already thinking, okay, so

We can spend a lot of time creating an inventory and then what? We need to have more short term success also to show to leadership that we're getting somewhere, not just delivering a big inventory and then, okay, so what? And that's also where we focus at the moment. So of course we have all the capabilities like many others to collect information from different places and identify that there is an issue.

Itan Barmes (18:17.678)
in the migration to PQC, at least the data in motion, the first step is to upgrade to TLS 1.3. So you need to do that. So if you do a network scan and you find TLS 1.2, or even worse, TLS 1.0, then you know that you need to upgrade as a first step to TLS 1.3. But just identifying this doesn't give you enough information.

And that is the second stream that is already starting to think, what is the set of information that I need to collect more than just identifying the issue that will give me the information that I need in order to understand how to remediate? So in the case of TLS, there is a configuration file that says what kind of TLS versions are allowed. Finding this configuration file really depends on the context. If it's in...

just saying an engine Nick server or a firewall or a legacy system that you don't even have access to the code, that's very different. So then you start digging deeper. And that's why inventory is really, important, but it's not everything. And by the way, don't get me started on C-bombs because there is a whole discussion about what is the difference between a C-bomb and an inventory.

I even got very confused. A lot of people publish about this and I think there will be a lot of benefit if some people who really understand this really well create very clear definitions of what is a C-bomb and how it is different than an Invitree.

Francis Gorman (20:04.164)
have to tell me now what is a sea bomb in in Ethan's understanding of it

Itan Barmes (20:10.176)
Okay, so these ideas are being formed. So I'll tell you how I think about it now. I think that C-BOM is just a standard, a format. And I'll give you an example. Someone, I showed a demo of our product to someone and they said, you know what? You need a button, a C-BOM button, export to C-BOM. And I thought, well, it actually makes sense because people want a C-BOM.

And then I thought about it and I realized that exporting it in a C-BOM format would lose a lot of information. So you actually exporting it, what you get out of it is less than what you had within our solution. And the idea of exporting something to C-BOM, fine, if you need to communicate that to someone else, it's a language, it's a format that you can use.

But the question is, what do you want to do with the C-BOM? If you want a C-BOM for the sake of having an inventory, then in our platform, you have the inventory. You don't need to export it as a C-BOM. If you want to communicate that information, fine. Then it's a format that someone on the other side is going to understand. So I think that the difference is very subtle. It's just.

One of them, the inventory is something you want to have because you need to know everything that you have. And a C-BOM is just a format to get there. But as I said, we're still thinking about this and also trying to understand. People understand different things by the same terminology. That's why I'm saying I think that it would be good for everyone if we nail this terminology a little bit better than we have now.

Francis Gorman (22:01.006)
of think of it like furniture you know I want to set a furniture I don't just want a chair you know I want a table and I need to understand how the sets go together in order to figure out if my configuration is correct

Itan Barmes (22:12.662)
Right, it's the name, it's defining. A chair has four legs and... Yes.

Francis Gorman (22:19.65)
And all of that. And now we've deviated into furniture speak from cryptographic builds and materials. It's a first. So I think I think one thing that that almost amuses me in this space is we've got we've got different levels. We seem to have the financial organizations that are being quite proactive and then other organizations and sectors that are not really moving at all. In your view, you're you're you're obviously in the startup field. So you're you're talking to many different variants of

Itan Barmes (22:24.408)
Funky photography? that's a first.

Francis Gorman (22:49.624)
of client across multiple industries at the moment. Are you seeing levels of procrastination? Are you seeing levels of, I suppose, doubt in terms of if quantum is actually a thing that we should be worried about and spend the money on now? Or where do think executives and boards are at in this problem? Is AI dominating the board agenda still and quantum still isn't on the radar quite yet?

Itan Barmes (23:15.034)
We started the company at beginning of this year. So obviously, in my opinion, now is the right time to do this. It's on people's agenda all the way, know, boards and security professionals. I think that 2026 is going to be a defining year on this topic. Absolutely. About procrastination, of course, people procrastinate because, first of all, because they can.

