The Circumpolar
Explaining Arctic geopolitics, governance and security.
Supported by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and the Arctic Institute
The Circumpolar
Why China plays by the rules in the Arctic
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China has no Arctic territory, calls itself a near-Arctic state, and has worked its way into almost every legal regime in the region. Dr Iselin Stensdal talks about international law as China's way in. The conversation covers the Law of the Sea and the Northern Sea Route, the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, the Svalbard Treaty, research rights at Ny-Ålesund, and why China keeps playing by the rules. The closing argument: the Arctic may matter far less to Beijing than the headlines suggest.
What does international law actually do for China in the Arctic? China has no territory there, despite calling itself a near Arctic state, and it has worked its way into nearly every legal regime that we can find in the region. Welcome to the Circumpolar. My name is Serafima Andreva. I'm your host, and today with me we have China expert, an Arctic expert also, Dr. Islaming Stan. So what role does international law play for China in the Arctic?
SPEAKER_00Well, it is a legitimizer with the international liberal order. This is, you know, how we organize the world and how states should and should not interact with the international law. So, you know, it and this does not, you know, strictly apply to China, it applies to any country. International law would provide, you know, rights and responsibilities. But I think it's also important to just remind ourselves what governs the Arctic. And of course it's the Arctic states. A lot of the Arctic is governed by the national and the sovereignty of the states. And then we have more regional mechanisms like the Arctic Council, which you know a lot about Cesarofima. And then there's the international global agreement that uh also includes the Arctic in the polar areas, but is not, you know, limited to these areas.
SPEAKER_01So when China ratified the Law of the Sea Convention in the 1990s, the Arctic was nowhere in the thinking. How did this Law of the Sea Convention signed with no Arctic intent suddenly become this Arctic pillar?
SPEAKER_00Well, it uh really supports the interests of China. And so now we have it very clearly what China's interests in the Arctic are. So in 2018, China published a white paper with its Arctic policy, and there's four stated goals to understand the Arctic, to protect the Arctic, to develop the Arctic, or like utilize the resources and shipping lanes, and fourth to participate in Arctic governance. But I think with the Law of the Sea, it pertains particularly, you know, to the to the free navigation. So so shipping. And this is about the Northern Sea Root then? Or yeah, but but also the China's very interested and promotes a rule-based world order. So it's absolutely in China's interest to have uh yeah, predictability and and the and the same rules that will apply for everybody.
SPEAKER_01This would be in contrast, for example, to the United States. Well, when we'll look at the when we look at at least uh law of the sea and then the use of that. Yeah. Is that also a signal coming from China then in the Arctic, or is it not really aimed at them?
SPEAKER_00No, of course, for for China, the the special area and sort of the area of um contention would be the South China Sea, where China has disputes with the with other countries. And so when China first took up its interest for the Arctic, this was you know a parallel that was often drawn. See what China's doing in the South China Sea. This is what will happen in the Arctic, but so far not, and probably it will never happen because China doesn't really have a, you know, these kind of claims in the Arctic as it has in the South China Sea.
SPEAKER_01And speaking of activities that China has uh in the South China Sea, I mean China is known for its fishing and very or to some degree even overfishing, you could say. But uh in the Arctic we could see a different types of type of behavior. In 2018, there was this uh Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, and this is kind of can we count this maybe as an odd success story with Chinese reputation for this large fishing fleet, overfishing, and still it signed this binding deal not to fish in in the area, and no one is fishing there yet, so maybe that's part of it. But uh, but what is the Chinese approach here?
SPEAKER_00Well, there's two things. So the Centric Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, uh, it put down a 16-year moratorium of uh unregulated commercial fishing from 2021. But it's it's very easy to promise you will not do something if if you wouldn't be able to do it anyways, right? That there's no like commercial fishing possibilities at the moment. So that's quite easy to say, okay, so we will wait. But for China, I think it was quite important to be to be uh included. Yeah. So this is uh it's a is a new agreement that only conserves Arctic governance. So it sort of pertains to the fourth, fourth goal of China. So I would say it's m probably the best example where China has been part of uh forming new Arctic regulations.
