For decades, during the Cold War, we in the West were obsessed about one primary threat: the USSR, its allies and the fear of MAD - mutually assured destruction (i.e. nuclear war). Then, miraculously, it all went away when the Berlin Wall fell (1989) and later the Soviet Union dissolved (1991). We declared victory ("thousand points of light" in the words of President Bush) and decided that threat had disappeared. Furthermore we actually engaged the Russia successor as an ally of sorts (especially in counter terrorism) and saw them as part of the solution as opposed to THE problem. In the last few decades, however, Russia has risen again to pose a threat, at least to its immediate neighbours (Ukraine, Chechnya, Georgia, perhaps the Baltic States), and by extension to the West/world. Why did we draw this conclusion that matters had changed to this extent? Borealis is joined by former RCMP strategic analyst Angus Smith to look at what we can learn about threat assessment over time.
For decades, during the Cold War, we in the West were obsessed about one primary threat: the USSR, its allies and the fear of MAD - mutually assured destruction (i.e. nuclear war). Then, miraculously, it all went away when the Berlin Wall fell (1989) and later the Soviet Union dissolved (1991). We declared victory ("thousand points of light" in the words of President Bush) and decided that threat had disappeared. Furthermore we actually engaged the Russia successor as an ally of sorts (especially in counter terrorism) and saw them as part of the solution as opposed to THE problem. In the last few decades, however, Russia has risen again to pose a threat, at least to its immediate neighbours (Ukraine, Chechnya, Georgia, perhaps the Baltic States), and by extension to the West/world. Why did we draw this conclusion that matters had changed to this extent? Borealis is joined by former RCMP strategic analyst Angus Smith to look at what we can learn about threat assessment over time.