And second of all, be very honest, CISOs have a very demanding job. You have so many things on your agenda and quantum risk, something that is perceived to be a futuristic risk. Quantum computers need to develop quite a lot before they can actually do some damage. That's a great excuse for people to kick the can down the road. And I would even say that it's...

kind of partly our fault because we've been all preaching about this for a long time. But what is the solution? If you don't provide solutions that are, I don't want to say easy, but know, manageable, just calling out that this is a problem and you have to do something about it, you need to be realistic. How much time and effort is this going to cost? And that's something that I know I'm not pitching my solution here.

Conceptually, these are things that I've been thinking about for quite some time. What is the solution for this? And just expecting, so Mike Osborne from IBM, there was an event and he was on stage and actually said, the whole story about inventories, if we have to create perfect inventories and migrate every single issue to PQC, there is not enough money in the world to do this.

And that's a really good point. So how do you prioritize? Do you have to do everything? In what phases? All these things that are, that's risk management in general. That has nothing to do with quantum. These are really important points. And when you talk to people and try to convince them to do something about this, then it needs to be a little bit more than a...

Itan Barmes (25:34.488)
Harvard's not the group later. Everything's going to break. have to, you know, forget about everything else and focus on this. It's just not going to work.

Francis Gorman (25:43.972)
I that's a really good point. I think the Harvest Now Decrypt later, you've got my wife's list as the one that still sits with me from conversations that we had over the last while.

Itan Barmes (25:53.464)
So by the way, however, start to decrypt later, think about it. What is the message that you're giving? You're basically saying you're too late. You're already too late. When people hear that, say, okay, I'm too late. So there's no point doing anything about this. It doesn't drive action. And of course it's very subtle. So it depends how you bring this message, but you know, being so, sometimes these messages are really extreme.

Francis Gorman (25:59.951)
saying.

Itan Barmes (26:21.846)
And I think we need to be a bit more pragmatic about this.

Francis Gorman (26:25.412)
I'm fully aligned there. think scare tactics create the opposite. They drive people away from the problem. The problem in and of itself, though, I think people find it really hard to qualify. So if I look at the advice that's coming out of Europe, high exposures are mediated by 2030 and all exposures are mediated by 2035. In your opinion, leaning back into the physics background and everything you've saw over the last number of years, if you were to look at those timelines and based on

the evolution of the technology and the breakthroughs that we're seeing over the last number of years. How comfortable are you that we're going to get there within that time frame?

Itan Barmes (27:05.784)
Wow, that's the one trillion trillion dollar question. When, when is this actually going to happen? So the article that we wrote that you talked about at the beginning, the different levels. And so the title is why, why haven't quantum computers already broken cryptography? And in other words, what still needs to happen before we get, before we get to, know, what people call Q day.

And breaking RSA 2048, that's what people call, this is the point we need to get to, that's Q day. The levels that we identified and the technological advances that we predict that need to happen before this all becomes a real issue, they will be demonstrated on breaking very small keys.

So again, RSA is factoring large numbers. The smallest number that you can factor, well, the smallest is 15, but there are reasons that 15 is not that interesting, nevermind what they are, 21. There is an article, a very detailed article about what quantum computers need to do to factor the number 21 in details.

I spoke to people who are very deep into this, you know, into this content. And they say that that is most likely going to happen within the next two years. Now, when that happens, then you fact that the number 21, there is a big, big gap between 21 and two to the power 2048. But it's a...

It's more of a scaling problem than, it's more engineering than physics. So my personal opinion is when let's say within a year or two, when quantum computers actually start factoring numbers in a scalable way, there are demonstrations that are very, very specific and not scalable. Interesting, but not that relevant. When this starts happening in a scalable way,

Itan Barmes (29:31.266)
then I would start being worried. Now, if this is true and it's gonna happen within the next two years, let's say in 2027, how it evolves from breaking, factoring the number 21 to a 24, 48-bit RSA key, I don't know. No one knows exactly how quickly that's going to happen. But the ability to do that in someone's basement, and by someone I mean, know, nation-state,

That's a different story than where we are now. Demonstrating the building blocks of implementing Shor's algorithm now, I think it's going to be very difficult for anyone to do it in isolation. But scaling up this technology after showing these building blocks, that's a different story. So if you believe that, then 2027 is going to be a really important year.