SPEAKER_01You mentioned to the fourth goal, yes. What are the goals?
SPEAKER_00Oh, I meant I uh so it's uh to understand the Arctic, protect the Arctic, develop or utilize the Arctic, and then the fourth is the fourth is participation in Arctic governance. Yes. Interesting.
SPEAKER_01So and when we look at other types of agreements, because there are a lot of them, one that has been, I think, maybe more relevant now uh recently is the BB and J agreement. And and those negotiations on the high seas, I mean, they are changing kind of how China sees themselves, aren't they? How can we can this be conceptualized into the well I guess that's more of a you know chicken or the egg discussion?
SPEAKER_00But uh definitely if we compare with with the Law of the Sea negotiations with you know started in the 70s and 80s. So so China's a wildly different country now in the 2020s than it was back then. So I think it's it's in a way it's quite uh it's a quite natural development of China's position. And of course, the BB and J it concerns marine genetic resources and potential benefit sharing and other some environmental aspects, but also uh capacity building and technology transfer. And now China has technology and it sort of has that capacity and capability of extracting genetic resources. So in the negotiations it was much more aligned with even the US and and and what we traditionally call developed countries. Yeah.
SPEAKER_01But how how could we see this in practice? Like what was the what was the Chinese approach? What what was it that happened that was in fact different?
SPEAKER_00Well, so it it aligned more with the with the industrialized or or developed countries. Whereas in the 70s and and 80s it was, you know, staunchly launched uh and also very sort of stood with the G77, the developed countries and least developed countries.
SPEAKER_01But now its interests have changed. What interest does China have then in in this BBJ?
SPEAKER_00Well, as I said, it's it's I think of course um so the second goal is to protect the Arctic. So that would be environmental impact assessment and uh also the like marine protected areas. And and I think, of course, China's fishing fleet in total, there's been overfishing and there's been some bad practices. But the Chinese government is actually quite concerned with environment. Yeah.
SPEAKER_01So I so I think that's uh is this symbolic policy or is this uh or is this a status-seeking thing, or is this actually an environmental regulations thing to say?
SPEAKER_00So my impression is that it's actually uh that is a sincere wish to contribute. We can see it in climate change as well. And also okay, so we're in 26 now, so about 10, 13, 14 years ago, there was terrible air pollution in China, and they really, you know, quickly changed it. Uh so but of course, there's the one thing is you know the ideal and what you would want to achieve, and and then there's the uh what actually happens. So there's a discrepancy there. But uh yeah.
SPEAKER_01The reason I'm asking is because so frequently we see that different states have uh when they approach climate or especially the climate negotiations or environmental negotiations, it's often used as a brand of foreign policy interests, right? Uh as a status-seeking thing. But uh, we're looking at, I mean, China's many other places um as well. I mean, we can see that them they are in the global uh at the treaty level, as we have covered already. But there are also some bilateral relations happening, there are some organizational corporation types of uh activities happening, right? There are many different ways to roam or to the Arctic, as we could say. So when we look at bilateral global treaties and the only forum remaining which still has all states uh in it is of course the Arctic Council. So if you look at these three levels, is what which on one of those is uh most important? Or or what is the what is more important for China maybe?
SPEAKER_00Well, I think the the the different levels and the different agreements and mechanisms and I guess bilateral relations, they uh they work differently and they cover different aspects or areas, right? But with the geopolitical situation now, I would definitely say that bilaterally Russia is the the Arctic country that is open for business for China, definitely. Uh but uh and things have changed. I don't know if many people know this, but as recent as 2017, there was a huge gas deal between the US and China. So the Alaska I don't remember the name, but uh an Alaskan company and Synopec. And it was 43 billion US dollars. And I think most of the financing came from from Bank of China and also the China Investment Corporation. Uh and there's some funny pictures with like she and Trump actually smiling and shaking hands. Uh but by 2019 that deal was effectively dead. Since 2019, the other Canada and the Nordic Arctic countries have also, you know, well, of course, there's been the full-scale version of Ukraine and things have just deteriorated. So I would say as for the sort of Arctic corporation, I think Russia is the most important bilateral relations today.
SPEAKER_01But have the bilateral, because we've seen this with Russia has had much less to do with the olestern Arctic states. Has the same thing happened for China everywhere, or has it not happened as much? Because yes, you say Russia is is the most important partner, which which makes sense, but does it still have, you could say, some something that clings to or?
SPEAKER_00Well, I mean it it's still an observatory of the Arctic Council, right? And and science is by nature international. And um I think of the Nordic countries, probably Norway is the most sort of positive towards exchange with China. Yeah, the of Iceland's a very interesting case there because I think 2006 the US Army withdrew from Iceland. And two years later we had the financial crisis, you know, and and Iceland was really in need of a friend or at least some some money, so it turned more more towards China. And around 2012, yeah, the scientific cruise of uh Shuelong, the Snow Dragon, was sort of invited by the then president, and he said, Okay, so we'll need the Arctic is uh like a pillar in our bilateral relations. This is Grimston. Yes, of course. And yeah, and the Chinese built this relatively large uh embassy on Iceland, but now things seem to also to have soured between Iceland and uh and and China.
SPEAKER_01But is this due to the war in Ukraine, or is this due to other things?
SPEAKER_00Of course, you Ukraine is uh it's a it's a big issue, but there's also all the Nordic countries are more suspicious towards China or have found evidence, or at least if not evidence, then possibilities of of Chinese sort of intelligence uh operations and I think it's more for security reasons. Yeah.
SPEAKER_01It makes a lot of sense. I mean, in Norway here we had uh some Chinese intelligence operations of somebody living in a bunker close to an airport. Yeah. So that's and then something else I I don't remember, but it was also something recent. So it this is actively something people talk about, obviously. But if we go back to Russia, so Russia and China, I mean, uh you've written a book or you've been I edited it. You've edited the book. China and Friends in the Cold. Uh China and Russia in the Arctic. So it's you've been kind of looking at this, or at least also editing. In addition to in addition to researching it. But if we look at this, I mean China and Russia, they have grown grown closer in the Arctic, especially after 2022. But how real is this partnership? Are there uh benefits? Are there certain restrictions? What is happening?
SPEAKER_00Yeah, that's the I don't know, billion-dollar question? Million dollar question. Well, you know, when I don't I know Stoltenberg, when he was the NATO secretary, he said it, and someone else said it, I guess China invests billions of dollars in the Arctic. And that is technically true, but it's all located, or not all, but most of it, like the what makes it billions of dollars is located around the Yamal LNG and the the second Arctic LNG 2 projects. So so there's definitely, you know, this is sort of the economic center of Chinese investments in the Arctic. Uh and of course I think she and Putin they they like each other. Just seems like they have a rapport. But there's also, and I mean Arctic is mentioned in sort of the the long list of of joint joint uh when they have joint statements of like the cooperation areas. But yeah, how how deep, how deep is the friendship? That's uh who knows. Yeah, I think also like the Power Siberia 2 pipeline, which the Russians are quite seem to be quite uh eager to get going. The Chinese are, you know, stalling a little bit. So I think for for the Chinese, of course they have com commonalities with Russia, but it's also harder to if they become too close with Russia, they risk alienating uh Western countries.
SPEAKER_01And that is why they are stalling.
SPEAKER_00Could be. Yeah. I think that's probably part of the part of the reason. Yeah. We saw that with with uh with shipping after uh after Russia's invasion in 2022. Up until then, the state-owned company Costco had been had like these trial sailings since I think 2013. Not many, and of course, Tonnage could not match what's going through CUS or anything, but you know, still there was a couple of sailings and then they just shut it down in 2022 and have not resumed. Uh and also they don't seem too interested to resume uh Costco.