And things will probably start scaling potentially faster than we can anticipate. So if you follow that logic and you agree with it, and you take into consideration that migration will take much longer than that, then for me personally, that's a compelling argument to really start moving.

Because if you just look at the number of qubits and where we are now and where we need to be, it's very unclear how things are going to evolve. And it's about the future. I think that this event in potentially 2027 of starting to break fact and numbers in a scale scalable way, I think that's going to be a turning point.

Francis Gorman (31:20.42)
I that feeds very nicely into the advice Dr. Mikhail Moskalovsky me with when he said, it's okay to be a day early, but we can't afford to be a day late. And I think that resonated quite well. it feeds into that. We do know when we break the mathematical and the physics boundary and it becomes a scaling issue, things can accelerate. We've seen that with AI over the last number of years. Things just accelerate beyond anyone's expectations. we expect AI will probably play a role in that acceleration.

if you can now, you know, if you have all of the building blocks that you need and it's purely hardware, you know, simulating different types of ways that this can fit together to scale and, you know, get it to run at different temperatures and, you know, make it make it more commercially viable. So it's a fascinating, fascinating area for me personally to look at and to kind of observe how that gets demonstrated over the next number of years. Before we finish up, if there's a CISO or CTO or

a CEO sitting out there right now and they've heard this and they're God I need to do something between now and 2030 I need I need to act from a pragmatic standpoint is there any advice you could leave the listeners with in terms of getting started now for somebody who was just on the cold face doesn't really know where to where to mobilize

Itan Barmes (32:42.616)
I would like to start with something that you shouldn't do. You should not, or you can do whatever you want, obviously, but what is not necessarily going to help you is understanding quantum, quantum physics, understanding what qubits are about. And I'm saying that because I've been asked way too many times to come and talk to executives about, this topic. And then one time it was someone who studied physics 20 years ago and he said,

You know, I haven't touched physics since then. It's really interesting. Can you explain to me how a quantum computer works? And that was a really interesting conversation, but I knew nothing will come out of it because you really get distracted by the beautiful physics behind it. And I'm a physicist. It's beautiful. It's intriguing. But if you realize that you need to do something about this, then you need to take a pragmatic approach.

inventory is trying to get a grip of what this means. So conduct a risk assessment, but not a superficial risk assessment. Go a bit deeper. You don't have to figure everything out, but I think it's like an onion, you know, the onion methods start peeling the layers one by one. So we've built, when I was at Deloitte, we built a whole methodology around that. And that is

how you set up a program like this. One of the big issues on this topic is it's not even a technical problem. It's a governance problem. How do you deal with something like this? Who in the organization is responsible for it? Because I've seen a lot of initiatives that start and very often it's someone who is very passionate about this, but it's a single person. So it really leans on them personally. And then they leave for whatever reason and then you start all over again.

So very pragmatically, how do you, without depleting too many resources from other things, how do you frame the problem? How do you get buying from management? And then the best thing you can do is start. Don't wait too long to know exactly what you need to do, but start taking action. And I've seen a lot of successes there that you learn from it. We all learn from it because no one has done this before.

Itan Barmes (35:09.804)
This is a fairly new problem. And we basically all need to do this together. So getting this kind of experience, learning from it, and teaching others, I think that's what we all need to do.

Francis Gorman (35:25.62)
that teaching others for me is one of the key activities that need to come out of the efforts. It's a community effort, it's solving a problem, there's no commercial advantage to maintain and trust for the world that we live in today.

Itan Barmes (35:40.886)
And by the way, it's a community full of people who really want to do the right thing. So it's actually in that sense going really well. We just need to provide these people with resources, time and money to actually do it.

Francis Gorman (35:58.341)
It's been absolutely wonderful having you on. Thanks again for that really intriguing insight into a different side of quantum from the physics background to the pragmatic advice that you've left us on. And I really do appreciate you taking the time out to speak to me today. My pleasure, as always. Thank you.

Itan Barmes (36:14.764)
My pleasure as always.