SPEAKER_01But of course then we've had more private companies uh doing the the shipping why uh why uh yeah I've heard that the smaller, more risk-willing companies are more eager and Costco is less eager. But when it comes to just following a little bit on China and Russia, you mentioned China is is somewhat careful uh because they want to be not only Russia's friend, but everybody's uh in relationship with uh everyone in the Arctic, you say. And for Russia, I mean this is also kind of a trade-off, right? To keep them close, but not too close, because the Arctic, I mean, we know having the one thing is the strategic importance of cola, peninsula, etc. But also in general, having the Chinese uh too close to home when the economy is going bad and they're dependent. But just having one question about that is who is the most restrictive with this relationship? Is China or Russia more restrictive?
SPEAKER_00So I think I would say China, the top of my head, but I guess it also sort of depends on in which areas you you think of, right? Because also in 2024, I guess, two years ago, yeah. So they they they have this bilateral uh dialogue and then they uh established a subcommittee on on shipping, so so it's kind of back on the table. Yeah.
SPEAKER_01Let's go a little bit away from Russia, but not too far to Swalbard. I mean, China has a lot of interests uh in in Svalbard, as many other Northern Arctic states do. I mean, one thing is uh the Svalbard Treaty, the other thing is the research station at Nyolsen. So when it comes to that interest in Svalbard, where does China, how does China read the Svalbard Treaty? Because you know, Russia, for example, reads the Svalbard Treaty differently. Yeah. Than Norway does. So how does China read the treaty? How does China read their own role in the research and governance regime at Swalbard? What is the positioning there?
SPEAKER_00So, first of all, the Svalbard Treaty is very important for China. And as I you like going back to the first question, like what is international the role of international law as a legitimizer? So I think China signed it in 1925. Yeah, so it's it's quite, you know, some time, some time ago. Uh and it's mentioned that it's a signatory, I think it's mentioned five times in this white paper on its Arctic policy. And China has been very vocal that it supports all Arctic state sovereignty, does not challenge that. But of course, there's, you know, the Swaba Treaty is a special, uh special thing, is uh and I think from a Chinese side it's seen as and it also does grant the the citizens of the signature country special rights. And I the biggest sort of discrepancy, and this is not only China though, this is other countries as well, is the reading of research uh according to Norwegian government. And if you read the treaty, it doesn't really say that citizens are granted the right to research. Maybe that was not, you know, on the not not something they thought of in 1920 when it was drawn up. But it has been a custom by Norwegian governments to not only allow but sort of encourage science and scientific activities on Svalbar. So a few years back when yes, and so New Olason is kind of the designated research town. And and when they when they wanted to, I guess, streamline and sort of change a little bit how how this New Olason was was run, then uh some research representatives, including the the Chinese side, criticized this as sort of being an infringement of their their their rights and and uh yeah, as sort of I don't think they've said the breach of the of the treaty, but at least they were quite negative. And but China was not the only one. I think France also kind of had the same concerns. Uh but at the end of the day, it's not, I mean, uh except for a few, I guess one letter with sort of where concerns were stated. It hasn't it hasn't sort of blown uh up to more proportions. It hasn't been sort of on the governmental level that that this has been discussed.
SPEAKER_01This is very interesting because I mean, looking at the recent uh Svalbard paper coming from the Norwegian government and also all of the claims coming from the Norwegian government surrounding Svalbard, it's been heavily more talking about sovereignty, right? You mentioned that there hasn't been that much talk taking it up to the government level. But are things boiling more now?
SPEAKER_00I think you should ask someone else that question. Yeah, I don't well, you know, we see this uh the US has its own story and and Canada, who knows? But but at least in the Nordic Arctic countries, it's just much more restrictive attitude and also practice towards Chinese nationals, not just the sort of Chinese government.
SPEAKER_01For China they have they reacted differently to this now recently than they have before? Or is it still the same thing?
SPEAKER_00No, the embassies usually you know issue a statement, and probably that we would guess, you know, that there are contacts between the the embassy and then the government, but it's it's not like the Nobel Peace Prize. How harsh are the statements? Oh I I don't know. I I wouldn't say they're very harsh. They state that like this is wrong, or like we strongly believe in uh following international law. It's uh to my reading, and I I'm not a sort of a diplomatic scholar, uh they seem like pretty standard phrases for for objecting. Yeah.
SPEAKER_01So very so still playing by the rules, still keeping calm, you could say, from the Chinese side. Yeah. Fascinating. So if you would then But actually before I ask you about the policy recommendation, I would uh I want to ask you a question and how much of a threat is China in the Arctic? I mean, if we look at the legal perspectives, not that uh because we haven't really covered the military and security aspects of it. Is China even a threat to international governance or law in the Arctic? Or is it not?
SPEAKER_00Well, that depends on who you ask. But from my observation, China's pretty much playing by the rules. I'm sure there are, you know, intelligence operations and undercover things that we as regular citizens and even as researchers we don't we don't know about until we read about it in the paper or newspaper. So uh but there's uh there's at least much more attention to the potential of of Chinese sort of uh intelligence operations. But I mean compared to Russia, there seems to be much more sort of hybrid operations from Russia with like most likely like the cables and s oh yeah, that's true. Uh so the uh one of them one of the ships pulled a cable in Baltic Sea. Yes, that's true.
SPEAKER_01It traveled up to towards Norway.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, yeah. And they were apprehended uh between sort of Sweden and Denmark. Yeah.
SPEAKER_01That happens. That happened. But when if you want to look at let's say you have let let's make you a almighty powerful advisor, you what you advise, it's practically the law. So speaking of international law, so it's this is a very clear advice, and you have all the needs and means that are you could ever wish for for only this recommendation. Okay. I've got so many good ideas. Three-day work week. So for only this recommendation. So what would you say is a what would you recommend as a policy on how to approach China in the Arctic for us in the West?
SPEAKER_00Well, I think in a way, same behaviors you should have with any country. Of course, China is special because it's uh the only country that can sort of challenge the US. But I think we should engage China in sort of engage it in the Arctic Council. That was one of the reasons, at least from the Norwegian side, why why China was even sort of accepted into the Arctic Council. The thinking was that if we exclude uh important big actors, they might start their own clubs. So it's better to engage them. But of course, we should not be naive, either to China or to to any country. And sort of the the purpose of a of a government is to you know protect its own state's interests. Yeah. So maybe not this fancy or exciting recommendation.
SPEAKER_01So not too much of a new allocation of uh of funds and uh and everything. Keep keep calling and carry on.
SPEAKER_00But here's the thing too, right? Of course it's very important for a small country like Norway if a big country like China is interested in the Arctic, since Arctic's a big part of Norway. But if you you know turn the table around, the Arctic is, you know, it's a small part of the globe for for China. I think we at least news news articles and tend to somehow and sometimes sort of blow it a bit out of proportions, the interest from China for the Arctic. Yes, it's an interest, but it's I mean, like the BBNJ, it doesn't really pertain only to the polar areas, you know, it's a global agreement. So so it's it's sort of Arctic by the chance of of location, not the Arctic, because it's the Arctic always. Yeah.
SPEAKER_01Keep in mind that we should have a broad perspective on the world.
SPEAKER_00That we're not mm-you know, we're not foreign policy priority number one or two or three.
SPEAKER_01I think this is a great uh this is a great uh advice not only to to us in the in the European Arctic, but also to the United States if you look through their Arctic strategy and you do a word search for China in contrary to other countries. There China is mentioned a lot more times. So hopefully somebody who is writing these strategies is uh listening to your words and saying, okay, maybe maybe I'll delete one or two to China of these two Chinas of the 45 Romanian.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, well, I mean so So the the Arctic is important for China in in probably several respects, but like if you look at the policies beside the Arctic policy, so China has the aim or goal to become a that's hard to translate, but I guess we could translate into a like a great maritime power, and of course, and the polar waters are part of the the global waters, so so so it's important in that respect. And and secondly, it's China's defined uh four strategic new frontiers. So it's it's space and it's cyberspace, and then it's the deep seas, and it's the polar areas. So so this is also uh I guess where you can sort of see how how how the uh interest for for the Arctic uh fits in in the in a larger uh larger picture from China.
SPEAKER_01Futuristic. Yeah. But that's nothing new coming from China. Thank you so much. Thank you for uh being here and thank you for listening.
